Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-3006.
June 24, 2004
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court are Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's response thereto. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motions are granted.
I. Background
The following facts are undisputed by the parties. Plaintiff, Stephen Edwards, owns a limousine service called A Super-Limo Company ("Super-Limo"). This company is incorporated in the State of Nevada and operates out of Phoenix, Arizona. At the beginning of 2000, Plaintiff spoke with DeRonde Lynn Czelazawicz, a subcontracting driver seeking work with Super-Limo in the Connecticut area, about purchasing a 1997 Lincoln Town Car ("Town Car"). Plaintiff wired approximately $16,075 to Ms. Czelazawicz's mother's bank account, so that Ms. Czelazawicz could purchase the Town Car. Plaintiff further instructed Ms. Czelazawicz to title the Town Car in her name, and provided her funds to purchase insurance and maintain the vehicle. Ms. Czelazawicz purchased the Town Car on January 12, 2000, and titled and insured it in her name as agreed.
This was done because Ms. Czelazawicz did not have her own bank account.
During this same time, Plaintiff had a business relationship with Mr. Louis Devers. Mr. Devers owned a company called All Star Limousine. Occasionally, All Star Limousine would subcontract to drive for Plaintiff's Philadelphia-based Super-Limo clients. In the course of these business dealings, Mr. Devers mentioned to Plaintiff that his business was doing well, and that he was looking to add another Lincoln Town Car to his inventory. Plaintiff offered him the use of the Town Car titled in Ms. Czelazawicz's name, and Mr. Devers accepted the offer. The essence of the agreement was that Mr. Devers would pay Plaintiff $500 a month for the use of the Town Car, and Plaintiff would pay Mr. Devers for all of the business that All Star Limousine provided to Super-Limo customers.
In August 2000, Plaintiff, Ms. Czelazawicz, Mr. Devers and Mr. Devers' business partner Stan Levin met to turn over the vehicle. Plaintiff directed Ms. Czelazawicz to sign the Connecticut title and turn it over to Mr. Devers, which she did. Plaintiff claims that he directed Mr. Devers to title the Town Car in the name of Super Limo Philadelphia. Mr. Devers disputes this, but this fact is not crucial to the resolution of the case. In fact, Mr. Devers titled the Town Car in the name of All Star Limousine, and continued to drive the Town Car for Super-Limo business as well as for All Star Limousine business.
The Court notes that Mr. Devers correctly asserted that he could not legally title the car in the name of Super Limo Philadelphia, because he was not an owner of Super-Limo and had no legal authority to sign on its behalf.
Plaintiff alleges that during this time he was in negotiations with Mr. Devers to purchase All Star Limousine. Mr. Devers disputes this claim, but again, this issue is not dispositive to the case. Plaintiff admits there was no written agreement concerning the purchase of All Star Limousine and that there had been no formalization of the relationship, such that it would give him an ownership interest in the company.
The Defendant Police Officers confirmed this by reviewing All Star Limousine's corporate documents which indicate that only Mr. Devers and Mr. Levin are shareholders and officers in the company. (Defs. Kelly and Harran's Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. Q at 114-18, Ex. H (Devers-1).)
Around October 2000, the business relationship between Plaintiff and All Star Limousine broke down, and Plaintiff demanded the Town Car be returned to him. Mr. Devers failed to appear with the Town Car at two pre-arranged meetings, and both times Plaintiff called the Bensalem Police Department to report the Town Car as stolen. Plaintiff made several police reports and began to regularly and frequently contact Defendant Officer Fredrick Harran asking that his car be listed in the National Crime Information Center ("NCIC") database as stolen. Plaintiff was told by the police that he should file a private criminal complaint to get his car back, and that because he had originally given Mr. Devers the Town Car to use, it would not be considered stolen for purposes of listing in the NCIC database. The Town Car was listed in the NCIC database for unauthorized use.
Around mid-November 2000, Plaintiff contacted Charmaine Gray, a service representative at the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation ("PennDot"). Ms. Gray sent Plaintiff paperwork to request a duplicate title and eventually processed the paperwork that retitled the Town Car in Plaintiff's name. On that paperwork, Plaintiff indicated that the owner of the Town Car was Allstar Limousine, changed the business address to an address in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (not the address of Allstar Limousine), indicated the duplicate title was needed because the previous title was "lost or stolen," and signed the form in the block entitled "Signature of Owner or Authorized Person." Plaintiff claims he told Ms. Gray that he was in the process of purchasing Allstar Limousine, but that he had terminated the relationship. Plaintiff admits the MV-38 PennDot document included in Defendants Kelly and Harran's Motion for Summary Judgement is in fact, the document he completed and signed. (Defs. Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. C at 114-18, Ex. H (Devers-1).)
Ms. Gray disputes this. She testified at her deposition that Plaintiff told her on multiple occasions that he was the owner of All Star Limousine. (Defs. Kelly and Harran's Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. K.) This fact, however, is not dispositive in this case. Defendant Officers charged Plaintiff with forgery, securing the execution of documents by deception and tampering with public records, based on the PennDot documents he admits he filled out, and a copy of a certified check with several discrepancies on it. What Plaintiff told Ms. Gray is immaterial to the case against him because the documents speak for themselves. (Defs. Kelly and Harran's Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. H (Devers-1).)
During this time, Plaintiff continued to call the Bensalem Police Department and request that they list the Town Car in the NCIC database as stolen. On November 27, 2000 Defendant Officer Harran contacted Defendant Officer Kelly of the Eastern Auto Theft Task Force and asked that he investigate the possibility that the Town Car had two separate titles. Shortly thereafter, Defendant Officer Kelly contacted PennDot and received a title history for the Town Car. The title history indicated that a duplicate title had recently been issued and that subsequently, the title had been transferred from All Star Limousine to Plaintiff. Defendant Officer Kelly reviewed the paperwork effecting the transfer, as well as the original request for a duplicate title. Both documents had what was later determined to be Plaintiff's signature upon them.
During the days that followed, Defendant Officer Kelly contacted Ms. Czelazawicz, Mr. Devers, and Mr. Levin, to determine their involvement in the matter and to piece together the events leading up to the transfer of title from Ms. Czelazawicz to Mr. Devers as detailed above. Mr. Devers and Mr. Levin provided Defendant Officer Kelly with All Star Limousine's corporate documents and share certificates demonstrating that Plaintiff was neither a corporate officer nor a part owner of the company. Both men also confirmed that they had not given Plaintiff verbal or written authority to act on behalf of All Star Limousine. Finally, they reviewed the PennDot documents ordering the duplicate title and transferring the Town Car's title to Plaintiff. They informed Defendant Officer Kelly that the signatures on the documents were not theirs.
On December 13, 2000, Defendant Officer Kelly and Defendant Officer Turk, another member of the Eastern Auto Theft Task Force, met with Ms. Gray at PennDot. Ms. Gray told Defendants that she received a phone call from Plaintiff who claimed he was the owner of All Star Limousine and that he had lost the title to the Town Car. Ms. Gray said that she express mailed Plaintiff a form to obtain a duplicate title (MV-38), a form to correct the Vehicle of Record (MV-41), and a form to transfer ownership of the vehicle (MV-4ST). (Defs. Kelly and Harran's Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. Q at 8-9.)
On January 9, 2000, Defendant Officer Kelly contacted Gertrude Jones, a notary public from Arizona whose signature and stamp appear upon the Application for Duplicate Certificate of Title by Owner. Ms. Jones confirmed that she had notarized some paperwork for Plaintiff relating to the State of Pennsylvania, and that Plaintiff had signed the paperwork in her presence. (Defs. Kelly and Harran's Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. Q at 8-9.)
Following their investigation, Defendant Officers Kelly and Turk executed an affidavit of probable cause to support the arrest of Plaintiff on four counts of Forgery, four counts of Tampering with Public Records and four counts of Securing Execution of Documents by Deception. (Defs. Kelly and Harran's Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. P, Def. Turk's Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. H.)
Plaintiff surrendered to authorities, and following a preliminary hearing on December 12, 2001, he was held over on 3 counts of Securing Execution of Documents by Deception. (Defs. Kelly and Harran's Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. R.) The case against Plaintiff was nol-prossed on August 6, 2002, on motion from Assistant District Attorney Edward Spreha.
Plaintiff filed the instant complaint on May 8, 2003, alleging Defendant Officers Harran, Kelly and Turk violated his civil rights through false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and arresting Plaintiff without probable cause.
II. Standard of Review
A motion for summary judgment will be granted where all of the evidence demonstrates "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Since a grant of summary judgment will deny a party its chance in court, all inferences must be drawn in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. U.S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The ultimate question in determining whether a motion for summary judgment should be granted is "whether reasonable minds may differ as to the verdict." Schoonejongen v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 143 F.3d 120, 129 (3d Cir. 1998). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
III. Discussion
A. Counts I through IV Alleging Civil Rights Violations Under the Fourth Amendment.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Officers Harran, Kelly and Turk violated his 4th Amendment right to be free from arrest, detention and prosecution without probable cause. The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation . . ." U.S. Const. Amend IV. The Supreme Court defines probable cause as "a reasonable ground for belief of guilt and that the belief of guilt must be particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized." Maryland v. Pringle, 124 S.Ct. 795, 800 (2003) (quoting Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979)). This is a "totality of the circumstances" test, in which the Court must carefully consider all the "facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge . . ." Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff claims that Defendants had no probable cause to believe that he was guilty of forgery, securing execution of documents by deception, and tampering with public records. Police arrested Plaintiff pursuant to a Governor's warrant executed on May 16, 2001, based upon the sworn affidavit of Defendant Officers Kelly and Turk. In order to prevail, Plaintiff must show that the affidavit supporting his arrest warrant lacked probable cause or would have lacked probable cause, but for some material misrepresentation or omission. The Plaintiff in his complaint alleges the latter.
The Court begins its analysis with the presumption that the affidavit supporting the warrant was valid. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978). In order to overcome this presumption, Plaintiff must satisfy a two part test as outlined in Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 1997). Specifically, plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) that the affiant knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a falsehood in applying for a warrant; and
(2) that such statements or omissions are material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 399.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Officers Kelly and Turk made a number of omissions in their Affidavit of Probable Cause ("the Affidavit") that led to the warrant being issued for his arrest. The Court will discuss each individually.
The Court notes Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Officer Harron seem limited to the fact that he participated in some capacity in the investigation. He is not listed on the Affidavit of Probable Cause and therefore cannot be liable for any alleged misrepresentations or omissions contained therein.
Plaintiff begins by arguing Defendant Officers Harron, Kelly and Turk brought charges against him in retaliation for his incessant phone calls to the Bensalem police station with regard to his Town Car. Plaintiff fails, however, to provide any evidence to support this contention beyond his own bare assertions.
Next, Plaintiff claims the Affidavit fails to recognize that Plaintiff was the true or equitable owner of the Town Car. In fact, not only does the Affidavit recount Plaintiff's claim of ownership (including detailing the documents produced by Plaintiff to prove his claim) (Pl.'s Opp. Ex. H at 1), but the Affidavit also reports the result of an inquiry to Yankee Auto Group confirming that Plaintiff "paid for the [Town Car] with a Webster Bank cashiers check. [The Owner of Yankee Auto Group] also stated that [Plaintiff] titled the vehicle in [Ms. Czelazawicz's] name." (Pl.'s Opp. Ex. H at 5.) Finally, the Affidavit recounts the arrangement between All Star Limousine and Plaintiff, whereby All Star would pay Plaintiff $500 per month for use of the Town Car. (Pl.'s Opp. Ex. H at 6-7.) Given this evidence, the Court finds there was sufficient information within the Affidavit to inform the Magistrate of the weight of evidence supporting Plaintiff's ownership claim.
Yankee Auto Group is the entity from whom Ms. Czelazawicz originally purchased the Town Car.
Next, Plaintiff argues that the Affidavit fails to mention that Defendant Officer Kelly caught Ms. Czelazawicz in a lie. During the course of Defendant Officer Kelly's investigation, he asked Ms. Czelazawicz to explain the purchase of the Town Car. Ms. Czelazawicz originally said that she bought the Town Car with a money order. Defendant Officer Kelly then confronted her with the statement from the owner of Yankee Auto Group that Plaintiff was the actual purchaser of the Town Car, and Ms. Czelazawicz was simply his agent. Ms. Czelazawicz then admitted, that she had lied and that she and Plaintiff were partners in a limousine business. Although the veracity of witnesses is relevant to a determination of probable cause, Ms. Czelazawicz's uncorroborated testimony did not form the basis for any part of the factual information surrounding the charges leveled against Plaintiff. At most, Ms. Czelazawicz's testimony (nearly all of which was corroborated by other sources), formed the basis for the background leading up to Plaintiff's illegal actions, and not information concerning the illegal acts themselves. In other words, even accepting that Plaintiff was the rightful owner of the Town Car, it was the manner in which he changed the title from All Star Limousine to his name that is the source of the criminal complaint against him. Ms. Czelazawicz's statement, false or otherwise, had no part in this determination. It is therefore immaterial, and fails the second part of Sherwood's two part test.
Plaintiff's next argument is that Defendant Officers Kelly and Turk mischaracterized the nature of the title transfer from Ms. Czelazawicz to All Star Limousine. According to Plaintiff, Ms. Czelazawicz signed over an open title, and Plaintiff instructed Mr. Devers to title the car in the name of Super Limo Philadelphia. Even accepting this version as true, it does not change the information that formed the basis for the probable cause warrant against Plaintiff. There was still sufficient evidence that Plaintiff's subsequent actions to retitle the Town Car in his name constituted forgery, tampering with public records, and securing execution of documents by deception. The fact that Plaintiff had been wronged by Mr. Devers and Ms. Czelazawicz does not then allow him to reassert his ownership rights by falsifying a PennDot duplicate title request and thereafter signing over the title to himself. Pennsylvania law provides a civil action for regaining possession of wrongfully retained chattels such as the Town Car. The Bensalem Police Department advised Plaintiff to pursue such avenues, but instead he chose to engage in illegal self help. Any mischaracterization of the title transfer from Ms. Czelazawicz to All Star Limousine is immaterial.
Plaintiff also argues that the Police trumped up charges against him based on the copies of the cashiers check used to purchase the Town Car, that the Plaintiff himself provided to investigators and PennDot. Defendant Officers Kelly and Turk detail in the Affidavit several discrepancies between the copy of the check Plaintiff provided to PennDot and Bensalem Police to prove his ownership of the Town Car (hereinafter referred to as the "First Copy") and the copy of the check purporting to be the same that was faxed to the Bensalem Police with the Town Car's insurance card (hereinafter referred to as the "Second Copy"). These discrepancies included: the check number on the Second Copy was out of alignment and seemed to run towards the upper right hand corner of the check, the payee listed on the First Copy was "Yankee Auto Group Inc." and the payee on the Second Copy was "Yankee Auto Group" and the signature of "Christine Nadeau" on the Second Copy was off set from the signature line, whereas the signature was completely on the line in the First Copy. (Pl. Opp. Ex. H at 3). Subsequent investigation by Defendant Officer Kelly determined that the First Copy was an accurate copy of the original check used to purchase the Town Car. (Pl. Opp. Ex. H at 5). This information was reported in the Affidavit. No satisfactory explanation has ever been provided for the discrepancies in the Second Copy. From the information provided above, there is probable cause to believe that regardless of whether the First Copy was accurate, there were some valid questions as to the authenticity of the Second Copy, such it would lead a reasonable person to suspect Plaintiff committed the crime of forgery.
Plaintiff's final argument is that because the Defendant Officers knew Plaintiff was the rightful owner of the Town Car and that he was simply trying to correct the title to reflect his ownership status, they knew he was not trying to defraud anyone, a necessary element of the crime of forgery. In addition, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Officers knew that because of his rightful ownership status, he did not "knowingly make a false entry in" a government record, a required element of the crime of Tampering with Public Records or Information. Both of these arguments attempt to side step the fundamental principles upon which our legal system is based.
Rightly or wrongly, the Town Car was titled in the name of All Star Limousine. Only an owner or authorized person of All Star Limousine could request a duplicate title and subsequently sign over such title to Plaintiff. Plaintiff, by his own admission, was not an owner of All Star Limousine. Even accepting Plaintiff's version regarding the negotiation of a buyout of All Star Limousine as true, the required legal acts, such as the issuing of share certificates, and the amendment and filing of corporate documents did not take place. Plaintiff was not an owner of All Star Limousine when he signed the PennDot forms.
Neither did Mr. Devers nor Mr. Levin authorize Plaintiff to order a duplicate title. Indeed, if Mr. Devers and Mr. Levin had been of the same mind with Plaintiff, ordering the duplicate title would not have been required in the first place, they would have simply signed over the title to Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff could not rightfully sign as an authorized person.
Instead of seeking legal redress with the courts to recover his property, Plaintiff attempted to pass himself off as an owner of All Star Limousine, and ordered a duplicate title claiming that the first title was "lost/stolen." Plaintiff admits he signed as the owner/authorized person on the MV-38 Application for Duplicate Certificate of Title Form, the MV-41 Application For Correction or Change Of Vehicle Record and the MV-4ST used to transfer ownership of the Town Car from All Star to Plaintiff. Therefore, Defendants correctly surmised that Plaintiff had changed the title over to his name in a fraudulent manner. Given all the circumstances known to Defendant Officers Kelly and Turk and provided in the Affidavit, there is more than sufficient evidence to constitute probable cause for the charges of forgery, tampering with public records or information, and securing execution of documents by deception. For these reasons, Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment as to Counts I-IV are granted.
B. Counts V, VI, and VII Alleging State Law Claims for False Imprisonment, Malicious Prosecution, and False Arrest
In his complaint, Plaintiff also makes state law claims for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and false arrest.
To prove false imprisonment, Plaintiff must show that he was detained, and such detention was unlawful. Patton v. Vucinic, 167 A. 450, 452 (Pa.Super. 1933). On the facts in this case, Plaintiff can prove he was detained. There was, however, sufficient probable cause within the Affidavit supporting his arrest warrant, and therefore as a matter of law, the police detained him lawfully. For this reason, Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are granted as to Count V.
Malicious prosecution requires proof that Defendants instituted proceedings against Plaintiff without probable cause, and that the subsequent proceedings were terminated in favor of the Plaintiff. Douris v. County of Bucks, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9282, *34 (July 3, 2001, E.D. Pa.). Here again, Plaintiff's claim fails because the Defendant Officers had sufficient probable cause to institute proceedings against him. Therefore, the Court grants Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment on Count VI.
Under Pennsylvania law, to win judgment on a claim for false arrest a Plaintiff must prove that either his arrest was made without probable cause or the arrest was made by a person without authority to do so. Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 295 (Pa. 1994). The Court has already found that there was sufficient probable cause to warrant Plaintiff's arrest. Plaintiff makes no argument that the Defendant Officers lacked the authority to arrest him, nor could he on these facts. Therefore, the Court grants Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment as to Count VII.
IV. Conclusion
For all the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. An appropriate order follows.