Opinion
1994.
(77210) Turgeon v. Commonwealth Edison Co. No. 2-93-0388, filed 03/21/94 ........................... Denied.
(77637) Urbas v. Saintco, Inc. No. 5-91-0296, filed 06/30/94 ........................ Withdrawn.
(77198) Vacala v. Village of La Grange Park No. 1-92-1553, filed 03/31/94 ........................... Denied.
(77224) Valencia v. Valencia Rule 23 Orders Nos. 3-93-0393, 3-93-0564, filed 04/07/94 ................................................ Denied.
(77700) Vieira v. Vieira Rule 23 Order No. 5-93-0333, filed 06/22/94 ............. Denied.
(77639) Vogt v. Bartelsmeyer No. 5-92-0832, filed 06/29/94 ........................... Denied.
(77484) Waterford Executive Group, Ltd. v. Clark Bardes, Inc. No. 2-93-0373, filed 04/22/94 ........................... Denied.
(77488) Weck v. La Mantia Rule 23 Order No. 2-93-0090, filed 05/19/94 ............. Denied.
(77651) Weisblatt v. Colky No. 1-93-3165, filed 06/30/94 ........................... Denied.
(77448) Westwood Forum, Inc. v. City of Springfield Nos. 4-93-0990, 4-93-0905, filed 05/20/94 ............... Denied.
(77263) Whitt v. Illinois-American Water Co. Rule 23 Order No. 5-93-0298, filed 04/14/94 ............. Denied.
(Harrison, J., took no part.) (77190) Williams v. Cahill No. 3-93-0628, filed 02/25/94 ........................... Denied.
(77233) Williams v. Mitchell Rule 23 Order No. 5-92-0762, filed 04/15/94 ............. Denied.
(77320) Yaxley v. Yaxley No. 4-93-0658, filed 02/18/94 ........................... Denied.
(77197, 77218) Zavala v. Powermatic, Inc. 260 Ill. App.3d 963 .................................... Allowed.
(Above causes are consolidated.) (77799) Zurich Insurance Co. v. Motorola, Inc. Miscellaneous Order No. 1-94-2960, filed 09/12/94 ............................................. Withdrawn.
APPENDIX
(No. 77193. — Appeal dismissed.)
In re D.C.
(The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. D.C., Appellee). Appeal dismissed April 20, 1995. ORDER
On the Court's own motion, it is hereby found that the appeal allowed by this Court on October 6, 1994, was improvidently taken and this cause is hereby ordered dismissed.
The mandate of the Court shall issue forthwith.
JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting:
I do not agree that review was improvidently granted in the present case, and therefore I dissent from the order dismissing the appeal.
The respondent minor was adjudicated delinquent after a trial court found, under a theory of accountability, that he had committed burglary. A divided appellate court reversed the adjudication, finding insufficient evidence that the defendant was accountable for the charged offense.
( 259 Ill. App.3d 637.) In brief, the appellate court majority concluded that the burglary had been completed by the time the defendant, absent while his friends broke into a car and apparently unaware of their actions, rejoined the offenders. The dissenting justice believed that the defendant's participation in the subsequent escape from the scene, with the proceeds of the crime, established his accountability for the offense. This court initially granted the State's petition for leave to appeal (145 Ill.2d R. 315(a)) but now dismisses the case. The effect of today's order is to leave the judgment of the appellate court intact, without providing any guidance or direction.
After we have added a case to our discretionary docket, briefing and oral argument may disclose to us sound reasons for deciding then to dismiss the appeal as having been improvidently granted.
(See Belcher v. Stengel (1976), 429 U.S. 118, 119-20,
50 L.Ed.2d 269, 271, 97 S.Ct. 514, 514 ("Now that plenary consideration has shed more light on this case than in the nature of things was afforded at the time the petition for certiorari was considered, we have concluded that the writ should be dismissed as improvidently granted").) None of the considerations that might justify such action exist here, however. For example, the present appeal does not fail to pose the issue raised by the State in its petition for leave to appeal; the case has not been found to turn on a narrow point of law or fact lacking public importance; no intervening change in the applicable statutes or case law eliminates the need for review; fuller consideration of the record has not disclosed a procedural defect that would preclude resolution of the appeal on its merits. See generally R. Stern, E. Gressman, S. Shapiro K. Geller, Supreme Court Practice 258-62 (7th ed. 1993).
Indeed, dismissal of the present appeal can be explained on only one ground: that members of this court who initially voted in favor of review have now concluded that the issue raised here does not warrant our attention. Although we do not lack the authority to dismiss a discretionary appeal because of a change of mind, we must also be aware that the repeated exercise of the dismissal power on this ground calls into question the adequacy of our procedures for selecting cases for review. See Blumstein, The Supreme Court's Jurisdiction — Reform Proposals, Discretionary Review, and Writ Dismissals, 26 Vand. L. Rev. 895, 933 (1973).
This case provides us with the opportunity to clarify certain language in our opinions regarding the limits of accomplice liability.
(See People v. Hickman (1974), 59 Ill.2d 89; People v. Johnson (1973), 55 Ill.2d 62; People v. Zierlion (1959), 16 Ill.2d 217.) Appellate court decisions are in conflict on the question involved here; a majority of the panel deciding this case disagreed with the holdings of other appellate panels that, for accountability purposes, a crime is not complete until the offender has escaped from the scene.
(See People v. House (1992), 232 Ill. App.3d 309; People v. Johnson (1991), 220 Ill. App.3d 550; People v. Gil (1984), 125 Ill. App.3d 892.) Inexplicably, at the same term this court decided to dismiss the instant appeal, the court voted to allow the appeal in another case raising the same issue. (People v. Batchelor, No. 78127 (appeal allowed April 5, 1995).) I would adhere to our original determination, however, to address the question in the present appeal. Not only has this case already been briefed and argued in this court, but it poses the problem more certainly than People v. Batchelor and is the better vehicle for resolving the issue.
JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this dissent.