Opinion
February 14, 1949.
1. Injunction — conspiracies — labor unions and their members, demurrers.
A bill which charges that two labor unions of which the complainant's employees are not members have acted in this State in concert, and by predetermined design, together with their individual members, in maintaining picket lines, and that through pickets and otherwise, they have threatened complainant's employees with violence and that as a result numerous acts of violence against complainant's employees and against complainant's property have occurred, is good against a demurrer on the grounds that the bill does not charge facts sufficient to show a conspiracy between the defendants or that it does not charge that the defendants authorized any of the alleged acts of violence or that it is not drawn within the purview of the United States statutes, or that it does not charge where property rights have been invaded or need the protection of the injunctive process.
2. Injunction — continuing trespass to property.
The right to injunctive relief is a basic feature in the jurisdiction of a court of equity, particularly when it comes to enjoining repeated and continued trespasses on property, where actions at laws would entail a multiplicity of suits and the damages would be irreparable.
3. Injunction — restraining violence in strikes.
The use in a strike of force, violence, coercion, or intimidation to prevent employees from working or to prevent others from accepting employment is not permissible and an injunction will be granted to prevent such acts, and it is immaterial that the strike is for a lawful purpose, nor is it necessary that there should have been actual violence or physical assaults, it being sufficient that there has been intimidation to the extent that those against whom it is directed are deprived of the power to exercise their own judgment.
4. Injunction — criminal acts.
The fact that the unlawful acts charged against the defendants in a strike are punishable criminally is not such an adequate remedy as to bar equitable relief.
5. Conspiracy — to destroy a business.
When two or more private persons conspire together to illegally destroy the business of another, the conspiracy makes the wrongful acts of each, the joint acts of all of them.
6. Injunction — conspiracy — unlawful strike methods.
When the members of a union either singly or as a body leave their employment, the employer has the right to employ others in their places, and when the union, its officers and members agreed together that by force, threats, intimidation, and picketing they would prevent the employment of other persons, their undertaking is unlawful and may be enjoined.
7. Labor disputes — strikes — picketing.
Peaceful picketing is lawful, but mass picketing which is the use of a large number of pickets is not peaceable and when a picket line becomes a picket fence the party picketed is entitled to an injunction.
8. Interstate commerce — courts — jurisdiction.
The fact that a transportation company is engaged in interstate, as well as intrastate, commerce does not deprive the state courts of the jurisdiction and authority to enjoin unlawful acts of the defendants, occurring in this state, destructive of the property and property rights of the company, although such lawlessness is in the course of a strike, there being nothing in the fourteenth amendment or in the commerce clauses of the federal constitution, or in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.A. paragraph 101, et seq., or in the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. paragraph 151, et seq., which preempt all state control in such a case.
Headnotes as approved by Montgomery, J.
APPEAL from the chancery court of Hinds County, V.J. STRICKER, Chancellor.
Stevens Cannada, for appellant.
It is well settled that remedy by way of injunction is appropriate on the facts alleged in the bill. In this case the Labor Union, Local 1127, at one time was the bargaining agent representing all employees of the Southern Bus Lines, Inc., and sponsored and approved the former contracts between the Company and all of its employees. The contract expired by limitation and extensive negotiations to reach a new agreement proved fruitless, and while negotiations were still pending the defendant employees called a general strike. Notwithstanding the strike, the negotiations continued for approximately three months, when the Company gave notice that within a reasonable time, therein stated, the Company would re-employ and put back in service any of the old employees then out on strike, either singly or collectively, and protect them in their seniority rights. Only a very few of the employees returned to their jobs. After due notice, the Company began employing and training an entirely new force. These new employees possessed the constitutional right to labor for a livelihood, and complainant, as a certified carrier in both intrastate and interstate commerce, owed a definite obligation to provide adequate service to the public. The public itself is vitally interested. At the time this bill was filed, the patronizing public had been long-suffering, notwithstanding the fact that several cities and towns in Mississippi were dependent altogether on its transportation service.
The right to injunctive relief without the aid of a statute, either State or Federal, is supported by the authorities. This is particularly true when it comes to enjoining repeated trespass to property where actions at law would entail a multiplicity of suite and where the damages would be irreparable. The use of injunction has been employed in labor disputes. A labor dispute or a strike arising through differences between employer and employee simply furnish the occasion for an outburst of violance.
In 31 American Jurisprudence, Section 321, page 991, under the general subject of "Labor", the text reads in part: "While injunctions have in some instances been issued by Federal courts on the ground that the acts enjoined amount to an interference with interstate commerce, the principal grounds upon which equitable jurisdiction is assumed are the inadequacy of the legal remedy and the prevention of a multiplicity of suits. The power of the court to punish the violation of an injunction by fine or imprisonment renders an injunction an effective remedy in labor disputes. The right to such relief is not affected by the fact that the defendants can be compelled to give security to keep the peace, such remedy being deemed inadequate. Nor, since property rights are involved, is it any obstacle to injunctive relief that the acts to be restrained are of a criminal nature, and that to punish them as contempt amounts to an assumption of criminal jurisdiction without the intervention of a jury."
"The equitable remedies available to an employer or employee prior to the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act still remain in force."
In 43 Corpus Juris Secundum, Section 147, at Page 746, under the general subject of "Injunctions", the text in part reads:
"Unlawful acts in furtherance of a strike, whether it is lawful or unlawful, may be enjoined if the conditions which make an injunction proper are present; and this is so although the acts are punishable criminally. The means employed in aid of a lawful strike must be free from falsehood, libel, or defamation, and from physical violence, coercion, or moral intimidation."
And on Page 747, the text reads:
"(e) Force, Violence, or Intimidation to Prevent Others from Working.
"The use of force, violence, coercion, or intimidation to prevent employees from working or other workmen from accepting employment from the employer against whom a strike is in operation may be enjoined.
"The use of force, violence, coercion, or intimidation to prevent employees from working for the employer against whom the strike is in operation, or to prevent other workmen from accepting employment from him, is not permissible and an injunction will be granted to prevent the commission of such acts, and it is immaterial that the strike is for a lawful purpose. It is not necessary that there should have been actual violence or physical assaults, but it will be sufficient if threats, abusive language, or other acts amounting to intimidation and depriving those against whom the acts were directed of the power to exercise their own will in determining whether or not they should work, were used."
The fact that the threatened acts would also be a violation of the criminal laws makes no difference. This court in State ex rel. Rice v. Allen, 180 Miss. 659, 177 So. 763, in part said: "`Though equitable action is never predicated on the prevention of crime, as such, it is also true that the fact that conduct is punishable criminally does not constitute an adequate remedy so as to bar equitable relief.' Section 1009, Lawrence on Equity Jurisprudence; Floyd v. Adler, 96 Miss. 544, 51 So. 897; Crighton v. Dahmer, 70 Miss. 602, 13 So. 237, 21 L.R.A. 84, 35 Am. St. Rep. 666; Pleasants v. Smith, 90 Miss. 440, 43 So. 475, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 773, 775, 122 Am. St. Rep. 317."
In the case of State ex rel. Rice v. Hasson Grocery Company, 177 Miss. 204, 170 So. 234, 107 A.L.R. 663, the Court in part said: "It has been held in the case of Globe Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. et al., 97 Miss. 148, 52 So. 454, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 869, that private persons cannot conspire to illegally destroy the business of another, and where two or more conspire together, the conspiracy makes the wrongful acts of each the joint acts of all of them. See, also, Wesley v. Native Lumber Co., 97 Miss. 814, 53 So. 346, Ann. Cas. 1912d 796."
"So a combination or conspiracy to procure an employee or body of employees to quit service in violation of the contract of service would be unlawful, and in a proper case might be enjoined, if the injury threatened would be irremediable at law. It is one thing for a single individual, or for several individuals acting each upon his own responsibility, and not in co-operation with others, to form the purpose of inflicting actual injury upon the property or rights of others. It is quite a different thing, in the eye of the law, for many persons to combine or conspire together with the intent, not simply of asserting their rights or of accomplishing lawful ends by peaceable methods, but of employing their united energies to injure others or the public.'" (Citing many cases).
The historic jurisdiction of equity in a case of this kind is supported by the illustrious text book writers on the subject of equity as well as authorities, State and Federal, too numerous to collate within a compass of a brief. It might be said to be elementary law. Pomeroy in his work on Equity Jurisprudence, Volume 4, Fourth Edition, Section 1357, deals with the subject of continued or repeated trespasses at page 3240.
In Moss v. Jourdan, 129 Miss. 598, 92 So. 689, Headnote 7 expresses the law correctly as follows:
"7. Injunction. Continuous trespass enjoined.
If a trespass is continuous in its nature, and repeated acts of trespass are done or threatened, although each of such acts taken by itself may not be destructive or inflict irreparable injury, and the legal remedy may therefore be adequate for each single act, if it stood alone, the entire wrong may be prevented or stopped by injunction." See also Hood v. Foster, 194 Miss. 812, 13 So.2d 652.
We cite here a very interesting and leading case by the Illinois Court, involving an injunction against strikers, Franklin Union No. 4 v. People, (Ill.) 77 N.E. 176, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1001. In that case the threats, intimidations and acts of violence resemble those experienced by the complainant. Among other things it deals with the proper definition of a conspiracy. We cite especially the two most recent cases on the subject: We refer to the case of United Steel Workers of America (C.I.O.) et al. v. Nashville Corporation, Tenn.), Case No. 64, 768, 15 Labor Cases, decided October 16, 1948, by the Supreme Court of Tennessee. The other is the case of J.T. Lassiter et al. v. Swift Company (Ga.), Case No. 54, 767, 15 Labor Cases, decided by the Supreme Court of Georgia, October 11, 1948. Both cases involved injunctions granted to an employer against the labor union, to restrain unlawful acts causing irreparable damage, and both cases involved attachments or rule for contempt for violating the injunctions. The court in each instance assumed jurisdiction of a case very similar on the facts to the case at bar, and we believe both cases involved interstate commerce.
Our Mississippi Court has recognized and sanctioned the remedy by injunction in labor disputes and expressly held that the right to injunctive relief is available to a labor union itself as well as to the employer, and that the rule works both ways. Our Court has held that it is well settled that an employer may avail himself of the relief afforded by a court of equity and conversely the Union should be afforded reciprocal relief. We refer to the case of Mississippi Theatres Corporation et al. v. Hattiesburg Local Union No. 615, 174 Miss. 439, 164 So. 887. See also Stephenson v New Orleans and Northeastern Railroad Company et al., 180 Miss. 147, 177 So. 509.
It was contended in the court below that a state court of equity has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction in a labor dispute arising out of interstate commerce, since the Congress of the United States has by proper legislation preempted the whole field of interstate commerce and necessarily vested exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal Courts of any and every controversy arising out of interstate commerce, and has restricted the remedy by injunction. May we point out first the fact that appellant is a duly certificated common carrier of passengers by motor vehicle in intrastate commerce as well as interstate, and has large investments in properties necessary for a large network of intrastate operations in Mississippi. Intrastate as well as interstate commerce is involved in this action. But aside from that question there can be no doubt as to the jurisdiction of a state court of equity to protect appellant in its property rights and prevent, through force, intimidation and violence, irreparable injury to persons and property. The reports abound in injunction suits growing out of labor disputes and many of them arise as an incident to interstate commerce. We desire first to cite a fairly recent case by the Supreme Court of the United States, to-wit, Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 85 L.Ed. 836, decided in 1941. In that case the court said: "The question which thus emerges is whether a state can choose to authorize its courts to enjoin acts of picketing in themselves peaceful when they are enmeshed with contemporaneously violent conduct which is concededly outlawed. . . . . No one will doubt that Illinois can protect its storekeepers from being coerced by fear of window smashing or burning or bombings. And acts which in isolation are peaceful may be part of a coercive thrust when entangled with acts of violence. The picketing in this case was set in a background of violence."
"These acts of violence are neither episodic nor isolated. Judges need not be so innocent of the actualities of such an industrial conflict as this record discloses as to find in the Constitution a denial of the right of Illinois to conclude that the use of force on such a scale was not the conduct of a few irresponsible outsiders. The Fourteenth Amendment still leaves the state ample discretion in dealing with manifestations of force in the settlement of industrial conflicts. And in exercising its power a state is not to be treated as though the technicalities of the laws of agency were written into the Constitution. Certainly a state is not confined by the Constitution to narrower limits in fashioning remedies for dealing with industrial disputes than the scope of discretion open to the National Labor Relations Board. It is true of a union as of an employer that it may be responsible for acts which it has not expressly authorized or which might not be attributable to it on strict application of the rules of respondeat superior ( 311 U.S. 72). . . . A state may withdraw the injunction from labor controversies but no less certainly the Fourteenth Amendment does not make unconstitutional the use of the injunction as a means of restricting violence. We find nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment that prevents a state if it so chooses from placing confidence in a chancellor's decree, and compels it to rely exclusively on a policeman's club."
See also United Electrical Radio Machine Workers of America v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 65 F. Supp. 420, and General Electric Company v. Cojack, (D.C. Ind, 1946), 11 Labor Cases No. 63095. We refer also to General Motors Corporation v. International Union, Circuit Court of Wayne County, Michigan, reported in 11 Labor Cases, No. 63209 and Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 86 L.Ed. 1154, and Carnegie Illinois Steel Corporation v. United Steelworkers of America, 45 A.2d 857.
In Lily Dache, Inc., v. Rose, 28 N.Y.S. 303, the court held that boisterous conduct, the use of vile language, bellicose demeanor, threats, violence, coercion, intimidation, shouting and interference with use of premises, or impeding the public highway, as by "mass picketing", which is the use of a large number of pickets, was not peaceable picketing and was illegal, entitling plaintiff to an injunction. See also: Western Electric Company v. Western Electric Employees' Ass'n, 45 A.2d 695; U.S. Electric Motors, Inc., v. United Electrical Radio, Etc., decided February 6, 1946, 166 P.2d 921; and General Electric Company v. Peterson, Etc., 61 N.Y.2d 813.
It was admitted in the Court below that the state equity court would have jurisdiction if the same had not been divested by the Federal statutes cited in the brief of opposing counsel. Opposing counsel referred to or cited Sec. 52, Title 29 U.S.C.A., commonly known as the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act subsequently enacted. In a valuable Annotation in 146 A.L.R., Page 1245, it is shown that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was designed primarily to affect the procedural law by limiting to the courts of the United States the right to issue injunctions in labor disputes. See New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Company, Inc., 82 L.Ed. 1012, where the court says: "The legislative history of the Act (Norris-LaGuardia Act) demonstrates that it was the purpose of the Congress to further extend the prohibitions of the Clayton Act respecting the exercise of jurisdiction by Federal Courts and to obviate the results of the judicial construction of that Act."
See also Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, 85 L.Ed. 63.
In Brown v. Coumanis, 135 F.2d 163, 146 A.L.R. 1241, the court, dealing with the Norris-LaGuardia Act, said: "But we think the Act does not undertake to establish for employers any new substantive rights nor put within the protection of Federal Courts all labor disputes even though the conditions of the Act are met. Its purpose is not to enlarge Federal jurisdiction but in the matter of using injunctions to restrict it. It extends and supplements the restrictions first imposed by Section 20 of the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C.A., Sec. 52. The language is everywhere negative. . . . `No court of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction'. The Norris-LaGuardia Act does not vest power in a court of the United States to do anything it could not previously have done. It merely denies power to do by injunctions some things the courts had been doing. A suit does not arise under that act because the petitioner asserts that the Act will affect its trial and professes his willingness to conform to it. In order to generate this kind of Federal jurisdiction a right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action."
It will be observed from the foregoing that neither the Clayton Act or the Norris-LaGuardia Act creates substantive rights or confers any new jurisdiction on the Federal Courts, and that the main purpose is to delimit the jurisdiction of a Federal Court to grant injunctions. Authorities on this subject could be multiplied. The Act has no bearing upon the jurisdiction of a state court. See 43 C.J.S. under Injunctions, Sec. 138, pp. 695, 696.
In 14 American Jurisprudence, Section 247, under the Title "Courts", the text in part reads:
"In regard to state court the law is also said to be settled that courts of general jurisdiction therein have power to decide cases involving the rights of litigants under the Constitution or statutes of the United States unless deprived of the right so to do by the terms of the Federal Constitution or acts of Congress.
In Grubb v. Public Utilities Commission, 74 L.Ed. 972, the Supreme Court in part said: "The appellant relies on the commerce clause of the Constitution as in some way operating to commit to the federal courts and to withhold from the state courts jurisdiction of all suits relating to the regulation or attempted regulation of interstate commerce. This view of that clause is quite inadmissible. It has no support in any quarter, is at variance with the actual practice in this class of litigation, citing cases, and is in conflict with the doctrine often sustained by this court that the state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction of suits of a civil nature arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, save in exceptions instances where the jurisdiction has been restricted by Congress to the federal courts. Citing cases.
In Murray v. Chicago N.W. Railway Company, 62 Fed. 24, Headnote 4 reads: "Courts — Conflicting State and Federal Jurisdiction — Interstate Commerce.
"The fact that the subject of interstate commerce is beyond state legislative control does not ipso facto prevent the courts of the state from exercising jurisdiction over cases arising from such commerce."
See also Forsyth v. Central Foundry Company, (Ala.) 198 So. 706.
Let it be remembered here that we are dealing primarily with the jurisdiction of a court of equity to grant relief in a case wherein it was alleged that the remedy at law was sufficient. This court re-announced the rule that the remedy at law must be as effectual and as speedy as the remedy in equity before it could be said that there was an adequate remedy at law.
In the case at bar, the court had full jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties. The bill of complaint is essentially a class action. The named defendants appeared and filed their general demurrer. For any violation of the injunction the court would have jurisdiction of the persons. In Carlsbad Irrigation District v. Ford, 46 N. Mex. 335, 128 Pav. 2d 1047, the Supreme Court held that the lower court had jurisdiction of the parties and could enjoin acts done or to be done in other counties. To the same effect are Jennings Bros. Co. v. Beale, (Pa.) 27 A. 948; Kane and E.R. Co. v. Pittsburgh and W.R. Co., (Pa.) 88 A. 793; Chicago, R.I. and P. Railway Co. v. Wynkoop, (Kan.) 85 P. 595.
In Guiraud v. Nevada Canal Company, (Col.) 245 P. 485, it was held that the District Court which issued an injunction had jurisdiction of contempt proceedings for the violation of the injunction although the violation occurred in a county other than the District of the court which granted the writ and a motion for change of venue to the county where the offense was committed was denied.
In Clad v. Paist, (Pa.) 37 A. 194, it appears that the defendant planned to construct a building upon a road-bed located in another county and the plaintiff brought suit to enjoin this action. See also Schmaltz v. York Manufacturing Company, (Pa.) 53 A. 522; Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Gex Estate, 186 So. 659; Greenwood County v. Shay, (S.C.) 23 S.E.2d 825.
Courts of equity are more alert to grant the relief where the public interest is involved and where the complainant is a common carrier under a duty to maintain adequate and continuous service. In the case of Virginia Railway Company v. Railway Employees Department of the American Federation of Labor, 81 L.Ed. 789, the court said: "More is involved than the settlement of a private controversy without appreciable consequences to the public. The peaceable settlement of labor controversies, especially where they may seriously impair the ability of an interstate rail carrier to perform its services to the public, is a matter of public concern. That is testified to by the history of the legislation now before us, the reports of committees of Congress having the proposed legislation in charge, and by our common knowledge. Courts of equity may, and frequently do, go much further both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private interests are involved." Citing cases.
An annotation on this subject will be found in 149 A.L.R. at p. 1245.
Ben Stevens, and L. Barrett Jones, for appellees.
We submit there is no equity on the face of the bill.
In discussing this point, we shall do so first from the viewpoint of Local 1127 and then from the viewpoint of Local 1208.
In the first place, the allegations of the bill are entirely too skimpy as a factual matter to show any equity jurisdiction in this cause. The gist of the bill is in Paragraph 13, where the various alleged acts of intimidation and depredation are charged. It is to be noted that a good many of those alleged acts were not directed at the company's employees but were allegedly directed at intended patrons of the company. It is to be further noted that only in two or three instances were any alleged deperdations on property occurring in the State of Mississippi charged.
Finally, it is to be noted that in each paragraph there is the positive averment that members of Local 1127 participated in the alleged acts, though in many instances the names of the members are not given.
We submit that for each and every one of the alleged acts of violence and intimidation the appellant had a plain, adequate, and speedy remedy at law through the criminal statutes. If the appellant knew who committed each act, it had the right to immediately prosecute the offender. Moreover, it was its duty to do so, and, if it failed to do so, it is in the position of having winked at a misdemeanor, and to some extent is in the position of compounding a felony, where the alleged act would have been a felony. If it couldn't make the proof that members of Local 1127 had participated in the alleged acts, then it could not make proof before the court on a citation for contempt that the members had so participated, and, if it can't make proof of the acts, it clearly is not entitled to an injunction on the mere assumption of fact that members of Local 1127 and its officers and agents were participating in the acts. On the other hand, if it had proof of that fact, the criminal statutes would have afforded a speedier remedy than at injunction and a citation for contempt thereunder would do.
It is well-settled law that equity will not enjoin the commission of a crime, and yet that is exactly what the bill in this case asks the court to do. We realize that under certain state of facts equity will enjoin the committing of acts which may be criminal in nature, but only where the acts constitute a continuing nuisance or threaten irreparable damage if continued. In only one instance does the bill charge that any property in the State of Mississippi belonging to appellant was damaged, and we submit that what occurred outside of the State of Mississippi is not within the jurisdiction of Mississippi Courts and no ground for the issuance of any legal process, much less an injunction against Local 1127 and its officers, agents, and members.
As to Local 1208, there is clearly no equity on the face of the bill. Beyond the mere charge that its members were aiding Local 1127 in picketing and a mere charge that they had conspired with Local 1127, without in any way stating the facts constituting the conspiracy, there is nothing charged in the bill showing or even tending to show that any member of Local 1208 participated in any of the alleged acts of violance.
We next submit that the jurisdiction of this cause is not in the State courts, but entirely in the Federal Court. It is to be noted that the bill charges in this case that appellant is engaged in interstate commerce, operating in a good many states of the South and Middle West, and that it carries not only passengers but certain commodities. Therefore, the relationship between the appellant and Local 1127 is a relationship growing out of interstate commerce, and the bill shows that the appellant is subject to regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Moreover, the bill plainly shows that the disagreement between appellant and Local 1127 grows out of a labor dispute, the dispute being over wages and working conditions, and charges that the negotiations broke down and that Local 1127 called a general strike against appellant, and that strike was and is still going on against the appellant.
The Congress, in passing Chapter 5 of Title 29, U.S.C.A., strictly laid down what a complainant must charge in order to get an injunction against a labor union, and particularly against a labor union on strike. Those conditions are particularly set out in Section 107 of Title 29, U.S.C.A.
Any casual reading of the bill will show that it utterly fails to charge those facts and conditions which the Federal labor laws require to be charged as a prerequisite for obtaining an injunction in this class of case.
It is argued by counsel that these statutes are a delimiting of the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to issue an injunction, and that they create now substantive right in the labor union, but, if Section 104 of Title 29, U.S.C.A., which enumerates the things a labor union may do and which may not be restrained by an injunction, is not substantive in nature, we would like to know what it is. Moreover, Section 107, above referred to, is also substantive in nature in that it prohibits the issuance of an injunction unless the facts required by that section are charged and proved. Anything which limits the equity powers of the court not only is jurisdictional but of necessity confers substantive rights upon those whom the statute is intended to favor.
We submit that the whole subject of Labor-Management disputes when interstate commerc is involvd, as is the case here, is solely a question for the Federal Courts, and the mere fact that the employer may be doing some incidental intrastate business in no wise weakens that position. It has long been settled under the interstate commerce cases that the Federal Courts have jurisdiction of all maters arising out of interstate commerce, even though the carrier may be doing some intrastate business.
It is laid down in C.J.S., Vol. 21, under the subject "Courts", that state courts cannot enforce federal laws unless they have been authorized to do so by state law. We quote the following from Paragraph 526, at page 798 of the said volume: ". . . Where exclusive jurisdiction has not been expressly or impliedly granted to the federal courts, state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to enforce such rights, provided they are authorized by the state constitution and statutes to take jurisdiction."
There can be no pretense that any statute of the State of Mississippi, much less the Constitution of the State, provides that the state courts may enforce federal statutes.
In the next place, we submit that the Congress has impliedly vested in federal courts the exclusive jurisdiction of Labor-Management disputes where the parties are engaged in interstate commerce, as is the case here. The implication comes from the fact that the Congress several years ago preempted the field of Labor-Management relations in interstate commerce by passing the various statutes governing the same, some of which are the Wage and Hour Law, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the National Labor Relations Board Act, the Taft-Hartley Law, and the Norris-LaGuardia Law, limiting the power of the federal courts in issuing injunctions in labor disputes.
The rights of the parties here flow from and are involved in a labor dispute in a business admittedly engaged in interstate commerce. Therefore, the labor dispute is governed by the Federal statutes controlling Labor-Management relations and by the additional Federal statutes controlling interstate commerce.
Counsel relies very strongly on the case of Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 85 L.Ed. 836, 61 S.Ct. 552.
That case is easily distinguished from the case at bar because it shows on its face that the State of Illinois had authorized its courts to restrain the acts of the labor union involved in that case. The State of Mississippi has no such statute, and it is to be further noted that no phase of interstate commerce was involved in that case.
We further submit that the chancellor was correct in holding that the issuance of an injunction under the facts charged in this case would be a futile thing and would have converted the chancery court into a criminal court, for every citation for contempt under the scope of the temporary injunction as issued would of necessity have involved the alleged commission of some misdemeanor or felony, and, conceding the power of the court to fine and imprison for contempt, the limit of the fine and imprisonment would have been the limit prescribed by law for conviction under the penal statutes, and, as stated above, if the appellant had proof enough to secure a conviction of contempt before the chancellor, it would have proof enough to secure a conviction in the criminal courts of the State.
We concede the broad powers of a court of equity, but there is a limit to those powers, and, moreover, there is a limit on the duty of the chancery court to exercise those powers, and it is well-settled law that in instances of this kind there is no duty to exercise the power unless the complainant shows a state of facts demonstrating that he has no adequate remedy at law. Here, the remedy at law is not only adequate but was plain and as speedy as the process of citing for contempt would have been.
The Southern Bus Lines, a corporation, organized and constituted under the laws of the State of Louisiana, filed its original bill in the Chancery Court of Hinds County, making three labor unions and thirteen individuals defendants, and the thirteen individuals were also made defendants as officers and agents of the respective unions, and as representatives of all the other members of the union, who were made parties defendant under the numerous party rule.
The original bill alleges that the Southern Bus Lines is a certified common carrier of passengers by vehicle in interstate and intrastate commerce in nine states, including the State of Mississippi, and, in addition to carrying passengers, carries baggage, light express, newspapers, and United States mail, and maintains terminals, shops, and stations throughout its system, and such physical properties represent investments of hundreds of thousands of dollars; that this Line is charged with the duty of using every reasonable means to insure continuous and uninterrupted service in those areas where it conducts its operations; that the Bus Company and Local 1127 had a contract providing for bargaining and negotiating, and prior to the expiraton of ths contract, negotiations were begun concerning wage increases for certain employees and concerning other demands made by Local 1127, which negotiations continued until May 20, 1947, when Local 1127 called a strike; that, notwithstanding the strike, the defendant line continued to negotiate, and, on reaching no agreement, notice was served by the Bus Company that after August 20, 1947, applications for employment would be accepted and that the Bus Company would resume operation in an effort to meet its duties to the general public; that Local 1127 has established and is maintaining picket lines around the terminals, garages, office buildings, and other property of the Bus Line in Jackson and in other cities throughout the State, and although none of the complainant's employees were or are members of Local 1208, and no labor dispute existed between complainant and Local 1208, that Local 1208 and its members are acting in confederation and conspiracy with, and are actively aiding and abetting Local 1127, in maintaining its strike and picket activities, and in the other activities mentioned in the bill; that defendants by threats and violence are coercing and intimidating present and prospective employees and their families, and injuring and threatening to injure their persons and property; that by threats and violence defendants have conspired to stop the general public and patrons from using the service of the Bus Line; that defendants have used threats and violence against the officials of the Bus Line, and have damaged and destroyed the Bus Line's property. The bill lists thirty-two separate acts of violence and damage to property, many of which occurred in the City of Jackson — unquestionably within the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court of Hinds County — and many of which occurred at Columbus, Mississippi; and these injuries were both to the personnel of the Bus Line and its properties. There is attached to the bill as Exhibits "A" and "B" photographs of busses which had been mobbed and damaged; that the acts of violence so alleged constitute great and irreparable injury to complainant and constitute a continued trespass and hazard to the Bus Line property, and the Bus Line has no adequate remedy at law; that unless an injunction is granted bloodshed and possible loss of life will result.
The bill prays for process, for a temporary injunction, and that on final hearing the temporary injunction be made perpetual.
On the filing and presentation of the original bill of complaint, the Chancellor issued a fiat authorizing a preliminary injunction upon the complainant's giving bond to be approved by the clerk, and the injunction was issued as prayed for. The fiat of the Chancellor recited an extreme emergency, and the injunction, therefore, was ordered without notice to the defendants. Thereafter, all of the defendants, by the same counsel, interposed a general demurrer to the bill, and filed a motion to dissolve the temporary injunction. Upon the hearing the Chancellor sustained the general demurrer of the defendants, and the defendants declining to amend, final decree was entered dismissing appellant's bill and dissolving the injunction.
The grounds of the demurrer were: 1. No equity on the face of the bill. 2. The courts of Mississippi have no jurisdiction to issue an injunction in a labor dispute arising out of interstate commerce. 3. The bill does not charge facts showing a conspiracy between the defendants. 4. The alleged acts of violence, if true, are violations of the criminal laws, and a court of equity will not enjoin the commission of a crime. 5. The bill does not charge that the defendants authorized any of the alleged acts of violence. 6. Complainant is seeking to enforce statutes of the United States in the courts of Mississippi and the state court has no such jurisdiction. 7. The bill is not drawn within the purview of the United States statutes, and for that reason the court has no jurisdiction to enforce them. 8. The bill does not charge what property rights have been invaded or need the protection of the injunctive process. (Hn 1) Passing first upon ground 3 of the demurrer, we hold that the bill of complaint meets every requirement as to form laid down by the practice in this state, and there is no merit in this ground. There is no merit in grounds 5, 7, and 8, and it is unnecessary to discuss these grounds. The subject matters contained in grounds 4 and 6 of the demurrer are factors for consideration under grounds 1 and 2. Hence a decision of the points raised under grounds 1 and 2 of the demurrer will be decisive of all questions in the case that merit discussion, and we proceed to a consideration of these grounds.
(Hn 2) Does the bill of complaint contain grounds for equitable relief? Unquestionably it does. The right to injunctive relief is supported by the authorities and is a basic ground of the jurisdiction of a court of equity. This is particularly true when it comes to enjoining repeated and continuing trespass to property, where actions at law would entail a multiplicity of suits and where the damages would be irreparable. Stigall v. Sharkey County, 197 Miss. 307, 20 So.2d 664; McClendon et al. v. Mississippi State Highway Commission, Miss. 1949, 38 So.2d 325. Moss v. Jourdan, 129 Miss. 598, 92 So. 689; Hood v. Foster, 194 Miss. 812, 13 So.2d 652.
(Hn 3) The use of force, violence, coercion, or intimidation to prevent employees from working for the employer against whom the strike is in operation, or to prevent other workmen from accepting employment from him, is not permisisble and an injunction will be granted to prevent the commission of such acts, and it is immaterial that the strike is for a lawful purpose. It is not necessary that there should have been actual violence or physical assaults, but it is sufficient if threats, abusive language, or other acts amounting to intimidation and depriving those against whom the acts were directed of the power to exercise their own will in determining whether or not they should work, were used. 43 C.J.S., Injunctions, Sec. 147(e), page 747.
(Hn 4) The fact that such unlawful acts are violations of the criminal law makes no difference. In State ex rel. Rice v. Allen, 180 Miss. 659, 177 So. 763, this Court held that though equitable action is never predicated on the prevention of crime, as such, it is also true that the fact that the conduct is punishable criminally does not constitute an adequate remedy so as to bar equitable relief. (Hn 5) Private persons cannot conspire to illegally destroy the business of another, and where two or more persons conspire together, the conspiracy makes the wrongful acts of each the joint acts of all of them. Globe Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. et al., 97 Miss. 148, 52 So. 454, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.), 869; State ex rel. Rice v. Hasson Grocery Co., 177 Miss. 204, 170 So. 234, 107 A.L.R. 663.
In Mississippi Theatres Corporation et al. v. Hattiesburg Local Union No. 615, 174 Miss. 439, 164 So. 887, this Court held that an unincorporated labor union may seek injunctive relief against an employer in labor disputes, and that the right to an injunction is available to either side in proper cases. This case also holds that a labor union has the right to discipline its members and control their conduct, and has the right to speak for them. See also Stephenson v. New Orleans Northeastern Railroad Company et al. 180 Miss. 147, 177 So. 509; Franklin Union No. 4 v. People, 220 Ill. 355, 77 N.E. 176, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.), 1001, 110 Am. St. Rep. 248.
(Hn 6) While such is the law, it is equally true that, upon the members of Local 1127, either singly or in a body, leaving the employment of the Southern Bus Lines, Inc., the company had the right to employ other persons in their places, and if Local 1127, its officers and members, agreed together that by calling a strike, and by force, threats, intimidation, and picketing, they would prevent the members of said association from employing other persons in their places, then they entered upon an unlawful undertaking, the carrying into effect of which might be enjoined by a court of chancery. Franklin Union No. 4 v. People, 220 Ill. 335, 77 N.E. 176, 4 L.R.A., N.S., 1001, 110 Am. St. Rep. 284. The bill in this case charges the fact to be that Local 1127, Local 1208, and all the other defendants are maintaining picket lines around the terminals, garages, office buildings and other property of complainant, and that Local 1208, and its members, are acting in concert, confederation and conspiracy with, and are actively assisting and abetting in maintaining the strike, and that the defendants by threats and violence are coercing and intimidating prospective employees and their families, and are threatening injury to the persons and property of present and prospective employees; and in Paragraph 10 of the bill it is positively charged that all of these defendants have conspired together to unlawfully, and by means of violence, prevent and stop the general public from using the Company's services. These acts are unlawful.
(Hn 7) Peaceful picketing is a lawful act. Mass. picketing, which is the use of a large number of pickets, is not peaceable picketing, is illegal, and entitles the one being picketed to resort to equity and obtain an injunction. Lilly Dache, Inc. v. Rose, Sup., 28 N.Y.S.2d 303; Western Electric Company v. Western Electric Employees Ass'n, 137 N.J. Ed. 489, 45 A.2d 695; United States Electrical Motors, Inc. v. United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers, etc., Cal. Super., 166 P.2d 921; General Electric Company v. Peterson, Sup., 61 N.Y.S.2d 813.
When any individual or organization under whatsoever name attempts to use force to gain his or her ends, they are attempting to usurp a governmental function. When a picket line becomes a picket fence, it is time for the government to act. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation v. United Steelworkers of America, 353 Pa. 420, 45 A.2d 857.
The bill in this case alleges facts sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of a court of equity and obtain from it injunctive relief, unless such court is precluded because the strike involves interstate, as well as intrastate, commerce.
This brings us to the consideration of the second ground of demurrer, wherein it is urged that the state court has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction in a labor dispute arising out of interstate commerce.
(Hn 8) May we point out that the appellant is a duly certified common carrier of passengers by motor vehicle in intrastate commerce, as well as interstate, and has large investments in properties in this state, necessary for a large network of operations in Mississippi. Intrastate, as well as interstate, commerce is involved in this action. Such is the clear and unequivocal allegation of the original bill. But, aside from that question, there can be no doubt as to the jurisdiction of a state court of equity to protect appellant in its property rights and prevent, through force, intimidation and violence, irreparable injury to persons and property. The reports abound in injunction suits growing out of labor disputes, and many of them arise as an incident to interstate commerce.
No one should doubt that the State of Mississippi, through its courts by the injunctive process, can protect persons and properties in this state from damage by violence and from fear through threats and intimidation. Acts, which in isolation are peaceful, become part of a coercive thrust when entangled with acts of violence. The picketing in this case is alleged to have been set in a background of violence. In such a setting, it can be justifiably concluded that the momentum of fear generated by past violence would survive even though future picketing might be wholly peaceful. Nor was it written into the Fourteenth Amendment that a state, through its courts, cannot base protection against future coercion on an inference of the continuing threat of past misconduct. These acts of violence, as charged, were neither episodic nor isolated. Judges need not be so innocent of the actualities of such an industrial conflict as to find in the Constitution, state or federal, a denial of the right of Mississippi to conclude that the use of force was not the conduct of a few irresponsible outsiders. The Fourteenth Amendment still leaves the state ample discretion in dealing with manifestations of force in the settlement of industrial conflicts. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753, v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 61 S.Ct. 552, 85 L.Ed. 836, 132 A.L.R. 1200.
Neither does the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 101 et seq., nor the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 151 et seq., prohibit the institution, by either party involved in a controversy of this character, of proceedings in a state court; nor do they place exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts. The Norris-LaGuardia Act curtailed only the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts in the field of labor disputes, and has no application to the equity courts of the state. Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local No. 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Products, 311 U.S. 91, 61 S.Ct. 122, 85 L.Ed. 63; 1939, 39 Op. Atty. Gen. 242, 246; United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, D.C., 65 F. Supp. 420; Wisconsin Labor Relations Board v. Fred Rueping Leather Company, 228 Wis. 473, 279 N.W. 673, 117 A.L.R. 398; International Ass'n of Machinists v. State ex rel. Watson, 153 Fla. 672, 15 So.2d 485; Markham Callow, Inc. v. International Woodworkers of America, 170 Or. 517, 135 P.2d 727; Park Tilford Import Corporation v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., Cal. Sup., 155 P.2d 16.
The National Labor Relations Act does not preempt all state control, nor more specifically the state police power. United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, supra; Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 65 S.Ct. 1373, 89 L.Ed. 1782; Brown v. Coumanis, 5 Cir., 135 F.2d 163, 146 A.L.R. 1241.
The appellee relies on the commerce clause of the Constitution, article 1, Sec. 8, as in some way operating to commit to the federal courts, and to withhold from the state courts, jurisdiction of all suits relating to the regulation, or attempted regulation, of interstate commerce. This view of that clause is quite inadmissible. It has no support in any quarter, and is at variance with the actual practice in this class of litigation. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L.Ed. 23; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105, 38 S.Ct. 438, 62 L.Ed. 1006, 1 A.L.R. 1278; Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 225 N.Y. 397, 122 N.E. 260, Id., 252 U.S. 23, 40 S.Ct. 279, 64 L.Ed. 434; People's Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 270 U.S. 550, 46 S.Ct. 371, 70 L.Ed. 726; Public Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83, 47 S.Ct. 294, 71 L.Ed. 549; Murray v. Chicago N.W.R. Co., C.C., 62 F. 24, 42, 43. The state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction of suits of a civil nature arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, save in exceptional instances where the jurisdiction has been restricted by Congress to the federal courts. Grubb v. Public Utilities Commission, 281 U.S. 470, 50 S.Ct. 374, 74 L.Ed. 972, and numerous authorities therein cited.
We are of the firm conviction that under the law Liberty includes the right to make and enforce contracts, because the right to make and enforce contracts is included in the right to acquire property. Labor is property. To deprive the laborer and the employer of this right to contract peaceably with one another is to violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, which provide that no persons shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and that no state shall deprive any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law. Freedom of speech and freedom of the press, out of which grows the right to peacefully picket, cannot be too often remembered and invoked as basic to our scheme of society, but these liberties will not be advanced, nor can we even maintain them if we deny to the states, including the instrumentalities of their courts, the power to deal with coercion due to extensive violence. The Chancery Court of Hinds County had ample power and full jurisdiction to deal with and adjudicate the issues tendered by the original and amended bills of complainant filed in this cause, and the learned Chancellor erred in sustaining the demurrer and the motion to dissolve the injunction and, because of this error, the decree of the lower court will be reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.