Opinion
NNHCV146049358S
12-27-2016
Nicholas Crismale v. Christopher Walston
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, NO. 120
Robin L. Wilson, J.
FACTS
This case arises from the arrest of the plaintiff, Nicholas Crismale (Crismale), which took place on a commercial fishing boat in Long Island Sound. On August 27, 2014, Crismale filed an eight-count complaint against the defendants, Christopher
Andrew Walston (Walston), Jeffrey Samorajczyk (Samorajczyk), and Todd Aaron Chemacki (Chemacki). Crismale alleges the following relevant facts. " The plaintiff is a commercial fisherman who resides in Guilford, Connecticut." (Compl. ¶ 1.) " The defendant Walston is a resident of Guilford who is employed by his father in the stair business during the winter months and in the spring and summer months does some shell fishing." (Compl. ¶ 2.) " The defendants Samorajczyk and Chemacki are law enforcement officers employed by the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection. They are sued only in their individual capacities." (Compl. ¶ 3.) " On December 14th, 2011, the defendant Walston falsely and maliciously stated to the defendants Samorajczyk and Chemacki that the plaintiff was trespassing on his clam beds and stealing his clams." (Compl. ¶ 4.) " As a result, the plaintiff was arrested and prosecuted on criminal charges of which he was innocent, and of which the defendant Walston knew he was innocent, and incurred economic losses associated with his defense against the said false charges and also suffered humiliation and anxiety." (Compl. ¶ 5.) " Following the plaintiff's arrest, the defendant Walston stated to a reporter for the Hartford Courant concerning the plaintiff's arrest: 'I nailed him and I nailed him good.'" (Compl. ¶ 6.) " On March 18, 2014, a jury in the Superior Court at New Haven found the plaintiff not guilty of all charges." (Compl. ¶ 7.) Thus, the two alleged statements by Walston at issue are the one made to the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (EnCON) and the one made to the Hartford Courant. Counts one and two are directed at Walston, wherein count one sounds in slander and count two in malicious prosecution. Counts three through eight are not directed at Walston, but at Samorajczyk and Chemacki, wherein counts three and four sound in malicious prosecution; counts five and six in unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment to the United States constitution; and counts seven and eight in deprivation of property without due process in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution.
On April 21, 2016, summary judgment was granted for defendants Samorajczyk and Chemacki on the ground that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the decision to arrest the plaintiff was supported by probable cause and, therefore, Samorajczyk and Chemacki were entitled to qualified immunity. Crismale v. Walston, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-14-6049358-S, (April 21, 2016, Wilson, J.) (Docket Entry no. 113.20.) On March 7, 2016, Walston filed the motion for summary judgment that is presently before the court; (Docket Entry no. 120); accompanied by a supporting memorandum of law. (Docket Entry no. 121.) On April 7, 2016, the plaintiff filed an objection accompanied by a supporting memorandum of law; (Docket Entry no. 122); and on September 8, 2016, Walston filed a corresponding reply. (Docket Entry no. 125.) Oral argument was heard on the motion on September 12, 2016 at short calendar.
Walston's exhibits include: (A) an affidavit of Walston; (B) Crismale's response to interrogatories and requests for production; (C) an affidavit of Chemacki; (D) an affidavit of Samorajczyk; (E) a deposition of Hector Avila; (F) a deposition of Santos Bertrand; (G) a deposition of Sandoval Maynor; (H) a deposition of Crismale.
Crismale's exhibits include: (1) testimony of Walston at Crismale's criminal trial; (2) testimony of Crismale at Crismale's criminal trial; (3) an affidavit of Samorajczyk; (4) an affidavit of Chemacki; (5) a deposition of Crismale; (6) a misdemeanor summons and complaint issued to Crismale; (7) a transcript of phone calls; (8) the Hartford Courant article at issue.
DISCUSSION
" [S]ummary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cefaratti v. Aranow, 321 Conn. 637, 645, 138 A.3d 837 (2016).
" A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case . . . The facts at issue are those alleged in the pleadings . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . [T]he party adverse to such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Recall Total Information Management, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 147 Conn.App. 450, 456, 83 A.3d 664 (2014), aff'd, 317 Conn. 46, 115 A.3d 458 (2015). " [T]he genuine issue aspect of summary judgment requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred . . . A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 556, 791 A.2d 489 (2002). " A genuine issue has been variously described as a triable, substantial or real issue of fact . . . and has been defined as one which can be maintained by substantial evidence." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) United Oil Co. v. Urban Development Commission, 158 Conn. 364, 378, 260 A.2d 596 (1969).
" [T]he party moving for summary judgment . . . is required to support its motion with supporting documentation, including affidavits." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304, 324 n.12, 77 A.3d 726 (2013). " The existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counter-affidavits and concrete evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bruno v. Whipple, 162 Conn.App. 186, 214, 130 A.3d 899 (2015), cert. denied, 321 Conn. 901, 138 A.3d 280 (2016). " [O]nly evidence that would be admissible at trial may be used to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment . . . Practice Book § [17-45], although containing the phrase including but not limited to, contemplates that supporting documents to a motion for summary judgment be made under oath or be otherwise reliable . . . [The] rules would be meaningless if they could be circumvented by filing [unauthenticated documents] in support of or in opposition to summary judgment." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nash v. Stevens, 144 Conn.App. 1, 15, 71 A.3d 635, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 915, 76 A.3d 628 (2013). The trial court has discretion in determining whether to consider documentary evidence submitted by a party in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. See Bruno v. Whipple, 138 Conn.App. 496, 506, 54 A.3d 184 (2012) (" Whether a trial court should consider documentary evidence submitted by a party in relation to a motion for summary judgment presents an evidentiary issue to which we apply an abuse of discretion standard"). " Summary judgment in favor of the defendant is properly granted if the defendant in its motion raises at least one legally sufficient defense that would bar the plaintiff's claim and involves no triable issue of fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Serrano v. Burns, 248 Conn. 419, 424, 727 A.2d 1276 (1999).
I
COUNT ONE--SLANDER
" Defamation is comprised of the torts of libel and slander: slander is oral defamation and libel is written defamation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gleason v. Smolinski, 319 Conn. 394, 430 n.30, 125 A.3d 920 (2015). " [T]o establish a prima facie case of defamation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant published a defamatory statement; (2) the defamatory statement identified the plaintiff to a third person; (3) the defamatory statement was published to a third person; and (4) the plaintiff's reputation suffered injury as a result of the statement . . . A defamatory statement is defined as a communication that tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him . . . Each statement furnishes a separate cause of action and requires proof of each of the elements for defamation." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 430-31.
A
Walston's Statement to EnCON
" A defendant may shield himself from liability for defamation by asserting the defense that the communication is protected by a qualified privilege." Gambardella v. Apple Health Care, Inc., 291 Conn. 620, 628, 969 A.2d 736 (2009). " [S]tatements that a complaining witness makes to the police are subject to qualified immunity rather than absolute immunity." Gallo v. Barile, 284 Conn. 459, 463, 935 A.2d 103 (2007). " When considering whether a qualified privilege protects a defendant in a defamation case, the court must resolve two inquiries . . . The first is whether the privilege applies, which is a question of law . . . The second is whether the applicable privilege nevertheless has been defeated through its abuse, which is a question of fact." (Citation omitted.) Gambardella v. Apple Health Care, Inc., supra, 291 Conn. 628.
1
Whether the Privilege Applies
Walston argues that a qualified privilege applies to his statement to EnCON because it is a statement made to law enforcement. Crismale argues that whether the statement applies is a question of fact for the jury, an argument which is directly contrary to Gambardella v. Apple Health Care, Inc., supra, 628; and Crismale fails to put forth any case law to the contrary. Therefore, the court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact that qualified immunity applies to Walston's statement to EnCON.
2
Whether the Privilege Has Been Defeated
Walston argues that the privilege has not been defeated because Crismale has failed to put forth any evidence to counter his averment that the statement was not made with malice, and was based on good faith observations. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Ex. A, Docket Entry no. 121.) Crismale counters that " Walston admitted he was at least 500 yards away from the plaintiff's fishing boat when he called the authorities"; (Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n at 2, Docket Entry no. 122); and offers Walston's testimony at Crismale's criminal trial as evidence of this fact. (Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n Ex. 1 at 37, Docket Entry no. 122.)
" As a general matter, a qualified privilege in a defamation case may be defeated if it can be established that the holder of the privilege acted with malice in publishing the defamatory material." Gambardella v. Apple Health Care, Inc., supra, 291 Conn. 630. " [A] qualified privilege is lost upon a showing of either actual malice, i.e., publication of a false statement with actual knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, or malice in fact, i.e. publication of a false statement with bad faith or improper motive." (Emphasis omitted.) Id. " A negligent misstatement of fact will not suffice [to show actual malice]; the evidence must demonstrate a purposeful avoidance of the truth . . . Further, proof that a defamatory falsehood has been uttered with bad or corrupt motive or with an intent to inflict harm will not be sufficient to support a finding of actual malice . . . although such evidence may assist in drawing an inference of knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 637-38. " [R]eckless' disregard may be found when an individual publishes defamatory statements with a high degree of awareness of . . . probable falsity . . . or . . . entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [the] publication." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 639. " [T]he operative question is not whether the defendants' statements . . . were inaccurate or negligently made, or whether their assessments of [the plaintiff] were accepted . . . Proof of malice requires far more than proof of negligence or proof of disagreement." Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, 97 Conn.App. 527, 540-41, 906 A.2d 14 (2006).
" Whether the privilege has been lost because of abuse is a question normally for the jury." (Emphasis in original.) Burton v. American Lawyer Media, Inc., 83 Conn.App. 134, 139, 847 A.2d 1115, cert. denied, 270 Conn. 914, 853 A.2d 526 (2004). Nevertheless, the Appellate Court has repeatedly affirmed trial court determinations that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant made an allegedly defamatory statement with malice. See, e.g., Mara v. Otto, 127 Conn.App. 404, 13 A.3d 1134 (2011). In one such case, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's grant of the defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment on this ground where the defendants offered affidavits in which they averred that (1) they were acting within the scope of their administrative duties when they published statements regarding the plaintiff's professional competency to the Department of Public Health; and (2) they did not submit any false allegations " willfully, deliberately or with malice aforethought." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, supra, 97 Conn.App. 538. The plaintiff in Chadha averred in an affidavit that the defendants did not submit any evidence to the department demonstrating that their allegations regarding the plaintiff were true, that they were aware that the plaintiff's file did not reflect any occurrences of incompetent care, and that the board eventually exonerated the plaintiff of charges of inability to practice medicine. Id., 540 n.11. The court found that the plaintiff's evidence failed to raise a factual issue with respect to actual malice because the plaintiff " [relied] on his own conclusory statements and personal assessment of the motives of the defendants" and did not offer " facts as would be admissible in evidence as required by Practice Book § 17-46." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 540. Moreover, " [e]ven if one assumes that the plaintiff was exonerated of the defendants' allegations against him, that fact is not relevant to the issue of whether the defendants acted with malice when they made the statements that form the basis of the plaintiff's claim." Id.
Based on the foregoing authority, Walston's statement to EnCON does not defeat the applicable qualified immunity. Walston submitted an affidavit along with his motion for summary judgment wherein he averred that his statement was based on his observations of Crismale, was made in good faith, and was not made with malice. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Ex. A, Docket Entry no. 121.) Crismale's reliance on the distance from which Walston observed Crismale's boat as evidence that Walston couldn't have possibly known that Crismale was on Walston's lot is incorrect in that it does not address Walston's sworn statement that he was viewing the boat through binoculars; (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Ex. A ¶ 9, Docket Entry no. 121); let alone the fact that this court has already acknowledged that EnCON investigation revealed that Crismale was on Walston's lot . See Crismale v. Walston, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-14-6049358-S, . Therefore, the court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Walston's statement to EnCON is subject to immunity.
B
Walston's statement to the Hartford Courant
1
Whether the Privilege Applies
Walston argues that the privilege of fair comment applies to his statement to the Hartford Courant that " [he] nailed him and [he] nailed him good" because it " was public information and already disclosed prior to Walston's comments . . . The fact that the plaintiff was arrested is a knowable, and true fact. Furthermore, Walston's comment about the arrest was merely a comment of opinion on the outcome of arrest that actually took place; there is no dispute that the plaintiff was arrested and charged." (Emphasis in original.) (Def.'s Mem. Supp. at 6, Docket Entry no. 121.)
" The privilege of 'fair comment, ' which was one of the most important privileges realized at common law, was a qualified privilege to express an opinion or otherwise comment on matters of public interest." Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 114, 448 A.2d 1317 (1982). " As a general rule . . . the privilege of fair comment applies to expressions of opinion." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted.) Id., 111 n.4. " An opinion . . . is a personal comment about another's conduct, qualifications or character that has some basis in fact." (Emphasis in original.) Id., 111. " A statement can be defined as factual if it relates to an event or state of affairs that existed in the past or present and is capable of being known." Id. " This distinction between fact and opinion cannot be made in a vacuum . . . for although an opinion may appear to be in the form of a factual statement, it remains an opinion if it is clear from the context that the maker is not intending to assert another objective fact but only his personal comment on the facts which he has stated . . . Thus, while this distinction may be somewhat nebulous . . . [t]he important point is whether ordinary persons hearing or reading the matter complained of would be likely to understand it as an expression of the speaker's or writer's opinion, or as a statement of existing fact." (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 111-12.
" An opinion is privileged as fair comment only when the facts on which it is based are truly stated or privileged or otherwise known either because the facts are of common knowledge or because, though perhaps unknown to a particular recipient of the communication, they are readily accessible to him . . . If the facts that are criticized or commented upon are not stated or known, however, then fair comment is no defense. The reason for this distinction is as follows: an opinion must be based upon facts; if the facts are neither known nor stated, then a defamatory opinion implies that there are undisclosed defamatory facts which justify the opinion." (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 117-18.
" [T]he privilege of fair comment requires [the court] to read the allegedly libelous articles in their totality, in the context in which they were published . . . In order for a statement to be defended as fair comment it must be recognizable by the ordinary reasonable person as opinion and not as a statement of fact . . . In applying this test, however, [t]he court must consider all the words used, not merely a particular phrase or sentence. In addition, the court must give weight to cautionary terms used by the person publishing the statement. Finally, the court must consider all of the circumstances surrounding the statement, including the medium by which the statement is disseminated and the audience to which it is published." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 120-21.
In Goodrich, the Supreme Court determined that colloquial and figurative expressions such as " sore spot, " " ghost town, " " up to its rooftop in troubles, " " mere shell of a shopping center" and " plagued by a host of traffic, conservation and financial worries" used to embellish facts about the plaintiff's real estate development were statements of opinion subject to qualified immunity. Id., 121-24. " [F]air comment may be severe and may include ridicule, sarcasm, and invective . . . and . . . the comment is not rendered unfair by the writer's flippant style . . . or even by the use of gross exaggeration." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 123.
As to a matter of public concern: " It is well established that [t]he commission of crime, prosecutions resulting from it, and judicial proceedings arising from the prosecutions . . . are without question events of legitimate concern to the public . . . Indeed, [p]ublic allegations that someone is involved in crime generally are speech on a matter of public concern." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gleason v. Smolinski, supra, 319 Conn. 415.
In the present case, the statement at issue is a matter of public interest because it involved the commission of a crime. See id. As to whether Walston's comments to the Hartford Courant were of fact or opinion, " a reasonable person could only view [them] as pure expressions of opinion . . ." Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., supra, 188 Conn. 124. First, Walston made the statement in the context of an ongoing criminal trial. To the extent that the comment could be interpreted as a comment on the upcoming trial, Walston could not have known the outcome. It was clear that the statement did not " [relate] to an event or state of affairs that existed in the past or present and is capable of being known"; Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., supra, 188 Conn. 111; but speculated on the outcome of a future event. Speculation as to what might be does not equate to a statement of what is or was . See Stevens v. Helming, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-11-6019393-S, (June 23, 2014, Wilson, J.), aff'd, 163 Conn.App. 241, 135 A.3d 728 (2016) (comment on outcome of ongoing investigation was not a statement of fact). To the extent that the comment could be interpreted as a comment on Crismale's arrest, the statement " I nailed him and I nailed him good" is a colloquial figurative statement, much like those at issue in Goodrich, which our Supreme Court determined were of opinion rather than fact. Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., supra, 188 Conn. 121-24. For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the qualified privilege of fair comment applies to Walston's statement to the Hartford Courant.
2
Whether the Privilege has been Defeated
Walston argues that the privilege has not been defeated because Crismale has failed to put forth any evidence to counter his averment that the statement was not made with malice, and was based on good faith observations. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Ex. A, Docket Entry no. 121.) Crismale counters that " [a]rguably, Walston made this statement to the press shortly before the plaintiff's trial because he intended to damage Crismale's reputation." (Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n at 9, Docket Entry no. 122.)
In light of Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, supra, 97 Conn.App. 540-41, and Nash v. Stevens, supra, 144 Conn.App. 15, discussed previously in this memorandum regarding proof of malice and admissible evidence, Crismale's suppositions in his memorandum of law as to the intent of Walston's comments cannot support a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Walston's statement was made with malice. Therefore, the court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Walston's statement to the Hartford Courant is subject to immunity.
II
COUNT TWO--MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
Walston argues that Crismale's claim fails because he did not initiate or procure the subject criminal proceedings against Crismale since the arrest was based on Walston's complaint made on the day of arrest and the independent observations of the officers. Walston further argues that he acted with probable cause and that there is no evidence of malice. Crismale counters that " [b]ut for Walston's call on December 14, 2011, no arrest would have occurred. Walston contacted the [EnCON] police once again on April 19, 2012." (Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n at 7, Docket Entry no. 122.) Crismale argues that the comment made by Walston to the Hartford Courant and that he called EnCON again after the arrest is evidence of bad intent.
Exhibit 7 of Crismale's objection; (Docket Entry no. 122); which is a transcript of phone calls and submitted as evidence of this communication, is not authenticated and, therefore, is not admissible for the purposes of this motion. See Nash v. Stevens, supra, 144 Conn.App. 15.
" An action for malicious prosecution against a private person requires a plaintiff to prove that: (1) the defendant initiated or procured the institution of criminal proceedings against the plaintiff; (2) the criminal proceedings have terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the defendant acted without probable cause; and (4) the defendant acted with malice, primarily for a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice. Zenik v. O'Brien, 137 Conn. 592, 595, 79 A.2d 769 (1951); Brodrib v. Doberstein, 107 Conn. 294, 296-98, 140 A. 483 (1928); McGann v. Allen, 105 Conn. 177, 185, 134 A. 810 (1926); 3 Restatement (Second), Torts (1977) § 653; W. Prosser, Torts (4th Ed. 1971) § 119. The law governing malicious prosecution seeks to accommodate two competing and ultimately irreconcilable interests. It acknowledges that a person wrongly charged with criminal conduct has an important stake in his bodily freedom and his reputation, but that the community as a whole has an even more important stake in encouraging private citizens to assist public officers in the enforcement of the criminal law. 1 F. Harper & F. James, Torts (1956) § 4.11.
" The policy of encouraging private citizens to assist in law enforcement is vindicated, in the law of malicious prosecution, by providing a limited immunity in the form of the first element that the plaintiff must prove to maintain his cause of action. A private person can be said to have initiated a criminal proceeding if he has insisted that the plaintiff should be prosecuted, that is, if he has brought pressure of any kind to bear upon the public officer's decision to commence the prosecution. Fatone v. DeDomenico, 161 Conn. 576, 577, 290 A.2d 324 (1971); Zenik v. O'Brien, supra, 596. But a private person has not initiated a criminal proceeding if he has undertaken no more than to provide potentially incriminating information to a public officer. In such a case, if the defendant has made a full and truthful disclosure and has left the decision to prosecute entirely in the hands of the public officer, he cannot be held liable for malicious prosecution. See White v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad, 417 F.2d 941, 943 (8th Cir. 1969); Fatone v. DeDomenico, supra ; Brodrib v. Doberstein, supra, 298; Jensen v. Barnett, 178 Neb. 429, 431, 134 N.W.2d 53 (1965); Archer v. Cachat, 165 Ohio St. 286, 287-88, 135 N.E.2d 404 (1956); Rose v. Whitbeck, 277 Or. 791, 797, 562 P.2d 188 (1977) and 278 Or. 463, 468-69, 564 P.2d 671 (1977); 3 Restatement (Second), Torts (1977) § 653, comment g; W. Prosser, Torts (4th Ed. 1971) § 119, p. 837; 1 F. Harper & F. James, Torts (1956) § 4.3, p. 306.
" The narrow issue in the case before us is to determine the extent to which falsity of the information provided to the public officer diminishes the private person's immunity. It is conceded that a private person cannot escape liability if he knowingly presents information that is false; false information necessarily interferes with the intelligent exercise of official discretion. The problem arises when the information proves to be false, although the informer in good faith believed it to be true. The defendants requested that the trial court instruct the jury that 'the informer is not liable though the information proves to be false and his belief was one that a reasonable man would not entertain.' This request to charge was taken verbatim from 3 Restatement (Second), Torts (1977) § 653, comment g. The trial court charged instead that the test was whether the informer 'had reasonable grounds to believe [that the information] was true . . .' That language is found, in dictum, in Zenik v. O'Brien, supra, 596, although, earlier, in Brodrib v. Doberstein, supra, 298, we had adopted a standard closer to that of the Restatement when we held that no action would lie against a person who 'fully and fairly states all the material facts within his knowledge to the prosecuting attorney and in good faith abides by his decision as to whether they constitute probable cause for believing that a crime has been committed . . .' We now affirm that the proper standard is that of Brodrib v. Doberstein and the Restatement. See Gogue v. MacDonald, 35 Cal.2d 482, 487, 218 P.2d 542 (1950); Pratt v. Kilborn Motors, Inc., 48 Ill.App.3d 932, 936, 363 N.E.2d 452, 6 Ill.Dec. 770 (1977); Newton v. Spence, 20 Md.App. 126, 135-36, 316 A.2d 837 (1974); Renda v. International Union, UAW, 366 Mich. 58, 84, 114 N.W.2d 343 (1962); Epling v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 55 Ohio App.2d 59, 62, 379 N.E.2d 239 (1977).
" The trial court was therefore in error in refusing to instruct the jury in accordance with the defendants' request to charge. In our judgment, a proper concern for private assistance to public law enforcement officers requires immunity from liability for malicious prosecution for the citizen who, in good faith, volunteers false incriminating information. To impose upon such a citizen the burden of having his conduct measured, retrospectively, by the standard of a reasonable person, would necessarily have a chilling effect on the willingness of a private person to undertake any involvement in the enforcement of the criminal laws.
" In reaching this decision, we emphasize that we are addressing only one element of the cause of action for malicious prosecution. Our adoption of a good faith standard is limited to the issue of the defendants' initiation of criminal proceedings. We recognize that a person who has taken a more vigorous role, who has insisted that criminal proceedings go forward, has automatically 'initiated' criminal proceedings. Once the initiation threshold is crossed, greater involvement signals greater risks. The liability of any person who has initiated criminal proceedings depends upon whether he has acted with probable cause, with 'the knowledge of facts sufficient to justify a reasonable person in the belief that there are reasonable grounds for prosecuting an action.' Vandersluis v. Weil, 176 Conn. 353, 356, 407 A.2d 982 (1978); Zenik v. O'Brien, supra, 597. Today's decision does not alter this well-settled law of probable cause." McHale v. W.B.S. Corp., 187 Conn. 444, 447-51, 446 A.2d 815 (1982).
Walston submitted affidavits of the arresting officers, who both attest that probable cause existed based upon (a) Walston's complaint; (b) their own observations; (c) notification by the Bureau of Aquaculture that Crismale's boat was on Walston's lot; and (d) Crismale's admission to being off his lot. (See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Exs. C & D, Docket Entry no. 121.) Therefore, the defendant has submitted evidence that the decision to arrest Crismale was made without any pressure from Walston, and was instead made on the basis of the information provided by Walston and the independent observations of the officers. Crismale fails to offer any admissible evidence to the contrary. Moreover, with regards to Walston's interaction with EnCON, Crismale alleges nothing other than that " [o]n December 14, 2011, the defendant Walston falsely and maliciously stated to the defendants Samorajczyk and Chemacki that the plaintiff was trespassing on his clam beds and stealing his clams." (Compl. ¶ 4.) Crismale, therefore, alleges nothing other than that Walston provided potentially incriminating information to EnCON, rather than pressure . Because the court grants Walston's motion for summary judgment on this issue alone; see Serrano v. Burns, supra, 248 Conn. 424 (" [s]ummary judgment in favor of the defendant is properly granted if defendant in its motion raises at least one legally sufficient defense that would bar the plaintiff's claim and involves no triable issue of fact"); it is not necessary to examine the parties' other arguments. Therefore, the court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Walston did not initiate or procure the subject criminal proceedings against Crismale and therefore, Walston is entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to the malicious prosecution claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted because there is no genuine issue of material fact that the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law with respect to the defamation claims; and there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the malicious prosecution claim that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.