Opinion
C.A. No. 08C-02-118 RRC.
Submitted: June 24, 2008.
Decided: August 25, 2008.
On Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
GRANTED.Vincent J. X. Hedrick, II, Esquire, Law Office of Beverly L. Bove, Wilmington, DE, Attorney for Plaintiff.
Colin M. Shalk, Esquire, Casarino, Christman Shalk, P.A., Wilmington, DE, Attorney for Defendant.
Dear Counsel:
Lori Bromstad-Deturk ("Plaintiff") was involved in a motor vehicle accident with a third-party underinsured motorist. Plaintiff was driving a vehicle at the time of the accident that was insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("Defendant"). The policy on that vehicle provided $100,000 for underinsured motorist coverage, which Defendant has tendered to Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff had two additional motor vehicles insured by Defendant. All three policies were under separate insurance agreements, and all vehicles were within Plaintiff's household. The policies each provided $100,000 in underinsured motorist coverage, and all contained an "anti-stacking provision." The language of the anti-stacking provision in each policy reads as follows:
[i]f two or more vehicles owned or leased by you, your spouse or any relative are insured for this coverage under one or more policies issued by us or an affiliated company, the total limit of liability under all such coverages shall not exceed that of the coverage with the highest limit of liability.
The applicable statute is 18 Del. C. § 3902, governing "uninsured and underinsured vehicle coverage." Particularly at issue is 18 Del. C. § 3902(c), which provides:
[w]hen 2 or more vehicles owned or leased by persons residing in the same household are insured by the same insurer or affiliated insurers, the limits of liability shall apply separately to each vehicle as stated in the declaration sheet, but shall not exceed the highest limit of liability applicable to any 1 vehicle.
The issue before the Court is whether 18 Del. C. § 3902(c) authorizes the anti-stacking provisions contained in the insurance policies between Defendant and Plaintiff. If so, that would have the effect of allowing Plaintiff to potentially receive $300,000 in uninsured motorist coverage, instead of $100,000.
The Court holds that the anti-stacking provisions in the insurance policies are permitted by the plain language of 18 Del. C. § 3902(c), and that therefore the terms of the insurance agreements preclude the Plaintiff from stacking her insurance policies. Defendant's motion to dismiss is therefore granted.
I. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
Defendant contends that 18 Del. C. § 3902(c) is directly applicable to the facts of this case, and permits the kind of anti-stacking provision contained in the insurance policies. Defendant maintains that the anti-stacking provisions operate to prevent Plaintiff from stacking her underinsured motorist coverage.
Plaintiff responds that, as a general policy matter, 18 Del. C. § 3902 is designed to protect individuals from underinsured motorists, and that 18 Del. C. § 3902(c), being "ambiguous," should be interpreted to reflect that policy and be thus construed to allow stacking.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
III. DISCUSSION
Plant v. Catalytic Constr. Co., 287 A.2d 682, 686 (Del.Super. 1972), aff'd 297 A.2d 37 (Del. 1972).
Id.
Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967, 968 (Del. 1978).
This Court has addressed this issue in at least three previous cases. In Johnson v. Colonial Insurance Company of California, this Court held that an insured could not stack the underinsured motorist coverage for two separate automobile insurance policies written by the same insurer, where the policies covered two separate motor vehicles in the insured's household. In its analysis of 18 Del. C. § 3902(c), the Johnson Court examined the original Senate bill that amended the statute to bring 18 Del. C. § 3902(c) into its present form. The synopsis of that Senate bill states, in pertinent part:
Johnson v. Colonial Insurance Company of California, 1997 WL 126994, at *3 (Del.Super.).
[r]egardless of the number of motor vehicles involved, the number of persons covered or claims made, vehicles or premiums shown in the policy or premiums paid, the limit of liability for uninsured motorist or underinsured motorist coverage shall not be added to or stacked upon limits for such coverages applying to other motor vehicles to determine the amount of coverage available to an insured injured in any one accident.
Senate Bill No. 223, 135th General Assembly (1990).
The Johnson Court went on to hold that 18 Del. C. § 3902(c) unambiguously permitted anti-stacking provisions, and that the plaintiff-insured was precluded from stacking by the terms of the insurance policies from stacking coverage.
Later, this Court, in Lewis v. American Independent Insurance Company, endorsed the Johnson Court's holding that 18 Del. C. § 3902(c) is intended to prohibit stacking. In Lewis, this Court held that an insurer "was not obligated to provide [underinsured motorist] coverage because [ 18 Del. C. § 3902(c)] precludes the stacking of multiple underinsured motorist coverages for the threshold purpose of establishing whether the tortfeasor is an underinsured motorist." While factually different than the present case (in that it involved determining whether stacking was permitted to establish an amount greater than the amount offered by the underinsured motorist, thus triggering underinsured motorist coverage), the Lewis Court's interpretation of 18 Del. C. § 3902(c) is nonetheless persuasive.
Lewis v. American Independent Insurance Company, 2004 WL 1426964, at *8 (Del.Super.).
Id. at *1.
Also instructive is Justice v. Colonial Insurance Company, where this Court again addressed the issue of stacking pursuant to 18 Del. C. § 3902(c). The Court noted that stacking is permitted except where restricted by statute. The Court stated, in dicta:
Justice v. Colonial Insurance Company, 1998 WL 442717 (Del.Super.) (addressing the issue of whether separate insurance policies could be stacked to determine whether underinsured motorist coverage had been triggered).
[a]n example of a statutory restriction on stacking not applicable here is 18 Del. C. § 3902(c) which prohibits stacking when "two or more vehicles owned or leased by persons residing in the same household are insured by the same insurer or affiliated insurers.
Id. at *2.
Plaintiff did not address any of the above three cases (relied upon by Defendant in its original motion) in its Response to Defendant's motion to dismiss. However, at oral argument Plaintiff's counsel argued that Johnson was simply wrongly decided, and that Lewis is distinguishable, since it involved the question of whether policies could be stacked to determine whether underinsured motorist coverage was triggered. Plaintiff urges the Court to find controlling a Delaware Supreme Court decision, Deptula v. Horace Mann Insurance Co., 892 A.2d 1235 (Del. 2004), where it was held that an individual injured in a motor vehicle accident could to stack his personal policy with his employer's policy to determine whether underinsured motorist coverage was triggered. However, Deptula is distinguishable. In Deptula, unlike the present case, the insurance policies were issued by different insurers, and therefore 18 Del. C. § 3902(c) was not applicable.
Oral Arg. Tr. at 16, 15-17 (June 24, 2008).
"If [a] statute as a whole is unambiguous and there is no reasonable doubt as to the meaning of the words used, the Court's role is limited to an application of the literal meaning of those words." As the Johnson and Lewis cases have held, 18 Del. C. § 3902(c) is unambiguous, and this case is falls precisely into the type of case in which 18 Del. C. § 3902(c) permits anti-stacking provisions. Defendant is correct that Plaintiff is prohibited from stacking under the terms of the insurance policies.
Leatherbury v. Greenspun, 939 A.2d 1284, 1288 (Del. 2007) (citing In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095, 1096-97 (Del. 1993)).
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.