Summary
In Eretz Funding, Ltd. v. Shalosh Associates, 266 AD2d 184, 185 (2nd Dept 1999), the Court instructed that, "[a] party seeking to be relieved of its default must establish both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Fennell v. Mason, 204 AD2d 599)."
Summary of this case from Pyatigorsky v. DerbaremdikerOpinion
Argued September 14, 1999
November 1, 1999
Max Markus Katz, P.C., New York, N.Y., for appellants.
Novak Juhase, Woodmere, N.Y. (G. Alexander Novak of counsel), for respondents.
GUY JAMES MANGANO, P.J., CORNELIUS J. O'BRIEN, DAVID S. RITTER, ROBERT W. SCHMIDT, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
In an action to recover on a mortgage note, the defendants appeal (1) from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (McCarty, J.), dated September 1, 1998, which denied their motion to vacate a judgment of the same court entered January 16, 1998, upon their default in opposing the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and (2), as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the same court, dated October 23, 1998, as, upon reargument, adhered to the original determination.
ORDERED that the appeal from the order dated September 1, 1998, is dismissed, as that order was superseded by the order dated October 23, 1998, made upon reargument; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order dated October 23, 1998, is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,
ORDERED that the respondents are awarded one bill of costs.
A party seeking to be relieved of its default must establish both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see, CPLR 5015[a] [1]; Fennell v. Mason, 204 A.D.2d 599 ). Under the circumstances of this case, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in rejecting the defendants' vague and unsubstantiated excuse of law office failure (see, Rosado v. Economy El. Co., 236 A.D.2d 598; Correa v. Ahn, 205 A.D.2d 575 ). The defendants were aware that the plaintiffs obtained a default judgment against them and took no steps to vacate the default until the plaintiffs obtained a restraining order freezing a bank account. Such conduct constituted an intentional default, which is not excusable (see, Roussodimou v. Zafiriadis, 238 A.D.2d 568 ;Perellie v. Crimson's Rest., 108 A.D.2d 903 ).
MANGANO, P.J., O'BRIEN, RITTER, and SCHMIDT, JJ., concur.