Opinion
Case No. 01-cv-4138-JPG
September 13, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on defendant Karl F. Mehnert's ("Mehnert") Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff Danny Wayne Deisher ("Deisher") responded to the motion (Docs. 12 16), and Mehnert replied to the response (Doc. 14). Deisher's response to the motion is more like a response to a motion for summary judgment in that it refers to matters outside the pleading. When such material is presented in connection with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court may convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment or it may exclude the additional material from consideration. In this case, the Court declines to consider the additional materials and will consider this motion as it was intended by Mehnert, under Rule 12(b)(6).
I. Alleged Facts
This § 1983 suit arises out of a custody battle in the Circuit Court for the Second Judicial Circuit, Wabash County, Illinois, between Deisher and his ex-wife Heather Strockbine ("Strockbine") over their child, Hunter Deisher ("Hunter"). The complaint alleges the following facts. On May 20, 1999, several years after the couple's divorce, Strockbine reported to Mehnert, an employee of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services, that Deisher had been involved in inappropriate sexual conduct with Hunter, who was three years old at the time. Upset that Deisher had not been imprisoned as a result of another inappropriate sexual conduct charge that Mehnert had investigated years earlier, Mehnert began an investigation of Strockbine's charges with the intent of impairing Deisher's relationship with his son. Mehnert was aware that Strockbine and Deisher were in the midst of a dispute over Hunter's custody and urged Strockbine to seek an order of protection preventing Deisher from contacting Hunter. The Wabash County Circuit Court issued such an order on May 24 (Compl. Ex. B), which prevented Deisher from exercising the visitation rights he had been granted in the divorce (Compl. Ex. A).
As a part of his investigation, on May 21 Mehnert interviewed Hunter, who denied that he had been abused. Several days later, on May 25, a licensed clinical social worker interviewed Hunter with Mehnert present. During the interview, once again, Hunter said nothing about inappropriate sexual conduct with Deisher. After the official interview ended, Strockbine forced Hunter to tell the social worker that Deisher had committed inappropriate sexual conduct. Based on that statement, Mehnert determined that there was "credible evidence" that Deisher had sexually abused Hunter. Mehnert made this determination knowing the circumstances in which the statement had been given, knowing that Hunter had made no other statement that inappropriate sexual conduct had occurred, and not knowing whether other leading or suggestive communications between Hunter and Strockbine might have affected the truthfulness of Hunter's responses. The complaint does not explain the relevance of Mehnert's finding of "credible evidence," and the Court can divine none on its own.
Deisher was not able to see Hunter for approximately 2 years and expended approximately $50,000 to have his visitation rights fully restored. On April 16, 2001, Strockbine, Deisher and the Wabash Circuit Court agreed that there was no credible factual basis to believe that Deisher had acted in a sexually inappropriate way with Hunter or that he was a danger to Hunter (Compl. Ex. C).
Essentially, Deisher complains of two specific acts by Mehnert: (1) his urging Strockbine to seek an order of protection and (2) his finding "credible evidence" of sexual abuse. Mehnert asks the Court to dismiss this case on the grounds that (1) Deisher has not identified any constitutional right of which he was deprived, (2) the Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain this claim in light of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, (3) Deisher received the procedural process that he was due and (4) that Mehnert is entitled to qualified immunity. Deisher concedes that this case does not assert a procedural due process claim, so Mehnert's third argument for dismissal is moot.
II. Analysis
A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Because the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine goes to the question of whether the Court has jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case, the Court will examine that issue first. Mehnert argues that the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this case because the case essentially requests review of a state court judgment — namely, the order of protection issued by the Wabash County Circuit Court — a task which a district court is not authorized to perform. Mehnert invokes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), but subject matter jurisdiction is properly considered under Rule 12(b)(1). In Rule 12(b)(1) challenges such as the one in this case, all well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true and are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell Assocs., 104 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994); 2 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice, § 12.30[4], at 12-38 to 12-39 (3d ed.).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, established in the cases Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), prevents a party from attempting to relitigate in federal district court a judgment entered in state court. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486; Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 990, 996 (7th Cir. 2000). "In its most straight-forward presentment, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal jurisdiction when the federal plaintiff alleges that [his] injury was caused by a state court judgment." Remer, 205 F.3d at 996. "The fundamental and appropriate question to ask is whether the injury alleged by the federal plaintiff resulted from the state court judgment itself or is distinct from that judgment." Young v. Murphy, 90 F.3d 1225, 1231 (7th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). Litigants who object to a state court judgment may appeal that judgment through the state appeals process, and may ultimately petition the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari. A litigant may not, however, attempt to collaterally attack a state court judgment by filing suit in a federal district court. GASH Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 727 (7th Cir. 1993). Only the Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction to review a state court judgment, no matter how erroneous or unconstitutional that judgment is. Remer, 205 F.3d at 996.
In order to determine whether a lawsuit is attempting to relitigate a judgment issued in state court, the Court looks to see if the claim is "inextricably intertwined" with the state court judgment. Remer, 205 F.3d at 996; Wright v. Tackett, 39 F.3d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1994). A claim may be inextricably intertwined even when it was not argued in the state court. Remer, 205 F.3d at 996. The essence of this determination is whether this Court is being asked to review the state court decision. Id.; Wright, 39 F.3d at 157. If the claim is inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment, the district court cannot entertain the claim even if the claim alleges that the state court's action was unconstitutional. Allen v. Allen, 48 F.3d 259, 261 (7th Cir. 1995).
Deisher's complaint may be read to assert a claim that the Wabash County Circuit Court incorrectly entered the order of protection. Such a claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Deisher complains that he was denied companionship and association with his son for two years and was forced to expend money to regain that companionship and association in the Wabash County Circuit Court. These circumstances resulted directly from the issuance of the order of protection obtained by Strockbine at Mehnert's urging, which forbade Deisher to contact his son. This claim by Deisher is premised on an allegedly erroneous state court order of protection and cannot succeed in this Court without the Court's calling into doubt the state court's decision to enter the order of protection. That Deisher asks for damages instead of some sort of injunctive or declaratory relief does not make his claim any less a challenge to the state court order of protection. See, e.g., Manley v. City of Chicago, 236 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2001). Because this Court does not have jurisdiction to review state court orders, the Court must dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction Deisher's claim that the order of protection was incorrectly entered.
Deisher's complaint may also be read to assert a claim that Mehnert violated Deisher's constitutional rights independent of the judicial proceedings that resulted in the order of protection. There is a distinction between a challenge to a state court decision and a challenge to an injury prior to that decision that the decision failed to remedy. Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 555-56 (7th Cir. 1999); Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003, 1005 (7th Cir. 1995). For example, in Long, the Court of Appeals found that violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act that occurred in the process of evicting a tenant were independent of the state court eviction order that actually effected the eviction. Thus, the plaintiff's Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claims were not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Long, 182 F.3d at 555-56. In Nesser, the Court of Appeals found that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar constitutional conspiracy claims against court personnel and attorneys involved in making a state court decision, even though a part of his claim for damages was the entry of the state court decision. Nesser, 68 F.3d at 1005.
Thus, to the extent that the complaint seeks to hold Mehnert liable for violating some independent right of Deisher's and claims only as an element of damages that the violation caused the issuance of the protective order that deprived him of a constitutional right, the Court will analyze the challenge to that claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
B. Dismissal on the Merits
Mehnert claims that Deisher has not sufficiently identified the constitutional right he claims was violated and that, even if Deisher has sufficiently stated a claim, Mehnert is entitled to qualified immunity. When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 402 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 191 (2000). The Court should not grant a motion to dismiss unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove his claim under any set of facts consistent with the complaint. Id. at 405.
1. Constitutional Right
Deisher alleged that he was deprived of a liberty interest in familial relations with Hunter. Such a right is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); see Brokaw v. Mercer Co., 235 F.3d 1000, 1018 (7th Cir. 2000). However, the right is not absolute. It is limited by "`the compelling governmental interest in the protection of children particularly where the children need to be protected from their own parents.'" Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Croft v. Westmoreland Co. Children Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d Cir. 1997)). There must be a balancing of a family's fundamental right to familial relations and the government's compelling interest in protecting children from abuse, which at times involves removal of children from their homes. Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1019. However, the government does not have an interest in protecting children from their parents by removing them from their homes based on mere allegations of neglect without "some reasonable and articulable evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a child has been abused or is in imminent danger of abuse." Removal in such circumstances would violate the parent's liberty interest in familial relations. Croft v. Westmoreland Co. Children Youth Serv., 103 F.3d 1123, 1126 (3d Cir. 1997); see Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1019. In the absence of such evidence, the balance always tips in favor of the right to familial relations and the government is not justified in removing a child from his or her home.
The cases cited by Deisher demonstrate that a social worker's removal of a child from his parents without "reasonable and articulable evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion" of abuse or danger of abuse violates due process. It is clear that Deisher has alleged that no "reasonable and articulable evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion" existed. Therefore, construing the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in Deisher's favor, the Court finds that he has sufficiently alleged that the government did not have a compelling interest in protecting Hunter from Deisher and that Deisher did have an interest in being with Hunter. Thus, the Court finds that Deisher has sufficiently identified a constitutional right of which he claims he was deprived.
2. Qualified Immunity
Mehnert is entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that shields government officials from liability for civil damages where their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 950 (7th Cir. 2000). It applies only to state officials who occupy positions with discretionary or policymaking authority and who are acting in their official capacities. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816; Denius, 209 F.3d at 950.
The Court applies a two-step analysis to determine whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity. First, the Court must determine whether the plaintiff states a violation of a constitutional or statutory right. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999); Denius, 209 F.3d at 950. The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that a right has been violated. Perry v. Sheahan, 222 F.3d 309, 315 (7th Cir. 2000). In the interest of promoting clarity in legal standards, the Court should decide this question even if the officer is clearly immune. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609; Denius, 209 F.3d at 950.
Second, the Court must determine whether the right was sufficiently clear at the time of the violation that a reasonable official would have understood that what he was doing violated that right. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609; Denius, 209 F.3d at 950. The plaintiff also bears the burden of demonstrating that a constitutional right is clearly established. Perry, 222 F.3d at 315; Denius, 209 F.3d at 950. To determine whether the right was clearly established, this Court looks to Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decisions, then, if there is no controlling precedent, to all relevant caselaw to determine if there is a clear trend. Denius, 209 F.3d at 950-51.
Although Deisher has sufficiently identified the constitutional right involved in this case, he has not stated a claim for deprivation of that right. In order to state a § 1983 claim against an individual, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and that the defendant was acting under color of state law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); Brokaw v. Mercer Co., 235 F.3d 1000, 1009 (7th Cir. 2000).
Deisher's claim fails because he has not alleged that Mehnert sufficiently participated in removing Hunter from him. Deisher alleges that Mehnert "urged" Strockbine to seek an order of protection; his response to the motion to dismiss confirms that he merely "encouraged" her. This is not enough to show that Mehnert deprived Deisher of a right. In fact, all the cases Deisher cites involve actual removal or threat of removal of a child from the home by the social worker, not mere referral to an impartial judiciary to seek removal. Mehnert's suggestion, even if it was a strong suggestion, to resort to an impartial judicial process to seek the relief that Strockbine believed she needed, regardless of his own personal belief about the situation, could no more have caused the deprivation that the acts of the legislators who passed the law permitting courts to issue orders of protection. For this reason, the Court finds that Deisher has failed to state a claim for a § 1983 violation.
Even if he had alleged sufficient participation by Mehnert in the deprivation, the Court finds that Deisher has failed to cite any cases clearly establishing prior to May 1999 that urging or encouraging a parent to seek a protective order in the absence of "reasonable and articulable evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a child has been abused or is in imminent danger of abuse" violates the other parent's constitutional rights to familial relations with the child. As noted earlier in this order, the cases cited by Deisher involve social worker's decisions to remove children from their homes without a court order. Thus, they are not relevant to the case at bar.
With respect to his claim that Mehnert incorrectly found "credible evidence" of sexual abuse, Deisher has not alleged any logical connection between this finding and the ultimate harm he claims to have suffered and, in response to the motion to dismiss, has failed to point to any cases holding that making such a finding, even if erroneous, amounts to a constitutional violation.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Mehnert is entitled to qualified immunity on Deisher's claims that Mehnert violated his constitutional rights by urging or encouraging Strockbine to seek an order of protection or by finding "credible evidence" of sexual abuse. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss those claims with prejudice.
III. Conclusion
The Court hereby GRANTS the motion to dismiss (Doc. 4), DISMISSES for lack of subject matter jurisdiction Deisher's claim that the order of protection was incorrectly entered, DISMISSES with prejudice Deisher's claims that Mehnert violated his constitutional rights by urging or encouraging Strockbine to seek an order of protection or by finding "credible evidence" of sexual abuse and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.