Opinion
May 13, 1996
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Berler, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
Contrary to the contention of the defendant Harry Campbell, the plaintiff established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the credit agreement executed by Campbell expressly and unambiguously made him a co-obligor thereunder, notwithstanding the fact that he signed it in his corporate capacity ( see, Brewster Tr. Mix Corp. v. McLean, 169 A.D.2d 1036). Significantly, the agreement consisted of a single page of clearly worded language and made references to both Campbell and his wholly-owned corporation. Therefore, this is not a situation wherein the plaintiff attempted to trap an unwary corporate officer into making an unintended assumption of personal liability by inserting an obscure clause in the midst of a lengthy and complex contract ( see generally, Brewster Tr. Mix Corp. v. McLean, supra; Paribas Props. v. Benson, 146 A.D.2d 522; cf., Salzman Sign Co. v. Beck, 10 N.Y.2d 63; Trenga Realty v Tiseo, 117 A.D.2d 951; Warren-Connolly Co. v. Saphin, 283 App. Div. 391). Accordingly, Campbell's attempt to avoid personal responsibility by observing that he wrote "Pres." after his signature on the agreement is unavailing under the particular circumstances of this case.
Furthermore, Campbell's claims that he neither read nor understood the terms of the agreement and that he was misled by unspecified oral representations as to its contents are patently inadequate to raise a triable issue of fact ( see, Florence v Merchants Cent. Alarm Co., 51 N.Y.2d 793; Martino v. Kaschak, 208 A.D.2d 698; Koster v. Ketchum Communications, 204 A.D.2d 280; Touloumis v. Chalem, 156 A.D.2d 230; Chemical Bank v. Kaufman, 142 A.D.2d 526). Therefore, partial summary judgment was properly awarded in favor of the plaintiff. Mangano, P.J., Miller, Ritter and Pizzuto, JJ., concur.