From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Hajek v. Bill Mowbray Motors Inc.

Supreme Court of Texas
Mar 16, 1983
647 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. 1983)

Summary

holding language enjoined evoked no threat of danger to anyone and defamation alone is not sufficient justification for restraining an individuals right to speak freely

Summary of this case from PORCARI v. OMDA OIL

Opinion

No. C-1806.

March 16, 1983.

Appeal from the 138th District Court, Cameron County, Lewis, J.

Costilla Stapleton, Edward A. Stapleton, III, Brownsville, for petitioner.

O'Leary, Sanchez Benton, Robert A. Whittington, Brownsville, for respondent.


Bill Mowbray Motors, Inc. sued James Hajek for libel and sought a temporary injunction to prevent Hajek from driving his vehicle in the community with a defamatory message painted on all four sides that Mowbray Motors sold him a "lemon." The trial court granted the temporary injunction and the court of appeals affirmed. 645 S.W.2d 827. We reverse the judgments of the courts below and dissolve the temporary injunction.

We must address a preliminary question of this Court's jurisdiction. Prior to 1981, the temporary injunction appeal statute specifically provided, "Such case may be heard in the Court of Civil Appeals or Supreme Court . . .," and included other references implying the availability of Supreme Court review. See Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4662 (1925). We construed these provisions as granting jurisdiction to this Court to review orders granting or denying a temporary injunction where the main case out of which the application for injunction grew was a case over which we had jurisdiction. See Southwest Weather Research, Inc. v. Jones, 160 Tex. 104, 327 S.W.2d 417, 418-19 (1959); Weaver v. Board of Trustees of Wilson Independent School Dist., 143 Tex. 152, 183 S.W.2d 443 (1944).

In 1981 the legislature amended article 4662 to state that a party only "may appeal from such order or judgment to the Court of Appeals." This amendment limits our jurisdiction over appeals from the granting or denying of a temporary injunction.

Statutory references by article numbers alone are to the current Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated. References to rules are to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

Absent a special statute granting jurisdiction, article 1821 makes final in the court of appeals decisions reviewing interlocutory orders made appealable to the court of appeals. The two exceptions are: (1) where there is a dissent upon a question of law material to the decision, and (2) where the court of appeals' holding on a material question of law conflicts with a prior decision of another court of appeals or this Court. International Harvester Co. v. Stedman, 159 Tex. 593, 324 S.W.2d 543, 545-46 (1959); State v. Wynn, 157 Tex. 200, 301 S.W.2d 76, 78-79 (1957). This general rule now applies to temporary injunctions, since the legislature no longer designates them a special type of interlocutory order appealable to this Court. Southwest Weather Research, Inc. v. Jones, supra, 327 S.W.2d at 418.

Hajek urges this Court has jurisdiction because the court of appeals' decision conflicts with Stansbury v. Beckstrom, 491 S.W.2d 947 (Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland 1973, no writ). See Article 1728(2). We agree that we have jurisdiction because of this conflict.

The temporary injunction granted by the trial court constitutes a prior restraint on free speech. Our Constitution provides, in part:

Every person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press. Tex. Const. art. I, § 8.

The language enjoined here evoked no threat of danger to anyone and, therefore, may not be subject to the prior restraint of a temporary injunction. Defamation alone is not a sufficient justification for restraining an individual's right to speak freely. Ex parte Tucker, 110 Tex. 335, 220 S.W. 75, 76 (1920).

Because the decision of the court below conflicts with article I, section 8 of the Texas Constitution and Ex parte Tucker, supra, we grant the application for writ of error and, without oral argument, reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and dissolve the temporary injunction. Rule 483.


Summaries of

Hajek v. Bill Mowbray Motors Inc.

Supreme Court of Texas
Mar 16, 1983
647 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. 1983)

holding language enjoined evoked no threat of danger to anyone and defamation alone is not sufficient justification for restraining an individuals right to speak freely

Summary of this case from PORCARI v. OMDA OIL

holding that injunction preventing Hajek from driving a vehicle with defamatory message on all four sides that Mowbray Motors sold him a "lemon" was an improper prior restraint as "[d]efamation alone is not a sufficient justification for restraining an individual's right to speak freely"

Summary of this case from Mishler v. Mac Systems, Inc.

vacating an injunction restraining a customer from driving a car painted with words accusing a dealership of selling a "lemon" vehicle

Summary of this case from Lilith Fund for Reproductive Equity v. Dickson

striking down an injunction because the language at issue "evoked no threat of danger to anyone and, therefore, may not be subject to the prior restraint of a temporary injunction."

Summary of this case from Davenport v. Garcia

striking down an injunction because the language at issue "evoked no threat of danger to anyone and, therefore, may not be subject to the prior restraint of a temporary injunction."

Summary of this case from Cullum v. White

In Hajek v. Bill Mowbray Motors, Inc., 647 S.W.2d 253, 255 (Tex. 1983) (per curiam), the Court dissolved an injunction prohibiting an owner from driving his car on which he had prominently labeled as a "lemon".

Summary of this case from Davenport v. Garcia

relying solely on the Texas Constitution to invalidate a temporary injunction against driving a car with a lemon painted on it and a message disparaging the dealership which sold the car, and reversing a court of appeals opinion which relied solely on federal law

Summary of this case from Davenport v. Garcia

In Hajek, the court observed that the legislature had amended article 4662 in 1981 to state that a party “may [only] appeal from such order or judgment to the Court of Appeals,” limiting the supreme court's jurisdiction over appeals from the granting or denying of a temporary injunction.

Summary of this case from Town of Flower Mound v. Mockingbird Pipeline, L.P.

In Hajek, the court observed that the legislature had amended article 4662 in 1981 to state that a party "may [only] appeal from such order or judgment to the Court of Appeals," limiting the supreme court's jurisdiction over appeals from the granting or denying of a temporary injunction.

Summary of this case from Fl. Mound v. Mockingbird

dissolving temporary injunction as violative of article one, section eight of Texas Constitution

Summary of this case from Texas Mut. Ins. Co. v. Surety Bank

In Hajek, an automobile dealership brought a libel action against an automobile owner and obtained a temporary injunction to prevent the owner from driving his vehicle with the message that the dealership sold him a "lemon."

Summary of this case from Brammer v. KB Home Lone Star, L.P.

In Hajek, 647 S.W.2d at 255, the Court further narrowed this exception by stating that language which "evoke[s] no threat of danger to anyone... may not be subject to the prior restraint of a temporary injunction."

Summary of this case from Pirmantgen v. Feminelli

In Hajek, the Texas Supreme Court reversed an injunction prohibiting Hajek from driving an automobile with a message painted on all four sides that the dealership had sold him a "lemon."

Summary of this case from Karamchandani v. Ground Technology, Inc.
Case details for

Hajek v. Bill Mowbray Motors Inc.

Case Details

Full title:James HAJEK, Petitioner, v. BILL MOWBRAY MOTORS, INC., Respondent

Court:Supreme Court of Texas

Date published: Mar 16, 1983

Citations

647 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. 1983)

Citing Cases

Kinney v. Barnes

See, e.g., Stuart, 427 U.S. at 561, 96 S.Ct. 2791 (“[I]t is ... clear that the barriers to prior restraint…

Davenport v. Garcia

This court previously indicated that a prior restraint would be permissible only when essential to the…