Opinion
Argued December 11, 2000
January 11, 2001.
In an action to rescind a separation agreement, the defendant husband appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Pitts, J.), entered February 18, 2000, which denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Caputi, Weintraub Neary, Huntington, N.Y. (Gary N. Weintraub of counsel), for appellant.
Before: DAVID S. RITTER, J.P., SONDRA MILLER, WILLIAM D. FRIEDMANN NANCY E. SMITH, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.
Judicial review of separation agreements is to be exercised sparingly, with a goal of encouraging parties to settle their differences on their own (see, Christian v. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63). A party seeking to set aside a separation agreement which is fair on its face must prove fraud, duress, overreaching, or that the agreement is unconscionable (see, Christian v. Christian, supra; Wilson v. Nepell, 253 A.D.2d 493; Abrams v. Abrams, 240 A.D.2d 445). The defendant made a prima facie showing that the plaintiff is not entitled to set aside the separation agreement (see, Cohen v. Cerier, 243 A.D.2d 670; Giurdanella v. Giurdanella, 226 A.D.2d 342; Gaines v. Gaines, 218 A.D.2d 683; Middleton v. Middleton, 174 A.D.2d 655; Greenfield v. Greenfield, 147 A.D.2d 440; Anonymous v. Anonymous, 137 A.D.2d 739; Most v. Monti, 91 A.D.2d 606). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of any triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment.