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holding that the plaintiff could not bring an Article 78 action alleging violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") because the IDEA did not contain a private right of action and no implied right of action exists
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519463
06-04-2015
In the Matter of EAST RAMAPO CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant, v. John B. KING Jr., as Commissioner of Education, et al., Respondents.
Minerva & D'Agostino, P.C., Valley Stream (David J. Butler of Morgan Lewis, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for appellant. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Jeffrey W. Lang of counsel), for respondents.
Minerva & D'Agostino, P.C., Valley Stream (David J. Butler of Morgan Lewis, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for appellant.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Jeffrey W. Lang of counsel), for respondents.
Before: PETERS, P.J., EGAN JR., ROSE and LYNCH, JJ.
Opinion
PETERS, P.J.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Melkonian, J.), entered February 3, 2014 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to, among other things, review a determination of respondent State Education Department which found that petitioner's dispute resolution practices relating to several students' individualized education programs violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. This appeal involves the ability of petitioner, a local educational agency (hereinafter LEA) (see 20 U.S.C § 1401 [19][A]; 34 C.F.R. 300.28 [a] ), to challenge a determination of respondent State Education Department, a state educational agency (hereinafter SEA) (see 20 U.S.C. § 1401 [32]; 34 C.F.R. 300.41 ), that regulated and enforced petitioner's compliance with the mandates of the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (see 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. [hereinafter IDEA] ). The dispositive issue here is whether the IDEA grants petitioner a private right of action to challenge the State Education Department's determination which, among other things, found that its dispute resolution practices relating to the provision of a free appropriate public education to students with disabilities violated state laws and regulations promulgated in accordance with the IDEA, and directed it to take certain corrective measures to bring its practices into conformance therewith. We hold that the IDEA does not confer upon petitioner such a private right of action. To receive federal funding under the IDEA, the State Education Department is required to establish and maintain policies and procedures to ensure that students with disabilities receive, among other things, a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment and an individualized education program tailored to their unique needs, and that these students and their parents are afforded certain procedural safeguards (see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412 [a][1], [4], [5], [6][A]; 1415; 34 C.F.R. 300.100 ). In comparison, petitioner's receipt of funding under the IDEA is conditioned upon its annual submission of “a plan that provides assurances to” the State Education Department that, in its provision of education to students with disabilities, it, among other things, complies with the policies and procedures that the State Education Department established pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (20 U.S.C. § 1413 [a][1]; see 34 C.F.R. 300.200 ).
Contrary to petitioner's contention, this issue was properly preserved for our review, as respondents raised the affirmative defense in their answer and accompanying memorandum of law (see CPLR 3211[a][7] ; [e]; Butler v. Catinella, 58 A.D.3d 145, 150–151, 868 N.Y.S.2d 101 [2008] ).
In 2012, exercising its authority to monitor and regulate petitioner's compliance with its policies and procedures (see 20 U.S.C. § 1416 [a][3]; § 1412 [a][6][A]; 34 C.F.R. 300.600 ), the State Education Department reviewed various student records, determined that petitioner's dispute resolution practices violated federal and state law and directed petitioner to take certain corrective action. In response, petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the determination on the basis that the State Education Department's findings were unsupported by substantial evidence and premised on an erroneous construction of the IDEA. Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the merits, and petitioner now appeals.
Inasmuch as the IDEA does not expressly confer upon petitioner a private right of action to contest the State Education Department's regulatory and enforcement actions (see Lake Washington Sch. Dist. No. 414 v. Office of Supt. of Pub. Instruction, 634 F.3d 1065, 1068 [9th Cir.2011] ; Traverse Bay Area Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Michigan Dept. of Educ., 615 F.3d 622, 627–628 [6th Cir.2010] ; Lawrence Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. New Jersey, 417 F.3d 368, 371 [3d Cir.2005] ; County of Westchester v. New York, 286 F.3d 150, 152 [2d Cir.2002] ), we need only focus on whether Congressional intent to create such a right may be implicitly discerned from the IDEA's statutory and regulatory provisions (see Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–287, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 [2001] ; Lopez v. Jet Blue Airways, 662 F.3d 593, 596 [2d Cir.2011] ; see also Cruz v. TD Bank, N.A., 22 N.Y.3d 61, 70, 979 N.Y.S.2d 257, 2 N.E.3d 221 [2013] ). In determining whether an implied statutory right of action exists, the principal inquiry is whether Congress intended to create the right, with additional consideration given to whether the federal statute was enacted for the benefit of a specialized class, whether recognition of a private right of action would promote the purposes of the statute and whether the right is one typically afforded to the states (see Transamerica Mtge. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23–24, 100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 [1979] ; Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 [1975] ; Young v. Robertshaw Controls Co., Uni–Line Div., 104 A.D.2d 84, 91, 481 N.Y.S.2d 891 [1984] [Levine, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part] ).
To begin, it is significant that Congress created procedural safeguards to ensure that students with disabilities receive a free appropriate public education and, in doing so, expressly granted a private right of action to “any party aggrieved” by an SEA's administrative findings or decision resolving a due process complaint challenging “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of [a particular] child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child” (20 U.S.C. § 1415 [b][6] [A]; [f], [g], [i][2][A]; see also Education Law § 4404 ; 8 NYCRR 200.5 [i], [j], [k], [l] ). Since the IDEA includes an express right of action in favor of a specific class of persons, it is logical to assume that, had Congress intended to bestow upon LEAs a right of action to challenge an SEA's regulatory and enforcement actions, it would have expressly done so (see Traverse Bay Area Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Michigan Dept. of Educ., 615 F.3d at 629–630 ; County of Westchester v. New York, 286 F.3d at 152 ; Matter of Doe v. City of Schenectady, 84 A.D.3d 1455, 1458, 923 N.Y.S.2d 241 [2011] ).
Because petitioner challenged the State Education Department's regulatory determination, rather than its administrative determination resolving a due process complaint involving a particular child's education, petitioner is not a “party aggrieved” (20 U.S.C. § 1415 [b][6][A]; [i] [2] [A] ).
Further evidence of a lack of Congressional intent can be found in the hierarchal regulatory and enforcement structure created by the IDEA, which requires the federal Secretary of Education to monitor the states' implementation of IDEA mandates and imposes upon the states corresponding regulatory and enforcement responsibilities over LEAs (see 20 U.S.C. § 1412 [a] [11]; § 1416 [a][3]; 34 C.F.R. 300.600, 300.603 ). The delegation of regulatory and enforcement power to the Secretary of Education and the states, but not to LEAs, suggests that Congress specifically intended to deny LEAs a right of action to challenge an SEA's compliance with the IDEA (see
Traverse Bay Area Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Michigan Dept. of Educ., 615 F.3d at 630 ; cf. People v. Grasso, 42 A.D.3d 126, 135, 836 N.Y.S.2d 40 [2007], affd. 11 N.Y.3d 64, 862 N.Y.S.2d 828, 893 N.E.2d 105 [2008] ; Simpson v. New York City Tr. Auth., 112 A.D.2d 89, 90, 491 N.Y.S.2d 645 [1985], affd. 66 N.Y.2d 1010, 499 N.Y.S.2d 396, 489 N.E.2d 1298 [1985] ). Moreover, it would be inconsistent for Congress to implicitly create this right of action, as doing so would divest the Secretary of Education and the states of their regulatory and enforcement authority and would transfer that power to the Judiciary (see County of Westchester v. New York, 286 F.3d at 153 ; Conboy v. AT & T Corp., 241 F.3d 242, 253 [2d Cir.2001] ; see also Hudes v. Vytra Health Plans Long Is., 295 A.D.2d 788, 789–790, 744 N.Y.S.2d 80 [2002], lv. denied 99 N.Y.2d 505, 755 N.Y.S.2d 711, 785 N.E.2d 733 [2003] ).
Upon the foregoing, we hold that Congress did not intend to grant petitioner a right of action to challenge the State Education Department's enforcement of state laws and regulations promulgated under the IDEA. In light of our determination, respondents' alternate argument for affirmance is academic.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
EGAN JR., ROSE and LYNCH, JJ., concur.