Opinion
01 Civ. 2519 (LBS)
November 13, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Petitioner Nikolas Chandras filed a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that the state prosecutor failed to disclose certain impeachment evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). For the reasons set forth below, the petition is denied.
Although cast as violations of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, as explained more fully below, Chandras's claims are more properly analyzed as alleged violations of the due process rights protected by Brady and its progeny.
BACKGROUND
On April 15, 1997, a man entered the Fleet Bank at 6901 Fifth Avenue in Brooklyn and presented the teller, Rina Gilsteyn, with a note threatening to blow up the bank if Gilsteyn did not give the man money. Gilsteyn complied, and the man left the bank with approximately $6500. On April 16, 1997, the police arrested Chandras, and he was charged with the robbery.
Chandras proceeded to trial on October 17, 1997 before New York Supreme Court Justice Larry D. Martin. At trial, the prosecution introduced the eyewitness testimony of Gilsteyn, who described the robbery and her subsequent identification of Chandras in a lineup the following day. The arresting officer, Detective Michael Galletta, then described the circumstances of Chandras's arrest, which was based on information received from Daniel Callahan, a friend of Chandras who Detective Galleta knew from previous encounters in Callahan's neighborhood.
Callahan was the prosecution's final witness in its case-in-chief. He testified that Chandras had previously discussed robbing the Fleet Bank. (Trial Transcript ("TT") at 153-54.) On the afternoon of April 15, 1997, Chandras arrived at Callahan's apartment and flashed a group of fifty and one hundred dollar bills, saying "I told you I was going to get it," which Callahan understood to mean that he completed the robbery. (TT at 153.) Callahan then described his encounter with Detective Galletta, his concerns about being implicated in the robbery, and his ultimate identification of Chandras as the perpetrator. The prosecutor concluded his direct examination by eliciting Callahan's extensive criminal history as well as the presence of two pending cases against him, including a burglary arrest that occurred after Chandras's arrest.
Defense counsel's cross-examination of Callahan consisted of numerous attempts to impeach his credibility regarding his drug use, criminal history, and possible motivations for testifying falsely. The cross-examination included suggestions that Callahan was receiving some consideration for testifying against Chandras:
Q: Let me understand this, you have been a criminal since 1992. You testified here that you are sitting in jail and you haven't made a deal with the District Attorney?
A: Nope.
. . .
Q: Are you looking to the future by testifying here?
A: This has nothing to do with my case whatsoever.
Q: Mr. Callahan, how many times have you talked to the District Attorney?
A: Twice.
Q: At that time, when you were talking to the District Attorney, was your attorney present?
A: Once she was.
Q: And at that time or at any of the times when you were present there, your attorney, who is defending you on this case, never possibly mentioned to the District Attorney about helping you out on your present charge?
A: They told me they couldn't promise anything.
Q: Oh, they couldn't promise anything, but did they say that they could do something?
A: They didn't say nothing like that, sir.
Q: Are you expecting no help whatsoever on your present case for testifying here?
A: It would be nice if it happens, but I'm not looking forward to anything.
(TT at 170, 174-75.)
The prosecution did not conduct any redirect examination of Callahan. The jury convicted Chandras of one count of Robbery in the First Degree. N.Y. Penal Law § 160.15[3] (McKinney 2002). On November 10, 1997, the court sentenced Chandras to ten years imprisonment. Callahan eventually pled guilty to a misdemeanor offense on the burglary charge and received six months imprisonment.
On May 6, 1999, Chandras, represented by counsel, appealed his conviction. He argued that (1) the pre-trial lineup was unnecessarily suggestive and violated his right to due process; (2) the trial court improperly admitted evidence that was the product of an illegal search and seizure; (3) the trial court erred by impermissibly limiting the scope of defense counsel's cross-examination; (4) the trial court erred by charging the jury with a duty to discuss the evidence; and (5) the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The Appellate Division rejected all of Chandras's claims. People v. Chandras, 267 A.D.2d 394, 700 N.Y.S.2d 233 (2d Dep't 1999). The New York Court of Appeals denied Chandras permission to appeal the Appellate Division's judgment. People v. Chandras, 94 N.Y.2d 917, 768 N.Y.S.2d 356, 729 N.E.2d 1155 (2000) (Bellacosa, J.).
On May 28, 1999, while his direct appeal was pending, Chandras moved to vacate his conviction pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.10. In support of his motion, Chandras submitted an affidavit from Callahan dated May 12, 1999 (the "Callahan Affidavit") in which Callahan recanted his trial testimony. (Callahan Aff. Ex. B.) Callahan stated that his trial testimony was untrue and that "I was coerced into perjuring myself on the stand by the Assistant District Attorney Kin Ng in exchange for a deal on my pending case at the time." (Id.) Chandras alleged in his motion that Callahan's perjury tainted the arrest and subsequent lineup and required a new trial.
In a Supplemental Notice of Motion dated December 9, 1999, Chandras, represented by different counsel, sought to expand the scheduled § 440.10 hearing. Chandras sought to include claims that (1) the prosecutor failed to disclose an agreement or understanding with Callahan for a reduced sentence on his pending indictment in exchange for his testimony, and failed to correct misstatements by Callahan that he was not promised any benefit for his testimony; and (2) the prosecution knew (or should have known) about Callahan's psychiatric history and failed to disclose such evidence in violation of his Brady obligations. The state trial court granted Chandras's motion and expanded the scope of the hearing.
The trial judge held hearings on December 15, 1999, and January 3 and 7, 2000. At the hearings, Callahan alleged that he knew nothing about the bank robbery. (Hearing Transcript ("HT")(1) at 8.) Callahan described his initial meeting with Assistant District Attorney ("ADA") Kin Ng and the following exchange:
Callahan initially attempted to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination in response to this line of questioning. (HT(1) at 6-7.)
The hearing transcript is divided into three separately numbered and paginated parts. The parenthetical reference identifies the part in which the cited material appears.
Q: Now, when ADA Ng discussed your testimony with you about Mr. Chandras's case, did he also discuss with you what would happen to your burglary case?
A: Well, no. I asked him about it. I said, What am I going to get out of this? And he says, Well, it's against the law for me to offer a deal for your testimony. But, you should read between the lines.
(HT(1) at 13.)
On cross-examination, Callahan responded that he could not remember his earlier trial testimony, but "if [the trial transcript] says it there I guess it's true." (HT(1) at 18, 21.) Callahan also acknowledged that he and Chandras were imprisoned together in the Downstate Correctional Facility, and he had seen Chandras prior to submitting the affidavit. (HT(1) at 28.) At the close of cross-examination, in response to questions about the truth of his affidavit and trial testimony, Callahan invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege not to incriminate himself. (HT(1) at 28-29.)
Callahan's defense attorney, Diana Boyar, testified that, to her knowledge, ADA Ng did not make any deal or promise, but she assumed that Callahan would receive favorable treatment in his open case. (HT(1) at 31, 34.) In a sworn affidavit and testimony, ADA Ng stated that he did not make any deal or promise in exchange for Callahan's testimony. (HT(1) at 47; Ng Aff. Ex. J.; see also Monte Aff. Ex. J (stating that no deal was offered to Callahan involving his pending misdemeanor assault case).)
ADA Ng handled both Chandras's case and Callahan's subsequent burglary prosecution. (HT(1) at 49.)
The hearing also encompassed Callahan's history of mental illness. At the time of Chandras's trial, Callahan was housed in the psychiatric ward of the Brooklyn House of Detention and was on medication for a condition described as bipolar disorder. Callahan acknowledged, however, that at the time of Chandras's trial, he had never revealed any psychiatric problems to his trial attorney, the prosecution, or the police. (HT(1) at 15-16, 21-23.)
The state trial judge denied Chandras's § 440.10 motion. (Decision of Martin, J., Sept. 6, 2000, Ex. K.) The judge was not satisfied that "Mr. Callahan was, in fact, coerced into giving false testimony against the Defendant at trial," or that "the People violated either their Brady or Giglio obligations based on the testimony adduced at the hearing." (Id.) The Appellate Division denied Chandras's leave to appeal, (Decision and Order of Santucci, J., Oct. 17, 2000, Ex. L), and Chandras subsequently filed the instant petition.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") governs Chandras's petition. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 2002). Under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to state prisoners unless the state court's adjudication of the claim on the merits "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Id. § 2254(d)(1).
As explained by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), a decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases," or if the state court "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable" from previous cases considered by the Court, but reaches a result that is different from Court precedent. Id. at 405-06. A state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law if the state court "unreasonably applies" the correct governing legal rule to the facts of the particular case, or "unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Id. at 407.
AEDPA also constrains federal review of state factual findings. The habeas petitioner must demonstrate that the decision was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(2) (West 2002). A federal court must presume the correctness of the factual findings of state courts, and the state petitioner must rebut this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 2254(e)(1).
DISCUSSION
In his petition, Chandras alleges two constitutional violations based on his attorney's inability to cross-examine Callahan about the alleged coercive deal and Callahan's history of mental illness. He argues that this inability violated the Confrontation Clause. (E.g., Chandras Mem. at 11-12.) Chandras does not identify any direct restriction on the scope of cross-examination related to these topics, however, and the trial transcript reveals none. The gravamen of his petition, then, is the prosecutor's alleged failure to disclose these two pieces of impeachment information pursuant to his Brady and Giglio obligations. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 677-78 (1985) (analyzing the failure to produce impeachment information as a possible due process violation rather than a possible violation of the right to effective cross-examination). The Court will discuss these claims in turn.
Alleged Plea Agreement Brady and its progeny impose a due process obligation on the prosecution to disclose material evidence in its possession that is favorable to the defendant. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. There are three components to a Brady violation: (1) the government suppressed evidence, either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the suppressed evidence was favorable to the defendant; and (3) the failure to disclose the evidence resulted in prejudice to the defendant. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82; United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 140 (2d Cir. 2001).
The Brady rule encompasses exculpatory and impeachment evidence.Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676; Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154-55. When the government enters into an agreement or understanding with one of its key witnesses regarding a pending prosecution, for example, the prosecutor has two interrelated obligations. First, the prosecutor must disclose the agreement to the defense. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154-55. Second, the prosecution may not knowingly solicit false trial testimony about the deal or allow false testimony to go uncorrected if it appears. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976); see also Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); Jenkins v. Artuz, 294 F.3d 284, 292-93 (2d Cir. 2002).
Here, Petitioner claims that the state prosecutor violated these obligations by failing to disclose an alleged understanding between Callahan and the prosecution — a promise for lenient treatment in a pending burglary case in exchange for testifying in the Chandras case. The ADAs involved in Callahan's pending cases at the time, however, flatly denied, in both sworn testimony and affidavits, that there was an offer outstanding to Callahan. These statements are consistent with Callahan's contemporaneous trial testimony, in which he denied the existence of any promise or offer. Although it is true that the government cannot avoid itsBrady or Giglio obligations by making only general promises of leniency to witnesses, Dubose v. Lefevre, 619 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1980), there must be some evidence of an agreement or understanding between ADA Ng and Callahan for a Giglio violation to have occurred. In the absence of credible evidence contradicting the ADAs' denials, Chandras's claims of prosecutorial misconduct are meritless.
Petitioner responds that neither the ADAs nor Callahan's trial testimony should be believed. He identifies evidence that allegedly rebuts the government's claims: the Callahan Affidavit, Callahan's hearing testimony, and the misdemeanor sentence Callahan received in his burglary prosecution rather than a sentence commensurate with a previous felony offer.
This evidence, however, is not "clear and convincing" proof that an agreement existed between Callahan and the ADAs at the time of his trial testimony. First, the Callahan Affidavit is dated over a year after Chandras's trial and suspiciously arrived soon after Callahan encountered Chandras in the same correctional facility. Second, Callahan's hearing testimony is ambiguous at best. Although he stated in his affidavit that a coercive deal existed, Callahan would not affirm this allegation at the hearing, saying only that ADA Ng declined to promise anything because it was against the law to do so. Even if Callahan expected some leniency for his testimony, a general or hopeful expectation is not enough to create an agreement or understanding which triggers a Giglio obligation. Collier v. Davis, 301 F.3d 843, 849 (7th Cir. 2002). Finally, ADA Ng explained that the ultimate plea bargain and lesser sentence was a product of the strength of its case against Callahan rather than any pending agreement. (HT at 49-50.) Contrary to Petitioner's suggestions, the existence of this later plea bargain alone does not imply a secret agreement that, if it existed, required disclosure. See DeMarco v. United States, 415 U.S. 449, 450 (1974) (per curiam) (stating that the factual issue of whether the plea agreement was entered into before or after the witness's trial testimony is "dispositive" for purposes of identifying a possibleGiglio violation).
Faced with this evidence, the state court declined to credit Callahan's allegation of a coercive deal in the May 1999 affidavit and held that the government did not violate its Giglio obligation. The existence of an agreement or understanding is a factual issue, and a federal court reviewing a habeas petition presumes that a state court's findings are correct. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2002); see also Collier, 301 F.3d at 848 (stating that the existence of an agreement or understanding is a factual determination, which the petitioner must rebut with clear and convincing evidence); Dye v. Stender, 208 F.3d 662, 665 (8th Cir. 2000) (same). The Petitioner has failed to put forth clear and convincing evidence sufficient to rebut this presumption. The lack of credible support for Chandras's claims, contrasted with the evidence directly contradicting those claims, demonstrates that the state court properly rejected his motion to vacate his sentence.
The state court correctly identified Brady and Giglio as the governing legal principles, and its rejection of Chandras's motion was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of those precedents. Therefore, Chandras's claim of prosecutorial misconduct stemming from the nondisclosure of an alleged agreement with Callahan is denied.
Additional Impeachment Evidence
Chandras alleges a second Brady violation. He points to medical documents from Correctional Health Services, which detail Callahan's history of mental illness, and Callahan's incarceration in the psychiatric unit of the Brooklyn House of Detention at the time of his trial testimony. (Chandras Mem. Ex. B.) Chandras argues that the prosecutor's failure to disclose this impeachment evidence warrants a new trial.
Again, Petitioner casts this claim as a Confrontation Clause violation. (Id. at 15-17.) As the medical records were known to the defense only after the trial concluded, however, Chandras can identify no direct restriction on defense counsel's cross-examination of Callahan, and casting the claim as a denial of his right to effective cross-examination does not adequately describe his constitutional claim.See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 677-78. Rather, a constitutional error may have occurred, and a new trial may be warranted, if the prosecution suppressed material impeachment information concerning Callahan's psychiatric history.
The extent of the impeachment evidence allegedly subject to disclosure is unclear. In his petition, Chandras included a Correctional Health Services admission form dated October 16, 1997, one day before the start of Chandras's trial. (Chandras Reply Mem. Ex. A.) This document refers to Callahan's history of hospitalizations in 1982, 1985, and 1996, as well as the current medications that Callahan was taking. (Id.) Other documents detailing Callahan's mental status are from December 1999 — well after the trial. (Chandras Mem. Ex. B.) Presumably, although the record before the Court does not indicate one way or the other, Callahan's Department of Corrections file also identifies the unit in which Callahan was being held.
In deciding whether a Brady violation occurred pursuant to the three-part inquiry set out in Strickler, a court must first determine whether the prosecution "suppressed" the evidence at issue. Suppression of evidence may occur, of course, if the prosecutor has actual possession or knowledge of the evidence and fails to disclose it to the defense.See, e.g., United States v. Pena, 227 F.3d 23, 27 n. 3 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that the obligation to disclose Brady material in a presentence report stems from the government's possession of the report). This is not such a case. Unlike Pena, the prosecutor did not actually possess the documents at issue, and ADA Ng, Detective Galletta, and Callahan's own defense attorney testified that they were unaware of Callahan's previous treatment for mental illness (HT(1) at 34-35, 47-48; HT(2) at 10-11). Callahan himself did not inform anyone of his prior psychiatric treatment. (HT(1) at 15-16.) In addition, nothing in Callahan's demeanor during his trial testimony put Chandras's defense attorney on notice that Callahan had a mental illness. (HT(3) at 31.) And neither the ADA nor the detective-investigators acting on his behalf retrieved Callahan directly from psychiatric unit of the Brooklyn House of Detention. (HT(1) at 51-52; HT(3) at 33.)
Thus, there is no evidence that the prosecutor knew about Callahan's psychiatric history. In this context, where neither specific information from the witness, observation of his demeanor, nor the routine process for retrieving the witness from the detention center gave the prosecution reason to be aware of any issue involving Callahan's mental health, the Court declines to impose an obligation to seek out such evidence. See United States v. DiPaolo, 804 F.2d 225, 230 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that the government has no obligation to seek out evidence of witnesses' psychiatric history); see also East v. Scott, 55 F.3d 996, 1003 (5th Cir. 1996) (same).
The prosecutor's lack of actual knowledge of Callahan's psychiatric history, however, does not end the matter. Suppression of evidence may also occur if the prosecutor has only "constructive knowledge" of theBrady material's existence. Coppa, 267 F.3d at 140 ("[A] prosecutor can `suppress' evidence even if he has acted in good faith and even if the evidence is `known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor.'") (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995));United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200, 1208 (2d Cir. 1995) ("The individual prosecutor is presumed to have knowledge of all information gathered in connection with the government's investigation."). The concept of constructive or imputed knowledge implies a concomitant duty to seek out Brady material from other government agencies working with the prosecution. As the Supreme Court recently framed the rule, "the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police." Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282 (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437).
Although the prosecutor's general duty is clear, the exact point at which government agents can fairly be categorized as acting on behalf of the prosecution, thus requiring the prosecutor to seek out any exculpatory or impeachment evidence in their possession, is uncertain. See United States v. Zagari, 111 F.3d 307, 320 n. 13 (2d Cir. 1997) ("The extent to which knowledge may be imputed from one federal investigative agency to another for Brady purposes is as yet unclear."). On the one hand, courts, including the Supreme Court, have imputed knowledge ofBrady material to prosecutors when the evidence is known only to prosecutorial personnel (including fellow prosecutors in the same office) or government agents investigating the particular case. E.g., Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438 (police investigator); Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (fellow prosecutor); United States v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149, (3d Cir. 1993) (Drug Enforcement Administration agents); Morell, 524 F.2d at 554-55 (government agent supervising confidential informant); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (assuming, sub silentio, that a state prosecutor had constructive knowledge of information in state child services division's investigative files). Furthermore, prosecutors can "suppress" evidence by failing to search for background information, such as a witness's criminal history, that is readily available through routine investigation of the prosecution's files or the files of other government agencies. E.g., Crivins v. Roth, 172 F.3d 991, 997-98 (7th Cir. 1999); Hollman v. Wilson, 158 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Auten, 632 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1980); cf. Coppa, 267 F.3d at 140 (interpreting Kyles to require the Government actively to seek Brady material "in its files and in the files of related agencies reasonably expected to have possession of such information") (emphasis added).
The Second Circuit has described this relationship as acting as an "arm of the prosecutor." Pina, 752 F.2d at 49 (citing United States v. Morell, 524 F.2d 550, 555 (2d Cir. 1975)).
On the other hand, Brady does not require the prosecution to seek out exculpatory or impeachment evidence within the possession of all government agencies. As the Second Circuit has noted, adoption of such a "monolithic view of government" would condemn criminal prosecution "to a state of paralysis." United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Quinn, 445 F.2d 940, 944 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding "completely untenable" the position that "knowledge of any part of the government is equivalent to knowledge on the part of this prosecutor") (internal quotations omitted). Thus, for example, the Second Circuit held that state prosecutors did not have constructive knowledge of exculpatory information in a parole officer's report. Pina v. Henderson, 752 F.2d 47, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1985). The Second Circuit (and other courts) also have not required federal prosecutors to learn about evidence possessed by state governments or other federal agencies that are not involved in the investigation of the particular defendants.E.g., Avellino, 136 F.3d at 256 (refusing to charge federal prosecutor with constructive knowledge of information gathered in a state investigation); United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 949 (2d Cir. 1993) (FBI agents uninvolved in the prosecution of the individual defendants);Quinn, 445 F.2d at 944 (federal prosecutors in different parts of the country); see also United States v. Morris, 80 F.3d 1151, 1169-70 (7th Cir. 1996) (declining to impute to prosecutors information gathered by the Office of Thrift Supervision, SEC, and IRS).
Falling between these two poles, and particularly relevant in this case, are situations involving agencies within the same government whose role is custodial rather than prosecutorial or investigative. These situations represent, at best, an uneasy fit with the principles outlined above. Government agents at times may be aligned with the prosecution "team" because they have continuing responsibility for the government witness. Mastracchio v. Vose, 274 F.3d 590, 599-600 (1st Cir. 2001) (treating police officers who comprised the government's witness protection team as part of the prosecution for Brady purposes); United States v. Wilson, 237 F.3d 827, 831-32 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 840 ("[I]t is impossible to say in good conscience that the U.S. Marshal's Service was not `part of the team' that was participating in the prosecution, even if the role of the Marshal's Service was to keep the defendants in custody rather than go out on the streets and collect evidence."). In the absence of regular contact with the prosecution or any investigative or prosecutorial responsibility, however, imputing knowledge of these government agents to the prosecution threatens to stretch the relevant phrase from the recent Supreme Court cases — "acting on the government's behalf in the case" — beyond its breaking point. See Payne, 136 F.3d at 255 (stating that a prosecutor is presumed to have knowledge of "information gathered in connection with his office's investigation of the case") (emphasis added); People v. Howard, 87 N.Y.2d 940, 641 N.Y.S.2d 222 (1996) (memorandum opinion) (describing the Department of Corrections as an administrative rather than a law enforcement agency and holding that the District Attorney has no obligation under Rosario to attempt to locate and gain possession of statements embodied in State Department of Correctional Services transcripts). In this case, for example, the record does not reveal that the state corrections officers investigated Callahan on behalf of the prosecution or involved themselves in any way with the prosecution's case other than by exercising their general custodial responsibilities.
In Mastracchio, the state police officers had custody of the government witnesses pursuant to a witness protection program.
Similarly, the second category of cases, which impose a duty on prosecutors to investigate readily available, routine background information, could be extended to require prosecutors to obtain corrections files as a matter of course when their key witnesses are currently incarcerated and have extensive criminal histories. Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 480 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that the state's obligation to turn over all information bearing on a witness's credibility includes the witness's prison records and any information therein); see also United States v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 894 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that, for purposes of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, prison files held by the Bureau of Prisons were in the possession and control of the United States Attorney's Office); United States v. Owen, 933 F. Supp. 76, 86 (D. Mass. 1996) (stating that the government's obligation to search for Brady material includes the Bureau of Prisons files). Given that the Department of Corrections files may not necessarily contain relevant exculpatory material, however, imposing this general duty to search may be unwarranted. See Avellino, 136 F.2d at 255 (cautioning against imposing "an unlimited duty on the prosecutor to inquire of other offices not working with the prosecutor's office on the case in question"); Brooks, 966 F.2d at 1503-04.
The Court need not decide whether, in a particular case, the relationship between the state prosecutor's office, the Department of Corrections, and a government witness or defendant would be extensive enough to require an individual prosecutor to learn of favorable evidence known only to corrections officials. As Williams counsels, the Court's review is limited to whether the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 529 U.S. at 405-07. Guided by this deferential standard, this Court concludes that the state court's decision was not contrary to the applicable federal law, as outlined by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, to the extent that the state court declined to impute knowledge of the Corrections Department officials to the individual prosecutor in this case, its decision was not an unreasonable application of Brady and its progeny.
Assuming arguendo that the prosecution did have constructive knowledge of Callahan's mental health status and that this information was favorable impeachment information, the Petitioner's claim still fails because the evidence does not meet the third, materiality prong necessary to prove a Brady violation. Undisclosed exculpatory or impeachment evidence is material if there is "a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. A "reasonable probability" is shown when the suppression of evidence "undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial." Id. at 435 (quotations and citation omitted). In the context of impeachment evidence, the Second Circuit has explained that:
[I]mpeachment evidence has been found to be material where the witness at issue supplied the only evidence linking the defendant(s) to the crime, or where the likely impact on the witness's credibility would have undermined a critical element of the prosecution's case. In contrast, a new trial is generally not required when the testimony of the witness is corroborated by other testimony, or when the suppressed impeachment evidence merely furnishes an additional basis on which to impeach a witness whose credibility has already been shown to be questionable.Payne, 63 F.3d at 1210 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Evidence of Callahan's psychiatric history does not satisfy this materiality standard. Although Callahan testified to hearing voices, there is no indication that Callahan's mental illness impaired his ability to perceive or recount events either on the date of the robbery or during trial. (HT(1) at 15, 22-24.) In light of the independent eyewitness testimony corroborating Callahan's account and defense counsel's vigorous attacks on Callahan's credibility, the undisclosed evidence would have been merely cumulative. United States v. Helmsley, 985 F.2d 1202, 1210 (2d Cir. 1993) (rejecting as immaterial cumulative undisclosed impeachment evidence). Thus, the state court properly concluded that no Brady violation had occurred.
CONCLUSION
The habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is denied. As Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing that he was denied a constitutional right, a certificate of appealability will not issue. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(c)(2) (West 2002). The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.
SO ORDERED.