Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 4:97-CV-1030-Y
March 8, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RENDERING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This case involves claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") by plaintiff Abdul Mohammed Haliq ("Haliq"), an inmate at the United States Bureau of Prisons' FMC-Fort Worth facility in Fort Worth, Texas. On November 8, 2000, the case was tried to the Court, with plaintiff Haliq represented by appointed counsel, and with the United States represented by Assistant United States Attorney Donna Webb. After careful consideration of the evidence and arguments presented at trial, and of all of the written submissions by the parties, the Court issues the following findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Haliq is a federal inmate confined at Federal Medical Center, Fort Worth ("FMC-Fort Worth").
2. Prior to February 1, 1997, Haliq suffered from degenerative disc/joint disease of the lumbar spine, osteoporosis and depression.
3. Prior to February 1, 1997, Haliq sought medical attention for the degenerative disc/joint disease of his lumbar spine and received medication, back braces, a walker and cane to help him ambulate.
4. Prior to February 1, 1997, Haliq had a history of reporting falls to medical staff at FMC-Fort Worth, including falls reported to medical staff in August 1995, September 1995, October 1995, July 1996, and August 1996. (Plaintiff's Exhibits 1-8.) Medical record entries from July and August 1996 show that medical personnel recorded that Haliq reported that he "has had 2-3 episodes of falling per week for the last several months," and that "he falls a few times a month." (Plaintiff's Exhibits 6, 8.)
5. Prior to February 1, 1997, Haliq was unable to perform any labor at FMC-Fort Worth because of his medical condition. He was medically unassigned.
6. On February 1, 1997, between approximately seven o'clock and eight o'clock in the morning, Haliq was carrying a cane in one hand and his laundry in the other hand as he walked into the laundry-room area of the Dallas Unit at FMC-Fort Worth.
7. On that date and near that time, Haliq fell in the laundry room located on the first floor of the Dallas Unit at FMC-Fort Worth.
8. There was no water on the floor of the laundry room on the first floor of the Dallas Unit at FMC-Fort Worth between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. on February 1, 1997.
Although both plaintiff Haliq and then fellow inmate Frederick Miccio testified that there was water on the floor at the time of Haliq's fall, the Court concludes that this testimony is not credible. This conclusion is supported by the volume of testimony by employees of FMC-Fort Worth that no wet spot was observed in the area in question immediately before Haliq's fall and the lack of evidentiary record of any reported problem with water on the floor on the morning of February 1, 1997. Testimony by Miccio that Haliq was assisted from the site of his fall by FMC-Fort Worth personnel and Miccio's testimony of the presence of a wet blanket at the site of the fall was contradicted not only by the testimony of FMC-Fort Worth employees, but by Haliq himself. As to the credibility of Haliq himself, in answer to a question about his back trouble prior to February 1, 1997, Haliq testified that he had back trouble only five times his whole life, which is directly contradicted by the medical records of FMC-Fort Worth. Haliq also testified that he had only fallen one time prior to the February 1, 1997 incident, which is again directly contradicted by the medical records. Furthermore, both Haliq and Miccio are convicted felons. Considering the testimony of Haliq and Miccio in light of these factors, the Court finds and determines that their testimony regarding the presence of water on the floor is either not believable or is at least less credible than the testimony of the defendant's contradicting witnesses.
9. Any fall Haliq sustained on February 1, 1997, was not caused by water on the floor of the Dallas Unit laundry room at FMC-Fort Worth.
10. Defendant's employees regularly inspected the premises of the Dallas Unit in the early morning hours of February 1, 1997, prior to the time of Haliq's fall.
11. No water was observed by Defendant's employees on the floor of the laundry room in the Dallas Unit in the early morning hours of February 1, 1997, prior to the time of Haliq's fall.
12. On February 6, 1997, Haliq appeared at sick call and reported he had back pain due to a fall he had near an ice machine on the Dallas Unit. The medical history taken from Haliq on February 6, 1997 does not record a complaint of slipping on a wet floor. (Government's Exhibit 1 page 44.)
13. The February 6, 1997 sick call record is the first time Haliq notified the defendant that he had fallen on February 1, 1997.
14. On February 12, 1997, an X-ray report revealed that there was a recent mild compression fracture of Haliq's spine at L1.
15. Haliq was observed at the medical clinic at FMC-Fort Worth from February 15, 1997, to February 17, 1997.
16. Haliq was admitted to the Short Term Care Unit at FMC-Fort Worth from February 18, 1997, to March 7, 1997, for treatment of the fracture of Haliq's spine at L1.
17. After March 7, 1997, Haliq experienced continued back pain and was again diagnosed as suffering from degenerative joint and disc disease of the lumbar spine with compression fractures at L1 and L4 and significant osteoporosis. Non-surgical management was recommended.
18. Although medical records indicate compression fractures at L1 and L4 of Haliq's lumbar spine, the evidence did not show that such conditions were related to the fall Haliq sustained on February 1, 1997.
19. Haliq's age and medical condition unrelated to the February 1, 1997 fall will not allow him to be gainfully employed after his incarceration.
20. Haliq has not incurred medical expenses or other actual expenses attributed to any fall on February 1, 1997 in the laundry room of the FMC-Fort Worth Dallas Unit or elsewhere.
21. Haliq has not suffered any lost wages from his February 1, 1997 fall in the laundry room of the FMC-Fort Worth Dallas Unit.
22. Haliq has a pre-existing degenerative medical condition concerning his lumbar spine and any future medical expenses Haliq may incur will be attributable to this condition.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Applicable Law
Pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States is liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. Although the FTCA directs federal courts to look to the law of the place, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 150 (1963) — a case in which the Court ultimately recognized that inmates in federal prison may recover damages from the United States for personal injuries sustained by reason of the negligence of a government employee — found that the duty of care owed by the government to federal prisoners "is fixed by 18 U.S.C. § 4042, independent of an inconsistent state rule." The Supreme Court's recognition that there is a duty of care defined by section 4042 appears to be inconsistent with the FTCA's general scheme of basing liability upon whether the United States, if a private person, would be liable under the law of the place where the act occurred. This apparent inconsistency is the source of some debate within this circuit. This Court, however, need not resolve this question because plaintiff Haliq has failed to establish a breach of duty under either standard.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (West 1994) and § 1346(b)(1) (West Supp. 2000).
Specifically, this federal law fixing the "Duties of [the] Bureau of Prisons" commands the BOP to "provide suitable quarters and provide for safekeeping, care, and subsistence of all persons charged with or convicted of offenses against the United States. . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a)(2) (West 2000).
Muniz, 374 U.S. at 164-65.
See Friedman v. United States, 221 F.3d 1334, 2000 WL 876391 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished copy attached).
See Dawson v. United States, 68 F.3d 886, 896 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that the question of whether section 4042 or the relevant Texas statute at issue in that case — a state statute regarding the liability of a landowner for injury resulting from recreational use of property — governed an inmate's claim under the FTCA, "is a question of law on which reasonable minds could differ"); see also Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 728 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc), opinion on remand vacated by, 120 F.3d 1307 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that "violation of a federal statute or regulation does not give rise to FTCA liability unless the relationship between the federal employee or agency and the injured party is such that the former, if a private person or entity, would owe a duty under state law to the latter in a nonfederal context"); cf Muhammed v. United States, 6. F. Supp.2d 582, 594 (N.D.Tex. 1998) (holding that the violation of § 4042 can form the basis of an action under the FTCA, and distinguishing Dawson and Johnson).
If the tort law of Texas were to be applied in this case, it would impose upon the defendant, as an owner or occupier of land, a general duty to keep the premises under its control in a safe condition. The duty owed by the government as a premises owner is further defined by the status of the complaining party and, to the extent plaintiff Haliq is an invitee, the duty owed to him is to exercise reasonable care to protect him from a dangerous condition known or discoverable. If the duty were to be defined by 18 U.S.C. § 4042, the obligation of Haliq's BOP caretakers would be "to exercise ordinary care, or, as some courts have said, reasonable care to do those things the Bureau of Prisons is obligated by § 4042 to do." Under either theory then, the duty owed to Haliq by his government caretakers is to exercise reasonable care to protect him from a dangerous condition that was known or discoverable.
See Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex. 1985).
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1998).
Muhammed, 6 F. Supp.2d at 595.
In order to prevail in a slip-and-fall case under Texas law, the plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) the owner/operator had actual or constructive knowledge of a condition on the premises; (2) the condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm; (3) the owner/operator did not exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk; and (4) the owner/operator's failure to use such care proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries. A premises owner's knowledge of a potentially harmful condition can be established in one of the following three ways: (1) proof that an employee caused the harmful condition; (2) proof that employees either saw or were told of the harmful condition prior to the plaintiff's injury, or (3) proof that the harmful condition was present for so long that it should have been discovered in the exercise of reasonable care. "[W]hen circumstantial evidence is relied upon to prove constructive notice, the evidence must establish that it is more likely than not that the dangerous condition existed long enough to give the proprietor a reasonable opportunity to discover the condition." Meager circumstantial evidence from which equally plausible but opposite inferences may be drawn is not legally sufficient to support a finding of knowledge. Conclusions of Law
Even the courts that have held that a general duty-of-care standard from 18 U.S.C. § 4042 is applicable to facts such as are before this Court recognize that the tort law of the state must provide the elements of recovery. See Muhammed, 6 F. Supp.2d at 594; Friedman, 2000 WL 876391, at *3; Flechsig v. United States, 991 F.2d 300, 303-04 (6th Cir. 1993).
Id., at 936; see also Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. 1992); Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Tex. 1983).
Threlkeld v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 211 F.3d 887, 892 (5th Cir. 2000 no writ history) citing Keetch, 845 S.W.2d at 262.
Wal-Mart Stores, 968 S.W.2d at 936.
Id.
1. Defendant did not breach a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect Haliq from a dangerous condition known or discoverable.
2. Defendant did not breach a duty to provide suitable quarters to Haliq, and did not breach a duty to provide for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence of Haliq.
3. Defendant did not have actual or constructive knowledge of a wet area or other unsafe condition in the FMC-Fort Worth Dallas Unit laundry room prior in the hours prior to Haliq's fall.
4. There was no water on the floor of the FMC-Fort Worth Dallas Unit laundry room and, if there was, it was not present for a sufficient time to charge Defendant with constructive knowledge.
5. Plaintiff Haliq failed to prove the requisite elements for a slip-and-fall case under Texas law: i.e., Haliq (1) failed to prove that Defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of a condition that posed an unreasonable risk of harm on February 1, 1997; (2) failed to prove that the government did not exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate risk; and (3) failed to prove that any failure to use such care proximately caused his injuries.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds and determines that plaintiff Abdul Mohammed Haliq shall take nothing by way of his claims against defendant United States of America, and it is ORDERED that all of plaintiff Haliq's claims against the United States of America be, and they are hereby, DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The duration of the appointment of counsel for plaintiff Haliq under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) was until the resolution of Haliq's claims in this Court. Thus, the appointment of counsel for Haliq is now terminated. The Court thanks pro bono attorney Hernandez and the law students assisting him for their very capable efforts on Haliq's behalf.
Unpublished Disposition
(Cite as: 221 F.3d 1334, 2000 WL 876391 (6th Cir.(Mich.)))
NOTICE: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
(The Court's decision is referenced in a "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions" appearing in the Federal Reporter. Use FI CTA6 Rule 28 and FI CTA6 IOP 206 for rules regarding the citation of unpublished opinions.)
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Herbert M. FRIEDMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America; United States Bureau of Prisons, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 99-1445.
June 21, 2000.
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.
Before MOORE and GILMAN, Circuit Judges; McKEAGUE, District Judge.
The Honorable David W. McKeague, United States District Judge for the Western District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
OPINION
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge.
** 1 Plaintiff Herbert Friedman, a former federal inmate who served approximately one year at the Federal Medical Center in Rochester, Minnesota, appeals the district court's dismissal of his claims against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). Friedman contends that he is entitled to damages because prison officials forced him to endure unsanitary living conditions and provided improper medical treatment during his incarceration. Specifically, he asserts that, based on his treatment, he has viable claims for culpable negligence, as well as negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, under Minnesota law.
Because the allegations contained in Friedman's complaint, even if proven, could not show that prison officials negligently or intentionally subjected him to emotional distress, we AFFIRM the district court's dismissal of Friedman's claims of emotional distress. We conclude, however, that Friedman should have been given an opportunity to amend his "culpable negligence" claim in order to state a claim for relief based on the federal duty of care set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 4042. Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment of the district court to the extent that it dismissed Friedman's "culpable negligence" claim, and REMAND to the district court. On remand, the district court should allow Friedman the opportunity to amend his "culpable negligence" claim.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Friedman brought this suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), alleging that, during his incarceration, prison officials failed to provide him with appropriate treatment for his chronic bowel condition and back ailment. Friedman also complains that prison officials forced him to use unsanitary utensils and trays in the prison's cafeteria, and he claims that the air quality in his housing unit was deficient.
Friedman suffers from Crohn's Disease and Ankylosing Spondylitis. Crohn's Disease is "a chronic inflammatory bowel disease that causes scarring and thickening of the intestinal walls and frequently leads to obstruction." RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 478 (2d ed. 1993). Ankylosing Spondylitis is a degenerative inflammatory disease that causes back pain and impaired mobility of the spinal column. Id. at 83.
In his complaint, Friedman contends that he is entitled to damages under the FTCA for several reasons: first, he argues that prison officials acted with "culpable negligence" when they failed to provide him with adequate conditions in light of his medical condition; second, he argues that officials negligently and intentionally subjected him to emotional distress by failing to address properly his medical condition and by failing to provide him with a sanitary living environment and finally, he argues that his treatment at the Federal Medical Center resulted in a loss of his earning capacity.
Friedman does not argue on appeal that the district court erred when it dismissed his "loss of earning capacity" claim. Because his initial appellate brief does not address this issue, we limit our review to the claims that Friedman raises on appeal. See, e.g., McMurphy v. City of Flushing, 802 F.2d 191, 198-99 (6th Cir. 1986).
On March 12, 1999, the government filed both a motion to dismiss Friedman's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and denied the motion for summary judgment on grounds that it was moot. Friedman now appeals the district court's dismissal of his complaint.
II. ANALYSIS
Friedman challenges the district court's dismissal of his FTCA claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We review de novo a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accepting as true all well-pleaded factual allegations. See Merriweather v. City of Memphis, 107 F.3d 396, 398 (6th Cir. 1997).
** 2 The FTCA provides a limited waiver of the federal government's sovereign immunity for claims against the United States in those instances where federal employees have committed negligent or wrongful acts within the scope of their employment — a limited waiver that extends only to "circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
A. Culpable Negligence
Friedman argues that the federal government's failure to provide him with sanitary living conditions and proper medical treatment during his confinement amounts to a claim of "culpable negligence" under Minnesota law. Although the FTCA directs federal courts to look to "the law of the place where the act or omission occurred," 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), the Supreme Court, in United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 164-165 (1963), indicated that, when considering a claim involving a federal prisoner, courts should allow a prisoner to pursue a negligence claim against the federal government even in those instances where the prisoner would not otherwise be entitled to recover under state law. See also Flechsig v. United States, 991 F.2d 300, 303-04 (6th Cir. 1993).
In Muniz, a case in which the Court held that a federal prisoner may sue under the FTCA to recover damages for personal injuries caused by employee negligence during the prisoner's confinement, the Court appears to adopt a federal rule of liability with its resolution of "[o]ne last point." Muniz, 374 U.S. at 164. The Court stated near the end of the opinion that:
[S]everal States have decided that a warden in charge of a penitentiary . . . is immune from suit because he exercises a quasi-judicial function requiring the use of discretion. Another has decided that the master of a house of correction has no duty of care toward his prisoners which would make him liable for his negligence. And there are overtones in these decisions suggesting that liability is also denied because of the fear that prison discipline would otherwise be undermined. Such cases should not be persuasive. Just as we refused to import the 'casuistries of municipal liability for torts,' in Indian Towing, [ 350 U.S. 61 (1955),] so we think it improper to limit suits by federal prisoners because of restrictive state rules of immunity. Whether a discretionary function is involved is a matter to be decided under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), rather than under state rules relating to political, judicial, quasi-judicial, and ministerial functions. And the duty of care owed by the Bureau of Prisons to federal prisoners is fixed by 18 U.S.C. § 4042, independent of an inconsistent state rule. Finally, having decided that discipline in the federal prisons will not be so seriously impaired that all recovery should be denied for negligently inflicted injuries, we should not at the same time make recovery depend upon a State's decision to the contrary.
** 3 Id. at 164-65 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes omitted). Based on this language, we conclude that Friedman need not show that Minnesota law allows prisoners to bring negligence claims against prison officials. Indeed, as the Court explained, Congress has provided an independent federal duty of care by directing the Bureau of Prisons to "provide suitable quarters and provide for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence of all persons charged with or convicted of offenses against the United States, or held as witnesses or otherwise." 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a)(2).
The Supreme Court's decision in Muniz, with its discussion about a federal duty of care, appears to be inconsistent with the general scheme of the FTCA, which hinges liability upon whether "the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). Perhaps Muniz is best characterized as an attempt on the part of the Court to "avoid[ ] making an important part of a federal prisoner's legal rights depend upon the extraneous criteria which send [a prisoner] to federal prison in one state rather than another." The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 HARV. L. REV. 134, 135-36 (1963).
To determine whether the government has breached the federal duty of care set by 18 U.S.C. § 4042, we must look to Minnesota's general negligence principles. As we wrote in Flechsig, "The FTCA allows suit by a federal prisoner for personal injury suffered as the result of employee negligence. This duty of care is set by section 4042. In order to determine liability, the elements of state tort law must be applied." Flechsig, 991 F.2d at 303-04 (citations omitted). See also Schindler v. United States, 661 F.2d 552, 560 (6th Cir. 1981). See generally 1 LESTER S. JAYSON ROBERT C. LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 5.06 (1997). In Minnesota, "[t]he essential elements of a negligence claim are: (1) the existence of a duty of care; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) an injury was sustained; and (4) breach of the duty was the proximate cause of the injury." Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. 1995).
Here, Friedman's complaint, if broadly construed, may be read to imply that the federal government breached its duty of care as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 4042 when prison officials negligently failed to provide him with sanitary living conditions and proper diet, bedding, and medical treatment, thereby causing his medical condition to deteriorate during his confinement at the Federal Medical Center. As his complaint now stands, however, Friedman has yet to allege coherently such a claim, and he has completely failed to mention the duty of care set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 4042. Although we are mindful that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) does not require a plaintiff to set out every detail of his claim, Rule 8(a)(2) does require a plaintiff to provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
We are not convinced that Friedman has satisfied this requirement. Nevertheless, we believe that Friedman should be given an opportunity to amend his complaint in order sufficiently to state a negligence claim. Thus, we vacate the judgment of the district court to the extent that it dismisses Friedman's "culpable negligence" claim, and remand to the district court. On remand, the district court should allow Friedman the opportunity to amend his "culpable negligence" claim; of course, the government would then have the right to raise any defenses appropriate in light of any amended complaint.
B. Negligent and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
** 4 Friedman has also alleged that prison officials negligently and intentionally subjected him to emotional distress during his incarceration. To prevail on a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress under Minnesota law, a plaintiff must prove that he: "(1) was within a zone of danger of physical impact; (2) reasonably feared for [his] own safety; and (3) suffered severe emotional distress with attendant physical manifestations." K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Minn. 1995). To prevail on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress in Minnesota, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) the conduct was intentional or reckless; (3) the conduct caused emotional distress; and (4) the distress was severe. See Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Minn. 1983). In this case, Friedman has failed to allege facts that could sustain either claim.
With regard to the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, Friedman has failed to allege facts that could be construed as placing him in a zone of danger during his confinement. As the district court explained, the improper medical treatment and unsanitary living conditions that Friedman allegedly experienced do not even come close to the type of "situations where it is 'abundantly clear that plaintiff was in grave personal peril for some specifically defined period of time."' J.A. at 29 (Op. and Order Granting Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 3) (quoting Benson, 527 N.W.2d at 558). Although the conditions at the federal prison may have been uncomfortable, Friedman was never forced to endure a specific and immediate threat of physical impact.
Likewise, with regard to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, Friedman has failed to allege facts that are so atrocious that they pass the boundaries of decency, especially when one considers that "[t]ort claims seeking damages for mental distress generally have not been favored in Minnesota." Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 437. Friedman has alleged facts that, at most, could show that his medical care, food choices, and air quality caused him some degree of discomfort and dissatisfaction. However, as the Supreme Court explained in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981), "To the extent that [prison] conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society." Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err when it dismissed Friedman's claims that prison officials negligently and intentionally subjected him to emotional distress.
III. CONCLUSION
Because the allegations contained in Friedman's complaint, even if proven, could not show that prison officials negligently or intentionally subjected him to emotional distress, we AFFIRM the district court's dismissal of Friedman's claims of emotional distress. We conclude, however, that Friedman should have been given an opportunity to amend his "culpable negligence" claim in order specifically to state a claim for relief based on the federal duty of care set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 4042. Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment of the district court to the extent that it dismissed Friedman's "culpable negligence" claim, and REMAND to the district court. On remand, the district court should allow Friedman the opportunity to amend his complaint in light of the foregoing analysis.