Opinion
No. CV 01-027 8868S
September 14, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO OPEN JUDGMENT (#125)
The issue presented here is whether a court may open and set aside a judgment in accordance with an arbitrator's decision entered, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-549z, after neither party requested a trial de novo. The plaintiff's motion to open the judgment claims that her failure to request a new trial within the twenty days specified by General Statutes § 52-549z(d) was reasonable in light of existing law or an excusable mistake. The defendant has filed two written objections to the motion to open, both arguing, in effect, that the court lacks authority to open the judgment. For the reasons stated, below, the motion is denied and the objection sustained.
Section 52-549z of the General Statutes provides, in relevant part, as follows: "(a) A decision of the arbitrator shall become a judgment of the court if no appeal from the arbitrator's decision by way of a demand for a trial de novo is filed in accordance with subsection (d) of this section. (b) A decision of the arbitrator shall become null and void if an appeal from the arbitrator's decision by way of a demand for a trial de novo is filed in accordance with subsection (d) of this section . . . (d) An appeal by way of a demand for a trial de novo must be filed with the court clerk within twenty days after the deposit of the arbitrator's decision in the United States mail, as evidenced by the postmark, and it shall include a certification that a copy thereof has been served on each counsel of record, to be accomplished in accordance with the rules of court . . ."
This case was consolidated previously with another action brought by plaintiff against two other defendants. Both actions sought damages for injuries that the plaintiff claims she suffered after falling on a cement walkway leading from the Jackie Robinson Middle School in New Haven. In the other action plaintiff sued the City of New Haven and its Board of Education. In the present action, she alleged that a contract this defendant signed with the Board of Education to maintain and repair lighting fixtures on the walkway made Aramark Services separately and independently liable to the plaintiff for the injuries she incurred. An apt analogy for plaintiff's theory of liability against this defendant would be the independent liability of a snow removal contractor to members of the public for negligent performance of its duties. See Gazo v. Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 240, 765 A.2d 505 (2001).
Both cases were referred for arbitration as part of the court-annexed arbitration program. On March 31, 2004, the arbitrator issued a decision recommending a verdict of 80 per cent negligence against one of defendants in the other file, the New Haven Board of Education, 20 per cent comparative negligence against the plaintiff, and defendant's verdicts in favor of the City and this defendant. The arbitrator accepted into evidence an agreement between this defendant and the Board of Education, noted the efforts of the City and Board "to shift the blame for the injuries" to Aramark, and its decision pondered why they had not joined Aramark as a defendant. Its query might have meant that the arbitrator felt that Aramark could only have been liable by way of indemnification, rather than being independently liable. Though finding that "the lighting along the walkway appears to have been poor on the night in question," the arbitrator did not explain why it excused Aramark from liability. It is thus unclear from the arbitrator's decision whether it rejected the plaintiff's theory of Aramark's independent liability or found that the poor lighting on that night was exclusively the Board's fault without any negligence on Aramark's part.
The Board of Education filed a timely motion for new trial, but neither of the parties in this file did so. On April 30, 2004, this court entered the judgment here that the plaintiff now seeks to open. The plaintiff's motion to open, filed on May 14, 2004, states that she did not request a trial de novo in this case because she believed that the request for a new trial filed by the Board of Education in the other file also applied to this case because the two cases had been consolidated.
The plaintiff makes two arguments why the court should open the judgment. First, now acknowledging that the Board's "claim for trial de novo applied only to it," she argues that her "belief as to the applicability of the defendant, New Haven Board of Education's, claim for trial de novo as applied to all defendants, is reasonable when viewed in light of the applicable case law." (Plaintiff's Motion to Reopen.) She cites two cases in support of this argument, Houde v. Consiglio, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 98-0420506S (March 5, 2002, Silbert, J.), and Colindres v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 01-04513023, 31 Conn. L. Rptr. 481 (March 5, 2002, Silbert, J.).
The pages in the plaintiff's motion are not numbered.
In Houde, an arbitrator's decision apportioned liability between the plaintiff and two defendants. Although one defendant appealed for a trial de novo, the other did not. The plaintiff then moved for judgment against the non-appealing defendant. Relying on the language of § 52-249u, which provides that an arbitrator's decision becomes null and void if one party files a timely appeal seeking a trial de novo, the court denied the motion. The court noted that the logic for providing a new trial to a non-appealing party is particularly strong where an arbitrator apportions liability among the parties. "Once that portion of the liability assigned to defendant Consiglio had been rendered null and void, the balance of the decision must also be considered to be null and void." The plaintiff argues that if the arbitrator's decision is now void as to both defendants in the other docket number here, because one of those defendants requested a new trial, the decision should be also void as to the defendant in this file.
The analogy between this case and Houde is not as neat as plaintiff claims, however. The logic of Houde may require a new trial against the non-appealing defendant in the other file, since one defendant did file an appeal. As the defendant points out, however, Practice Book § 9-5 requires separate pleadings in each file of a consolidated matter. That rule would seem to require separate appeals for trials de novo in each file of a consolidated case. Plaintiff claims, however, that this case is similar to Houde because the arbitrator here "apportioned liability among the plaintiff and the defendants." Describing the arbitrator's recommended verdict in favor of this defendant as an "apportionment of liability," however, mischaracterizes the arbitrator's decision with regard to this defendant. The only parties among whom the arbitrator apportioned liability remain parties to a pending case, in the other file. Thus Houde, though superficially similar to this case, does not compel a decision in plaintiff's favor here.
Section 9-5 of the General Statutes provides in subsection (c) that "[t]he court files in any actions consolidated pursuant to this section shall be maintained as separate files and all documents submitted by counsel or the parties shall bear only the docket number and case title of the file in which it is to be filed."
In Colindres v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company, the court granted a motion for judgment in favor of the defendant because the plaintiff did not file an appeal for new trial within the twenty-day period. The plaintiff had, however, requested a trial de novo in a companion case. Plaintiff initially opposed the motion for judgment on the grounds that "a claim for trial de novo was filed using a consolidated docket number," but later conceded that there was no such thing as a consolidated docket number and that plaintiff should have filed trial de novo demands in each of the consolidated cases. The court granted the defendant's motion for judgment because a "demand for a trial de novo must be filed in each case in which a trial de novo is sought," but also granted plaintiff's motion to open and set aside the judgment.
Plaintiff points to the court's order opening the judgment in Colindres as precedent that this court should do so also. In arguing that Colindres does not control the decision here, the defendant claims that the court there granted the motion to open without objection, but the court's language is somewhat more ambiguous. After discussing in the text of the decision why it was granting judgment in favor of the defendant in the case where no de novo trial had been sought, the Colindres court stated in a footnote that it had "[a]t oral argument . . . entertained, without objection the plaintiff's . . . oral motion to set aside a judgment." (Emphasis added.) The court did not indicate whether the actual decision to open the judgment had no objection. The absence of any legal analysis as to why the court opened the judgment renders the court's decision to do so of little precedential value.
The defendant cites Seiler v. Castaneda, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 98-0577236S, 26 Conn. L. Rptr. 629 (Feb. 28, 2000, Berger, J.), in opposition to plaintiff's motion. In Seiler, the court entered judgment in accordance with an arbitrator's decision after receiving no demand for a trial de novo. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a motion to open the judgment and for trial de novo. The other side objected, on the same ground urged by defendant here, that the statutory twenty-day period for seeking a new trial had passed. The plaintiff claimed that he never received notice of the arbitrator's decision and thus the twenty-day period had never begun. The court rejected that argument, however, because plaintiff waited two months after receiving notice of the judgment itself. The court also held that Practice Book § 17-4 does not provide relief to a party not meeting the twenty-day deadline contained in § 52-549z(a):
Section 17-4(a) of the Practice Book states "Unless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction, any civil judgment or decree rendered in the superior court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months succeeding the date on which notice was sent. The parties may waive the provisions of this subsection or otherwise submit to the jurisdiction of the court."
if this court were to accept the plaintiff's proposition, the plaintiff would be allowed to totally bypass the statutory trial de novo scheme and arguably wait almost four months and then argue a motion to open judgment . . . This result would render meaningless the legislature's purpose in enacting General Statutes § 52-549z(d) . . .
(Internal citations omitted; quotations omitted.)
To the extent that Seiler implies a court may never open a judgment after the twenty days, this court respectfully disagrees. Practice Book § 17-4 and General Statutes § 52-212a grant the trial court broad discretion to open judgments, subject to the four-month limit set forth in those sections, for "a good and compelling reason." Hirtle v. Hirtle, 217 Conn. 394, 398, 586 A.2d 578 (1991). A close reading of the Seiler case suggests that the court's decision there was prompted by "the plaintiff's failure to take any action until two months had passed," which that court regarded as "inexcusable in light of the twenty-day limitation period to request a trial de novo" — in other words, that there was no good and compelling cause to wait so long.
Section 52-212a of the General Statutes provides, in relevant part, as follows: "Unless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction, a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed."
Houde, Colindres, and Seiler are the only cases this court has found that address factual situations at all comparable to the present case and, taken together, suggest that a party failing to request a timely trial de novo does so at its peril. There is no binding appellate authority. None of these cases is close enough to the facts of this case to compel a decision in favor of either plaintiff or defendant. Houde involved only one case, not consolidated files; the text of Colindres supports defendant but the footnote opening the judgment is ambiguous; and Seiler suggests a court should not open the judgment. The unambiguous language of Practice Book § 9-5 requires separate filings in each case of a consolidated matter. The court therefore rejects plaintiff's claim that her failure to request a trial de novo in this case was reasonable in light of existing case law.
This court must thus address the plaintiff's second argument — that Practice Book § 17-4 and General Statutes § 52-212a permit the court to open the decision because of mistake. "Under the law of this state, judgments may be opened [under § 17-4 or § 52-212a] for a variety of reasons, including fraud, mistake, duress or as "otherwise provided by law . . ." Kim v. Magnotta, 249 Conn. 94, 104, 733 A.2d 809 (1999). In numerous decisions, however, courts have stated that the only kind of mistake justifying the opening of a stipulated judgment must be mutual, not merely unilateral on the part of one side. See, e.g., Richards v. Richards, 78 Conn.App. 734, 740, 829 A.2d 60 (2003). But since the law on stipulated judgments "has its roots in the law of contracts as well as the law of judgments," Kim v. Magnotta, supra, 249 Conn. 106, the court will also consider cases addressing mistake in the context of a judgment after hearing.
This court has found no appellate cases expressly stating that unilateral mistake does not justify the opening of a non-stipulated judgment. Mistake by counsel for one party is not a sufficient basis to set aside a trial decision; but see Salmon v. Department of Public Health and Addiction Services, 259 Conn. 288, 322-23, 788 A.2d 1199 (2002) ("Although . . . generally, one is not constitutionally entitled to effective assistance of counsel in a civil matter, that rule does not preclude a determination that the incompetence of one's attorney is a valid reason for failing to present evidence during an administrative proceeding. Case law supports the notion of vacating a prior court decision on the basis of gross neglect by a party's attorney, even in the absence of a viable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel"), except where the state seeks deprivation of liberty or a fundamental interest such as parental rights. See, e.g., In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208, 234, 764 A.2d 739 (2001) (holding that a parent whose parental rights are terminated may challenge judgment based on ineffectiveness of counsel claim). Cases where the courts have entered a judgment upon default or for a similar procedural reason do not provide any relief to the plaintiff. See, e.g., State v. Ritz Realty Corporation, 63 Conn.App. 544, 776 A.2d 1195 (2001) (holding that negligence of a party or his counsel is insufficient for purposes of § 52-212 to set aside a default judgment); Bergin v. State, 75 Conn.App. 591, 598, 817 A.2d 136, cert. den. 264 Conn. 903, 823 A.2d 1220 (2003) (holding that authority of workers' compensation commission to open judgment for the same reasons as allowed the Superior Court "extends the commission's power to open and modify judgments to cases of accident . . . to mistakes of fact . . . and to fraud . . . but not to mistakes of law"). A claim of professional malpractice would seem to provide adequate redress to civil litigants to whom the mistakes of counsel cause prejudicial harm. The court there concludes plaintiff has not presented a sufficiently "good and compelling" reason to open the judgment.
The motion to open judgment is therefore DENIED and the objection thereto SUSTAINED.
SO ORDERED.
BY THE COURT
STEPHEN F. FRAZZINI JUDGE