Summary
In Heisler, the only party defendant was the State, and to the extent that Heisler might be read to mean that the State has the sole responsibility to persons who might be injured in the course of participating in an election, we disavow such an interpretation.
Summary of this case from Pujolas v. Town of TonawandaOpinion
October 30, 1980
Appeal from the Court of Claims.
Present — Cardamone, J.P., Schnepp, Callahan, Witmer and Moule, JJ.
Order unanimously affirmed, with costs. Memorandum: Claimant, Ann Heisler, fell after she left a polling place located in an elementary school in West Seneca, New York, on election day November 4, 1975. She later served a notice of intent to file a claim and subsequently moved that the notice be treated as the claim itself. From an order granting the motion, the State appeals. It urges that the Court of Claims improperly construed the notice of claim and also asserts, for the first time, that the State has not waived its sovereign immunity for this kind of act. The first question is with what specificity must a claim be stated under section 11 CTC of the Court of Claims Act. That section provides in pertinent part, "The claim shall state the time when and place where such claim arose, the nature of same, and the items of damage or injuries claimed to have been sustained and the total sum claimed." What is required is not absolute exactness, but simply a statement made with sufficient definiteness to enable the State to be able to investigate the claim promptly and to ascertain its liability under the circumstances. The statement must be specific enough so as not to mislead, deceive or prejudice the rights of the State. In short, substantial compliance with section 11 is what is required (Chalmers Son v. State of New York, 271 App. Div. 699, 701, affd 297 N.Y. 690; Barski v. State of New York, 43 A.D.2d 767; Otis Elevator Co. v. State of New York, 52 A.D.2d 380, 384). Conclusory or general allegations of negligence that fail to adduce the manner in which the claimant was injured and how the State was negligent do not meet its requirements (Patterson v. State of New York, 54 A.D.2d 147, 150). A notice of intention to file a claim may be treated as a claim when it alleges the necessary elements of a cause of action in negligence. Examining the notice in this case reveals that it states the date, time and place of the mishap and that the polling place "is under the supervision of the Erie County Board of Elections * * * the Town of West Seneca * * * and the West Seneca Central School District * * * all acting pursuant to obligations imposed by the State of New York." It further alleges that Mrs. Heisler fell and fractured her right leg "at approximately 8:45 P.M. and as a result of proof and inadequate lighting and improper maintenance of the exterior premises". This notice of intention substantially complied with the statute because it states the time, place, nature of the claim, injuries and total sum claimed. The State was thus adequately notified so that it could take such immediate investigative action as it deemed necessary. The manner in which claimant was injured and how the defendant was negligent were stated or can be reasonably inferred (see Schweitzer v Mindlin, 248 N.Y. 560, 561). The State also argues that claimants failed to allege that the State of New York owned, leased or otherwise controlled the premises. The notice of intent, however, sufficiently alleged control when it stated that the school district, town and board of elections were all acting pursuant to obligations imposed by the State of New York (O'Brien v. City of Saratoga Springs, 224 App. Div. 124, 126; see Election Law, §§ 5-210, 5-204, subd 9; §§ 4-100, 4-102, 4-104, 3-400, 3-404; Schauf v. City of New York, 23 Misc.2d 585; 46 N.Y. Jur, Premises Liability, § 238; Page, Law of Premises Liability, § 10.20, p 260). We turn to the second issue raised for the first time on this appeal. Since sovereign immunity brings into question jurisdiction of the subject under the Court of Claims Act, it may be raised at any time (O'Neil v. State of New York, 223 N.Y. 40; Buckles v. State of New York, 221 N.Y. 418, 424). The issue is whether the State of New York by enactment of section 8 CTC of the Court of Claims Act waived its immunity for this tort arising out of the conduct of elections. Historically, the State was immune when the tort was incidental to a governmental function (Siegel, New York Practice, § 68; 55 N.Y. Jur, State of New York, § 190). Today absolute immunity from suits arising from torts incidental to governmental functions no longer exists. The State may be cast in liability on precisely the same basis as any individual who is obligated to discharge the governmental function and who fails in that duty, provided that the duty has been imposed for the benefit of the person injured by such failure. The test is whether an individual or private corporation assuming that he or it were obligated to discharge the governmental duty involved, would be liable to the injured person for breach of that duty (Runkel v. City of New York, 282 App. Div. 173; see, also, Jones v. State of New York, 33 N.Y.2d 275, 280; Incorporated Vil. of Flower Hill v. State of New York, 7 A.D.2d 940; McCarthy v. City of Saratoga Springs, 269 App. Div. 469). Since the State had a duty to maintain the premises to prevent injury to voters (46 N.Y. Jur, Premises Liability, § 238), and because such duty is recognized by the law of torts, liability may be imposed by the application of general tort principles and the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not serve as a bar to this action (see Jones v. State of New York, supra, at p 280).