PER CURIAM.

Shlomo Y. Hecht, P.A., and Shlomo Y. Hecht (Miramar), for appellant.

Legon Fodiman, P.A., and Todd A. Fodiman, and Todd R. Legon and Clayton D. Hackney, for appellee.

Before FERNANDEZ, LINDSEY, and GORDO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See De Cespedes v. Bolanos, 711 So. 2d 216, 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) ("The absence of a general time of performance, however, is not fatal to the enforceability of this contract. ‘The general Florida rule is that when a contract does not expressly fix the time for performance of its terms, the law will imply a reasonable time.’ "); Indep. Mortg. & Fin., Inc. v. Deater, 814 So. 2d 1224, 1225 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) ("Simply because a contract is unclear as to when payment must be made does not relieve a party of an obligation to make payment. Where an agreement does not specify the time for payment or provides for an indeterminate or indefinite time, the law implies that payment will be made within a reasonable time."); cf. Vision Palm Springs, LLLP v. Michael Anthony Co., 272 So. 3d 441, 446-7 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) ("Here, no settlement was finalized prior to Vision withdrawing its consent. While the parties engaged in preliminary negotiations, there was no enforceable settlement agreement because there was no assent by all of the parties to an agreement that was sufficiently specific and mutually agreeable as to every essential element. Coscan's counsel maintained throughout the negotiations that the insurance carrier would need to sign off before any agreement could be finalized. Thus, Coscan did not agree to the last of the proposed changes to the Second Revised Agreement prior to Vision revoking its agreement to settle because the carrier still had not given its approval.").