Summary
explaining that the plaintiff did not have a protected liberty interest in remaining in protective custody, but he did have an interest in being protected from the violence of other inmates under the Eighth Amendment
Summary of this case from Blake v. Lea Cnty. Corr. FacilityOpinion
No. CIV 00-92 LH/LFG
November 14, 2000
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION ON CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS
Within ten (10) days after a party is served with a copy of this legal analysis and recommendations, that party may, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), file written objections to such analysis and recommendations. A party must file any objections with the Clerk of the U.S. District Court within the ten-day period allowed if that party wants to have appellate review of the analysis and recommendations. If no objections are filed, no appellate review will be allowed.
This is a pro se, in forma pauperis civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff Henry Chavez ("Chavez") is a state inmate who complains that, in the course of a series transfers among various correctional facilities in New Mexico between October 1997 and September 1999, he was subjected to numerous threats, physical assaults, and mistreatment by other inmates and, on one occasion, by prison guards. He sues corrections officials, alleging deprivation of due process in that they failed to provide him with notice and a hearing before transferring him from protective custody into the general prison population, violation of the Eighth Amendment by deliberate indifference to his safety, and a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. He seeks an injunction and compensatory and punitive damages.
By order dated April 13, 2000, Judge Bruce D. Black dismissed certain claims and parties from the case [Doc. 5]. Defendants Jeff Serna (Serna) and Donna Martinez (Martinez), both employees of the New Mexico Corrections Department (NMCD), bring this Motion to Dismiss Counts I and III of Chavezs complaint [Doc. 19] (Count II is the subject of a separate motion by these Defendants for summary judgment). For reasons given below, the motion will be granted.
Allegations Against the NMCD Defendants
In his complaint, Chavez describes Defendant Serna as the Classification Bureau Chief for NMCD, and Defendant Martinez as NMCDs Deputy Classification Bureau Chief . ¶¶ 4-5. For his claim against these Defendants, he alleges as follows.
A. Factual Allegations
In July, 1996, Serna approved a transfer for Chavez from Southern New Mexico Correctional Facility (Southern) to Western New Mexico Correctional Facility (Western), the long-term protective custody facility, because he had enemies throughout the system. Complaint, ¶¶ 14-16.
The transfer took place in October 1997. In February 1998, Chavez was assaulted by another inmate at Western and was placed on involuntary administrative segregation status. A recommendation was made that Chavez be transferred back to Southern, as that facility was being reconstructed to house protective custody inmates from throughout the state. Complaint, ¶¶ 16-17. Serna initially approved the transfer back to Southern but later changed the paperwork so that Chavez would be transferred instead to the Torrance County Detention Facility (TCDF), a privately-run prison which, as Chavez describes it, houses extremely violent inmates and does not have adequate facilities or staff to provide for long term protective custody inmates. Complaint, ¶¶ 18-20. At TCDF, Chavez was the target of threats, abuse, and two physical assaults. Complaint, ¶¶ 23-34.
Chavez alleges further that he never waived his right to protective custody status and was entitled to notice and a hearing before being forced back into the general inmate population at any facility. He says that both Serna and Martinez knew that TCDF does not house protective custody inmates and that Chavez would not be provided adequate protective custody at TCDF and would thereby be placed in harms way. Complaint, ¶¶ 21, 36.
On March 30, 1998, approximately one month after his transfer to TCDF, Chavez wrote a letter to Serna, advising Serna that he had enemies at TCDF and requesting that he be transferred back to protective custody at Southern. The letter was answered by Defendant Martinez, who told Chavez that the Classification Bureau had no notice that Chavezs transfer request was pending. Complaint, ¶¶ 19, 35-36. Chavez wrote again to Serna on April 11, 1998, giving further reasons for his request. Martinez again responded, this time informing Chavez that the Classification Bureau had approved the transfer to Southern. Complaint, ¶¶ 37-38.
In spite of this statement by Martinez, Chavez remained at TCDF until August 1, 1998, when he was transferred to the Lea County Correctional Facility (LCCF), another privately run prison which, Chavez alleges, also did not have the facilities to house protective custody inmates. Chavez asserts that Serna and Martinez changed his paperwork so that he was sent to LCCF rather than to long term protective custody at Southern, as he had requested and as Martinez told him would occur. Complaint, ¶¶ 39-41.
Chavez states that, as with the earlier transfer, he did not waive his right to protective custody and was entitled to reasonable notice and hearing before being forced back into the general inmate population, and that Serna and Martinez were deliberately indifferent to his safety when they transferred him to LCCF, knowing that it was not equipped to handle protective custody inmates. Complaint, ¶¶ 42-43. Chavez alleges that, at LCCF, he was subjected to threats and assaults by guards and other inmates, which corrections officers did nothing to prevent. Complaint, ¶¶ 44-54.
He states further that, in August or September 1998, Serna and Martinez toured LCCF, on which occasion Chavez spoke directly to Martinez about the conditions under which protective custody inmates were housed; she responded that she was aware of the situation. Complaint, ¶ 55.
Chavez wrote to Serna again on August 14, 1998 and again requested a transfer to long term protective custody at Southern. Martinez wrote back, stating that the Classification Bureau had not been notified by LCCF administration that Chavezs transfer request was pending review. Chavez characterizes this response as deliberate indifference on the part of both Serna and Martinez. Complaint, ¶¶ 57-58. However, on September 14, 1998, Chavez was in fact transferred to Southern. Complaint, ¶ 59.
On September 23, 1998, Chavez was stabbed in the arm at Southern by gang members who said they recognized him as a protective custody inmate from LCCF and he needed to die.
Complaint, ¶ 63. In February 1999, Serna approved a recommendation from the administration at Southern that Chavez be transferred again to Western. However, Chavez was sent instead to The Central New Mexico Correctional Facility (Central), where he was again assaulted by gang members who claimed they knew Chavez had been a protective custody inmate at LCCF. Complaint, ¶¶ 65-68. On May 27, 1999, Serna approved Chavezs transfer back to long term protective custody at Southern, where he felt he would be protected. Complaint, ¶¶ 73-75. However, in September 1999, Serna approved Chavezs transfer back to LCCF, a transfer made without notice or a hearing. Chavez alleges further that, at LCCF, all protective custody inmates are placed together in a housing unit, without consideration for their individual classification status or needs. This system fails to separate violent inmates from those in need of protection.
Complaint, ¶¶ 76-81. In addition, LCCF is understaffed and poorly trained. Complaint, ¶ 83.
On September 13, 1999, Chavez was assaulted on the transport bus on the way to LCCF.
As soon as he was placed in a housing unit at LCCF, other inmates in his pod started yelling that he was a protective custody inmate and began a campaign of threats and violent behavior toward Chavez, including throwing urine on him in the shower, lighting fires in front of his cell door, and flooding his cell with dirty toilet water. Complaint, ¶¶ 84-86, 90, 93-94. On September 19, 1999, Chavez wrote again to Serna, reporting the conditions he encountered at LCCF and requesting a transfer back to Southern. Martinez responded by letter, telling Chavez that the Classification Bureau was award of Chavezs complaints and his desire to be transferred back to Southern; however, she informed him that he would continue to be housed at LCCF and she told the associate warden there to make sure that Chavez was housed with inmates of the same class status. This instruction was ignored, Chavez says. Complaint, ¶¶ 88-90.
B. Legal Claims
Chavez asserts in Count I of his complaint that he was denied due process in that Serna and Martinez failed to provide him with reasonable notice and a committee hearing before forcing him out of protective custody and back into general inmate populations at any correctional facility. Complaint, ¶¶ 103. In Count II, Chavez alleges that Sernas and Martinezs actions in transferring him to TCDF and LCCF, knowing that these facilities had a history of violent assaults and inadequate facilities and staff to house protective custody inmates, and knowing that Chavez had documented enemies at these facilities, constituted deliberate indifference to his safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Complaint, ¶¶ 106, 111. In Count III, he alleges that Sernas and Martinezs actions constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress. Complaint, ¶¶ 113-115.
As noted above, Count II is the subject of a separate motion for summary judgment by Defendants Serna and Martinez. Plaintiff concedes that Count III should be dismissed as against all NMCD Defendants. See, Plaintiffs Response to the NMCD Defendants Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 36], at 1. Therefore, the Court will not address the arguments directed toward the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that claim will be dismissed. What remains is Defendants argument that Chavez failed to state a claim in Count I of his complaint for deprivation of his due process rights in transferring him out of protective custody and into general inmate populations, at various times and in various institutions, without prior notice and a hearing.
Discussion A. Standards for Motion to Dismiss
A constitutional claim under § 1983 brought by a prisoner pro se should not be dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1526 (10th Cir. 1988). The allegations of the complaint must be accepted at face value, for purposes of the motion. Id., at 1526. Although the pro se complaint must be liberally construed under this standard, Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1520-21 (10th Cir. 1992), it will nevertheless be dismissed under Rule12(b)(6) if it fails to state a legally cognizable claim. See, Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992).
B. The Due Process Claim
Chavez asserts in his Reply brief that he does not challenge the constitutionality of Defendants action in transferring him from one institution to another and, indeed, it is well settled that a mere transfer between institutions does not implicate the due process clause, even if the transfer results in a detrimental change in living conditions. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 2538 (1976); Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 2000) (there is no federal constitutional right to incarceration in any particular prison or portion of a prison). Rather, Chavez argues that an inmate who has once been classified as a protective custody inmate (otherwise known as voluntary administrative segregation inmate) has a liberty interest in maintaining that custody, an interest created by Corrections Department policies and procedures which provide that, when an inmates classification is up for review, he shall be given written notice and an opportunity to present his case.
This liberty interest, Chavez argues, is protected by the Due Process Clause and is violated when an inmate is transferred from protective custody into the general prison population without notice and an opportunity to be heard. Defendants counter that an inmate has no constitutional right to be placed in any particular classification level, and that prison regulations governing reclassification procedures do not give the inmate a liberty interest in his protective custody status. The Court agrees with Defendants that no liberty interest is created under the circumstances of this case, and further that Chavezs endangerment claim must be analyzed under the Eighth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth.
In general, a prisoner has no inherent constitutional right to enjoy a particular security classification. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 97 S.Ct. 274 (1976); Templeman v. Gunter, 16 F.3d 367, 369 (10th Cir. 1994). However, a liberty interest may arise if the change in classification restricts the inmates freedom in such a way as to impos[e] atypical and significant hardships on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995). The Court finds, under the circumstances of this case, that the change in Chavezs classification does not give rise to a due process claim. Plaintiff's dissatisfaction with her security classification does not cause that status to constitute an atypical and significant hardship. There is no constitutional right to a particular security classification . . . Rather, the Sandin standard invokes a comparison of the punitive restraint with what an inmate can expect from prison life generally to determine whether there has resulted an atypical, significant deprivation . . . which presents "dramatic departures from the basic conditions and ordinary incidents of prison sentences . . . As plaintiff has not alleged any atypical and significant hardship, she has failed to allege the deprivation of a federally recognized liberty interest, and is not entitled to any of the procedural protections enunciated in Wolff or its progeny. She has no due process claim. Miller v. Campbell, supra, at 965.
The regulations which Chavez includes in his briefing do provide that an inmate shall be given written notice and an opportunity to be heard when his placement in administrative segregation (protective custody) is scheduled for review. See Exhibit A to Plaintiffs Response, at 6. However, the mere creation of procedural guidelines does not create a liberty interest under the constitution so as to support a cause of action under § 1983 for failure to provide these procedural protections. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471, 103 S.Ct. 864, 871 (1983) (implicitly overruled on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, supra); Levin v. Childers, 101 F.3d 44, 46 (6th Cir. 1996) (there is a fundamental logical flaw in viewing the process as a substantive end in itself); Miller v. Campbell, 108 F. Supp.2d 960, 966 (W.D.Tenn. 2000) (Procedural requirements alone do not create a substantive liberty interest, and mere violation of such procedures is not a constitutional violation).
In addition, the Court takes note of the fact that most of the cases on liberty interests in prison classification involve inmates who challenge their placement into involuntary protective custody, administrative segregation, or some other classification which places heightened constraints on their liberty, rather than inmates who challenge their release from voluntary protective custody into the less restrictive general inmate population.
See, e.g., Templeman v. Gunter, supra; Perkins v. Kansas Dept. of Corrections, 165 F.3d 803 (10th Cir. 1999); Clemmons v. Thomas, 86 F.3d 1166 (Table, text in Westlaw), Nos. 94-3172, 94-3173, 1996 WL 282304 (10th Cir. May 29, 1996); Lepiscopo v. Tansy, supra; Traylor v. Cypert, 172 F.3d 879 (Table, text in Westlaw), No. 98-6174, 1999 WL 72205 (10th Cir. Feb. 16, 1999), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1042 (1999); Beard v. Livesay, 798 F.2d 874 (6th Cir. 1986); Wright v. Enomoto, 462 F. Supp. 397 (N.D.Cal. 1976), aff'd, 434 U.S. 1052, 98 S.Ct. 1223 (1978); Devaney v. Hall, 509 F. Supp. 497 (D.Mass. 1981); Flowers v. Coughlin, 551 F. Supp. 911 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); Banks v. Fauver, 801 F. Supp. 1422 (D.N.J. 1992).
Thus, the consideration found dispositive in Sandin v. Conner, i.e., freedom from restraints which might impose atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, generally does not apply when the inmate is being released from protective custody into the less restrictive general population.
Finding no protected liberty interest, the Court will follow the general rule that federal courts do not sit to supervise the daily operation of state prisons, and will intervene only to correct a constitutional violation. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1886 (1979). Although, under the facts of this case, Chavez does not have a liberty interest in remaining in protective custody and thus does not have a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, he does have an interest in being protected from the violence of other inmates. This endangerment claim is best analyzed under the Eighth Amendments prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment; the Court will address the Eighth Amendment claim in its ruling on the motion for summary judgment filed by Serna and Martinez and currently pending before the Court.
Recommended Disposition
That the Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 19] Defendants Serna and Martinez be granted and that Count I (deprivation of due process), and Count III (intentional infliction of emotional distress), as they apply to these two Defendants, be dismissed with prejudice.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION ON CCA DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS
Within ten (10) days after a party is served with a copy of this legal analysis and recommendations, that party may, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), file written objections to such analysis and recommendations. A party must file any objections with the Clerk of the U.S. District Court within the ten-day period allowed if that party wants to have appellate review of the analysis and recommendations. If no objections are filed, no appellate review will be allowed.
This is a pro se, in forma pauperis civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff Henry Chavez ("Chavez") is a state inmate who complains that, in the course of a series transfers among various correctional facilities in New Mexico between October 1997 and September 1999, he was subjected to numerous threats, physical assaults, and mistreatment by other inmates and, on one occasion, by prison guards. He sues corrections officials, alleging deprivation of due process in that they failed to provide him with notice and a hearing before transferring him from protective custody into the general prison population, violation of the Eighth Amendment by deliberate indifference to his safety, and a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. He seeks an injunction and compensatory and punitive damages.
By order dated April 13, 2000, Judge Bruce D. Black dismissed certain claims and parties from the case [Doc. 5]. Defendants Donald Dorsey ("Dorsey"), Bill Pennycuff ("Pennycuff"), and Ramiro E. Rodriguez ("Rodriguez"), styling themselves the "CCA Defendants" because of their employment with Corrections Corporation of American ("CCA"), bring this Motion to Dismiss all claims against them [Doc. 17]. For reasons given below, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
Allegations Against the CCA Defendants
Chavez's allegations against the CCA Defendants come rather early in his lengthy complaint.
He alleges as follows:
In February 1998, he was assaulted by another inmate at the Western New Mexico Correctional Facility ("Western"), where he was being held at the time. As a result, he was approved to be transferred back to long term protective custody at the Southern New Mexico Correctional Facility ("Southern"). However, rather than being transferred to Southern, Chavez was sent instead to the Torrance County Detention Facility ("TCDF"), a private facility operated by CCA on contract with Torrance County, New Mexico, to house state inmates. TCDF does not house long term protective custody inmates, as it does not have the staff and facilities to do so. In addition, it houses "extremely violent inmates" (Complaint, ¶¶ 17-20). Defendant Dorsey is Warden at TCDF, Defendant Pennycuff is Chief of Security at the facility, and Defendant Rodriguez is an Assistant Warden there. Chavez states that, at TCDF, he was "showcased" as a protective custody inmate in front of the general prison population, and that Defendants Dorsey and Pennycuff knew that by housing him in such a manner, he would be subject to harassment and threats to his life from other inmates. (Complaint, ¶ 24).
Because of this "showcasing," Chavez alleges that he was threatened on a daily basis by general population inmates who attempted to break into his housing unit, kicking, yelling, throwing objects and urinating under the doors and through cracks in the walls. Chavez says that he advised Dorsey and Pennycuff of these threats on several occasions and requested that the protective custody unit be moved to a more secure location, but they failed to take steps to provide him adequate protection. (Complaint, ¶¶ 26-28).
Chavez also alleges that he was assaulted twice in the law library at TCDF, once on June 20, 1998, and a second time on July 25, 1998. (Complaint ¶¶ 29-32). He assigns blame for these assaults to Dorsey, who ordered that the library be moved to the main hallway of the facility from a more secure location in the education department; to Rodriguez, who was advised of the first assault and failed both to investigate the first incident and to protect Chavez from the second assault; to Pennycuff, who failed to respond to Chavez's grievances regarding security issues in the library; and to Defendants "John Doe, Sergeant Baca" and "John Doe, Sergeant A. Jaramillo," who photographed Chavez's injuries in the TCDF medical clinic following the assault, and who failed in their duties of keeping the law library secure and assigning an officer to monitor the library while in use by protective custody inmates. (Complaint, ¶¶ 29-34).
Chavez was transferred to the Lea County Correctional Facility ("LCCF") on August 1, 1998 and did not return to TCDF. He alleges in his complaint that he was assaulted at LCCF by inmates and corrections officers; was then transferred to Southern where he was assaulted by gang members; was then transferred to Central New Mexico Correctional Facility ("Central") where he was again assaulted by gang members; was transferred to Western; from there to Southern again; thence to LCCF, where he was assaulted on the transport bus, in his housing unit, and in the shower. At the time the complaint was filed, Chavez was still incarcerated at LCCF. (Complaint, ¶¶ 39-101). One of his requests for relief is that he be transferred to a facility that provides adequate protective custody.
For causes of action against the CCA Defendants, Chavez asserts that they violated the Eighth Amendment in that they were deliberately indifferent to his safety when they failed to provide adequate protective custody housing and security at TCDF. (Complaint, ¶¶ 107-08, 111-12). He alleges further that their conduct was extreme and outrageous and constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Complaint, ¶ 114-15).
The CCA Defendants move to dismiss the action against them on grounds that Chavez fails to allege personal involvement by Dorsey, Pennycuff, and Rodriguez, that Chavez fails to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that he fails to state a claim for punitive damages.
Discussion A. Standards for Motion to Dismiss
A constitutional claim under § 1983 brought by a prisoner pro se should not be dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1526 (10th Cir. 1988). The allegations of the complaint must be accepted at face value, for purposes of the motion. Id., at 1526. Although the pro se complaint must be liberally construed under this standard, Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1520-21 (10th Cir. 1992), it will nevertheless be dismissed under Rule12(b)(6) if it fails to state a legally cognizable claim. See, Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992).
B. Personal Involvement/Deliberate Indifference
Personal participation is an essential allegation in a § 1983 claim. Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996). Supervisory capacity is not sufficient, by itself, to impose liability; rather, plaintiff must allege that the supervisor knew of and acquiesced in the unconstitutional behavior, or expressly or otherwise authorized, supervised, or participated in conduct which caused the constitutional deprivation. Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 700 (10th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff must allege an affirmative link between the constitutional deprivation and either the supervisors personal participation, his exercise of control or direction, or his failure to supervise. Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 1997).
Defendants Dorsey, Pennycuff, and Rodriguez argue that Chavez's complaint does not set forth in sufficient particularity their personal involvement, and therefore all claims against them should be dismissed. Chavez alleges that Dorsey and Pennycuff allowed him to be showcased in such a way at TCDF that he was identifiable to the general prison population as a protective custody inmate, thus leaving him open to harassment, threats, and assaults. He says he was indeed threatened on a daily basis, and Dorsey and Pennycuff were advised of these threats and did nothing to stop them or otherwise to protect Chavez.
He alleges further that Dorsey ordered that the law library be moved from a secure area to one in which protective custody inmates were not protected and, as a result, he was assaulted twice in the library. He states that Pennycuff was advised of Chavezs concerns regarding security in the library but failed to take any steps to make the library safe. He says he told notified Rodriguez of the first library assault, but Rodriguez failed to investigate the incident and failed to protect Chavez from the second assault. These allegations are sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Dorsey, Pennycuff, and Rodriguez under § 1983.
A prisoner has the right to be reasonably protected from constant threats of violence from other inmates, and a prison officials deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment. Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir. 1996). Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society. Id., quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1977 (1994). To recover on an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to protect, an inmate must allege and prove two elements: (1) that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm; and (2) that the prison official has a sufficiently culpable state of mind, indicative of deliberate indifference to the inmates health and safety. Riddle, at 1204; Grimsley v. MacKay, 93 F.3d 676, 680 (10th Cir. 1996).
The deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious to warrant judicial intrusion. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Chavez alleges that he was subjected to daily threats against his life, that inmates threw objects at him, urinated on him, and physically assaulted him on two occasions, at least once landing him in the prison medical clinic. This allegation meets the first prong of the Eighth Amendment test.
The Court finds that Chavez has also sufficiently alleged the requisite culpable state of mind on the part of Dorsey, Pennycuff, and Rodriguez. The second element of the Eighth Amendment claim is a subjective not an objective one; that is, the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
1. Dorsey With regard to Defendant Dorsey, Chavez alleges that Dorsey knew that the unit in which Chavez was housed at TCDF was unsafe for a protective custody inmate and did not provide adequate personnel for his safety, and also knew that the general population inmates would harass and threaten Chavez and would attempt to break into his unit; however, he did nothing to protect Chavez. He also alleges that he advised Dorsey of these threats to his life and requested housing in a more secure unit, but Dorsey took no action, in spite of the fact that there were more secure units available. Chavez asserts further that Dorsey ordered that the law library be moved from the secure education department into the main hallway, knowing that the general population inmates, who had access to the library in its new location, would attack Chavez there if given the chance to do so, and that this action constitutes deliberate indifference to Chavezs safety. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim against Dorsey under the Eighth Amendment, as they indicate that Dorsey was aware of facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and that Dorsey actually drew the inference.
2. Pennycuff Chavez includes Pennycuff in the allegations of showcasing and rejecting Chavezs requests to move the protective custody unit to a more secure location, knowing that these actions would subject Chavez to threats and attempted assaults. In addition, Chavez alleges that he notified Pennycuff by way of the grievance procedure that the law library was unsafe due to contact between general population and protective custody inmates, but Pennycuff did not respond to the grievance.
The failure to respond to a grievance does not necessarily constitute deliberate indifference; however, as was true with Defendant Dorsey, the allegations of showcasing and failure to provide adequate protection, with knowledge of the danger to Chavez, are sufficient to allege personal involvement and to state a cause of action against Pennycuff under the Eighth Amendment.
3. Rodriguez Chavezs complaint against Rodriguez is that he advised Rodriguez of the first assault in the library and requested an investigation and beefed-up security for the library, and that although Rodriguez requested the names of the inmates who committed the first assaulted against Chavez, he did not follow through with an investigation and failed to provide the necessary security. This allegation is very close to alleging negligence rather than deliberate indifference, but the Court finds it sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Chavezs allegations meet the pleading requirement that Rodriguez was aware of facts implicating a substantial risk to Chavez and drew the inference that Chavez was in danger but did nothing about it, in that Chavez alleges Rodriguez was advised of threats and asked for the names of persons posing a danger so that he could investigate, and thereafter failed conduct any investigation.
4. John Doe Defendants Chavez also includes two John Doe defendants in his claims against the CCA Defendants.
He states that John Doe, Sergeant Baca and John Doe, Sergeant A. Jaramillo took photographs of his injuries at the TCDF medical clinic following the second assault against Chavez in the law library. He states further that these two defendants were responsible for keeping the library secure and assigning an officer to monitor the law library while protective custody inmates were there.
Although Chavez uses the words deliberate indifference to describe the actions of Baca and Jaramillo, his allegation is essentially one of negligence, which is not sufficient to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim. [O] nly the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Deliberate indifference as contemplated to support claims based on inmate attacks . . . is a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence . . . [internal punctuation omitted]. Benglen v. Zavaras, 7 F. Supp.2d 1171, 1175 (D.Colo. 1998), quoting from Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. An official must know of an excessive risk of harm to the inmate, in order to meet the deliberate indifference test; it is not enough to show that the official should have known of the risk. Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1310 (10th Cir. 1998). Chavezs claims against Baca and Jaramillo do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. Chavezs claims against these two John Doe defendants will be dismissed.
The Court takes no position on the merits of Chavezs claims against Defendants Dorsey, Pennycuff, and Rodriguez, but holds merely that Chavez has made sufficient allegations to avoid dismissal. He is, of course, still charged with the burden of proving his allegations.
C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In Count Three of his complaint, Chavez alleges that the actions of all Defendants, including those from CCA, were extreme, outrageous, intentional, or done in reckless disregard of his mental health, and that he has suffered emotional injury therefrom. In order to recover under a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress under New Mexico law, the plaintiff must show that the tortfeasors conduct was extreme and outrageous under the circumstances, that the tortfeasor acted intentionally or recklessly, and that as a result of the conduct the claimant experienced severe emotional distress. Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, 127 N.M. 47, 57, 976 P.2d 999, 1009 (1999). Liability arises only where the conduct is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Dominguez v. Stone, 97 N.M. 211, 214, 638 P.2d 423, 427 (Ct.App. 1981). Andrews v. Stallings, 119 N.M. 478, 491, 892 P.2d 611, 624 (Ct.App. 1995).
In order to recover under this cause of action, the plaintiff must show that his emotional distress was reasonable and justified under the circumstances; there is no liability where the plaintiff suffered exaggerated and unreasonable distress, unless it results from a peculiar susceptibility of which the actor had knowledge. Dominguez, 97 N.M. at 215. By severe we intend that a reasonable person, normally constituted, would be unable to cope adequately with the mental distress engendered by the circumstances. Jaynes v. Strong-Thorne Mortuary, Inc., 124 N.M. 613, 618, 954 P.2d 45, 50 (1997).
Plaintiffs allegations do not meet these standards. The fact that Chavez stated a claim against Dorsey, Pennycuff, and Rodriguez for deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment does not mean that the same allegations also state a cause of action under New Mexico law for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The state of mind necessary for a deliberate indifference claim is more blameworthy than negligence but something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.
The Court does not find that the conduct alleged failure to provide secure protective custody housing and to fully staff the law library to prevent assaults meets the test under New Mexico law for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress: conduct so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Dominguez, 97 N.M. at 214.
As Defendants point out in their briefing, life as a protective custody inmate is not always easy, pleasant, or comfortable, and Defendants are not liable under this particular tort unless their actions were essentially malicious and atrocious and rendered Chavezs life intolerable. Plaintiffs allegations do not rise to this level. The claim against the CCA Defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress will be dismissed.
D. Punitive Damages
Among his requests for relief, Chavez seeks punitive damages. Defendants seek dismissal of this portion of the prayer, arguing that Chavez has not alleged the requisite evil motive or callous indifference to his constitutional rights.
Punitive damages are available in a § 1983 action when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1640 (1983).
The issue is whether Defendants actions call for deterrence and punishment over and above that provided by compensatory awards. Jolivet v. Deland, 966 F.2d 573, 577 (10th Cir. 1992), quoting from Farmer, 511 U.S. at 54. The Court finds that the conduct of Defendants Dorsey, Pennycuff, and Rodriguez as alleged in Chavezs complaint, while perhaps not rising to the level of evil motive or intent, is sufficient to support an award of punitive damages under the reckless or callous indifference standard. The motion to dismiss the claim for punitive damages against these Defendants will therefore be denied.
Recommended Disposition
1. That CCA Defendants Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 17] be granted in part, to the extent that the claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress against all CCA Defendants, and the claims against John Doe Defendants Baca and Jaramillo as set forth in paragraph 33 and Count Two of plaintiffs complaint, be dismissed with prejudice; and
2. That the motion be denied in part, as Plaintiff has stated a valid claims against Defendants Dorsey, Pennycuff, and Rodriguez for failure to protect and for punitive damages.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION ON NMCD DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS REQUEST FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEFThis is a pro se, in forma pauperis civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff Henry Chavez ("Chavez") is a state inmate who complains that, in the course of a series transfers among various correctional facilities in New Mexico between October 1997 and September 1999, he was subjected to numerous threats, physical assaults, and mistreatment by other inmates and, on one occasion, by prison guards.
He sues corrections officials, alleging deprivation of due process in that they failed to provide him with notice and a hearing before transferring him from protective custody into the general prison population, violation of the Eighth Amendment by deliberate indifference to his safety, and a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. He seeks an injunction and compensatory and punitive damages. By order dated April 13, 2000, Judge Bruce D. Black dismissed certain claims and parties from the case [Doc. 5]. Other claims are the subjects of two separate motions to dismiss, currently pending before the Court, in addition to this motion for summary judgment.
Defendants Jeff Serna (Serna) and Donna Martinez (Martinez), both employed in the Classification Bureau of the New Mexico Corrections Department (NMCD), bring this Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 21], seeking dismissal of Count II of Chavezs complaint. Count II alleges, inter alia, that Serna and Martinez made the decision to transfer Chavez, first, to the Torrance County Detention Facility (TCDF), and later to the Lea County Correctional Facility (LCCF), knowing that these two facilities had violent environments and a history of inmate assaults, knowing that neither of these prisons had adequate facilities or staff to house protective custody inmates such as Chavez, and knowing that he would be particularly vulnerable to attack by general population inmates at TCDF and LCCF. These actions, Chavez alleges, constitute deliberate indifference to his safety, in violation of the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
In addition, Serna and Martinez seek dismissal of Chavezs demand for an injunction. In his prayer, Chavez asks that the Court award damages, both compensatory and punitive, as well as various forms of injunctive relief. Serna and Martinez argue that Chavez has not established the requisite elements for injunctive relief. For reasons given below, the motion for summary judgment on Chavezs Eighth Amendment claim should be granted, and claim for injunctive relief should be dismissed.
Claim of Eighth Amendment Violation A. Standards for Deciding the Motion 1. Standards for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party can demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Adickes v. S. H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598 (1970); Quaker State Minit-Lube, Inc. v. Firemans Fund Ins. Co., 52 F.3d 1522, 1527 (10th Cir. 1995). The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of establishing, through admissible evidence in the form of depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits or documentary evidence, that there is an absence of evidence to support the opposing partys case and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554 (1986).
Once the moving party meets its burden, the party opposing the motion must come forward with specific facts, supported by admissible evidence, which demonstrate the presence of a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986); Biester v. Midwest Health Servs, Inc., 77 F.3d 1264, 1266 (10th Cir. 1996). The party opposing the motion may not rest upon the mere denials of his pleadings to avoid summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir. 1991).
The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmovants position is insufficient to create a dispute of fact that is genuine. Lawmaster v. Ward, 125 F.3d 1341, 1347 (10th Cir. 1997). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there not sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. Thus, the courts inquiry is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Id., at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. The court in considering a motion for summary judgment construes the factual record and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1131 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 1964 (2000). 2. Elements of Eighth Amendment Cause of Action In Count II, Chavez alleges that Serna and Martinez, by their actions in transferring him to the privately-run TCDF and LCCF, which do not have adequate facilities or personnel to house protective custody inmates, knowingly placed him at risk of attack by violent inmates. A prisoner has the right under the Eighth Amendment to be reasonably protected from constant threats of violence from other inmates, and a prison officials deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir. 1996). Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society. Id., quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1977 (1994).
To recover on an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to protect, an inmate must allege and prove two elements: (1) that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm; and (2) that the prison official has a sufficiently culpable state of mind, indicative of deliberate indifference to the inmates health and safety. Riddle, at 1204; Grimsley v. MacKay, 93 F.3d 676, 680 (10th Cir. 1996). The deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious to warrant judicial intrusion. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The second element of the Eighth Amendment claim is a subjective, and not an objective, one; that is, in order for liability to attach, the official must be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must in fact draw the inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
The question to be decided on this motion, therefore, is whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the elements of the Eighth Amendment cause of action; that is, whether there is sufficient evidence that a jury could find that Chavez was subjected to a substantial risk of serious harm, and that Serna and Martinez were aware of facts from which they could and did draw the inference that such a risk existed, and were nevertheless deliberately indifferent to Chavezs plight.
Serna and Martinez have appended to the memorandum in support of their summary judgment motion their own affidavits, and copies of correspondence between Chavez and the Classification Bureau.
In response, Chavez filed a Motion for Extension of Time and Request to Deny the NMCD Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 23]. The motion for extension of time was denied by order dated August 24, 2000 [Doc. 38]. In the meantime, Serna and Martinez filed their Response [Doc. 27] to Chavezs motion for extension of time, which was docketed as both a Response to Chavezs motion for extension, and a Reply to Chavezs Response to the motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, Chavez filed his Reply to the Response to his motion for extension, labeled also a Request to Deny the NMCD Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 30], docketed as both a Reply to the Response to the motion for extension, and as a Surreply to the original motion for summary judgment. Chavez attached to this last document three exhibits: his own unsworn declaration, the declaration of Marcus Carter, and a copy of an executive summary of the January 14, 2000 consultants report on prison operations in New Mexico. Doc. 30 is accepted as a surreply to the motion for summary judgment, although Plaintiff did not seek leave of Court to file a surreply as required by D. N.M. LR-Civ. 7. 6(b). The Court considers the summary judgment motion fully briefed and ready for decision.
The Court finds no genuine issue of material fact as to the second element of the Eighth Amendment claim and therefore recommends that Defendants motion be granted.
B. Factual Allegations
Chavezs complaint is 26 pages long and contains 115 separate paragraphs, as well as a prayer for relief. His Eighth Amendment claim against Serna and Martinez boils down to the following allegations:
Chavez asserts that Serna made the decision to transfer Chavez to TCDF in February or March, 1998, and that at the time Serna made this decision, he was aware that TCDF did not have adequate facilities to house protective custody (PC) inmates such as Chavez. At TCDF, Chavez was showcased to the general population (GP) inmates as a PC and thus was set up as a target for abuse and assault. He was in fact subjected to threats and harassment by other inmates in which they yelled, kicked, and urinated on him. On June 20, 1998, and again on July 25, 1998, he was physically attacked by GP inmates in the prison law library. Serna next made a decision to transfer Chavez to LCCF, where he was sent on August 1, 1998. Again, Chavez alleges, Serna knew that LCCF did not house PCs and did not have the facilities or adequately trained staff to protect such inmates. At LCCF, he was assaulted by another inmate on August 5, 1998. Two days later, two corrections officers shoved him against a wall and punched him. On August 8, another corrections officer propped open the door to the PC pod so that GP inmates could get in and attack Chavez. One inmate kicked him in the groin, causing permanent injury to his testicle.
Chavez was next moved to Southern New Mexico Correctional Facility (Southern) on September 14, 1998, where he was assaulted and stabbed in the arm by inmates who, he says, were gang members who had been transferred to Southern from LCCF shortly after he was, the implication being they knew that he had been on PC status at LCCF. On March 19, 1999, Chavez was transferred to Central New Mexico Correctional Facility (Central), where gang members assaulted him in the yard, striking him on the jaw and the back of his head. The assailants said they knew that Chavez had been a PC while at LCCF.
Following another series of transfers, Chavez ended up again at LCCF on September 13, 1999. He was assaulted on the transport bus going to LCCF; inmates spit at him and struck him on the back of his head. He was threatened by other inmates who tried to break into his housing unit, yelling, kicking, lighting fires, and flooding the pod with dirty toilet water. In the shower, inmates spit and threw urine at him.
C. Knowledge by Serna and Martinez of Risk of Serious Harm to Chavez
There is insufficient evidence to go to the jury on the issue of whether Martinez or Serna were aware of facts which would lead them to draw the inference that Chavezs transfer to either TCDF or LCCF placed him at substantial risk of serious harm. As noted above, the standard on the second prong of the deliberate indifference test is a subjective one, in that it is not enough that the official should have been aware of the risk of serious harm; rather, he or she must actually have known. Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490, 495-96 (10th Cir. 1998).
It is true, as Chavez points out, that when a partys state of mind is at issue, summary judgment is generally inappropriate. Seamons v. Snow, 206 F.3d 1021, 1027 (10th Cir. 2000). However, summary judgment can be granted, even in a case involving allegations of deliberate indifference in the prison context, if the plaintiffs allegations . . . implicate only defendants negligence and do not establish the more culpable state of mind necessary to support claims of the denial of a constitutional right. White v. Colorado, 82 F.3d 364, 367 (10th Cir. 1996).
See also, Blumhagen v Sabes, 78 F.3d 597 (Table, text in Westlaw), Nos. 94-8022, et al., 1996 WL 91116 (10th Cir. Mar. 4, 1996) (affirming summary judgment on claim of Eighth Amendment violation, and rejecting plaintiffs contentions that summary judgment was inappropriate because state of mind was at issue and because the district court refused to allow discovery before granting summary judgment); Lee v. Shephard, 986 F.2d 1427 (Table, text in Westlaw), No. 92-7029, 1993 WL 53586 (10th Cir. Feb. 22, 1993) (affirming summary judgment where plaintiff failed to assert any allegations regarding a culpable state of mind on the part of Defendant prison officials); May v. Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections, 215 F.3d 1337 (Table, text in Westlaw), No. 99-6267, 2000 WL 633244 (10th Cir. May 17, 2000) (affirming summary judgment on a deliberate indifference claim).
Chavez alleges that Serna and Martinez knew that TCDF and LCCF had violent environments, knew that facilities and staff at TCDF and LCCF were inadequate to handle PC inmates and thus could not meet Chavezs needs, and knew that Chavez would be particularly vulnerable to attack by general population inmates at those facilities, and, in spite of this knowledge, they approved his transfer to TCDF and LCCF and failed to respond when he reported that he had been the target of assaults and improper treatment. However, the Court finds no genuine issue as to Sernas and Martinezs knowledge, nor as to any intentional, reckless, or wanton failure on their part to respond to Chavezs reports.
1. Defendants General Knowledge
Chavez alleges that he provided specific notice of his individual circumstances to Serna and Martinez by way of letters and by speaking directly to Martinez on one occasion; these allegations will be discussed in greater detail below. In addition, however, Chavez also implies that Serna and Martinez were generally aware, or should have been aware, that TCDF and LCCF were not equipped to handle protective custody inmates and were further aware that the classification system of the Department of Corrections was flawed, and their actions in placing Chavez in these institutions, without adequate classification procedures, constitutes deliberate indifference. The Court rejects this argument.
As noted above, a prison official is not liable under the Eighth Amendment unless the plaintiff can show that the official was actually, subjectively aware of a serious threat to the inmates safety.
It is not enough that the official should have been aware of the risk. Craig v. Eberly, supra, at 495-96. Chavezs allegation that Serna and Martinez had a duty to know whether TCDF and LCCF could safely provide for his needs as a protective custody inmate (Plaintiffs Surreply, at 4), states no more than that they should have been aware of a risk. Both Serna and Martinez assert in their respective affidavits that they were not aware of any risk to Chavez at the two private prisons, arising solely from his status as a PC inmate, which would have affected the decision to place him there. If, after such placement, he was later treated inappropriately by local prison officials (e.g., he alleges he was showcased as a PC inmate, and that corrections officers allowed GP inmates into the PC housing unit, looking the other way while Chavez was beaten), there is no indication that Serna or Martinez knew that his would occur.
Chavez includes with his briefing a copy of an executive summary of The Consultants Report on Prison Operations in New Mexico Correctional Institutions, dated January 14, 2000 (Exhibit A to Plaintiffs Surreply [Doc. 21]), hereafter referred to as Consultants Report. The report sets out problems that have arisen in both public and private prisons in New Mexico, including problems with inmate classification systems (see, Consultants Report, E-8 to E-12; other mention of classification issues occurs at E-7, E-13, E-14, E-16, E-17, E-21, E-24). The Report makes only brief reference to protective custody inmates, noting that inmates are allowed to request PC status without providing specific information to support their claims, so that there is no record of safety concerns reported by an inmate. (Consultants Report, at E-17). This statement does not support the assertion that Serna and Martinez were aware of, and ignored, a substantial risk to Chavez. In addition, the Court notes that the report was prepared in January 2000 and was based on a study of the state prison system which commenced on September 19, 1999. It does not establish that Serna and Martinez were aware of risks to Chavez, at the time Serna approved his transfer to TCDF in February 1998, nor to LCCF in August 1998, nor back to LCCF on September 13, 1999.
No further evidence has been produced to show that either of these Defendants was generally aware that problems existed in the classification system which put Chavez at risk. His conclusory allegations that they were so aware, and that they were deliberately indifferent to his needs, do not preclude summary judgment on this issue.
2. Defendants Specific Knowledge Regarding TCDF
With respect to Defendants alleged knowledge of a risk at TCDF, Chavez asserts that he wrote a letter to Serna on March 30, 1998, shortly after his transfer there, requesting that he be transferred back to long term protective custody at Southern and advising Serna of his enemy status at TCDF. He says he wrote again on April 11, 1998, providing reasons for this request. Martinez responded to both letters, the second time informing Chavez that his request for transfer to Southern had been approved.
Copies of this correspondence is attached to Defendants memorandum in support of their motion. It reveals that Chavez wrote a letter to Serna on March 30, 1998, in which he stated that he requested voluntary segregation as soon as he arrived at TCDF because he had enemies there, and that this facility cannot meet my institutional needs. He requested transfer back to Southern but added, If I have to wait, I will be glad to do so because if I end up going to another facility I will end up back in segregation because of my enemy status in the other facilities . (All correspondence between the parties is contained in an attachment labeled as Exhibit 1, to Exhibit B to Defendants Memorandum).
Exhibit B to Defendants Memorandum is the affidavit of Defendant Donna Martinez, hereinafter referred to as Martinez Affidavit.
Defendant Serna states in his affidavit that he did not read any of Chavezs letters, because Martinez, who is Sernas assistant, is assigned to respond to all correspondence from inmates. (Exhibit A to Defendants Memorandum, at 3).
Exhibit A to Defendants Memorandum is the affidavit of Defendant Jeff Serna, hereinafter referred to as Serna Affidavit.
On April 6, 1998, Martinez responded to Chavezs first letter, informing him that the Classification Bureau could not act on his request until it received the proper notice from TCDF; in reply, Chavez wrote to Martinez on April 11, 1998, informing her that TCDF had told him the transfer was being processed. He said in this letter:
This institution cannot meet my needs and at this point is denying me access to Law Library and my [illegible; could be one hour] of recreation. I have ongoing litigation in the courts at this time and I may be loosing [sic] one of my cases because of my possession here at TCDF and the denial of my rights to have access to a Law Library. I have been on voluntary segregation for over one month now and have only been allowed to go to the Law Library two times even though I have requested it every day. My transfer is therefore very urgent.
Martinez responded to this letter on April 17, 1998, telling Chavez that his request for transfer to Southern had been approved, that his name had been placed on a waiting list, and he would be transferred as soon as space was available.
Chavez was not in fact transferred back to Southern; rather, he was one of several hundred inmates who were sent to LCCF, as an emergency measure, on August 1, 1998.
During his stay at TCDF, and after the letters were written, he was assaulted in the prison law library, once in June and again in July, 1998.
This correspondence does not establish that Serna and Martinez were aware of a serious risk of harm to Chavez at TCDF. Martinez did read and respond to Chavezs letters, but she says that none of his correspondence revealed that he was clearly at risk of being assaulted by other inmates an any of the institutions to which he was transferred. (Martinez Affidavit, at 3). Chavez stated in his March 30, 1998 letter that he had enemies at TCDF and requested that he be transferred back to PC status at Southern. However, he also said in the letter that he had enemies throughout the system, indicating that the enemy situation at TCDF was not unique. In addition, he stated he would be glad to wait for the transfer, if necessary. Martinez says that Chavezs statement in the March 30 letter, that he was in PC status at TCDF, indicated to her that he was not in danger of assault by other inmates. He did not complain that he was in such danger. He said that TCDF could not meet his institutional needs, but that term generally refers to needs such as education and work, and he did not clarify further nor exhibit any fear of attack by other inmates. (Martinez Affidavit, at 3-4).
In his April 11, 1998 letter, Chavez again made no mention of fears for his safety; rather, he complained about lack of law library time. He did state in the letter that he was in voluntary segregation, which indicated to Martinez that he would be safe until he could be transferred to Southern. Martinez states generally that she had no knowledge or reason to believe that Chavez was at substantial risk of being assaulted by inmates at TCDF (Martinez Affidavit, at 2), and there is nothing in this correspondence which refutes that statement. In addition, although Chavez states that he was assaulted by GP inmates in the law library at TCDF in June and again in July, 1998, there is no indication that he included this information in any letters that he wrote to Serna or Martinez after the attacks occurred. Martinez states also that she did not have responsibility for making the decision to transfer Chavez to TCDF (nor to LCCF, on the two occasions he was transferred to that facility). (Martinez Affidavit, at 7).
Serna says in his affidavit that he had no knowledge that TCDF could not adequately house PC inmates and had no knowledge of a substantial risk to Chavez at that facility. (Serna Affidavit, at 1-2). He states further that the reason for Chavezs transfer to TCDF was because of lack of space at Southern, his previous place of incarceration. (Serna Affidavit, at 4; and Exhibit 1 to Serna Affidavit). Serna states also that he does not read correspondence from inmates, since Martinez handles that task, and that he did not read these letters from Chavez. (Serna Affidavit, at 3). Even if he had read the letters, there is nothing in them, as noted above, which could have provided notice to Serna that Chavez was at substantial risk of harm at TCDF. In short, there is no genuine issue of material fact that either Serna or Martinez was aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to Chavez at TCDF, and he has therefore failed to make out a case for the jury that the decision to transfer him to TCDF in the first place, and to keep him there from February to August 1998, constituted deliberate indifference on the part of either of these Defendants.
2. Defendants Specific Knowledge Regarding LCCF
Chavez was sent to LCCF, the first time, on August 1, 1998. He remained there for approximately six weeks, until September 14, 1998. After he left LCCF following this first stay, he was transferred to several other institutions, but eventually ended up back in LCCF on September 13, 1999. He was still at LCCF at the time he filed his complaint in this action. Serna states in his affidavit that Chavezs first transfer to LCCF was done as an emergency measure, rather than through the normal classification process, because the Corrections Departments contract with TCDF had expired and inmates who had been housed there had to be moved en masse. Chavez was one of several hundred inmates transferred at this time. Serna says that he had no knowledge that LCCF was unable to safely house PC inmates; in fact, one of the reasons Chavez was sent there was because he had no known enemies at LCCF at that time, and Serna therefore thought LCCF would be safe for Chavez. (Serna Affidavit, at 4).
One of these facilities was Southern.
Although Chavez alleges he was assaulted on two occasions at Southern, he himself requested that transfer, and he does not claim that the decision by Serna or Martinez to transfer him there constituted deliberate indifference. He does allege that these assaults were perpetrated by gang members who knew him from LCCF, but he makes no allegation that Serna or Martinez had any liability for these attacks.
Chavez alleges that during his first stay at LCCF, he was assaulted by inmate Donald Looney on August 5, 1998, shoved against the wall in his cell and beaten by corrections officers on August 7, 1998, and suffered permanent injury and disfigurement on August 8, 1998 when he was kicked in the groin by another inmate while officers stood by and either did nothing or actively assisted the attackers by allowing them access to the PC pod.
On August 14, 1998, Chavez wrote a letter to Martinez. He stated that he wished to be transferred to Southern and, although he had been told that this request was approved, he somehow ended up at LCCF instead. He told Martinez that he had placed himself in voluntary segregation at LCCF and complained that, as a PC inmate, he was not allowed law library access, recreation, and could not work or go to school. He said that he had enemies at LCCF but did not mention the August 5, 7, and 8 incidents described in his complaint, not even the alleged attack by prison guards.
His complaint refers only to lack to access to recreational and other opportunities.
As noted above, Serna says he did not read any of Chavezs letters, including the August 14, 1998 one. In any case, Martinez says that there was nothing in the letter to alert her, and presumably to alert Serna if he had read it, to any danger to Chavez. In the letter, Chavez did not report any attacks, did not tell Martinez he was in fear of being assaulted, and did not mention any concerns about the facilitys ability to safely house him in PC status. (Martinez Affidavit, at 5).
Martinez wrote back on August 27, 1998 and told Chavez that there had been no recommendation from LCCF to transfer him to Southern, and that he would not necessarily be approved to go there. She told him that, in the meantime, he would continue to be afforded PC status at LCCF as long as he felt in he needed it. As noted above, Martinez asserts that she was not responsible for the decisions to transfer Chavez to LCCF on either occasion and that, in any case, she had no knowledge that LCCF posed a substantial risk to Chavez. (Martinez Affidavit, at 2, 5).
Chavez alleges in his complaint that, in August or September 1998, both Serna and Martinez toured LCCF and were thereby made aware of the conditions under which PC inmates were held at LCCF. He also says that he spoke directly to Martinez on this occasion about the conditions of PC inmates, and she responded that she was aware of the situation. Serna says that he has visited LCCF in the past, although he has never toured the facility and has never visited the cells or housing units.
He says he did not witness any problems at LCCF with regard to PC inmates and had no information that would have led him to believe that LCCF could not adequately handle PC inmates such as Chavez. (Serna Affidavit, at 2).
Martinez acknowledges that she toured LCCF and says that Chavez might very well have talked to her during this tour. However, she says he did not report any serious problems to her nor express a belief that he was in danger of being assaulted or killed, in any such conversation. (Martinez Affidavit, at 2). Although this assertion appears to create an issue of fact between Martinezs and Chavezs versions of this conversation, the complaint is quite vague on this point, with Chavez stating only that he talked directly to Defendant Martinez about these problems and she said that she was aware. (Complaint, ¶ 55). Chavez does not state that he told Martinez that he was assaulted by Looney, or brutalized by guards, or kicked in the groin by another inmate while guards either assisted in the attack or stood by and did nothing. Martinez says she may well have spoken with Chavez, but she did not receive specific information from him about attacks or fear of attacks.
This allegation regarding a conversation between Chavez and Martinez does not raise an issue of fact requiring a trial on the question of Martinezs knowledge.
As noted above, Chavezs first stay at LCCF ended on September 14, 1998. Following a number of transfers to other facilities, Chavez was sent back to LCCF approximately a year later, on September 13, 1999. Chavez claims that this transfer, too, was done with deliberate indifference in that Defendants knew that LCCF could not adequately house PC inmates and keep them safe. Serna asserts in his affidavit that the Corrections Department made a decision that the majority of PC inmates in the state would be sent to LCCF and housed in a unit that was separate from the general population. Serna says that it was his judgment that the PC inmates would be safer if they were kept together at one facility. (Serna Affidavit, at 4-5).
With regard to his second stay at LCCF, Chavez alleges that he was assaulted on the bus on September 13, 1999 as he was being transported to LCCF, and that he has been subjected to constant threats from GP inmates in the form of yelling, kicking, spitting, throwing urine, lighting fires, and flooding his cell. On September 19, 1999, Chavez wrote again to Serna. The letter was read by Martinez. (Martinez Affidavit, at 5-6). Chavez stated in the letter that he got into a fight on the bus with two inmates who were spitting and slapping me on the back of my head, and described how the other inmates continually yell death threats at him, and how he cannot participate in recreation or go to the showers. He requested that he be transferred back into long-term protective custody at Southern.
Upon receipt of this letter, Martinez spoke to the Associate Warden at LCCF about Chavezs complaints. She asked the warden to ensure that Chavez would be housed with other PC inmates, away from involuntary administrative segregation inmates who pose a threat of harm to others. She says that she did not want Chavez to feel threatened, and the purpose of her call was to prevent that from happening. (Martinez Affidavit, at 6). She wrote back to Chavez on October 13, 1999, telling him she had spoken to the warden, as described above. She also stated that Chavez would continue to be housed at LCCF, as it currently houses almost all voluntary segregation inmates in the state.
She said further that the majority of inmates at Southern are now security threat group members, and [y]our placement at SNMCF would likely be most uncomfortable for you given the caliber of inmates now housed there. Martinez states she took these actions out of concern for Chavezs comfort and safety, and the first she learned of his dissatisfaction with her efforts was when she read his complaint in this lawsuit. (Martinez Affidavit, at 7).
This evidence does not demonstrate actions constituting deliberate indifference on the part of Serna or Martinez with regard to the decisions to transfer Chavez into LCCF in August 1998 and in September 1999, and to keep him there in spite of his request for a transfer to Southern. There is nothing to show that these Defendants had general information that LCCF was unable to care for PC inmates, nor is there any proof that Chavez specifically conveyed to Serna or Martinez that he was living under a risk of serious harm.
Chavezs first letter from LCCF, sent August 14, 1998, complained that he had been denied access to the law library and to recreational and other opportunities because of his PC status; however, he did not describe the incidents of violence which, he alleges in his complaint, occurred earlier in August, and he did not say that he felt unsafe or threatened at LCCF. The record does not show, and indeed Chavez does not specifically allege, that at the time of her tour of the facilities in August or September 1998, he told Martinez that he had been assaulted at LCCF or that he feared for his life.
His September 1999 letter, sent during his second stay at LCCF, does include a description of being spit on and hit on the back of the head, and being the target of insults, taunts, and other threatening behavior on the part of other LCCF inmates. However, the spitting and head-hitting, described as occurring on the transport bus, do not rise to the level of serious harm, as required under the first prong of the Eighth Amendment test. And although the later yelling, kicking, fire-setting, and urine-throwing, as described by Chavez, might constitute a risk of serious harm so as to satisfy the first prong of the test, there is no indication that Serna was aware of these incidents, since he had delegated correspondence duties to Martinez, and no indication that Martinez responded to this information in a way that can be characterized as deliberate indifference. Indeed, her actions in response to this letter demonstrate a concern for Chavezs safety, rather than deliberate indifference.
The Court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact with regard to Chavezs allegation that Serna and Martinez knew of, and acted with deliberate indifference toward, a substantial risk of serious harm to Chavez at LCCF.
Matters of inmate classification are generally seen as a facet of internal prison administration, and the Court will not interfere in matters of prison operations in the absence of a constitutional violation. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1886 (1979). Defendants having made the requisite showing of a lack of genuine issue for trial on the Eighth Amendment issue, the motion for summary judgment should therefore be granted.
Injunctive Relief
Serna and Martinez also argue that Chavezs request for injunctive relief should be denied in its entirety. In his prayer for relief, Chavez asks the Court to issue an injunction requiring Serna and Martinez to transfer Chavez immediately to a NMCD facility that will provide adequate protective custody, and to keep him in protective custody in a NMCD facility until his release from prison.
Chavez also sought an injunction against Defendant Robert Perry; however, Perry was dismissed from the lawsuit in the Judgment [Doc. 6] of April 13, 2000. In addition, Chavezs request for an injunction requiring the NMCD Defendants to provide him with reasonable access to a law library was mooted by the April 13 Judgment, which dismissed Chavezs claims relating to law library access.
Defendants argue that Chavez has not established any of the four required elements of a claim for injunctive relief. Chavez did not respond to this argument in his briefing on this motion.
If, after the period for objections has expired, the District Court adopts this Recommended Disposition on the motion for summary judgment, and also adopts the recommendation on Sernas and Martinezs separate motion to dismiss other claims against them, these two Defendants will be dismissed from this case. In that event, Chavezs claims for injunctive relief will be moot. The Court therefore declines to address Defendants arguments on this issue at this time, but will do so later, if Serna and Martinez remain as Defendants in the case.
Recommended Disposition
That the NMCD Defendants motion for summary judgment be granted.