Opinion
No. 1328 C.D. 2010
07-15-2011
David W. Fox, Individually and on Behalf of a Committee of Concerned Citizens, Appellant v. County of Clearfield, Board of Commissioners of the County of Clearfield, Joan Robinson McMillen, John A. Sobel, Mark B. McCracken, and Clearfield County Board of Assessment Appeals
BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER
David W. Fox, Individually and on Behalf of a Committee of Concerned Citizens (Committee), appeals from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County (trial court) that granted the preliminary objections (POs) filed by the County of Clearfield (County), the Board of Commissioners of the County (Board of Commissioners), Joan Robinson McMillen, John A. Sobel, Mark B. McCracken, and the County Board of Assessment Appeals (Board of Appeals) (collectively, Defendants) and dismissed Mr. Fox's Action in Mandamus and for Declaratory Relief (Complaint) with prejudice. On appeal, Mr. Fox argues that the trial court erred in concluding that: (1) he did not have standing to proceed in this matter; and (2) he had to exercise or exhaust his statutory remedies and could not invoke the trial court's equitable jurisdiction.
The individuals named are the County Commissioners.
Mr. Fox filed the Complaint on January 28, 2010, seeking declaratory judgment from the trial court stating that the County's current taxation system is unconstitutional and illegal on the grounds that it violates article VIII, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (commonly known as the Uniformity Clause). The Complaint also seeks an order from the trial court directing the County to perform a county-wide reassessment, and award of any other relief, such as attorneys' fees, litigation costs, and costs of suit. The Complaint alleged, in relevant part, the following. Mr. Fox is a citizen of the County, owns and resides in a single-family residence in the County, and pays real estate taxes in the County. (Complaint ¶¶ 1-2.) The County is a Sixth Class County subject to The Fourth to Eighth Class County Assessment Law (Law), formerly 72 P.S. §§ 5453.101-5453.706, and, to the extent not inconsistent, The General County Assessment Law (General Law), 72 P.S. §§ 5020-101-5020-602. (Complaint ¶¶ 3, 5.) The last county-wide reassessment was performed in 1989. (Complaint ¶ 16.) The "Defendants are charged with the legal responsibility to determine real property values . . . in [the County] and to levy and collect taxes" in compliance with the Uniformity Clause, as well as the Law and the General Law. (Complaint ¶ 6.) The Complaint set forth the text of the Uniformity Clause, as well as case law interpreting the Uniformity Clause that "a taxpayer is entitled to relief under the Uniformity Clause where his property is assessed at a higher percentage of fair market value than other properties throughout the taxing district." (Complaint ¶¶ 9-12 (quoting Clifton v. Allegheny County, 600 Pa. 662, 689, 969 A.2d 1197, 1213 (2009) (quoting Downingtown Area School District v. Chester County Board of Assessment Appeals, 590 Pa. 459, 466, 913 A.2d 194, 199 (2006))).) Mr. Fox alleged that, upon information and belief, his property "is being taxed at a higher percentage of [its] fair market value than other properties throughout the taxing district," which is unconstitutional pursuant to Clifton, and the appropriate relief is to order a "county-wide reassessment of property values for real estate taxation purposes." (Complaint ¶¶ 13-14.) The Complaint avers numerous ways in which the current assessment system used by the County results in the creation and perpetuation of a system that has an illegal, discriminatory effect among the County's taxpayers, which has permeated and pervaded the entire taxing system. (Complaint ¶¶ 15-18, 31-32.) The Complaint cites various statistical standards recognized by Pennsylvania courts in determining the uniformity of taxation, particularly the Price-Related Differential (PRD), Coefficient of Dispersion (COD), and the Common Level Ratio (CLR), which set forth maximum values under which a county's assessments can be compared to determine the constitutionality of an assessment system, and avers that the County's numbers greatly exceed the maximum values. (Complaint ¶¶ 19-30.) For example, the Complaint cites decisions from this Court in which we recognized that a COD of 15% represents the maximum allowable deviation among assessments for acceptable uniformity. (Complaint ¶ 23.) According to the Complaint, the County's COD was 49.4% in 2006, 54.9% in 2007, and "has exceeded 35% every year since 1989." (Complaint ¶ 25.) Mr. Fox alleged that he has no adequate remedy at law through the Defendants' assessment appeals process, and mandamus is the only appropriate remedy because the appeals process is unavailable and the Board of Commissioners is not interested in performing a county-wide reassessment at the request of a group of the County's residents, the Committee, as evidenced by the Board of Commissioners' response to a letter sent by Mr. Fox and the Committee. (Complaint ¶¶ 34-36.) Mr. Fox attached a copy of that letter to the Complaint.
The Uniformity Clause states that "[a]ll taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws." Pa. Const. art. VIII, § 1.
Act of May 21, 1943, P.L. 571, as amended, repealed by Section 6(1)(ii) of the Act of October 27, 2010, P.L. 895. The Law was replaced by the Consolidated County Assessment Law, 53 Pa. C.S. §§ 8801-8868, effective January 1, 2011. Because this matter arose prior to January 1, 2011, it is still governed by the Law.
Act of May 22, 1933, P.L. 853, as amended. The General Law was repealed insofar as it relates to second class A, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth class counties by Section 6(2) of the Act of October 27, 2010, P.L. 895, effective January 1, 2011. However, because this matter arose prior to January 1, 2011, the provisions of the General Law are applicable here.
The CLR is the percentage determined by the State Tax Equalization Board (STEB) on a county-by-county basis representing "the ratio of assessed value to current market value" currently used in the relevant county. Clifton, 600 Pa. at 692, 969 A.2d at 1215 (quoting, inter alia, Section 102 of the General Law, 72 P.S. § 5020-102). This is based on sales information furnished by the county. Id. The COD is a widely accepted statistical gauge of uniformity in tax assessments that represents "the average deviation from the median, mean, or weighted mean ratio of assessed value to fair market value, expressed as a percentage of that figure." Clifton, 600 Pa. at 694, 969 A.2d at 1216 (quoting Beattie v. Allegheny County, 589 Pa. 113, 131 n.7, 907 A.2d 519, 530 n.7 (2006)). Finally, the PRD measures the assessments in terms of progressivity and regressivity in real estate appraisals: "PRDs above 1.03 tend to indicate assessment regressivity (an appraisal bias in which high-value properties are appraised lower than low-value properties relative to their actual value), while PRDs below 0.98 indicate tax progressivity (. . . high-value properties are appraised higher than low-value properties relative to their actual value)." Clifton, 600 Pa. at 694, 969 A.2d at 1216-17 (quoting Beattie, 589 Pa. at 116 n.2, 907 A.2d at 521 n.2).
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ and "will not lie to compel discretionary acts." Bronson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 491 Pa. 549, 554, 421 A.2d 1021, 1023 (1980). Rather, mandamus may be used "only to compel the performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty where there exists a clear legal right in [the petitioner], a corresponding duty in [the respondents], and the want of any other adequate and appropriate remedy." Waters v. Department of Corrections, 509 A.2d 430, 432 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986) (emphasis added). Mandamus does not establish legal rights, but exists to enforce those rights that are already established. Id.
Defendants filed POs requesting the dismissal of the Complaint. Defendants' first PO, based on Rule 1028(a)(4) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, was that the Complaint was legally insufficient in that Mr. Fox filed the Complaint purportedly acting "on behalf of a Committee of Concerned Citizens," none of whom are identified, and that the failure to identify these individuals violates Rules 1701-1704 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure (relating to the filing of class actions). (POs ¶ 1.) Thus, Defendants requested that Mr. Fox's designation in the caption as a representative of the "Committee of Concerned Citizens" and corresponding averment in paragraph one of the Complaint be stricken as legally immaterial and the Complaint dismissed. (POs ¶¶ 1-3.) Defendants' second PO asserts that the Complaint should be dismissed because Mr. Fox did not exhaust his statutory remedy by appealing his assessment under the Law and that equity jurisdiction is not appropriate here because "[a] uniformity challenge to a particular assessment can and must be raised in a statutory appeal." (POs ¶¶ 4-8 (citing Beattie v. Allegheny County, 589 Pa. 113, 907 A.2d 519 (2006)).) The third PO again attacks the legal sufficiency of the Complaint, asserting, inter alia, that "[b]eyond conclusory allegations of disparity of uniformity, . . . [Mr.] Fox's [C]omplaint contains no allegation of actual empirical studies or statistical proofs prepared by [Mr. Fox] or available to [Mr. Fox] demonstrating disparities in actual assessments" and that the use of the CODs and CLRs are legally insufficient to state a substantial constitutional issue to justify equitable relief. (POs ¶¶ 9-11, 13.) Additionally, the Complaint's allegations are insufficient because the Law permits the use of the County's CLR to replace the County's predetermined ratio (PDR) in the absence of a recent county-wide assessment, which may cause some inequitable assessments. (POs ¶ 12 (citing Appeal of Armco, Inc., 515 A.2d 326 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986).) In the fourth PO, Defendants asserted, pursuant to Rules 1019 and 1028(a)(2) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, that the attachment of the letter that Mr. Fox and the Committee sent to the Board of Commissioners was legally impertinent matter that must be struck and the Complaint dismissed. (POs ¶¶ 17-20.)
After argument and briefing on Defendants' POs, the trial court granted the first and second POs and dismissed the Complaint with prejudice on those grounds. With regard to the first PO, related to Mr. Fox's representational status, the trial court concluded that Mr. Fox did not have representational standing under the Declaratory Judgments Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 7531-7541, because the Complaint failed to sufficiently allege how the unidentified members of the Committee had a direct, immediate, and substantial injury such that they would have standing to proceed in this equitable action. (Trial Ct. Op. at 3-4.) Thus, the trial court sustained Defendants' first PO and dismissed the Complaint. The trial court did not examine Mr. Fox's standing in his individual capacity. As for Defendants' second PO, that Mr. Fox failed to exercise or exhaust his statutory remedy, the trial court agreed and held that, pursuant to Beattie and the Law, Mr. Fox could not circumvent the statutory appeal process to present his uniformity challenge in the trial court's equitable jurisdiction. (Trial Ct. Op. at 4.) The trial court held that, although equitable jurisdiction is available if a taxpayer raises a substantial constitutional issue, such as a frontal attack on an underlying tax statute, and lacks an adequate remedy through the administrative appeal process, the Complaint did not satisfy these requirements and it would not invoke its equitable jurisdiction. (Trial Ct. Op. at 5 (citing Beattie, 589 Pa. at 128-29, 907 A.2d at 528-29, and Borough of Green Tree v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals, and Review of Allegheny County, 459 Pa. 268, 274, 328 A.2d 819, 822 (1974).) The trial court concluded that Mr. Fox failed to support his contention that his property is being taxed at a higher rate of fair market value than other properties, relying only on generalized and conclusory allegations of "taxation inequality," which were insufficient to confer equitable jurisdiction here. (Trial Ct. Op. at 5.) Additionally, the trial court distinguished Clifton on the grounds that the court in that case was exercising equitable jurisdiction to implement a series of ordinances providing for reassessment, the taxpayers were challenging the legality of the particular ordinance and the underlying taxing statute, and the holding was limited to Allegheny County. (Trial Ct. Op. at 6.) The trial court noted that, in fact, the Supreme Court in Clifton confirmed the "general rule that uniformity challenges are to be made through the statutory appeals process." (Trial Ct. Op. at 6-7.) Accordingly, the trial court sustained Defendants' second PO and dismissed the Complaint with prejudice. The trial court did not address Defendants' remaining POs. Mr. Fox now appeals to this Court.
In reviewing the trial court's order and opinion granting preliminary objections, our "review is limited to determining whether that court committed an error of law or abused its discretion." East Lampeter Township v. County of Lancaster, 696 A.2d 884, 886 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). To sustain preliminary objections, "it must appear with certainty that the law will not permit recovery and, where any doubt exists as to whether the preliminary objections should be sustained, that doubt should be resolved by a refusal to sustain them." Peerless Publications, Inc. v. County of Montgomery, 656 A.2d 547, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). "Preliminary objections admit as true all facts which are well pleaded as well as all inferences which are reasonably deducible therefrom." Id.
Mr. Fox first argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the Complaint in its entirety based on the Committee's lack of standing because the Complaint sufficiently set forth the necessary averments to support the determination that the Committee has standing. Moreover, Mr. Fox asserts that dismissing the Complaint in its entirety was improper where, notwithstanding the Committee's status, his individual standing to file the Complaint as an aggrieved property owner and taxpayer was not challenged in any of the POs or at oral argument on those POs.
Mr. Fox is correct that the POs did not challenge his individual standing as an aggrieved property owner and taxpayer to file this action. Rather, the POs challenged Mr. Fox's purported representation of the Committee and his standing to bring the Complaint on behalf of the Committee. Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing the Complaint with prejudice due to a total lack of standing. However, whether Mr. Fox, an individual, has standing to represent the Committee, an association, is a separate question. An association may have standing in a representational capacity where at least one of its members is suffering from a direct, immediate, and substantial injury, even though the association itself is not injured. Concerned Taxpayers of Allegheny County v. Commonwealth, 382 A.2d 490, 493-94 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1978) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975)). In order to assert such standing, the association must allege in its pleading that the member suffered a direct, immediate, and substantial injury as a result of the challenged action. Id. There are two problems with Mr. Fox's assertion that he possesses representational standing on behalf of the Committee in this case. First, the above stated principles would apply if the Committee were bringing an action on behalf of its members, but that is not the situation here. Rather, Mr. Fox, presumably an individual member of the Committee, is attempting to bring an action on behalf of the Committee. Second, although the allegations of the Complaint are admitted for the purposes of a demurrer, Peerless Publications, Inc. v. County of Montgomery, 656 A.2d 547, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995), the Complaint only alleges that the unnamed members are residents of the County. There is no allegation that any members of the Committee have suffered a direct, immediate, or substantial injury as a result of the challenged actions, that they own property, or that their property is unfairly assessed. Indeed, the Complaint does not aver that the Committee members are County taxpayers. Accordingly, the trial court was correct that the Committee does not have standing, and that Mr. Fox cannot assert representational standing on behalf of the Committee. However, because the Committee did not have standing, the appropriate remedy for the trial court would have been to strike the Committee from the caption and remove them as parties to the Complaint, not to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety. Thus, the trial court's dismissal of the Complaint on the basis of this PO was erroneous.
Mr. Fox next argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the Complaint for failing to exercise or exhaust his administrative remedies based on Beattie where this matter is clearly controlled by Clifton, which he asserts authorizes individual taxpayers to bring equitable actions claiming violations of the Uniformity Clause due to outdated county tax assessments that result in pervasive tax inequities. According to Mr. Fox, Clifton stands for the proposition that the individual appeals process "is not adequate when the inequity is pervasive" and "[r]elying upon taxpayers to 'force' application of the CLR [by which individual inequities may be corrected] through individual assessment appeals is no substitute for a constitutionally uniform property assessment in the first instance." Clifton, 600 Pa. at 712, 696 A.2d at 1227-28. Mr. Fox maintains that the Supreme Court, in Clifton, held that in those instances, an equitable action was the most appropriate and best means of raising this issue. Thus, Mr. Fox argues that, because Clifton applies to this challenge, the trial court erred in relying on Beattie and Armco to hold that his uniformity challenges should have been brought through the statutory appeals process and his failure to exhaust that process justified the grant of the County's PO and the dismissal of the Complaint. Moreover, Mr. Fox argues that the Complaint explicitly cites State Tax Equalization Board (STEB) data for the County and the International Association of Assessing Officers (IAAO) standards, which have been judicially recognized by Pennsylvania courts as sufficient to raise a justiciable issue of unconstitutional taxation, and that all of the County's statistics are higher than the statistics at issue in Clifton.
Rule 1028(a)(7) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure states that a party may file preliminary objections to any pleading based on the "failure to exercise or exhaust a statutory remedy." Pa. R.C.P. No. 1028(a)(7). The statutory remedy Mr. Fox asserts is inadequate is found at Section 701(b) of the Law, formerly 72 P.S. § 5453.701(b), which provided in relevant part that, "[a]ny person aggrieved by any assessment whether or not the value thereof shall have been changed since the preceding annual assessment, or any taxing district having an interest therein, may appeal to the board for relief." Id. Thus, when a taxpayer "believes that his property has been inequitably assessed," he "may appeal the assessment to the county board of assessment appeals." Clifton, 600 Pa. at 689 n.23, 969 A.2d at 1213 n.23. Similarly, Section 704(a) of the Law, formerly 72 P.S. § 5453.704(a), stated, in pertinent part, that:
Substantially similar language may be found at Section 8844 of the Consolidated County Assessment Law, 53 Pa. C.S. § 8844.
Substantially similar language may be found at Section 8854 of the Consolidated County Assessment Law, 53 Pa. C.S. § 8854.
[a]ny person who shall have appealed to the board . . . , who may feel aggrieved by the order of the board in relation to such assessment, may appeal from the order of the board to the court and thereupon the court shall proceed . . . to hear said appeal and the proofs in the case.Id. Accordingly, "[t]he board's decision is then appealable to the court of common pleas for a trial de novo." Clifton, 600 Pa. at 689 n.23, 969 A.2d at 1213 n.23. Section 704(b) of the Law outlines those factors a court of common pleas must consider in the de novo trial, including the application of the CLR to the current market value of the property for the tax year in question where the CLR varies by more than fifteen percent from the established predetermined ratio. Former 72 P.S. § 5453.704(b)-(c). Mr. Fox is correct that there are some instances, such as in Clifton, where multiple parties challenge an assessment system on the grounds that the use of that system results in "mass, systematic, non-uniform assessments," and where a county board of assessment appeals would be unable to adequately redress the non-uniformity, and, in those circumstances, a trial court's exercise of its equitable jurisdiction would not be improper. Clifton, 600 Pa. at 683 n.17, 969 A.2d at 1209 n.17. However, after reviewing the Complaint, the POs, the trial court's opinion, and case law, we conclude that this is not one of those circumstances in which a trial court must exercise its equitable jurisdiction.
In Clifton, our Supreme Court noted that the litigation before it, brought by multiple property owners, was the latest in a long line of cases, dating back to 1997, when the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County ordered a new county-wide reassessment, challenging Allegheny County's assessment and reassessment system. The Supreme Court carefully held that it was the tax assessment statutes, as applied in Allegheny County, that violated the Uniformity Clause. The Supreme Court declined to hold, as the trial court had, that all of the Commonwealth's tax assessment statutes permitting the indefinite use of a base year method of valuation for property tax purposes facially violated the Uniformity Clause. Clifton, 600 Pa. at 714, 969 A.2d at 1229. In concluding that the tax assessment statutes, as applied in Allegheny County, violated the Uniformity Clause, the Supreme Court examined numerous factors. It not only looked at the various objective data and indicators of non-uniformity, but also at the "factual underpinnings" of those statistics and "the lack of uniformity that ha[d] arisen over the years in Allegheny County." Id. at 710, 969 A.2d at 1227. The Supreme Court detailed the extensive problems that had beset the Allegheny County assessment system for over a decade, the many ordinances that had been enacted to try to remedy the admitted problems with uniformity, and affirmed the trial court's order granting a county-wide reassessment. Id. at 674-79, 714, 969 A.2d at 1204-08, 1229. Although the Supreme Court reviewed the objective data, such as the CLR, COD, and PRD, it cautioned that "[t]here is no suggestion by . . . this Court[] that deviation from one or more of these standards proves a lack of uniformity. Nor is there any suggestion that a 'mathematically precise' lack of deviation is required for the base year system, as applied, to survive constitutional scrutiny." Id. at 710, 969 A.2d at 1226-27 (emphasis added). Furthermore, although a county cannot satisfy the uniformity requirement by forcing individual taxpayers to file appeals and force the application of the CLR to those properties where the non-uniformity is pervasive, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "[t]here may well be circumstances where use of the CLR and the individual appeal process adequately serves to address cases of particular inequity, and as case law demonstrates, both taxpayers and municipalities make use of the appeals process." Id. at 712, 969 A.2d at 1227.
The laws specifically involved in Clifton were the General Law and the Second Class County Assessment Law, Act of June 21, 1939, P.L. 626, as amended, 72 P.S. §§ 5452.1-5452.20. Clifton, 600 Pa. at 669 n.1, 969 A.2d at 1201 n.1. However, all of the Commonwealth's tax assessment laws "neither require nor . . . prohibit periodic property reassessments" and "thus they permit real estate taxes to be levied on property values that are based upon . . . 'base year market value' for an indefinite period of time." Clifton, 600 Pa. at 669, 969 A.2d at 1201.
The Supreme Court set forth the following history of Allegheny County's assessment system and the litigation that led to Clifton. In the 1980s and 1990s, Allegheny County purported to assess property in the county on the property's actual value in the current taxable year, but did not conduct annual reassessments. Clifton, 600 Pa. at 674, 969 A.2d at 1204. Rather, it used the prior year's assessment and adjusted that assessment based on perceived increase or decrease in property values in the neighborhood in which the property was located. Id. Eventually, an area, but not an entire school district, would be reassessed and the values adjusted, which resulted in the reassessed properties' owners paying proportionally more in taxes than the non-reassessed property owners. Id. In 1996, the Allegheny Board of County Commissioners (Allegheny Commissioners) and Allegheny County Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review (Allegheny Board), adopted resolutions freezing assessments except for those due to physical changes on a property. Id. at 674-75, 969 A.2d at 1204. In 1997, the Allegheny Board "extended the freeze to the 1997 tax year" and intended "the freeze to remain in effect for five years" or until another countywide reassessment occurred. Id. at 675, 969 A.2d at 1204. Property owners filed a lawsuit challenging the freeze, and the trial court held that the freeze violated the Second Class County Code, Act of July 28, 1953, P.L. 723, 16 P.S. §§ 3101-6302, which requires assessment boards to revise and equalize assessments on an annual basis. Clifton, 600 Pa. at 675, 969 A.2d at 1204. The trial court directed the Allegheny Board to make appropriate adjustments but, upon being informed that the assessment system could not be repaired, modified that order to require the completion of a comprehensive countywide reassessment by 2000, for use in the 2001 tax year. Id. at 675, 969 A.2d at 1204-05. "In 2000, Allegheny County became a home-rule entity," and the Allegheny County Council (County Council) adopted an ordinance that required, inter alia, annual reassessments whereupon the trial court ordered an assessment that was completed for use in 2001. Id. at 675, 969 A.2d at 1205. Thereafter, there were several other lawsuits challenging the validity of the new assessments as not being certified and 90,000 taxpayers filed appeals challenging the valuation of their properties. Id. at 675-76, 969 A.2d at 1205. After an annual reassessment occurred in 2002, the ordinance was amended to authorize the use of the 2002 assessment as the base year for 2003-2005, and required that assessments for 2006 would be completed and given "to property owners, with an immediate right to appeal." Id. In early 2005, Allegheny County's Chief Assessor completed a computer-assisted reassessment for 2006 and obtained independent verification that the reassessment satisfied the IAAO standards. Id. The 2005 assessment was never formally certified. Id. In March 2005, County Council enacted Ordinance 15, which authorized the Chief Assessor to "(1) determine the actual value of each property; (2) perform an analysis of the increase or decrease in valuations in different neighborhoods; and (3) and assign a specific valuation limitation for each neighborhood . . . decrease, no change, one percent, two percent, three percent, or four percent." Id. at 676-77, 969 A.2d at 1205. Ordinance 15 was challenged, and the trial court concluded that Ordinance 15 violated, inter alia, the Home Rule Charter and the Uniformity Clause but it did not direct the Allegheny Board to use the 2005 reassessment values because there were still questions over the validity of those numbers. Id. at 677, 969 A.2d at 1205-06. County Council enacted Ordinance 45 in October 2006, providing for the continued use of the 2002 assessment value as the base year but "did not set forth any date by which a reassessment should be completed." Id. at 677, 969 A.2d at 1206. Ordinance 45 also removed the requirement that the Chief Assessment Officer conduct "ratio studies to determine whether the assessed values complied with IAAO uniformity and equality standards." Id. Thereafter, two lawsuits were filed by multiple property owners in Allegheny County challenging the validity of Ordinance 45. Id. at 677-78, 969 A.2d at 1206. The original complaints in Clifton did not focus on the Uniformity Clause, but after the trial court granted certain preliminary objections filed by Allegheny County, the trial court allowed the plaintiffs to file amended complaints which challenged Pennsylvania's assessment laws' indefinite use of base year method on Uniformity Clause grounds. Id. at 679-80, 969 A.2d at 1207-08. The trial court ultimately concluded that all of Pennsylvania's assessment laws that permitted the indefinite use of base year methodology to derive a property's actual value violated the Uniformity Clause, and ordered Allegheny County to undergo "a computer-assisted reassessment" for the 2009 tax year. Id. at 680-82, 969 A.2d at 1208-09. The matter went directly to the Supreme Court on appeal, pursuant to Section 722(7) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 722(7) (providing that the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals from matters where a court of common pleas finds a law constitutionally invalid).
Additionally, the Supreme Court, in Clifton, discussed the exhaustion of remedies in a footnote, stating:
Although not addressed by the parties, we preliminarily note that the trial court properly exercised equity jurisdiction over the present matter
(rather than dismissing appellees' complaints for failure to exhaust the administrative process), because appellees' claim that the base year system results in mass, systematic, non-uniform assessments raises substantial constitutional issues, which a county board of assessment appeals would be unable to adequately redress.Id. at 683 n.17, 969 A.2d at 1209 n.17 (citing Beattie, 589 Pa. at 120-23, 126, 907 A.2d at 524-25, 527). The Supreme Court cited Beattie, in which Allegheny County taxpayers brought a class action asserting an unconstitutional lack of uniformity in the county's method of tax assessment. Beattie, 589 Pa. at 115, 907 A.2d at 520. The trial court sustained Allegheny County's preliminary objections on the basis that taxpayers failed to exhaust statutory remedies. Id. at 117, 907 A.2d at 522. On appeal, this Court affirmed. Id. at 118-19, 907 A.2d at 522-23. On further appeal, the Supreme Court set out a two-pronged test for a taxpayer seeking to invoke a trial court's equitable jurisdiction. "[T]he taxpayer[] must (1) raise a substantial constitutional issue, and (2) lack an adequate remedy through the administrative appeal process." Beattie, 589 Pa. at 122, 907 A.2d at 524-25. The Supreme Court in Beattie held that the administrative appeal process in that case was inadequate because relying on that process would result in a "multiplicity of duplicative lawsuits." Id. at 126, 907 A.2d at 527 (quoting Kowenhoven v. County of Allegheny, 587 Pa. 545, 553, 901 A.2d 1003, 1008 (2006)). In Clifton, there was no need to require the parties to go through a tax assessment appeal process where the trial court already had exercised its equitable jurisdiction, and it was clear from the years of failed county-wide reassessments and assessment appeals that the ongoing litigation of individual assessment appeals before the county board of assessment appeals could not address the constitutional issues. Thus, in Clifton, the taxpayers met both prongs of the Beattie test.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Cappy also questioned whether administrative input would be helpful, noting that "[t]he primary purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to ensure claims will be addressed by the body having expertise in the area." Beattie, 589 Pa. at 134, 907 A.2d at 532 (Cappy, J., concurring) (quoting Lehman v. Pennsylvania State Police, 576 Pa. 365, 380, 839 A.2d 265, 275 (2003)).
Clifton is distinguishable from the case at bar. In making its determination in Clifton, which involved multiple taxpayer lawsuits, that the inequity in Allegheny County was pervasive such that the administrative remedies would not resolve the non-uniformity, the Supreme Court noted the lengthy history of litigation, dating back to 1997, when a county-wide reassessment had been ordered, challenging Allegheny County's assessment and reassessment procedures through both the court of common pleas and individual taxpayer appeals. In contrast, in this single taxpayer Complaint, there are no allegations of a pervasive history of litigation, invalid assessments and reassessments, or numerous individual assessment appeals in the County. Thus, the existence of a multiplicity of duplicative lawsuits that was clearly present in Clifton and Beattie is not present here. Finally, although Mr. Fox argues that he does not need to exhaust the administrative process pursuant to Clifton because he has cited the statistical predicates for showing mass, systematic, non-uniform assessments, i.e., the COD, PRD, and CLR, the Supreme Court cautioned that its decision was not a "suggestion . . . that deviation from one or more of these standards proves a lack of uniformity." Clifton, 600 Pa. at 710, 969 A.2d at 1226-27 (emphasis added). We decline to interpret Clifton as Mr. Fox suggests, i.e., that the pleading of the deviation of one or more of these statistical predicates proves a lack of uniformity, and raises, by itself, a substantial constitutional issue that would create an exception to the general rule that a party must exhaust his administrative remedies.
Moreover, we conclude that the remedy Mr. Fox can obtain through the administrative appeal process in an individual tax assessment appeal is not inadequate, pursuant to Clifton and Beattie, such that the trial court erred in dismissing the Complaint on the grounds that he failed to exhaust those remedies. The gravamen of Mr. Fox's Complaint is found in paragraphs 13 and 14, which state:
13. Upon information and belief, and for the reasons set forth hereinafter, [Mr.] Fox's property is being taxed at a higher percentage of fair market value than other properties throughout the taxing district.(Complaint ¶¶ 13-14 (emphasis added).) Although he cites numerous statistics regarding the tax assessment situation in the County, Mr. Fox's Complaint is that his property is overtaxed. In other words, Mr. Fox is seeking a reduction in his property's assessed value.
14. [Mr.] Fox's property is thus being unfairly and unconstitutionally taxed, such that, under the circumstances, relief must be granted in the form of a county-wide reassessment of property values for real estate taxation purposes. Clifton, [600 Pa. at 689,] 969 A.2d at 1213.
Such was the situation in Armco, where individual taxpayers filed challenges with the county board of assessment appeals seeking a reduction of their properties' assessed values. Armco, 515 A.2d at 328. The county board of assessment denied the appeal, but the trial court reversed and decreased the assessments by applying the CLR to the current market values. The taxing entities appealed to this Court, arguing that Section 704 of the Law violated the Uniformity Clause because it results in a discriminatory treatment of taxpayers, i.e., those who appeal and have the CLR applied to adjust their assessments and those who do not. This Court rejected that contention, noting that there was no discriminatory intent or effect inherent in the Law. Id. at 329. We, in fact, noted that the requirement that a trial court had to adjust a challenged assessment by the CLR, thereby reducing the assessed value, "provides counties with an incentive to maintain the consistency and integrity of their administrative assessments by establishing a method of reviewing administrative assessments that is based upon applying the STEB common level ratio to a property's current market value." Id. Furthermore, we stated that "by holding out to property owners the opportunity to take appeals which can test the base-year-value predetermined-ratio equation, the results of those appeals will inform the county and force it to monitor and reform its assessment levels to reflect reality." Id. at 330. Thus, as evidenced in Armco, a taxpayer or taxing entity is not precluded from raising a Uniformity Clause challenge during an individual tax assessment appeal. See also Downingtown Area School District, 590 Pa. at 466, 913 A.2d at 199 (a taxing entity filed an appeal from the assessment of a property to the board and trial court, raising a Uniformity Clause challenge in those appeals).
Similarly, in Jordan v. Fayette County Board of Assessment Appeals, 782 A.2d 642 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001), a group of taxpayers filed a class action with the trial court challenging the assessment methods used by a county and alleging that their properties, purchased or improved since the mid-1970s, were being assessed in a different manner than other properties. Id. at 643. This resulted, according to the taxpayers, in the non-uniform assessments of their properties and their having to pay a disproportionate share of property taxes, which violated, inter alia, the Uniformity Clause. Id. The trial court granted the county's preliminary objection and dismissed the action because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 643-44. On appeal, the taxpayers alleged that the statutory process provided for by the Law was constitutionally inadequate and that the requirement that they exhaust their statutory appeal remedies be disregarded. Id. at 644. This Court rejected both arguments, holding that the administrative remedy was adequate and, therefore, the trial court did not err in declining to exercise its equitable jurisdiction. We stated that:
[t]he doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies as a restraint upon the exercise of a court's equitable powers not only reflects a recognition of the general assembly's directive of strict compliance with statutorily-prescribed remedies, it also acknowledges that an unjustified failure to follow the administrative scheme undercuts the foundation upon which the administrative process was founded.Id. at 646 (quoting Shenango Valley Osteopathic Hospital v. Department of Health, 499 Pa. 39, 47, 451 A.2d 434, 438 (1982)).
. . . .
The premature interruption of the administrative process restricts the agency's opportunity to develop an adequate factual record, limits the agency in the exercise of its expertise and impedes the development of a cohesive body of law in that area.
Here, as indicated above, Mr. Fox's Complaint is that he is paying a disproportionately high amount of taxes on his property when compared to other properties in the taxing district. This is an issue that can readily be resolved by using the appeal procedures set forth in the Law, including the application of the CLR to determine the proper assessed value of Mr. Fox's property. Although Mr. Fox argues that, pursuant to Clifton, he should not be forced to appeal and have the CLR applied to his property, this situation is not like that in Clifton as discussed above. Essentially, Mr. Fox seeks, as the remedy for the alleged over-assessment of his property, to force the County to reassess every property therein. This remedy is disproportionate to Mr. Fox's desire to have his property properly assessed. Thus, Mr. Fox should follow the statutory procedures for appealing the assessment of his individual property set forth by the General Assembly. If Mr. Fox is unhappy with that result, he, then, can appeal that determination to the trial court and raise the issue of uniformity there. To hold otherwise in this matter would be to encourage the "premature interruption of the administrative process" that would "undercut[] the foundation upon which the administrative process was founded," Jordan, 782 A.2d at 646 (quoting Shenango Valley Osteopathic Hospital, 499 Pa. at 47, 451 A.2d at 438), which would not "ensure [that] claims will be addressed by the body having expertise in the area," Beattie, 589 Pa. at 134, 907 A.2d at 532 (Cappy, J., concurring) (quoting Lehman v. Pennsylvania State Police, 576 Pa. 365, 380, 839 A.2d 265, 275 (2003)). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in dismissing the Complaint pursuant to Rule 1028(a)(7) based on Mr. Fox's failure to exercise or exhaust his administrative remedies.
Finally, the cases relied upon by Mr. Fox in which the courts ordered county-wide reassessments are distinguishable. The cases Mr. Fox relies on involve actions filed by multiple taxpayers or a taxing entity, which essentially was challenging the assessments of all of the properties contained within its borders. Millcreek Township School District v. County of Erie, 714 A.2d 1095, 1109 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (holding that, where school district filed equitable action on grounds that all of the assessments of the properties within its borders violated, inter alia, the Uniformity Clause, a county-wide reassessment was warranted); City of Harrisburg v. Dauphin County Board of Assessment Appeals, 677 A.2d 350, 355 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (holding, inter alia, that where sixty-seven taxpayers brought an equitable action challenging the reassessment of their property by the county as violating the Uniformity Clause and as a de facto county-wide reassessment which violated Section 402(a) of the General Law, 72 P.S. § 5020-402(a), the levying of taxes based on a county-wide reassessment is prohibited until that reassessment is complete); City of Lancaster v. County of Lancaster, 599 A.2d 289, 299-300 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991) (holding that where multiple taxpayers and taxing entities challenged in equity the county's reassessment of ten of sixty taxing districts as violating the Uniformity Clause and as a de facto county-wide reassessment, taxes could not be levied until the reassessment was complete pursuant to Section 402 of the General Law). Moreover, in City of Lancaster, we noted that it was the recent re-evaluations of the properties in that case that created the inequities that pervaded the entire taxing system. Id. at 300. Thus, in those cases, there was no question that, absent filing the equitable action, multiple and duplicative appeals would have been filed to correct the inequities. Such is not the situation here, where Mr. Fox is challenging the assessment of his property. Additionally, Mr. Fox cites Ackerman v. Carbon County, 703 A.2d 82 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997), for the proposition that a group of taxpayers does not have to file a class action to raise a uniformity challenge and to obtain a court-ordered county-wide reassessment. However, Ackerman was a consolidated appeal of 600 individual tax assessment appeals, all arguing that the disparities in their individual property valuations resulting from the county's assessment system violated the Uniformity Clause. Id. at 85 n.1. Indeed, even Clifton involved multiple taxpayer challenges, along with a long history of other litigation, including thousands of individual tax assessment appeals. Accordingly, we conclude that the cases cited by Mr. Fox do not require the trial court to exercise its equitable jurisdiction and order a county-wide reassessment.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in granting the Defendants' PO regarding Mr. Fox's failure to exercise or exhaust his statutory remedies and dismissing the Complaint with prejudice on that basis.
/s/ _________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge ORDER
NOW, July 15, 2011, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County that granted the preliminary objection filed by County of Clearfield, the Board of Commissioners of the County, Joan Robinson McMillen, John A. Sobel, Mark B. McCracken, and the County Board of Assessment Appeals asserting that David W. Fox (Mr. Fox) failed to exercise or exhaust his statutory remedies, and dismissed with prejudice Mr. Fox's Action in Mandamus and for Declaratory Relief on that basis, is hereby AFFIRMED.
/s/ _________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge