Summary
In Conti, the plaintiff attempted to sue two coworkers for negligence "for their failure to provide adequate braking on their employer's truck, which the plaintiff was driving alone at the time of the accident."
Summary of this case from Pitterman v. Gen. Motors LLCOpinion
(2205)
By statute ( 31-293a), where an employee has a right to workers' compensation benefits for an injury caused by the negligence of a fellow employee, except where the fellow employee's negligence is in the operation of a motor vehicle, those benefits are the employee's exclusive remedy. The plaintiff, who was employed as a truck driver for the named defendant, sought damages from his defendant fellow employees for their alleged negligent failure to provide adequate brakes in the company truck in which he had been injured in a collision. The trial court, upon concluding that the plaintiff's relief was limited to benefits under the workers' compensation laws, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. On the plaintiff's appeal, held that since, at the time of the accident, the defendants were not engaged in any activity related to driving or moving the truck, the plaintiff's action did not fall within the 31-293a motor vehicle exception.
Argued December 4, 1984
Decision released February 5, 1985
Action to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained as a result of the negligence of the defendants, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, where the court, Zoarski, J., rendered summary judgment for the defendants, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. No error.
John A. Keyes, with whom, on the brief, was Michael J. Whalen, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Michael P. Del Sole, for the appellees (defendants).
The plaintiff instituted this action in negligence against two of his co-employees for their failure to provide adequate braking on their employer's truck, which the plaintiff was driving alone at the time of the accident. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff's relief was limited to the Workers' Compensation Act. From the refusal of the trial court to open, or to allow reargument concerning the summary judgment rendered in the defendants' favor, the plaintiff has appealed to this court.
The suit against the employer, Rose Hill Poultry Company, Inc., was withdrawn.
The following factual situation does not appear to be in dispute: On March 6, 1980, the plaintiff was employed as a truck driver for the Rose Hill Poultry Company. The plaintiff was alone in the truck provided by his employer and was driving in West Haven in the course of his duties of employment. A tractor-trailer allegedly cut in front of the plaintiff's vehicle, forcing the plaintiff off the highway and turning his truck over. The plaintiff claimed his injuries were the result of the defendants' negligence in providing him with a truck which had defective brakes. The defendant David Schbelle was the general manager of the company, while the defendant James Ciccarelli was employed as a mechanic servicing company vehicles.
The trial court concluded that since neither defendant was the operator of the truck under General Statutes 31-293a, the plaintiff was limited to his workers' compensation remedies and rendered summary judgment for the defendants.
General Statutes 31-293a provides as follows: "NO RIGHT AGAINST FELLOW EMPLOYEE; EXCEPTION. If an employee or, in case of his death, his dependent has a right to benefits or compensation under this chapter on account of injury or death from injury caused by the negligence or wrong of a fellow employee, such right shall be the exclusive remedy of such injured employee or dependent and no action may be brought against such fellow employee except for negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle as defined in section 14-1 or unless such wrong was wilful or malicious. No insurance policy or contract shall be accepted as proof of financial responsibility of the owner and as evidence of the insuring of such person for injury to or death of persons and damage to property by the commissioner of motor vehicles required by chapter 246 if it excludes from coverage under such policy or contract any agent, representative or employee of such owner from such policy or contract. Any provision of such an insurance policy or contract effected after July 1, 1969, which excludes from coverage thereunder any agent, representative or employee of the owner of a motor vehicle involved in an accident with a fellow employee shall be null and void."
The sole issue concerns the scope of "operation" as set forth in General Statutes 31-293a.
"Operator" or "driver" is defined by General Statutes 14-1 (32) as "any person who operates a motor vehicle or who steers or directs the course of a motor vehicle which is being towed by another motor vehicle."
"While it is true that `operation' is not defined in General Statutes 14-1, the cases clearly indicate that operation as it refers to a motor vehicle relates to the driving or movement of the vehicle itself or a circumstance resulting from the movement of the vehicle. See Plunkett v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 150 Conn. 203, 209, 187 A.2d 754 (1963); Reetz v. Mansfield, 119 Conn. 563, 178 A. 53 (1935); Stroud v. Water Commissioners, 90 Conn. 412, 97 A. 336 (1916)." Davey v. Pepperidge Farms, Inc., 180 Conn. 469, 472 n. 1, 429 A.2d 943 (1980). The construction of the term "operation of a motor vehicle" in General Statutes 31-293a as not including activities unrelated to the movement of the vehicle comports with the policy of the legislature. Dias v. Adams, 189 Conn. 354, 360, 456 A.2d 309 (1983).
We have recently stated that "[i]f a coemployee is not engaged at the time of the fellow employee's injury in any activity related to driving or moving a vehicle or related to a circumstance resulting from the movement of a vehicle, the lawsuit does not fall within the exception of General Statutes 31-293a." Kegel v. McNeely, 2 Conn. App. 174, 178, 476 A.2d 641 (1984).
The defendants were not engaged at the time of the accident in any activity related to driving or moving the truck. Hence, the plaintiff's case does not fall within the exception of General Statutes 31-293a.