OPINION BY McLAUGHLIN, J.

Howard Jonathan Bashman, Willow Grove, for appellant.

Frederick William Bode III, Pittsburgh, for appellee.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

OPINION BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:

Ronald Scott Hangey and Rosemary Hangey, husband and wife, appeal from the order sustaining preliminary objections to venue in Philadelphia County and transferring the case to Bucks County. We conclude the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the contacts of Husqvarna Professional Products, Inc. ("HPP") with Philadelphia did not satisfy the quantity prong of the venue analysis. We therefore reverse.

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of the case:

[The Hangeys] commenced this action on March 13, 2017 by filing a Complaint. The Amended Complaint, filed April 10, 2017, alleges that in May 2013, Plaintiff

Ronald Hangey purchased a Husqvarna riding lawnmower from Defendant Trumbauer's Lawn and Recreation, Inc. in Quakertown, Bucks County. On August 5, 2016, Ronald Hangey was maimed when he fell off his lawnmower and the lawnmower ran over his legs while the blades were still engaged; the accident occurred at [the Hangeys'] property in Wayne County. The Amended Complaint named five defendants—Husqvarna Professional Products, Inc. ["HPP"], Husqvarna Group, Husqvarna U.S. Holding, Inc., Husqvarna AB, and Trumbauer's Lawn and Recreation, Inc.—and sounds in negligence, strict liability, and loss of consortium.

All Defendants filed Preliminary Objections. Defendants Husqvarna U.S. Holdings, Inc. and Husqvarna AB filed Preliminary Objections which, inter alia , challenged personal jurisdiction. Defendants [HPP], Husqvarna Group, and Trumbauer's Lawn and Recreation, Inc., filed Preliminary Objections arguing, inter alia, improper venue. [The trial court] permitted the parties to take discovery relevant to the issues of personal jurisdiction and venue.

[The Hangeys'] venue-related discovery revealed the following. Husqvarna Group is a nonexistent entity that acts as a marketing device for a number of Husqvarna-branded corporate entities, including [HPP]. Deposition of John Stanfield, 55:14-56:9 (August 30, 2017). John Trumbauer, sole shareholder of Defendant Trumbauer's Lawn and Recreation, Inc., produced an affidavit in which he averred Defendant Trumbauer's Lawn and Recreation, Inc.'s principal place of business was in Quakertown, PA, that Philadelphia did not fall within their target market area, and they did not regularly conduct business in Philadelphia. Defendant Trumbauer's Lawn and Recreation, Inc.'s Preliminary Objection at Ex. "B." [HPP] is a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business located in Charlotte, North Carolina. See Defendants' Ex. "C" Affidavit of Jordan Baucom. In 2016, [HPP] had approximately $1.4 billion in sales revenue in the United States, of which $75,310.00 came from direct sales in Philadelphia County. See [HPP's] monetary sales data from 2014-2016, submitted to the Court under Seal pursuant to the Order dated September 12, 2017. Of the $75,000 in sales made in Philadelphia in 2016, roughly $69,700 came from a single Husqvarna authorized dealer, DL Electronics, Inc. Id. Approximately 0.005% of [HPP's] 2016 United States sales revenue resulted from direct sales in Philadelphia County. Sales data from 2014 and 2015 is substantially similar, with approximately 0.005% of Husqvarna's annual United States sale revenue resulting from direct sales within Philadelphia County. Id. These sales figures do not include the revenue generated by selling Husqvarna products at "big box" retailers such as Home Depot, Lowe's, or Sears. In the case of "big box" retailers, John Stanfield, the corporate representative for [HPP], testified that [HPP] delivers its products to the retailers' distribution centers, none of which are located in Philadelphia County. See e.g. Stanfield Dep. 31:17-34:20 (testifying that sales to Lowe's would be delivered to the Lowe's distribution center in either Pottsville or Pittstown, Pennsylvania). Once the Husqvarna products are delivered to the retailers' distribution centers, the retailers retain sole discretion as to where the products will be offered for sale, including stores located in Philadelphia County. See Affidavit of John Stanfield at 19.

Following oral argument, [the trial court] dismissed Defendants Husqvarna

U.S. Holdings, Inc. and Husqvarna AB due to want of personal jurisdiction and transferred the case against Defendants [HPP], Husqvarna Group, and Trumbauer's Lawn and Recreation, Inc. to Bucks County because venue was improper in Philadelphia County. [The Hangeys] filed a timely notice of appeal challenging this Court's finding of improper venue; however, they did not appeal the dismissal of Defendants Husqvarna U.S. Holdings, Inc. and Husqvarna AB. See Notice of Appeal, docketed September 26, 2017 (stating Plaintiffs appeal from the orders "transferring venue of this matter to the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, Pennsylvania").

Trial Court Opinion, filed Mar. 2, 2018, at 1-3 ("1925(a) Op.").

In finding venue in Philadelphia was not proper, the trial court found HPP's contacts satisfied the quality prong of the venue analysis, but did not satisfy the quantity prong. The court reasoned that only 0.005% of HPP's national revenue came from sales in Philadelphia and concluded that because this amount was "de minimis ," HPP's contact with Philadelphia was not general and habitual. Id. at 6.

The Hangeys raise the following issue on appeal:

Did the trial court err as a matter of law, and thereby abuse its discretion, in holding that [HPP] does not regularly conduct business in Philadelphia County, merely because the overwhelming majority of its sales in the United States have occurred elsewhere, thereby overlooking the undisputed continuous, ongoing, and regularly recurring sales of Husqvarna consumer products in Philadelphia County?

Hangeys' Br. at 8.

A panel of this court reversed the trial court's order. We granted Husqvarna's petition for re-argument and ordered the parties to brief an additional issue: "Whether the en banc Panel should specifically adopt or overrule prior appellate decisions involving the quantity prong of the venue analysis?" Order, filed July 9, 2019.

We review an order granting or denying preliminary objections asserting improper venue for abuse of discretion. Zampana-Barry v. Donaghue , 921 A.2d 500, 503 (Pa.Super. 2007). "A [p]laintiff's choice of forum is to be given great weight, and the burden is on the party challenging the choice to show it was improper." Fritz v. Glen Mills Schools , 840 A.2d 1021, 1023 (Pa.Super. 2003) (quoting Jackson v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc. & Laidlaw Transit PA, Inc. , 822 A.2d 56, 57 (Pa.Super. 2003) ). "However, a plaintiff's choice of venue is not absolute or unassailable." Id. (quoting Jackson , 822 A.2d at 57 ). "[I]f there exists any proper basis for the trial court's decision to grant the petition to transfer venue, the decision must stand." Krosnowski v. Ward , 836 A.2d 143, 146 (Pa.Super. 2003) (en banc ) (quoting Estate of Werner v. Werner , 781 A.2d 188, 190 (Pa.Super. 2001) ).

We must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that venue as to HPP was improper in Philadelphia. If venue is proper as to HPP, then the Hangeys may maintain their "action to enforce ... joint and several liability against" not only HPP, but also Husqvarna Group and Trumbauer's Lawn and Recreation, Inc. Pa.R.C.P. 1006(c)(1) ("an action to enforce a joint or joint and several liability against two or more defendants ... may be brought against all defendants in any county in which the venue may be laid against any one of the defendants").

Rule 2179 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provides that venue is proper against a corporation or similar entity in a county where it "regularly conducts business." Pa.R.C.P. 2179(a)(2). When determining whether venue is proper, "each case rests on its own facts," Purcell v. Bryn Mawr Hosp. , 525 Pa. 237, 579 A.2d 1282, 1286 (1990), and "[t]he question is whether the acts are being ‘regularly’ performed within the context of the particular business." Monaco v. Montgomery Cab Co. , 417 Pa. 135, 208 A.2d 252, 256 (1965). Further, in the venue context, "regularly" does not mean "principally," and a defendant "may perform acts ‘regularly’ even though these acts make up a small part of its total activities." Canter v. Am. Honda Motor Corp. , 426 Pa. 38, 231 A.2d 140, 142 (1967).

In determining whether venue is proper under this rule, courts "employ a quality-quantity analysis." Zampana-Barry , 921 A.2d at 503. "The term ‘quality of acts’ means those directly, furthering, or essential to, corporate objects; they do not include incidental acts." Monaco , 208 A.2d at 256 (quoting Shambe v. Delaware & Hudson R.R. Co. , 288 Pa. 240, 135 A. 755, 757 (1927) ). To satisfy the quantity prong of this analysis, acts must be "sufficiently continuous so as to be considered habitual." Zampana-Barry , 921 A.2d at 504.

Pennsylvania appellate courts have often considered the percentage of overall business a defendant company conducts in a county to determine if the quantity prong was met. In Canter , the Supreme Court found that a company whose employees drove cars into Philadelphia "to demonstrate cars and to consummate sales" met the quality test for venue, and that the contacts also met the quantity test where one to two percent of the company's gross sales occurred in Philadelphia. 231 A.2d at 143. In Canter , the company had gross sales of 3.7 million in 1964 and 4.1 million in 1965. Id. at 141. In Monaco , the Supreme Court found that a taxicab company based in Montgomery County conducted regular business in Philadelphia where five to ten percent of its business was from passengers it took into Philadelphia. 208 A.2d at 256. It reasoned that the cab company's acts of driving into Philadelphia and collecting fares were regularly performed. Id. Further, in Zampana-Barry , this Court found venue proper in Philadelphia where a law firm based in Delaware County derived three to five percent of its income from cases litigated in Philadelphia. 921 A.2d at 506.

As these cases establish, courts often consider whether the percentage of a defendant's business is sufficient to constitute "habitual" contact. However, no court has stated that the percentage of a defendant's business is the sole evidence relevant to the "quantity" analysis. Rather, courts must determine whether all the evidence presented, including the scope of the defendant's business, viewed in the context of the facts of the case, establish that a defendant's contacts with the venue satisfy the quantity prong. See Mathues v. Tim-Bar Corp. , 438 Pa.Super. 231, 652 A.2d 349, 351 (1994) (finding trial court did not abuse discretion in finding quantity prong not satisfied where evidence established only one or two sales occurred in county); Monaco , 208 A.2d at 256 (noting "[t]he question is whether the acts are being ‘regularly’ performed within the context of the particular business").

Where this Court concluded that conducting a small percentage of a business in a venue did not satisfy the quantity prong, the Court's core finding was that the contacts failed the quality prong of the venue test and the cases often addressed defendants who were small and/or local companies, not multi-billion-dollar corporations. For example, in Singley v. Flier , 851 A.2d 200, 202-03 (Pa.Super. 2004), we found that the contacts that the plaintiff alleged Villanova University had with Philadelphia—three graduate courses offered in Philadelphia, practical experience for nursing students in Philadelphia hospitals, a history course entitled "Tours of Philadelphia," and volunteer and athletic opportunities—did not satisfy the quality prong of the venue analysis. We also found that the three graduate courses also failed the quantity prong "when viewed in light of the University's entire academic program, which includes several graduate degrees, as well as a law school." Id.

Further, in PECO Energy Co. v. Philadelphia Suburban Water Co. , this Court found that Philadelphia Suburban Water Company's contacts with Philadelphia, which included approximately one mile of pipeline running through Philadelphia and a one-time purchase of water from Philadelphia, were "minimal and incidental, at best." 802 A.2d 666, 670 (Pa.Super. 2002). We concluded that the contacts were not essential to defendant's business and were "far less in quantity, as well as quality, than the contacts cited" in prior cases. Id. at 671. Further, in Battuello v. Camelback Ski Corp. , 409 Pa.Super. 642, 598 A.2d 1027, 1029-30 (1991), this Court discussed the plaintiff's claim that venue in Philadelphia was proper due to Camelback Ski Corporation's relationship with eastern Tours, which transported Philadelphians to Camelback. We concluded the relationship was "tenuous," noting that Camelback's sending of brochures and quoting prices did not meet the quality prong of the venue analysis, Philadelphians purchased tickets only after they arrived at Camelback, and the business generated, which was less than one percent of Camelback's business, was "far too small to qualify as ‘general or habitual.’ " Id. at 1030.

The percentage of a company's overall business that it conducts in a given county, standing alone, is not meaningful and is not determinative of the "quantity" prong. Each case turns on its own facts, and we must evaluate evidence of the extent of a defendant's business against the nature of the business at issue. A small or local business may do all of its work in just a few counties or even a single one, while a large business may span the entire nation. Indeed, the percentage of sales a multi-billion-dollar company makes in a particular county will almost always be a tiny percentage of its total sales. Courts thus should not consider percentages in isolation. Rather, courts must consider all of the evidence in context to determine whether the defendant's business activities in the county were regular, continuous, and habitual.

Here, HPP is a multi-billion-dollar corporation. It had at least one authorized dealer located in Philadelphia to which it delivered products for sale. Although HPP's sales through authorized dealers in Philadelphia constituted only 0.005% of HPP's national sales, the dollar figure of those Philadelphia sales in 2016 was $75,310. The number and dollar figure of sales in Philadelphia, and the fact that HPP has an authorized dealer in Philadelphia to sell its products, is relevant to the determination of whether HPP's contacts with Philadelphia satisfied the "quantity" prong of the venue analysis. Therefore, we conclude the trial court erred in relying almost exclusively on evidence of the percentage of defendant's business that occurred in Philadelphia when addressing the quantity prong.

Further, based on the totality of the evidence, HPP's contacts satisfied the quantity prong of the venue test. Its contacts with Philadelphia—including having an authorized dealer in Philadelphia, and selling $75,310 worth of products through that dealer in 2016 in Philadelphia—were "sufficiently continuous so as to be considered habitual." See Zampana-Barry , 921 A.2d at 504.

In reaching this conclusion, we do not find it necessary to approve or disapprove of any of our prior decisions. Rather, our conclusion is based on the prior precedents of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and consistent with those of our Court. However, as discussed above, we clarify that the percentage of sales of a corporation in a venue is but one factor to consider when determining whether the quantity prong of the venue analysis is satisfied, and such evidence must be viewed within the context of the business at issue in each case.

As for the quality prong, the trial court found there was "no question" that it was met. See 1925(a) Op. at 5. The Hangeys do not dispute that conclusion and we will not address it further.

Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

President Judge Panella, Judge Dubow, Judge Murray and Judge McCaffery join the opinion.

Judge Kunselman and Judge Nichols concur in the result.

Judge Stabile files a dissenting opinion in which Judge King joins.

DISSENTING OPINION BY STABILE, J.:

I would conclude that the trial court acted within its permissible discretion in sustaining preliminary objections to venue in Philadelphia County. I therefore respectfully dissent.

Our courts of appeal have explained many times that trial courts enjoy "considerable discretion" in determining whether venue is proper, and we will reverse only where the trial court abuses its discretion. Purcell v. Bryn Mawr Hosp. , 525 Pa. 237, 579 A.2d 1282, 1284 (1990) ; Zampana-Barry v. Donaghue , 921 A.2d 500, 503 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied , 596 Pa. 709, 940 A.2d 366 (2007). The outcome in each case depends on its own facts. Monaco v. Montgomery Cab Co. , 417 Pa. 135, 208 A.2d 252, 256 (1965) ( citing Shambe v. Delaware and Hudson R.R. Co. , 288 Pa. 240, 135 A. 755, 757 (1927) ). Accordingly, an appellate court will not overturn the trial court's decision so long as it is reasonable in view of the facts. Id.

Here, the record shows that from 2014 to 2016, approximately .005% of the United States sales revenue of Appellee Husqvarna Professional Products, Inc. ("HPP") came from direct sales in Philadelphia County. HPP also delivers products to the distribution centers of big box retailers such as Lowe's and Home Depot, but none of those distribution centers is located in Philadelphia County and HPP does not control the ultimate point of sale after it delivers its products to the big box distributors. The question presented is whether HPP "regularly conducts business" in Philadelphia County as per Rule 2179(a)(2) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer depends on our review of the trial court's application of a quantity/quality analysis.

Quality acts are "those directly, furthering, or essential to, corporate objects; they do not include incidental acts." Monaco , 208 A.2d at 256. The trial court concluded that HPP's activities were sufficient in quality to support venue in Philadelphia County. HPP furthers its business interests by selling products directly to two Philadelphia retailers, which in turn sell those products to the public. Trial Court Opinion, 3/1/18, at 5. The parties do not dispute that HPP has quality contacts with Philadelphia County. "By ‘quantity of acts’ is meant those which are so continuous and sufficient to be termed general or habitual." Monaco , 208 A.2d at 256. The trial court found that .005% of HPP's national sales revenue was de minimus and therefore of insufficient quantity. Id. at 6.

I believe the trial court's conclusion was reasonable, in accord with applicable case law, and therefore not an abuse of discretion. For example, in Singley v. Flier , 851 A.2d 200 (Pa. Super. 2004), this Court affirmed an order transferring venue from Philadelphia to Delaware County. The plaintiff slipped and fell in a parking lot on the campus of Villanova University in Delaware County. The plaintiff argued for venue in Philadelphia County based on three graduate courses Villanova conducted at the Philadelphia Naval Yard. Villanova owned no property and conducted no other activity in Philadelphia. This Court concluded that Villanova's activities in Philadelphia failed both the quality and quantity prongs of venue analysis, writing with regard to the latter that "the quantity of these contacts—three graduate level courses—is lacking when viewed in light of the University's entire academic program, which includes several graduate degrees, as well as a law school." Id. at 203. In other words, the trial court reasonably found quantity lacking where the defendant conducted a proportionately very small amount of its activity in the plaintiff's county of choice. That is precisely what the trial court considered occurred in this case on appeal.

Other cases reinforce this point and the discretion exercised by the trial court. In PECO Energy Co. v. Philadelphia Suburban Water Co. , 802 A.2d 666 (Pa. Super. 2002), the plaintiff sued the defendant in Philadelphia County alleging losses stemming from water pipes that ruptured in Montgomery County. All affected water customers lived in Montgomery County. The defendant had no connection to Philadelphia County other than one mile of transmission pipeline—representing .036 percent of its piping system—passing through. Id. at 670. In 2000, defendant conducted a one-time purchase of 300,000 gallons of water from the City of Philadelphia, representing .0007% of its water purchases over ten years. Id. This Court concluded that the defendant's contacts to Philadelphia County were not essential to the furtherance of its business, and "minimal and incidental, at best." Id.

In Battuello v. Camelback Ski Corp. , 409 Pa.Super. 642, 598 A.2d 1027 (1991), the plaintiffs sued the defendant ski resort in Philadelphia County for their son's fatal accident that occurred at the defendant's resort in Monroe County. In support of venue, the plaintiffs cited, among other things, that the defendant sent promotional brochures to residents of Philadelphia County; that the defendant advertised in Philadelphia County; and that defendant worked with a tour company in Philadelphia that regularly brought Philadelphia residents to its resort. Id. at 1028. This Court affirmed the order transferring venue to Monroe County, reasoning that solicitation of business in Philadelphia County did not establish sufficient quality, and that the sale of business generated for the defendant by the Philadelphia-based tour company was "far too small to qualify as ‘general or habitual’ " and therefore did not establish sufficient quantity. Id. at 1030 ; see also Mathues v. Tim-Bar Corp. , 438 Pa.Super. 231, 652 A.2d 349 (1994) (holding that the York County defendant's "isolated and limited" activities in Montgomery County were insufficient to support venue there).

Granting the trial court considerable discretion, as we must, and considering the authority of Singley , PECO Energy , and Battuello , I do not believe we can conclude the trial court's decision was unreasonable. Those cases teach that quantity is lacking where a defendant's activity in a county is insignificant in relation to its overall activity. I recognize that other cases have found that venue will lie against a defendant in a county where it conducts a comparatively small amount of its business. See Monaco , 208 A.2d at 256 (holding that venue would lie in Philadelphia County against a defendant that conducted five to ten percent of its cab business there); Canter v. American Honda Motor Corp. , 426 Pa. 38, 231 A.2d 140, 143 (1967) (holding that one to two percent of a defendant's business was sufficient to establish the quantity test described in Monaco ); Zampana-Barry , 921 A.2d at 506 (three to five percent of a law firm's legal services conducted in Philadelphia supported venue in Philadelphia County). I also recognize that the jurisprudential law in this area is lacking in clarity. See Zampana-Barry , 921 A.2d at 506-09 (Klein, J. concurring). I do not believe, however, that any of the foregoing cases support the Majority's decision to overrule the trial court's discretion. Rather, I believe that our appellate standard of review—which requires us to afford the trial courts considerable discretion and directs us not to overturn any reasonable result—is a product of the inherent difficulty in articulating precise standards governing a quality and quantity analysis. Put simply, the lack of precise alignment in our case law in this area may be explained by the broad discretion given our trial courts to decide these issues.

Moreover, "[a] finding by an appellate court that it would have reached a different result than the trial court does not constitute a finding of an abuse of discretion." Harman ex rel. Harman v. Borah , 562 Pa. 455, 756 A.2d 1116, 1123 (2000). Rather, "an abuse of discretion exists when the trial court has rendered a judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, has failed to apply the law, or was motivated by partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will." Id. at 1124. "Where the record adequately supports the trial court's reasons and factual basis, the court did not abuse its discretion." Id. Thus, the law recognizes that different judges might consider similar facts and reach different results, with neither committing an abuse of discretion. Some degree of uncertainty in the law is therefore unavoidable, and this brings with it the inherent difficulty in reconciling the results of all of our prior precedent on this issue.

In my view, the Majority reverses the trial court in this case because the Majority would have reached a different result. Nothing in the Majority's Opinion supports a conclusion that the trial court overstepped the bounds of its considerable discretion in applying a relatively imprecise body of law to the facts of this case. Under our existing jurisprudence, all of which the Majority leaves intact, trial courts have discretion to assign great weight—even decisive weight—to the fact that a defendant conducts a vanishingly small percentage of its business in the plaintiff's chosen forum. In contrast with existing precedent, the Majority has all but forbidden trial courts to transfer venue on that basis. If five one-thousandths of a percent is sufficient to establish quantity, it is difficult to imagine a percentage that is too small.

The Majority reasons that its result is warranted, at least in part, because HPP is a large, multi-billion dollar company conducting business throughout the United States and the percentage of its sales revenue in any county is likely to be a tiny percentage of its overall sales revenue. Majority Opinion at 1142–43. I am willing to assume that this is true, but I believe it is entirely irrelevant to question before us. Faithful application of the quantity analysis under existing jurisprudence will not leave plaintiffs without a forum in which to pursue claims against large companies. Rather, it will simply restrict the choice of forum according to the well-established criteria of our Rules of Civil Procedure.

For all of the foregoing reasons, I would not disturb the trial court's exercise of discretion in transferring venue in this case from Philadelphia to Bucks County.

I respectfully dissent.

Judge King joins the dissenting opinion.