Opinion
FBTCV186072051
02-04-2019
Mark E. HAMMOND v. CITY OF BRIDGEPORT et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
The plaintiff, Mark E. Hammond, commenced the present case on February 20, 2018, against the defendant, the city of Bridgeport. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant failed to comply with a determination made by the workers’ compensation commissioner— as well as a subsequent stipulation between the parties that was approved by the commissioner— by initially reinstating the plaintiff to a lower-paying position and, over time, failing to adjust his status and rate of pay to be commensurate with his original, higher-paying position.
On May 2, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction due to the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Specifically, the defendant argues that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his remedies pursuant to the Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Act (the act) as well as the collective bargaining agreement that exists between the plaintiff’s union and the defendant. The plaintiff filed an objection to the motion on May 30, 2018, along with an affidavit in support. On July 30, 2018, the defendant filed a reply memorandum of law.
"Under our exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine, a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action that seeks a remedy that could be provided through an administrative proceeding, unless and until that remedy has been sought in the administrative forum ... In the absence of exhaustion of that remedy, the action must be dismissed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Levine v. Sterling, 300 Conn. 521, 528, 16 A.3d 664 (2011). "Because the exhaustion [of administrative remedies] doctrine implicates subject matter jurisdiction, [the court] must decide as a threshold matter whether that doctrine requires dismissal of the [plaintiff’s] claim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Furthermore, "[a] court deciding a motion to dismiss must determine not the merits of the claim or even its legal sufficiency, but rather, whether the claim is one that the court has jurisdiction to hear and decide." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hinde v. Specialized Education of Connecticut, Inc., 147 Conn.App. 730, 740-41, 84 A.3d 895 (2014).
"[I]n the context of a workers’ compensation case, our Supreme Court has stated that [a] stipulation is a compromise and release type of settlement similar to settlements in civil personal injury cases where a claim is settled with a lump sum payment accompanied by a release of the adverse party from further liability ... Our Supreme Court has, on a number of occasions, also stated that the term ‘stipulation’ is included within the term ‘voluntary agreement’ in the act." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Davis v. Forman School, 54 Conn.App. 841, 846, 738 A.2d 697 (1999). "[General Statutes § ] 31-296, titled, ‘Voluntary Agreements, ’ provides in relevant part: ‘[The workers’ compensation commissioner] shall retain the original [voluntary] agreement, with his approval thereof, in his office and, if an application is made to the superior court for an execution, he shall, upon the request of said court, file in the court a certified copy of the agreement and his statement of approval thereof ... In relevant part, [General Statutes] § 31-300 provides that in the event that either party does not appeal from the commissioner’s decision within ten days after the decision has been made, ‘such award shall be final and may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment of the Superior Court.’" (Emphasis in the original.) Fenton v. Connecticut Hospital Ass’n Workers’ Compensation Trust, 58 Conn.App. 45, 51, 752 A.2d 65, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 911, 759 A.2d 504 (2000).
In contrast, other sections of the act concerning suits related to awards granted by the commission indicate that in certain circumstances, jurisdiction remains with the commission rather than the Superior Court. In Hyatt v. Milford, 26 Conn.App. 194, 600 A.2d 5 (1991), appeal dismissed, 224 Conn. 441, 619 A.2d 450 (1993), the plaintiff brought an action in the Superior Court claiming that although the workers’ compensation commissioner had awarded him benefits for a designated period of time at a certain rate, his employer wrongfully paid less week-to-week than the amount afforded by the award. Assessing its jurisdiction, the court noted that "[t]he plaintiff here ... received neither a commuted and currently payable nor a lump sum award ... but rather received an award of $326 for 195 weeks ... The plaintiff’s claim in the present case can only be construed as an attempt either to modify his award into a lump sum payment or to interpret the payment method due under his award. The modification or interpretation of an award made by the workers’ compensation commissioner is the function of the workers’ compensation commission and not the Superior Court." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) Id., 198-99.
For the proposition that the modification or interpretation of an award is within the sole jurisdiction of the workers’ compensation commission, Hyatt cites, inter alia, General Statutes § 31-315, which provides in relevant part: "Any award of, or voluntary agreement concerning, compensation made under the provisions of this chapter ... shall be subject to modification in accordance with the procedure for original determinations, upon the request of either party ... The commissioner shall also have the same power to open and modify an award as any court of the state has to open and modify a judgment of such court. The compensation commissioner shall retain jurisdiction over claims for compensation, awards and voluntary agreements, for any proper action thereon, during the whole compensation period applicable to the injury in question." "Section 31-315 allows the commission to modify an award in three situations. First, modification is permitted where the incapacity of an injured employee has increased, decreased or ceased, or ... the measure of dependence on account of which the compensation is paid has changed ... Second, the award may be modified when changed conditions of fact have arisen which necessitate a change of [the award] ... Third, [t]he commissioner shall also have the same power to open and modify an award as any court of the state has to open and modify a judgment of such court ... The final clause of § 31-315 allows the commission to retain jurisdiction over claims during the entire compensable period ... In other words, [p]ursuant to § 31-315, a workers’ compensation award is always limited to a claimant’s current condition and [is] always subject to later modification upon the request of either party ... if the complainant’s condition changes." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Schenkel v. Richard Chevrolet, Inc., 123 Conn.App. 55, 59, 1 A.3d 257 (2010).
Finally, in DeOliveira v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 273 Conn. 487, 870 A.2d 1066 (2005), the court also determined that certain sections of the act grant the commission jurisdiction for claims arising out of an award granted by the workers’ compensation commissioner. As a later decision aptly summarizes, "[i]n DeOliveira, the issue was whether Connecticut recognizes a cause of action against an insurer for bad faith processing of a workers’ compensation claim ... The court observed that General Statutes § § 31-278, 31-288(b), 31-300 and 31-303 authorize a workers’ compensation commissioner to provide financial remedies to reimburse an employee for costs associated with unwarranted delay in the receipt of workers’ compensation payments ... The court concluded that, by providing remedies for such conduct, the legislature evinced its intention to bar a tort action for the same conduct proscribed and penalized under the act." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Yuille v. Bridgeport Hospital, 89 Conn.App. 705, 708, 874 A.2d 844 (2005).
In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that he is due compensation arising out of the defendant’s failure to reinstate him to the proper position, with the proper rate of pay. The defendant’s obligation to reinstate the plaintiff to a particular position is attributed to the workers’ compensation commissioner’s decision and a subsequent stipulation between the parties. Accordingly, the present case may be heard by this court because it falls within the ambit of actions brought to enforce a final award from the commissioner.
The defendant’s reliance on Hyatt, § 31-315, and DeOliveira is misplaced. Rather than seeking to modify or interpret an award from the commissioner or recoup workers’ compensation payments, the plaintiff here is seeking payment for a period after his return to work, using the commissioner’s decision and the stipulation as the basis for demonstrating his entitlement to such payment. Indeed, the present case does not concern the condition that caused the plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim or any payments due to him during the compensable period. The act therefore does not bar the present case and this court has subject matter jurisdiction.
With regard to the defendant’s next argument, it is true that "[t]he [exhaustion doctrine] is applied in a number of different situations ... including when an exclusive grievance or arbitration procedure is contained in a collective bargaining agreement and when an administrative appeal is taken ... In the collective bargaining context ... [t]he purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to encourage the use of grievance procedures, rather than the courts, for settling disputes. A contrary rule which would permit an individual employee to completely sidestep available grievance procedures in favor of a lawsuit has little to commend it." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Garcia v. Hartford, 292 Conn. 334, 339-40, 972 A.2d 706 (2009).
"It is not true, however ... that simply because the claim alleged by the plaintiff arose out of the employment relationship, the plaintiff was required to resort to the grievance procedures of the collective bargaining agreement governing that relationship. Not every dispute that arises out of an employment relationship constitutes a grievable matter. Whether a dispute is grievable under a collective bargaining agreement depends on the proper interpretation of the agreement." Mendillo v. Board of Education, 246 Conn. 456, 475-76, 717 A.2d 1177 (1998), overruled on other grounds by Campos v. Coleman 319 Conn. 36, 123 A.3d 854 (2015); see also Sobczak v. Board of Education, 88 Conn.App. 99, 109, 868 A.2d 112, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 941, 875 A.2d 43 (2005).
In the present case, the plaintiff was not required to exhaust his remedies pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. The collective bargaining agreement between the plaintiff’s union and the defendant contains an exclusive grievance procedure as well as a section establishing the wages to be paid. Article 21 states that the grievance procedure applies to "[a]ny grievance or dispute which may arise between the parties, including the application, meaning or interpretation of this agreement ..." Here, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant’s failure to reinstate him to the appropriate position resulted in him being paid less than he ought to have been. Although the collective bargaining agreement may form the basis for the plaintiff’s calculations— that is, what his compensation should have been, given a particular job title— the basis of the present action is the workers’ compensation commissioner’s decision and the stipulation between the parties: agreements separate and apart from the collective bargaining agreement. The wages to be paid to the various positions held by the plaintiff, as established by the collective bargaining agreement, are not in dispute, and the plaintiff’s allegations do not implicate the application, meaning, or interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Rather, it is the execution of the stipulation that is presently before the court. Payment in accordance with the rates determined by the collective bargaining agreement is merely the reference point for the damages the plaintiff seeks. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s failure to adhere to the grievance procedures laid out in the collective bargaining agreement does not deprive this court of subject matter jurisdiction.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied.