Summary
In Leaf Hotel Corporation v. City of Hattiesburg, 168 Miss. 304, 150 So. 779, the Court said: "In determining the meaning of the statute the principle of strict construction against the exemption should be applied.
Summary of this case from State Tax Comm. v. Jackson Casket Co.Opinion
No. 30800.
November 13, 1933.
1. TAXATION.
Statute exempting permanent additions to existing hotels from taxation must be strictly construed against exemption and most favorably to taxing power (Laws 1924, c. 347).
2. TAXATION.
Claimant of exemption from taxation has burden of showing clearly right thereto, and all reasonable doubts must be resolved against him.
3. STATUTES.
In construing statute, manifest, unthought-of results should be avoided if possible, especially if injustice results, and unwise purpose will not be imputed to Legislature when reasonable construction is possible.
4. TAXATION. Fourth story added to existing three-story hotel held not "permanent addition" within tax exemption statute ( Laws 1924, chapter 347).
Laws 1924, chapter 347, provides, in part, that "all permanent hotels, and all permanent additions to existing hotels," may be granted a tax exemption.
APPEAL from Circuit Court of Forrest County.
Sullivan Sullivan, of Hattiesburg, for appellant.
Section 1394, chapter 22, volume one, Mississippi Code Annotated, 1930, says: — "All words and phrases contained in the statute are used according to their common and ordinary acceptation and meaning, but technical words according to their technical meaning."
In chapter 347, Laws 1924, there is nothing whatsoever to suggest that the word "addition" was not used in its common and ordinary acceptation and meaning.
Addition means something added.
Webster's New International Dictionary.
Century Dictionary defines the word "addition" as: "Super-addition, appendage, adjuct, increase, enlargement, argumentation."
1 Words and Phrases, 4th series, 92; Atkins v. Boardman (Mass.), 2 Met. 457, 37 Am. Dec. 100.
We call to the court's attention the case of State v. Butler County, 10 Ohio Cir. Dec. 118, in which it was said that the word "addition" in a statute requiring county commissioners to advertise for proposals for the erection of any public building or any addition thereto would include the installation of an elevator in a courthouse.
It is our contention that the use of the word "addition" in the statute so obviously was used in its common and ordinary acceptation and meaning, and therefore meant adding to an existing hotel either by building to it laterally or by building new stories on top of it, that there was no occasion to search elsewhere for another meaning.
A statute is not to be read as if open to construction as a matter of course. It is only in the case of ambiguous statutes of uncertain meaning that the rules of construction can have any application.
25 R.C.L., pp. 957-958, par. 213; 25 R.C.L., p. 961, par. 217; State v. J.J. Newman Lumber Company, 103 Miss. 263.
In construing statutes, the chief aim of the courts should be to reach the real intention of the Legislature. A construction which will bring about manifestly unthought of and unjust results will be avoided, if possible, and if necessary to avoid such results, the courts will widen or narrow the letter of the statute.
Canal Bank Trust Company v. Brewer, 114 So. 127; Huber v. Freret, 103 So. 3.
If the act was not passed simply to encourage building of new hotels, and the permanent enlargement of existing hotels, as a necessary measure to promote ample hotel accommodations for the travelling public in Mississippi, for what other conceivable purpose could it have been passed?
If the Legislature made it possible for municipalities and boards of supervisors to allow the exemption of permanent additions to existing hotels for the purpose of encouraging ample hotel accommodations, what conceivable difference then could it have made to the Legislature whether such additions were made by building them along side of the existing hotel or whether they were built on top of the existing hotel?
R.W. Heidelberg, of Stevens Heidelberg, of Hattiesburg, for appellee.
The law imposes upon the complainant in this case the duty of showing affirmatively that the property in question is clearly within the terms of the exemption statute, as it is the universal law that one claiming an exemption from taxation assumes the burden of showing that he is entitled to it.
Morris Ice Co. v. Adams, 75 Miss. 410, 22 So. 944.
Statutes of exemption from taxation must be strictly construed, and the language employed must be construed most favorably to the state.
Yazoo, etc., R. Co. v. Thomas, 65 Miss. 563, 5 So. 108; Greenville Ice Coal Co. v. City of Greenville, 69 Miss. 86, 10 So. 574; State v. Simmons, 70 Miss. 485, 12 So. 477.
The party pleading exemption from taxation was imposed upon him the burden of clearly showing his title to the immunity claimed, and if his right may be fairly said to remain in doubt, the claim must be denied.
New Standard Club v. McGowen, 111 Miss. 92, 71 So. 289; Greenville Ice Coal Co. v. City of Greenville, 69 Miss. 86; Brick Lumber Co. v. Miller, 123 Miss. 850, 86 So. 579; Adams County v. National Box Co., 125 Miss. 598, 88 So. 168; Barnes, Sheriff, v. Jones, 139 Miss. 675, 103 So. 773; Board of Supervisors v. Merck Alston, 153 Miss. 346, 120 So. 839; Building Loan Association v. City of Gulfport, 155 Miss. 498, 124 So. 658.
It is appellee's contention that the putting of the fourth story on the then existing three story brick building, which, among other things, involved the removal of the then existing roof and other changes in the three story building, was an alteration and not an addition within the meaning of the statute.
The character of addition covered by this exemption statute must of necessity be a lateral addition, one that occupies ground without the limits of the building to which it constitutes an addition.
Updike v. Skillman, 27 N.J. Law (3 Dutch.) 131; Perrine v. Parker, 34 N.J. Law (5 Vroom) 352.
Argued orally by W.C. Sullivan, for appellant.
This is an appeal by the Leaf Hotel Corporation from a judgment of the circuit court of Forrest county fixing the value of its property for taxation in the city of Hattiesburg. The hotel corporation being dissatisfied with the assessment as fixed by the mayor and commissioners of the city appealed therefrom to the circuit court; there the cause was tried before judge and jury resulting in a verdict fixing the various items of property owned by appellant, subject to taxation, upon which verdict a judgment was accordingly rendered. The judgment ascertained and fixed the amount of taxes due, based upon the city levy, and was against the hotel corporation and the sureties on its appeal bond. The judgment was also for the statutory damages and costs.
The only question in the case is whether or not appellant's entire hotel building was subject to taxes, or whether the fourth story of the building was exempt therefrom? If the fourth story was exempt, the judgment should be reversed; if it was not exempt, the judgment should be affirmed.
In 1927 the Hotel Mitchell owned the lot and hotel building here involved. Later appellant acquired title to the property. During the year 1927, the Hotel Mitchell put an additional story to the then existing brick hotel building, making a four-story instead of a three-story building. Acting under the provisions of chapter 347 of the Laws of 1924, which statute provides that "all permanent hotels, and all permanent additions to existing hotels" may be granted a tax exemption, the Hotel Mitchell applied to the city authorities for exemption from municipal taxes. The application was granted as to the added fourth story. The question is whether or not this fourth story constituted a "permanent addition" to the existing hotel within the meaning of the statute. In determining the meaning of the statute the principle of strict construction against the exemption should be applied. The language of the statute must be construed most favorably to the taxing power. The claimant of the exemption has the burden of showing clearly his rights thereto; all reasonable doubts must be resolved against the claimant. Greenville Ice Coal Co. v. City of Greenville, 69 Miss. 86, 10 So. 574; New Standard Club v. McGowen, 111 Miss. 92, 71 So. 289, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 274; Currie-Finch Brick Lumber Co. v. Miller, 123 Miss. 850, 86 So. 579; Adams County v. National Box Co., 125 Miss. 598, 88 So. 168; Barnes, Sheriff, v. Jones, 139 Miss. 675, 103 So. 773, 43 A.L.R. 673; Board of Supervisors v. Merck Alston, 153 Miss. 346, 120 So. 839; Gulfport Building Loan Association v. City of Gulfport, 155 Miss. 498, 124 So. 658.
No authority directly in point is referred to by either side. Updike v. Skillman, 27 N.J. Law (3 Dutcher) 131, and Perrine v. Parker, 34 N.J. Law (5 Vroom) 352, cited and relied on by appellee, come nearer to the point than any of the others. In the Updike case the court held that an addition to a building within the meaning of the mechanics' lien law of New Jersey must be a lateral addition on the ground outside of the building to which it is connected; that adding to the height, extending the depth, or increasing the interior accommodiations of a building were alterations, not additions, within the meaning of the statute. The statute provided that no building should be subject to the provisions of the act for repairs done thereto or alterations made therein. The Perrine case involved the construction of a provision in the charter of the city of Trenton which required the assessment of the real estate of the city every three years, but provided that the assessing authorities in the meantime should add to the assessment the value of any building or addition erected on any lot. The word "addition" in the statute was held to mean only lateral additions which occupy land without the limits of the original building, and that additions to height or depth were mere alterations and not within the meaning of the statute. The Updike case was cited and approved.
In construing the statute manifest, unthought-of results should be avoided if possible, especially if injustice follows. An unwise purpose will not be imputed to the Legislature when a reasonable construction will save the statute from such imputation. Canal Bank Trust Co. v. Brewer, 147 Miss. 885, 113 So. 552, 114 So. 127; Robertson v. Texas Oil Co., 141 Miss. 356, 106 So. 449; Huber v. Freret, 138 Miss. 238, 103 So. 3.
Manifestly, the land on which the hotel structure stood and the first three stories were not exempt from taxes. If the fourth story was exempt, what would be the relative rights of the holder of a tax title to the lot and the first three stories and the owner of the fourth story? The fourth story could not be sold for the taxes on the lot and the first three stories. If the added fourth story is a permanent addition within the meaning of the statute, would not a cellar underneath the entire building be a permanent addition? Imagine the complications that would arise between the holder of a tax title to the fourth story and the owner of the cellar.
Affirmed.