Opinion
No. CV00-0160901
October 10, 2003
The defendant, Weather Shield Manufacturing ("Weather Shield") has moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Weather Shield contends that this court is without subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff, Ralph Carpinella, lacks standing to bring and maintain this action.
The plaintiff, Ralph Carpinella, has moved to add his wife, Sheila Carpinella, as a plaintiff in this matter and to amend the Second Amended Complaint accordingly.
In his Second Amended Complaint, Ralph Carpinella has sued the defendants Weather Shield Manufacturing Inc., Huttig Building Products and County Lumber, Inc. (hereinafter, all defendants referred to as "Weather Shield") for improper manufacture, design and fabrication of windows and doors, which were installed into the property known as 725 Breakneck Hill Road in Middlebury. Ralph Carpinella contends, inter alia, the defective windows and doors resulted from Weather Shield's improper application of the water resistant coating. It is his claim that the windows and doors are so defective that water entered and remains in between many of the panes of glass, and, further, peeling, flaking, and delaminating of the coating on the windows and doors has occurred. The purchase price of these windows and doors was approximately $180,000. Both the plaintiff and his wife, Sheila Carpinella, were parties to the contract with Weather Shield for the purchase of the windows and doors. Sheila Carpinella was, at the time this suit was filed in August 2000, and continued to be up until the date of the hearing on these motions, the sole owner of the property at 725 Breakneck Hill Road. While the court commends counsel for filing, as requested, supplemental memoranda on the effect of plaintiff's reacquisition of the defective windows and doors, the court has determined it does not need to consider that issue for purposes of deciding Motions 174 and 178.
No other defendant disclosed experts within the deadlines set by this court. Weather Shield is taking the lead in this litigation.
On the day of the hearing, Ralph Carpinella presented a quitclaim deed which had been executed that morning by Sheila Carpinella and which purportedly conveyed the property at 725 Breakneck Hill Road to Ralph and Sheila Carpinella.
Now pending before this court for decision are Weather Shield's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and a parallel motion filed two weeks earlier, by Ralph Carpinella, to add his wife Sheila, as party plaintiff. The parties have briefed and argued each motion extensively and evidence was presented in a hearing. For the following reasons the court concludes that the plaintiff's motion to add should be granted under the authority of General Statutes § 52-109 and, therefore, that defendant's motion to dismiss should be denied.
After this hearing, the court allowed further memoranda of law to be submitted by the parties, confined to the limited issue of the quitclaim deed.
At the hearing, where both the motion to add and the motion to dismiss were heard, Weather Shield objected to the motion to add being heard due to the pendency of their motion to dismiss. While overruling the objection, the court noted the objection for the record.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The longstanding rule in Connecticut, relative to subject matter jurisdiction is that "Whenever the absence of jurisdiction is brought to the notice of the court or tribunal, cognizance of it must be taken and the matter passed upon before it `can move one further step in the cause; as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction.' Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. (37 U.S.) 657, 717 [1838]; Denton v. Danbury, 48 Conn. 368, 372." Woodmont Assn. v. Milford, 85 Conn. 517, 524, 84 A. 307 (1912).
The point has been frequently made. See, e.g., Kohn Display Woodworking Co. v. Paragon Paint Varnish Corporation, 166 Conn. 446, 448, 352 A.2d 301 (1974); East Side Civic Assn. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 161 Conn. 558, 559, 290 A.2d 348 (1971); Carten v. Carten, 153 Conn. 603, 610, 219 A.2d 711 (1966); Felletter v. Thompson, 133 Conn. 277, 280, 50 A.2d 81 (1946) (Maitbie, C.J.); Baldwin Piano Organ Co. v. Blake, 186 Conn. 295, 297-98, 441 A.2d 183 (1982).
As noted in Dilieto v. County Obstetrics Gynecology Group, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Waterbury, Docket No. X02 CV97-0150435S, 26 Conn. L. Rptr. 345 (January 31, 2000, Sheldon, J.), a classic situation in which a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction is when the party prosecuting an action lacks standing to do so. McGee v. Dunnigan, 138 Conn. 263, 83 A.2d 491 (1951); Nader v. Altermatt, 166 Conn. 43, 59, 347 A.2d 89 (1974); Crone v. Gill, 250 Conn. 476, 477 n. 1, 736 A.2d 131 (1999) (dismissing a writ of error challenging an order disqualifying an attorney from representing a criminal defendant because the attorney, who filed the writ in his own name as plaintiff in error, had no standing to challenge the disqualification order).
"Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless [one] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stamford Hospital v. Vega, 236 Conn. 646, 657, 674 A.2d 821 (1996). "Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring suit or is classically aggrieved." Steeneck v. University of Bridgeport, 235 Conn. 572, 579, 668 A.2d 688 (1995). The fundamental test for establishing classical aggrievement is well settled: "[F]irst, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision . . . (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Med-Trans of Connecticut, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health Addiction Services, 242 Conn. 152, 158-59, 699 A.2d 142 (1997); accord State Medical Society v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry, 203 Conn. 295, 299-300, 524 A.2d 636 (1987). Second, the "party claiming aggrievement also must demonstrate that its asserted interest has been specially and injuriously affected in a way that is cognizable by law." United Cable Television Services Corp. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 235 Conn. 334, 343, 663 A.2d 1011 (1995). Crone v. Gill, supra, 250 Conn. at 479-80.
Ralph Carpinella's motion to add is based on Connecticut's "wrong plaintiff" statute, General Statutes § 52-109. This statute provides that:
See, also, Practice Book § 9-20.
When any action has been commenced in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff, the court may, if satisfied that it was so commenced through mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, allow any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff.
On its face, § 52-109 appears to contemplate that when the conditions set forth therein are met, a lawsuit "commenced in the name of the wrong person" — presumably a person who has no present interest in or legal right to prosecute the lawsuit — can be saved from dismissal by the substitution of "any other person" as party plaintiff. The two conditions that must be met to invoke the statutory remedy of substitution are: first, that the action was "commenced in the name of the wrong person by mistake;" and second, that the proposed substitution "is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute." Id.
The court's authority to order substitution or addition of plaintiffs instead of ordering dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is extensively and persuasively discussed, by Sheldon, J., in Dilieto v. County Obstetrics Gynecology Group, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. X02 CV97-0150435S, 26 Conn. L. Rptr. 345. As pondered by Sheldon, J., what is puzzling about this statute on first reading is the seeming impossibility of invoking its protections without first causing the court to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Proof that an action was commenced "in the name of the wrong person" would seemingly be the exact same proof that the original plaintiff has no standing to prosecute the action. This is the position taken by the defendant Weather Shield in their oral objection to the court's decision to hear the motion to add concurrent with the motion for summary judgment. That is, Weather Shield claims that if it is the court's obligation to resolve the subject-matter jurisdiction-issue as soon as it arises, how could the court, when presented with evidence that a plaintiff without standing has commenced an action, even consider a motion to add a party plaintiff without first dismissing the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Weather Shield advocates strict application of the "decide jurisdiction first" rule and dismissal of the matter in that the criteria of Practice Book § 30-31 are satisfied.
In fact, as discussed extensively by Judge Sheldon, a series of decisions from our Appellate Court have established that in spite of the "decide jurisdiction first" rule, a case can be saved from dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction by the granting of a proper motion to substitute under General Statutes § 52-109.
For example, in Wickes Mfg. Co. v. Currier Electric Co., 25 Conn. App. 751, 760, 596 A.2d 1331 (1991), the Appellate Court upheld a trial court's order permitting the substitution of a new plaintiff for the original plaintiff in a breach of contract action even though the record clearly showed that the original plaintiff had never had standing to bring the action. There, the action was prosecuted for six years in the name of the original party to a contract even though that party had ceased to exist before the action was commenced. Even so, the court approved the substitution of one of the original plaintiff's corporate successors for the following reasons, which brought it within the scope of § 52-109: first, that the commencement of the action in the name of the original plaintiff had been a "mistake;" and second, that the substituted party, which owned all the rights to the original plaintiff's claim, was the real party in interest with respect to that claim, and thus was "necessary for a determination of the real matter in dispute." Wickes Mfg. Co. v. Currier Electric Co., supra, 25 Conn. App. 760. At no point in the court's decision did it suggest that the action should have been dismissed because of the original plaintiff's non-existence, and resulting lack of standing.
It is this court's decision, based on prevailing and persuasive case law, that a court may order addition or substitution of plaintiffs in lieu of dismissal whenever the conditions of the substitution statute are met. As noted by Judge Sheldon, the legislature's provision of this statutory remedy would be completely undermined by any rule requiring the immediate dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction of any action commenced in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff. Any contrary interpretation of the interplay between the wrong plaintiff statute and the subject matter jurisdiction statute would fail to fulfill the intent of the legislature to eliminate the harshness and inefficiency of common-law pleading. Hagearty v. Ryan, 123 Conn. 372, at 375-76, 195 A. 730 (1937). Therefore, this court will move to consideration of the motion to add notwithstanding the pendency of the defendants' motions to dismiss.
The Substantive Requirements of General Statutes § 52-109
Ralph Carpinella's motion to substitute is based on Connecticut's "wrong plaintiff" statute, General Statutes § 52-109. This statute provides that:
When any action has been commenced in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff, the court may, if satisfied that it was so commenced through mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, allow any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff.
The term "through mistake" is not defined in the text of § 52-109, nor has it ever been defined for the purpose of that statute in any appellate decision. Even so, the task of interpreting it can readily be advanced by reading Judge Sheldon's exhaustive and scholarly opinion in Dilieto. In particular, Judge Sheldon notes that the drafters of the (predecessor) Practice Act sought "to alter the harsh and inefficient result that attached to the mispleading of parties at common law." Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Retirement Management Group, Inc., 31 Conn. App. 80, 84, 623 A.2d 517 (1993). Under the common law practice, as described in Hagearty v. Ryan, supra, 123 Conn. 375-76, any action prosecuted by a person who lacked or lost standing was always subject to immediate abatement even if the real party in interest was ready, willing and able to prosecute it. The result of this mandatory abatement rule was that a real party in interest who wished to pursue an abated action would either have to file a new action or, if the time to do so had expired, file a motion for a new trial on grounds of mispleading. In either case, much time, money and energy were required to file, pursue and adjudicate a new action or a new trial motion that could easily be remedied if the original trial court were simply empowered to cure the defect.
Hence, though the "wrong plaintiff" statute was clearly designed to alter the harsh and inefficient procedural consequences of the common law by allowing real parties in interest to save their mispleaded lawsuits in the courts where they were originally brought, the statute just as clearly conditioned the right to such relief on the same showing of mistake that was required for the granting of a new trial. Accordingly, this court agrees that to prevail on a motion to substitute under § 52-109, a plaintiff must prove that the mistake which led him to misplead in the name of the wrong person did not result from his own failure to exercise reasonable diligence to know the truth.
That is, the term "through mistake," as used in § 52-109, and adopted by the Dilieto decision means an honest conviction, entertained in good faith and not resulting from the plaintiff's own negligence, that he is the proper person to commence the lawsuit. Only if he bears the burden of proving that he acted upon such a conviction in commencing the lawsuit in his name alone can the plaintiff's motion to add be granted.
Second, modern cases discussing when the "wrong plaintiff" statute may properly be invoked have not limited the availability of the remedy of substitution to cases involving clerical errors in the naming or describing of plaintiffs. Instead, mistakes deemed correctable under the statute have obviously included errors as to who, among the successors to the original plaintiff's claim, actually had standing to assert the claim when the action was commenced. See, e.g., Wickes Mfg. Co. v. Currier Electric Co., supra. No mere typo or misrendering of a corporate name, such an error is very clearly a mistake of substance. In sum, as the Appellate Court observed in Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Retirement Management Group, Inc., and Investors Mortgage Co. v. Rodia, substitution may properly be ordered to "correct a mistake in ascertaining the real party in interest" (emphasis added), not just an error in the description, spelling or punctuation of a known party's name. Dilieto v. County Obstetrics Gynecology Group, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. X02 CV97-0150435, 26 Conn. L. Rptr. 345.
Determination If the Plaintiff Commenced this Action "Through Mistake," Within the Meaning of Section 52-109
Ralph Carpinella explained in his testimony that the reason he commenced this lawsuit in his name alone was essentially an oversight. He testified without contradiction that the property was in his wife's name alone for "planning purposes" and there was no intent to deceive opposing parties. There is no dispute that the fact of the property being held in Sheila Carpinella's name alone was disclosed in discovery over two and a half years ago. Importantly, Weather Shield could not show prejudice with respect to their preparation, to date, in this case, were Sheila Carpinella to be added as a party plaintiff. Rather, defense has suggested in their legal arguments that the failure to name Sheila Carpinella as a plaintiff is a mistake in law and therefore doesn't qualify under the statute. That is, once the windows and doors became incorporated into the property owned by Sheila Carpinella, Ralph Carpinella's ownership interest in those items was divested and he has no standing to seek damages in connection with the value of or damage to the windows and doors owned by another person. While considering Weather Shield's position on this issue, this court is not persuaded and finds that the plaintiff commenced this action in his name alone through mistake within the meaning of § 52-109.