Summary
In Byrd v. Byrd, 193 Miss. 249, 8 So.2d 510 (1942), the Court considered whether an order of the Board of Supervisors was an adjournment sine die or a recess.
Summary of this case from Masonite Corporation v. State Oil Gas BoardOpinion
No. 34922.
June 8, 1942.
1. STATUTES.
Statutes should not be construed to require performance of duties rendered impossible of performance.
2. STATUTES.
Statutory words not of technical import are to be construed in their ordinarily accepted meaning.
3. STATUTES.
An unwise purpose should not be imputed to the Legislature.
4. COUNTIES.
During regular session of county board of supervisors, incidental or temporary suspension of business is a "recess," and is not an "adjournment" within statute requiring order for adjournment to specify business to be transacted at adjourned meeting (Code 1930, secs. 202, 203).
5. COUNTIES.
An "adjourned meeting," within statute requiring order of county board of supervisors for adjourned meeting to specify business to be transacted thereat, is a meeting which is ordered by board at regular meeting, and which is to convene after termination of such regular meeting and prior to next regular meeting (Code 1930, secs. 202, 203).
6. COUNTIES.
Where regular session of county board of supervisors began July 7, board provided, on July 9, for consideration of equalization of assessments until completion thereof, and recessed on July 11 until July 14, without specifying nature of business to be transacted on July 14, meeting on July 14 was not an "adjourned meeting" within statute requiring order for adjourned meeting to specify business to be transacted thereat, and order of equalization on July 16 was valid (Code 1930, secs. 202, 203, 3162).
APPEAL from the circuit court of Greene county, HON. ARTHUR G. BUSBY, Judge.
Heidelberg Roberts, of Hattiesburg, and J.W. Backstrom, of Leakesville, for appellee on suggestion of error.
The court in the rendition of its opinion herein, on April 13, 1942, by holding that the meeting of the board of supervisors held on Monday, July 14th, was not a continuation of the regular July meeting of the board, as provided for in Section 202, Code of 1930, but was an adjourned meeting provided for by Section 203, Code of 1930, gave to the words "continue," "adjourned," and "adjourned meeting" entirely too technical definitions and failed to recognize the distinction between "recess" and "adjourn," which the Legislature has fixed, as evidenced by the two statutes themselves and the amendment of Section 202 by Chapter 62, Laws of 1935.
Section 202, Code of 1930, provides for the meetings of the board of supervisors and provides that they may "continue" in session, etc. One of the definitions given by Webster of the word "continue" is "to cease not," and if the court is to give to this word, in this statute, that highly technical definition, which, it is submitted, was given in the original opinion herein, it would mean that when the board convened at the time fixed by law it would have to stay in session and cease not until the business was finished. To cease not would mean that it could not stop for anything. It could not recess overnight. It could not recess from Saturday until Monday. It could not recess in order to attend a funeral. If it did, it would not continue in session in the sense that "continuance" means to cease not.
Section 203 provides that a regular meeting, by an order on its minutes, the board may "adjourn" to meet at any time it may determine upon, and, further, provides that the order providing for an "adjourned meeting" must specify each matter of business to be transacted thereat.
Webster, in defining the word "adjourned," gives as a synonym, "suspend," "taking a recess." According to this definition of the word, a recess overnight would be an adjournment, and the reconvening of the board in session the next day would be an adjourned meeting. A recess from Saturday until Monday would be an adjournment, and the reconvening on Monday would be an adjourned meeting. A recess for only an hour or two, to attend a funeral, would be an adjournment, and the reconvening of the session after the funeral was over would be an adjourned meeting.
But it is submitted that the Legislature did not use these words in this technical sense at all, and that when in Section 202 it provided that upon meeting the board should continue in session, it simply intended by this language that when the board met in regular session it would proceed to transact the public business with such reasonable dispatch as the public welfare might demand, and when it provided by Section 203 for an adjourned meeting of the board it intended a meeting held in pursuance of an order made while the board was in regular session, to be held after the regular session had terminated, either by sine die adjournment, or by operation of law, which meeting would be, of course, before the time fixed by law for the next regular meeting.
Adjournments taken from day to day, or even to a day certain, do not interrupt the business of the session. Roberts' Rules of Order. Of course, to call a recess an adjournment or vice versa does not alter the fact.
Intermela v. Perkins, 205 F. 603.
It was the intention of the board to make said session a continuation of the regular session for the transaction of regular business. The order provides for taking up such regular business as the board may choose. The fact that the board used in this order the word "adjourned," instead of the word "recess," does not change the character of the session to be held. I apprehend, had the board used in the order the word "recess," instead of the word "adjourned," there would be no contention in this case but what the meeting would have been a continuation of the regular session. After making the order in question the regular session was not closed by an adjournment sine die. In the absence of the board closing the regular session by an adjournment sine die, the law does not close such session, as the law fixes no particular time when the same shall adjourn when in regular session. The board may continue in session as long as it has public business to attend to. Its session may close by an adjournment sine die, by the opening of another session under the law, or by a failure to meet under its recess adjournment.
Gilbert et al. v. Canyon County (Idaho), 94 P. 1027.
The court, in construing the statute, will also take into consideration the result of its construction thereof, and will not impute to the Legislature an unwise purpose, nor will it so construe a statute that manifest injustice or injury might result.
Leaf Hotel Corp. v. City of Hattiesburg, 168 Miss. 304, 150 So. 779; L.H. Conard Furniture Co. v. Mississippi State Tax Commission, 160 Miss. 185, 133 So. 652; Zeigler v. Zeigler, 174 Miss. 302, 164 So. 768.
The appellant admits that the July meeting is a revenue meeting and that its session is not limited to six days but may continue so long as business requires; that the only limitations on such meeting is that it must adjourn or that the assessment roll must be completed ten days before the August meeting, and that the board of supervisors met on the first Monday of July, 1930. This brings the matter down to the sole question, it being a revenue term, did the board of supervisors have the right to adjourn or recess on Friday until Monday without making the meeting on Monday, the 14th, an adjourned term in the contemplation of Section 203?
Section 202 governs regular meetings and revenue meetings. A revenue meeting is a regular meeting, but the length of the session is not limited to six days. Section 203 governs special and adjourned meetings. It is not contemplated, and we submit that you cannot have a regular meeting and an adjourned or special meeting at the same time. The only purpose of an adjourned meeting would be to handle some matter that the board could not attend to at a regular meeting or within the time that a regular meeting could run; and the board could then adjourn to some future day by specifying the business to be transacted. That would be an adjourned meeting as contemplated by the statute, but it would be necessary that the regular meeting be adjourned sine die or by operation of law before the adjourned meeting, otherwise there would be no reason for the calling of an adjourned meeting.
The appellant has taken the position that if the board of supervisors recess or adjourns one day and resumes its session the next day it is not an adjournment. But if they recess or adjourn until the next succeeding day it is an adjournment and is an adjourned term.
The appellant cites Gilbert v. Canyon County, 14 Idaho 429, 94 P. 1027, 1031. This case clearly bears out our contention that the meetings held on the 14th, 15th, and 16th of July were a continuation of the July term and not an adjourned term under Section 203 of the Code.
The appellant contends that Chapter 62, Laws of 1935, not only amends Section 202 of the Code but amends Section 203 of the Code. The appellant is wrong in his interpretation of the amendment. It is not an amendment of Section 203, but only amends Section 202.
Attention should be called to the fact, as held by the Supreme Court of Idaho in the case above cited, that the word used by the board of supervisors in its minutes, when it recessed from Friday until Monday, is of no significance. It is not a question of whether or not they used the word "adjourned" or "recessed." The question is: What was it? If it was a mere recess until Monday, so that the convening of the board on Monday was a mere continuation of the regular July meeting, then the assessment in this case is valid and the original opinion should be withdrawn and the cause affirmed.
O.F. Moss, of Lucedale, for appellant on suggestion of error.
It appears to us that Sections 202 and 203 of the Mississippi Code of 1930 are plain, unambiguous, and mean what they say. It is plain that the board of supervisors of Greene County during the year 1930 could remain in session for six days, but not longer, at any regular meeting, other than a revenue meeting, when they might have remained in session as long as business required, except as restricted by Section 3162 of the Code of 1930, which provides that the equalization of the assessment must be completed at least ten days before the August meeting.
So what do we have in plain language under Sections 202 and 203? Each regular session of the board begins on the first Monday in each month (Section 200, Code of 1930). The board meets on the first Monday of each month, and may continue in session, if necessary, for six days, except at a revenue session when it may continue in session until ten days before the August meeting. The board must continue in session each day, that is, they must hold a session each day sometime during the twenty-four hours, and the minutes must so show, unless they want to adjourn and specify in the adjourning order the matters to be transacted at the adjourned meeting. The board, of course, may hold a session one day and recess in the afternoon until tomorrow morning, to a time less than twenty-four hours away, without specifying in its adjourning order the business to be transacted at the Wednesday meeting.
Under the statute as it existed in 1930, the board could perform no valid acts except at regular meetings and special and adjourned meetings provided for strictly in accordance with the terms of the statute, and no business could be attended to at an adjourned meeting unless specified in the order providing for the adjourned meeting. Under the statute there was no such thing as a continuation of a regular meeting, as counsel for appellee would have us believe.
Davis v. Grice, 141 Miss. 412, 106 So. 631; Jones v. Burford, 26 Miss. 194; Smith v. Nelson, 57 Miss. 138.
Whether we call it a "continued meeting," a "recessed meeting," or an "adjourned meeting" is immaterial, for these terms all mean the same thing. The provisions of Section 202 of the Mississippi Code of 1930 to the effect that the board of supervisors may remain in session longer than six days at a revenue term does not enter into the argument at all. It matters not whether the board is authorized to sit six days, ten days or twenty days, if it adjourn for more than one day during that time to another day more than one day from the date of adjournment, the next meeting will be an adjourned meeting under the plain language of the statute. The board of supervisors in this case adjourned on July 11, 1930, until Monday, July 14, 1930, and its meeting on July 14, under the plain, unambiguous terms of the statute, was an "adjourned meeting." When the board adjourned on July 11, 1930, it was engaged in considering and equalizing the real assessment roll of Greene County for the fiscal year 1930. It adjourned on July 11, 1930, as shown by an order entered on its minutes, until July 14, 1930, without specifying in its order of adjournment each matter of business to be transacted at said adjourned meeting. Therefore, all acts of the board of supervisors at said adjourned meeting on and after July 14, 1930, with reference to said assessment roll, are illegal, null and void, and for that reason the tax sale based on said void assessment is also void.
ON SUGGESTION OF ERROR.
The basis upon which a former reversal of the case rested was the alleged invalidity of the tax sale to the state and its patent to appellee. In adjudging this question sufficient emphasis was lacking upon the fact that the assessment upon which the tax sale was founded was approved by the board of supervisors at its July, 1930, meeting, which was a meeting "for the transaction of business under the revenue law" at which the board "may continue in session as long as business may require." Code 1930, Sections 202, 3162. Since the July meeting was finally adjourned on a day prior to the expiration of its allowable limits, the authorities cited in our former opinion (Sharp v. Smith, 180 Miss. 887, 178 So. 595; Davis v. Grice, 141 Miss. 412, 106 So. 631; Hunter v. Bennett, 149 Miss. 368, 115 So. 204; City of Grenada v. Grenada County, 167 Miss. 814, 150 So. 657; and Price v. Harley, 142 Miss. 584, 107 So. 673) are not applicable.
We are led therefore to reexamine the effect of a recess by the board from one day to a later day, both of which are within the statutory limits of the time authorized for a regular meeting. This question was raised but left undetermined as unnecessary to the decision in Davis v. Grice, supra. We are now confronted directly with the question whether the order of the board on Friday, July 11, 1930, to reconvene the following Monday constituted the latter session an "adjourned meeting" under Code 1930, Section 203, at which no business could be disposed of unless the order therefor "shall specify each matter of business to be transacted thereat." While it is true that the board at its session on Wednesday, July 9th, ordered that on such date the board should "in regular session, proceed to examine, pass upon and equalize each and all assessments of property both real and personal, listed and contained in the said assessment rolls, and that it continue so to do until it complete the equalization of all property so contained in said rolls of the county," it is conceded that the recessing order of Friday, July 11th, did not specify each matter of business to be transacted the following Monday, and that on Wednesday, July 16th, it entered its order finally approving the assessment rolls as equalized.
In determining whether the meeting on Monday, July 14th, was an "adjourned meeting" within the purview of the statute or a mere recess during and as a continuation of a regular meeting, it is appropriate to consider the evident purpose of the Legislature in requiring that at an adjourned meeting the board may consider only such matters as have been designated in the order providing for such meeting. It is important that all persons interested in the business to be transacted by the board be advised by proper notice so that they may know when they may present claims, petitions or other matters, and also keep advised of its proceedings so as to remain alert to any discussions or proposed action which may affect their interests. The statute furnishes such notice as to all regular meetings, at which there may be transacted all business over which the board is given jurisdiction. Moreover, at its July meeting it must equalize its tax rolls. When the board has finally adjourned its regular meeting, not only may the nature of its transacted business be revealed by its minutes but all interested parties are thereafter free to suspend their attention to and scrutiny over its proceedings until the next regular meeting. So long as the board remains in regular session and its minutes show no final discontinuance thereof, all persons are charged with notice that it is free to transact all matters proper at such meeting, and it should be presumed that they would consider such business as the law required them to consider, especially when, as here, it had on a previous day expressed by an order its intention to take up the matter of equalization and continue until it was completed.
If a final adjournment is to be construed as an assurance to the public that no other matters would be considered and done until the next regular meeting, and since public necessity or emergency might require a consideration of other business too urgent to await the next regular meeting, special and adjourned meetings are provided for. As to these the public would not be charged with notice. Hence it is required that at such meetings, as distinct from a regular meeting, only such business may be transacted at an adjourned meeting as shall theretofore have been specified by an order entered at a regular meeting, and in a newspaper as to special meetings. Code 1930, Section 203.
It should be clear that since the only notice required of the board and available to the public as to an adjourned meeting is that spread upon the minutes of the board at its regular meeting, such minutes must likewise be deemed an adequate source of information as to what business is being proposed or transacted at the regular meeting, and also whether the board has finally concluded its labors for the term. Moreover, it would not be practicable for the board to so presage the complexity of matters subject to its attention as to specify them in detail in every order recessing during a regular meeting at which its powers include supervision over all matters within its jurisdiction. Statutes should not be construed to require performance of duties rendered impossible of performance. Boyd v. Coleman, 146 Miss. 449, 111 So. 600.
The word "adjourn" has two well-recognized meanings. The first is to suspend or recess during a meeting which continues in session; the second is to conclude or terminate a term or meeting. In the latter sense the adjournment is usually sine die. While ambiguity is often present it should always be readily dispelled by a reference to the minutes of the body. The distinction finds apt illustration in the minutes of the board here involved. On Friday, the minutes recited "ordered by the board that for good and sufficient reasons the board do now adjourn until Monday morning July 14, 1930, at 8 o'clock a.m." This was plainly a mere recess. The board remained in session. The term was not ended. The public could justifiably gain no other impression than that the board would reconvene on Monday and resume its business. To the inquiry of one interested taxpayer whether the board was still in session, and of another whether the board had adjourned, the same answer could not be given. The minutes of Wednesday recite that the "board met pursuant to adjournment on Tuesday" and concluded as follows "ordered by the board that the board do now adjourn until the first Monday of August, 1930, at 8 o'clock." The former unquestionably implied a recess, while the latter was both by popular understanding and by statutory requirement a final adjournment.
Since words not of technical import are to be construed in their ordinarily accepted meaning (State v. J.J. Newman Lbr. Co., 103 Miss. 263, 60 So. 215, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.), 858; Town of Union v. Ziller, 151 Miss. 467, 118 So. 293, 60 A.L.R. 1155; Warburton-Beacham Supply Co. v. City of Jackson, 151 Miss. 503, 118 So. 606; Chattanooga Sewer Pipe Works v. Dumler, 153 Miss. 276, 120 So. 450, 62 A.L.R. 999; Texas Company v. Wheeles, 185 Miss. 799, 187 So. 880), and since an unwise purpose should not be imputed to the Legislature (Zeigler v. Zeigler, 174 Miss. 302, 164 So. 768), we are led to the only conclusion which is consistent with these principles.
A regular meeting of the board remains in session until it is terminated by an order of final adjournment or by operation of law. During such session an incidental or temporary suspension of business is not an adjournment in the sense contemplated by Section 203 but a recess only. An "adjourned meeting" is one ordered by the board at a regular meeting, and which is to convene after the termination of such regular meeting and prior to the next regular meeting. This view is supported by the following cases: Ex parte Mirande, 73 Cal. 365, 14 P. 888; Brinson v. Southeastern Stages, 192 Ga. 36, 14 S.E.2d 463; Intermela v. Perkins, 9 Cir., 205 F. 603; Gilbert v. Canyon County, 14 Idaho 429, 437, 94 P. 1027, 1031. The language used by the court in the last case is appropriate here, "Had the board used in the order the word `recess,' instead of the word `adjourned,' there would be no contention in this case but what the meeting would have been a continuation of the regular session." Cf. Hoyt v. Brown, 153 Iowa 324, 133 N.W. 905.
We are of the opinion therefore that the meeting of the board was a meeting for the transaction of business under the revenue law and was therefore not limited to six days and that the resumption of business pursuant to a prior order of recess did not constitute same an "adjourned meeting." The result of this view is that the assessment and subsequent delinquent tax sale are valid and that the title to the property involved herein is valid in appellee. The jury having found for appellee T.B. Byrd, the case ought to be and is affirmed. The original opinions are withdrawn and the suggestion of error is sustained and the judgment is affirmed.