Opinion
Docket No.: CR19-724
04-20-2020
Re: Commonwealth v. Ronald Lee Blowe
Katherine M. Beye, Esquire Norfolk Commonwealth's Attorney's Office 800 East City Hall Avenue, Suite 600 Norfolk, Virginia 23510 B. Thomas Reed, Esquire Attorney and Counselor at Law 4504 Colley Avenue Norfolk, Virginia 23508
Katherine M. Beye, Esquire
Norfolk Commonwealth's Attorney's Office
800 East City Hall Avenue, Suite 600
Norfolk, Virginia 23510 B. Thomas Reed, Esquire
Attorney and Counselor at Law
4504 Colley Avenue
Norfolk, Virginia 23508 Dear Counsel:
Today the Court rules on Defendant Ronald Lee Blowe's motion to suppress interview statements involving his drug addiction, drug use, and prior bad acts to support his drug addiction, which he made to a police detective during the investigation of another crime. The Commonwealth seeks to admit these statements at trial while Blowe contends that the statements are not probative of the current robbery-related crimes with which he is charged and, even if probative, are highly prejudicial.
The Court finds that Blowe's admission of his drug addiction is probative of the robbery-related offenses with which he is currently charged but that his admission of drug use in December 2017 is not. The Court finds that although statements concerning prior bad acts normally are inadmissible, they are relevant here to show Blowe's motive and/or identity. The Court further finds that the legitimate probative value of the statements—other than the statement about Blowe's December 2017 drug use—outweighs any incidental prejudice.
The Court therefore GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion to suppress.
Background
Blowe is charged with Statutory Burglary, Robbery, Use of a Firearm in the Commission of Robbery, Possession of a Firearm by a Violent Felon, Wearing a Mask in Public to Conceal Identity, and Malicious Wounding stemming from the robbery of a 7-Eleven store in the City of Norfolk and a subsequent assault, both of which occurred on November 21, 2017. (Commonwealth's Resp. Def.'s Mot. Suppress ¶ 1.) Blowe was not a suspect of the November 21, 2017, robbery when he subsequently was arrested for the robbery of another convenience store in the City of Norfolk on December 7, 2017. (Id. ¶ 2.)
Blowe was interviewed by Detective Oyola of the Norfolk Police Department on the day he was arrested for the December 2017 robbery. (Id. ¶ 3.) Prior to the interview, the detective read Blowe his Miranda rights, and Blowe elected to be interviewed. (Id.) During the interview, Blowe (1) admitted to having a history of smoking crack cocaine; (2) admitted to smoking crack cocaine for the past few days; (3) stated, "I beg for money everywhere"; (4) stated, when asked how often he buys crack cocaine each day, "I give people rides. I have sex. Vernon, he's gay, he like to have sex. So he wants . . . I just do whatever, know what I mean? . . . If he wants to have sex and give me money, then I'll do that."; and (5) stated, "I'm a fucking junkie. It don't matter if I go to jail for a year or thirty years. I get out. I can't beat the fucking habit. I done eleven years, man- I thought that I could do it." (Id. ¶ 4.)
On March 8, 2018, Blowe became a suspect in the November 21, 2017, robbery investigation based on a DNA "hit" from items that were recovered at the scene and analyzed by the Department of Forensic Science ("DFS"). (Id. ¶ 5.) On June 13, 2018, DFS confirmed the "hit" in a direct comparison from a known sample of Blowe's DNA via a buccal swab. (Id.) On June 27, 2018, Blowe was acquitted of the December 7, 2017, robbery; however, on April 3, 2019, he was charged with committing the November 21, 2017, offenses. (Id. at ¶¶ 6-7.)
On February 7, 2020, Blowe filed a motion to suppress any statements he made during the December 7, 2017, interview. The Commonwealth filed a responsive brief on February 19, 2020. The Court held a hearing on the motion on March 3, 2010 (the "Hearing"), and, at the conclusion of the Hearing, took the motion under advisement.
Blowe's suppression motion actually seeks to suppress more than just statements he made at the December 7, 2017, interview, although at the Hearing he orally amended his motion—in part based on clarification from the Commonwealth regarding what it sought to introduce at trial—to include only those statements addressed herein.
Positions of the Parties
Defendant's Position
Blowe seeks to suppress any statements he made during the December 7, 2017, interview "relating to him being a 'f-ing junky', [sic] or any statements by [Blowe] about going back to prison, or panhandling for money to go to the crack house." (Def.'s Mot. Suppress 2.) Blowe argues that such statements "lack any probative value and that whatever probative value does exist is outweighed by the prejudicial effect thereof." (Id.)
The Commonwealth's Position
The Commonwealth agrees that the majority of the statements Blowe made at the December 7, 2017, interview are inadmissible. (Commonwealth's Resp. Def.'s Mot. Suppress 1.) It asserts, however, that Detective Oyola should be allowed to testify as to specific admissions and statements Blowe made regarding the following: his addiction to crack cocaine; his use of crack cocaine during the days leading up to December 7, 2017; and his "begging for money, giving people rides and having sex with another individual in exchange for money for crack cocaine." (Id. at 2-3.) The Commonwealth contends that although Rule 2:404(a) of the Virginia Rules of Evidence provides that character evidence is normally inadmissible due to its prejudicial nature, Rule 2:404(b) provides an exception for admissible evidence that, inter alia, "is relevant to show motive . . . [or] identity." (Id. at 3.) According to the Commonwealth, Blowe's prior bad acts associated with his drug addiction directly relate to his motive to commit the current offenses. (Id.) The Commonwealth also claims that the statements would be "one piece of circumstantial proof of [Blowe's] identity at trial." (Id.)
Analysis
Legal Standard
In Virginia, "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is generally not admissible to prove the character trait of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith." Va. R. Evid. 2:404(b); see also Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 89, 393 S.E.2d 609, 616 (1990) (noting that courts generally exclude evidence of other offenses "if offered merely to show that the accused is a person likely to commit the crime charged"). However, the Virginia Rules of Evidence provides an exception to the general rule:
[I]f the legitimate probative value of such proof outweighs its incidental prejudice, such evidence is admissible if it tends to prove any relevant fact pertaining to the offense charged, such as where it is relevant to show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, accident, or if they are part of a common scheme or plan.Va. R. Evid. 2:404(b).
Although evidence of a prior crime "tends to show the defendant [is] guilty of another crime," it may be admitted if it "tends to prove any fact in issue." Spencer, 240 Va. at 89, 393 S.E.2d at 616. "Every fact, however remote or insignificant, that tends to establish the probability or improbability of a fact in issue, is relevant, and if otherwise admissible, should be admitted." Harrell v. Woodson, 233 Va. 117, 122, 353 S.E.2d 770, 773 (1987).
It is the duty of the trial court to weigh the evidence's "probative value against its prejudicial effect." Spencer, 240 Va. at 90, 393 S.E.2d at 617. "Whenever the legitimate probative value outweighs the incidental prejudice to the accused, evidence of prior offenses, if otherwise competent, is admissible." Lewis v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 497, 502, 303 S.E.2d 890, 893 (1983).
"When evidence is admissible . . . for one purpose but not admissible . . . for another purpose, the court upon motion shall restrict such evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly." Va. R. Evid. 2:105.
Discussion
The Court has considered the pleadings, argument from counsel, and applicable authorities. The Court now rules as follows.
The Commonwealth seeks to allow Detective Oyola to testify at trial to the following statements (the "Statements"): (1) that Blowe was interviewed on December 7, 2017, after being informed of his Miranda rights and stating that he understood them but nevertheless wished to speak; (2) that Blowe admitted that he was addicted to crack cocaine; (3) that Blowe was using crack cocaine in the days leading up to December 7, 2017; and (4) that Blowe admitted to "begging for money, giving people rides and having sex with another individual in exchange for money for crack cocaine." The Commonwealth argues that, under Rule 2:404(b) of the Virginia Rules of Evidence, this evidence is admissible to demonstrate Blowe's motive to commit the November 2017 robbery—as opposed to the robbery under investigation at the time—and as "one piece of circumstantial proof of [Blowe's] identity at trial." Blowe, on the other hand, argues that the Statements lack any probative value and, even if they were probative, they are unfairly prejudicial.
Although the Commonwealth in it responsive brief lumps together Blowe's statements regarding his drug addiction and his December 2017 drug use, the Court elects to treat the two statements separately.
As an initial matter, it appears undisputed that the information the Commonwealth seeks to admit at trial is factually correct and is supported by the December 7, 2017, interview of Blowe. Further, it is undisputed that the statements regarding Blowe's prior activities involve the types of "prior bad acts" that Rule 2:404 generally precludes. The questions before the Court therefore are whether the Statements are relevant to show motive and/or identity—as the Commonwealth argues—and, if so, whether their legitimate probative value outweighs their incidental prejudice.
Blowe's motion to suppress the statements that he was interviewed on December 7, 2017—after being informed of his Miranda rights—and that he stated that he understood these rights but nevertheless wished to speak appear to be predicated on the Court's suppression of all other statements sought to be admitted by the Commonwealth. Of note, Blowe did not dispute these facts on brief or at the Hearing.
A. The Relevance of the Statements.
The Virginia Supreme Court has held that "[e]very fact, however remote or insignificant, that tends to establish the probability or improbability of a fact in issue, is relevant, and if otherwise admissible, should be admitted." Harrell, 233 Va. 117, 122, 353 S.E.2d 770, 773 (1987). Stated differently, "evidence has relevance if it 'tends to cast any light' on any material point." Ricks v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 330, 334, 573 S.E.2d 266, 268 (2002). Blowe initially asserts that the Statements lack any probative value, essentially contending that the Statements are not relevant. Significantly, "[i]t is its tendency to prove or disprove—not its sufficiency, standing alone, to satisfy the ultimate burden of proof—that makes a fact relevant." Thomas v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 741, 753-54, 607 S.E.2d 738, 744, adopted upon reh'g en banc, 45 Va. App. 811, 613 S.E.2d 870 (2005). Prejudicial facts therefore ultimately may be admissible if they help resolve a disputed fact.
Evidence of a defendant's other crimes, wrongs, or acts, however, is generally not admissible to demonstrate a propensity to commit the crime with which the defendant is currently charged. Va. R. Evid. 2:404(b); see also Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 272, 176 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1970) ("The general rule is well established that in a criminal prosecution, proof which shows or tends to show that the accused is guilty of the commission of other crimes and offenses at other times, even though they are of the same nature as the one charged in the indictment, is incompetent and inadmissible for the purpose of showing the commission of the particular crime charged."). This is because "such evidence implicating an accused in other crimes unrelated to the charged offense . . . may confuse the issues being tried and cause undue prejudice to the defendant." Guill v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 134, 138, 495 S.E.2d 489, 491 (1998). Such evidence nevertheless may be admissible if it "tends to prove any relevant fact pertaining to the offense charge," including the defendant's motive to commit the crime or his identity. Va. R. Evid. 2:404(b); see also Thomas, 44 Va. App. at 757 n.8, 607 S.E.2d at 745 n.8 (noting that "settled Virginia law . . . follows an 'inclusionary approach' to the uncharged misconduct doctrine by admitting such evidence 'if relevant, for any purpose other than to show a mere propensity or disposition on the part of the defendant to commit the crime.'" (quoting Kent Sinclair, et al., Virginia Evidentiary Foundations § 6.4[A], at 165 (1998))).
In Thomas v. Commonwealth, the Virginia Court of Appeals held that the defendant's possession of drug-related materials—forty-six plastic baggies—in his car was probative of his alleged simultaneous illegal possession of a handgun. 44 Va. App. 741, 755, 607 S.E.2d 738, 744 (2005). The court found that the baggies, along with marijuana residue found in the vehicle and the defendant's admission to distributing drugs in the past, "tended to show just what the prosecutor argued—that [the defendant] was still engaged in the distribution of marijuana." Id. The court went on to note that "[a] logical basis exists for making this point in a case involving weapons" and that many courts have recognized the "commonsense" relationship between the distribution of illegal drugs and the possession and use of firearms. Id. It ultimately held that, although not dispositive, "evidence linking a defendant to drug distribution may be considered as one factor in determining whether he may have had a motive to possess a firearm." Id.
Of note, there was no pending charge related to the possession of the drug-related materials.
The Virginia Supreme Court applied these principles in Lewis v. Commonwealth. 225 Va. 497, 502, 303 S.E.2d 890, 893 (1983). There, the defendant was tried for purchasing stolen goods. Id. The court permitted evidence that the defendant had purchased stolen goods on two prior occasions. Id. Although this evidence would generally be inadmissible and certainly was prejudicial, the court reasoned that it was relevant to show that the defendant knew the goods he purchased in the present case were also stolen. Id. The court quoted well-established case law that "[s]uch evidence is permissible in cases where the motive, intent or knowledge of the accused is involved, or where the evidence is connected with or leads up to the offense which the accused is on trial." Id. (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 272, 176 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1970)).
Here, the Commonwealth contends that the Statements are relevant to show both motive—because Blowe's drug addiction provides a motive to commit robbery—and identity—because the November 2017 video does not clearly show the robber's face. The video depicts a man, matching only Blowe's general characteristics, robbing the store and assaulting a customer.
The Court finds that Blowe's statements regarding his long-term drug addiction and his past actions to acquire money to purchase drugs are relevant to his motive to commit robbery and to the identity of the offender in the November 2017 crimes. Just as possession of drug-related materials makes it more likely that an individual is in possession of a firearm, drug addiction often motivates addicts to take extreme measures and commit crimes, including robbery, in order to fund their addiction. Relevant evidence "need not conclusively prove the ultimate fact in issue, but only have 'any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.'" Thomas, 44 Va. App. at 754, 607 S.E.2d at 744 (quoting McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 440 (1990)).
The Court finds that Blowe's statement regarding his drug use in the days leading up to December 7, 2017, however, is not relevant to the current offenses. Such drug use has no bearing on either his motive to commit the November 2017 robbery or the identity of the offender who committed that robbery and assault. Whether Blowe used crack cocaine weeks after the crimes with which he is being charged is simply irrelevant. The Court therefore sustains Blowe's motion to suppress with respect to the statement regarding Blowe's December 2017 drug use.
B. Balancing Legitimate Probative Value and Incidental Prejudice.
As indicated in Virginia's evidentiary rules, "evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is generally not admissible to prove the character trait of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith." Va. R. Evid. 2:404(b). The rule goes on to provide an exception, however: "if the legitimate probative value of such proof outweighs its incidental prejudice, such evidence is admissible if it tends to prove any relevant fact pertaining to the offense charged," including motive and identity. Id.
This is consistent with Virginia case law. The Virginia Supreme Court has held that "evidence implicating an accused in other crimes[, wrongs, or acts] unrelated to the charged offense [normally] is inadmissible because it may confuse the issues being tried and cause undue prejudice to the defendant." Guill v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 134, 138, 495 S.E.2d 489, 491 (1998). Hence, even if relevant, such evidence "is subject to the further requirement that the legitimate probative value of the evidence must exceed the incidental prejudice caused the defendant." Id. at 139, 495 S.E.2d at 491.
Courts consider several factors to determine if evidence is unduly prejudicial, including "whether the content of the statements tends to 'arouse the jury's hostility or sympathy for one side without regard to the probative value of the evidence,' and whether it tends to confuse or mislead the trier of fact, or distract it to irrelevant considerations." Lambert v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 740, 755, 833 S.E.2d 468, 476 (2019) (quoting Clay v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 96, 107-08, 531 S.E.2d 623, 628 (2000)). The Virginia Court of Appeals has summarized the analysis as follows: "Virginia law . . . intervenes only when the alleged prejudice tends to inflame irrational emotions or leads to illegitimate inferences." Thomas v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 741, 758, 607 S.E.2d 738, 746, adopted upon reh'g en banc, 45 Va. App. 811, 613 S.E.2d 870 (2005).
Evidence of Blowe's drug addiction and the extreme measures he took to support his addiction admittedly is prejudicial; however, "this is the case with most prosecution evidence." Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 143, 314 S.E.2d 371, 383 (1984); see also Thomas, 44 Va. App. at 757-58, 607 S.E.2d at 746 ("In a sense, all 'evidence tending to prove guilt is prejudicial'—at least from the point of view of the person standing trial." (quoting Powell v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 107, 141, 590 S.E.2d 537, 558 (2004)); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 213, 220, 429 S.E.2d 229, 234 (1993) ("[O]ther crimes evidence is, by its nature, highly prejudicial to an accused.").
Ultimately, the question is "whether the incrementally greater prejudice allegedly added by the evidence [of other bad acts is] of sufficient magnitude to warrant their outright exclusion." Thomas, 44 Va. App. at 758-59, 607 S.E.2d at 746. Here, the Court finds that they are not. The legitimate probative value of the statements regarding Blowe's drug addiction and the extreme measures he took to support his habit do not outweigh their incidental prejudice, and the Court therefore finds those statements admissible.
The Court may issue a cautionary or limiting instruction when evidence is admissible for one purpose but not another. Va. R. Evid. 2:105. When a limiting instruction is issued, it is assumed that the jury will follow that instruction. Jones v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 437, 451-52, 650 S.E.2d 859, 866 (2007). In order to ensure that the jury appropriately focuses on the current charges, the Court will entertain a motion to issue an appropriate limiting instruction to the jury, e.g., to consider the admissible statements only as evidence of Blowe's motive to commit the current offenses and/or to identify the offender at the November 2017 robbery and assault. See Lambert, 70 Va. App. at 752, 833 S.E.2d at 475 (2019).
The Court therefore denies Blowe's Motion to Suppress with respect to the statements regarding Blowe's drug addiction and his past actions to acquire money to buy drugs.
Conclusion
The Court finds that Blowe's admission of drug use in December 2017 is not probative of the November 2017 robbery-related offenses with which he is currently charged; this statement therefore is not admissible at trial. The Court further finds that Blowe's admission of his drug addiction is admissible at trial, however. With respect to Blowe's statements regarding his past actions to acquire money to buy drugs, the Court finds that these statements are relevant to prove Blowe's motive to commit robbery and his identity as the offender in the November 2017 crimes; the Court further finds that the legitimate probative value of the statements outweighs any incidental prejudice. The Court therefore finds that Blowe's statements regarding his past actions to acquire money to buy drugs are admissible at trial.
The Court therefore GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Blowe's Motion to Suppress certain interview statements he made. Attached is an Order incorporating the Court's ruling.
Sincerely,
/s/
David W. Lannetti
Circuit Court Judge DWL/bgg
Encl.
VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE CITY OF NORFOLK
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA v. RONALD LEE BLOWE, Defendant. Docket No.: CR19-724-00 - 05 ORDER
Pursuant to the Court's letter opinion of April 20, 2020, the Court GRANTS IN PART Defendant's Motion to Suppress, specifically with respect to his admission of drug use in the days leading up to December 7, 2017. The Court DENIES IN PART Defendant's Motion to Suppress with respect to the interview statements he made regarding his drug addiction and his past actions to acquire money to buy drugs.
Endorsements are waived pursuant to Rule 1:13 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. The Clerk's Office is directed to email copies of this Order to Katherine M. Beye, Esquire, Office of the Commonwealth's Attorney, and B. Thomas Reed, Esquire. Any objections shall be filed within fourteen days.
Entered: April 20,2020
/s/_________
David W. Lannetti, Judge