Opinion
C. A. 3:21-3375-JMC-PJG
11-18-2022
Dontavious Darrell Briggman, Sr., Plaintiff, v. Republic Service, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Dontavious Darrell Briggman, Sr., a self-represented litigant, filed this employment action asserting claims of discrimination and retaliation against his former employer. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Republic Service. (ECF No. 23.) Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Briggman of the summary judgment and dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Republic's motion. (ECF No. 25.) Briggman filed a response (ECF No. 38), and Republic replied, (ECF No. 39). Having reviewed the record presented and the applicable law, the court finds that Republic's motion should be granted.
The defendant is improperly identified by Briggman in the caption of the Complaint. The defendant is formally known as “Allied Services, LLC” and does business as Allied Waste Services of Lee County; Republic Services of Lee County; or Allied Waste Services, LLC. The court refers to the defendant as “Republic,” consistent with the defendant's use in its briefing.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are either undisputed or are taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, to the extent they find support in the record. Republic employed Briggman as a garbage truck driver beginning on July 2, 2019. In November 2019, Briggman, who is African American, refused to give up his route to a white employee who demanded it. A few weeks later, Briggman's supervisor gave the route to the white employee, cut Briggman's hours, and transferred Briggman to another location that was less convenient for Briggman.
On March 31, 2020, Briggman injured his shoulder by falling from the side of his truck. Initially, Republic refused to schedule a doctor's appointment for Briggman because there was a shortage of available drivers who could complete Briggman's route in his absence. Briggman did not receive a doctor's appointment until May, wherein he was diagnosed with a torn rotator cuff and was scheduled for surgery in December 2020. Briggman resigned as part of his workers' compensation claim settlement agreement in October 2020.
Briggman filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on March 1, 2021, raising claims of race discrimination and retaliation regarding his separation from employment. Briggman claimed that he was denied a reasonable accommodation and discharged because of his injury and race. Briggman also claimed that he was terminated in retaliation for complaining about being forced to give his route to a white employee.
Briggman filed this lawsuit on October 15, 2021. Briggman raises claims of disparate treatment based on race and retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.; and failure to accommodate and retaliation pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Standard
Republic seeks dismissal of Briggman's lawsuit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). However, Republic's motion requires the court to consider evidence outside of the pleadings and seeks dismissal of the lawsuit with prejudice. Therefore, the court treats Republic's motion as seeking summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”); Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 1985); see also 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1366 (3d ed. Apr. 2022).
Republic argues the motion need not be converted to summary judgment because the evidence relied on-a settlement agreement between the parties-is integral and explicitly relied on in the Complaint. See, e.g., Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that, in ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court may consider documentary evidence outside of the pleading that is “integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint” if the plaintiff does not challenge the document's authenticity). However, the settlement agreement is not mentioned in the Complaint and Briggman does not rely on the agreement to support his claims. Rather, the agreement is integral to Republic's defense. Therefore, the court cannot consider the settlement agreement without converting the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).
“All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). Thus, when converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a motion for summary judgment, the court generally must give the parties notice that it is converting the motion and a reasonable opportunity for discovery. Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 721 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (citing Gay, 761 F.2d at 177; E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 450 (4th Cir. 2011)). The issuance of a Roseboro order that explains the procedure for converting a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment if a party relies on evidence outside of the pleadings is sufficient to satisfy the notice requirement of Rule 12(d). See, e.g., Jeremy C. v. Kijakazi, C. A. No. SAG-20-649, 2021 WL 3291814, at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 2, 2021); Sykes v. Ratledge, C. A. No. 7:17-CV-00275, 2018 WL 2125955, at *3 n.7 (W.D. Va. May 8, 2018); Reaves v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., C. A. No. 7:08-CV-00560, 2009 WL 366045, at *3 (W.D. Va. Feb. 12, 2009).
Moreover, the court need not provide time for discovery if the non-movant fails to articulate a need for discovery to oppose the motion. See Sager v. Hous. Comm'n of Anne Arundel Cty., 855 F.Supp.2d 524, 542 (D. Md. 2012); Messick v. Bd. of Educ. of Wicomico Cty., C. A. No. GLR-14-2690, 2014 WL 7357554, at *4 n.2 (D. Md. Dec. 19, 2014) (quoting Nguyen v. CNA Corp., 44 F.3d 234, 242 (4th Cir. 1995)). The non-movant must file an affidavit or declaration pursuant to Rule 56(d) explaining why he cannot present facts essential to justify his opposition without discovery. Sager, 855 F.Supp.2d at 542-43; see also Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc., 721 F.3d at 281 (stating the district court abuses its discretion in converting a motion to one for summary judgment and granting the motion where the non-moving party files a Rule 56(d) affidavit stating that it could not properly oppose the motion without a chance to conduct discovery).
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party may support or refute that a material fact is not disputed by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). Rule 56 mandates entry of summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
In deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the evidence of the nonmoving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248.
The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Erickson, 551 U.S. 89, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Republic's Motion
Republic argues that Briggman released any employment discrimination claims he had against Republic by entering into a settlement agreement with Republic for his workers' compensation claim, and therefore, this action should be dismissed. The court agrees.
Employees may release their right to sue for discrimination under Title VII or the ADA in a private settlement so long as the employees' waiver of their right is knowing and intelligent. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52, n.15 (1974) (Title VII); Shirey ex rel. Kyger v. City of Alexandria Sch. Bd., 229 F.3d 1143, *3 (4th Cir. 2000) (Table) (ADA); Shaw v. N. Carolina Dep't of Pub. Safety, 372 F.Supp.3d 307, 309 (M.D. N.C. 2019) (ADA).
Courts generally look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary, including: (1) the clarity and specificity of the release language; (2) the plaintiff's education and business experience; (3) the amount of time the plaintiff had for deliberation about the release before signing the release; (4) whether the plaintiff knew or should have known his rights upon execution of the release; (5) whether the plaintiff was encouraged to seek, or in fact received, the benefit of counsel; (6) whether there was opportunity for negotiation of the terms of the release; and (7) whether the consideration given in exchange for the waiver and accepted by the plaintiff exceeds the benefits to which the plaintiff was already entitled by law or contract. See Cassiday v. Greenhorne & O'Mara, Inc., 63 Fed.Appx. 169 (4th Cir. 2003) (Title VII) (citing Melanson v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 281 F.3d 272, 276 (1st Cir. 2002)); Scoggins v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., Civil Action No. 2:11-3028-PMD, 2012 WL 6102031, at *2 (D.S.C. Dec. 10, 2012) (Title VII) (citing Torrez v. Pub. Serv. Co. of New Mexico, 908 F.2d 687, 689-90 (10th Cir. 1990)); but see Shaw v. N. Carolina Dep't of Pub. Safety, 372 F.Supp.3d 307, 309 (M.D. N.C. 2019) (explaining the split of authority between courts that look to the totality of the circumstances or to state contract law for ADA claims).
Here, Briggman does not dispute that he settled his workers' compensation claim in October 2020 by entering into a settlement agreement with Republic. (Settlement Agreement, Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A, ECF No. 23-2.) As part of that agreement, Briggman agreed to resign his position and release any claim he may have had regarding his employment with Republic in exchange for settlement pay. The agreement specifically lists claims pursuant to Title VII and the ADA as claims that Briggman agreed to release. (Id. at 5.) In signing the agreement, Briggman acknowledged that he had seven days to consider the terms of the agreement, that he was advised to consult with an attorney before signing the agreement, that he read and understood all of the terms of the agreement, and that he signed the agreement knowingly and voluntarily. (Id. at 8.) Briggman was represented by counsel at the time he entered into the agreement. (Id. at 3.)
Briggman does not argue that his waiver of his right to sue under Title VII and ADA was not knowing and intelligent. In his response to the motion, Briggman claims that, based on conversations with human resources, he believed he would continue to be employed by Republic after he signed the settlement agreement. (Pl.'s Resp., ECF No. 38 at 1.) Even assuming that is true, it does not show that Briggman did not voluntarily and knowingly waive his right to pursue employment discrimination claims. More importantly, Briggman does not dispute that he signed the settlement agreement, nor does Briggman assert that he did not understand the release language, that he was not counseled about the effect of the release, or that the release terms were unclear. See Bala v. Com. of Virginia Dep't of Conservation & Recreation, 614 Fed.Appx. 636, 639 (4th Cir. 2015) (providing that, when determining whether a settlement agreement effected a waiver of rights under federal employment discrimination laws, “[w]here the parties' intent is clear from the unambiguous terms of the contract, construed as a whole, we need not and cannot resort to extrinsic evidence of intent”); see also Scoggins, 2012 WL 6102031, at *3 (stating that the plaintiff's conclusory argument that he signed the release under duress was not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact in light of the clear and unambiguous language of the release and the fact that the plaintiff was represented by counsel when she signed it). Consequently, there is no dispute that Briggman waived his right to bring a Title VII or ADA claim against Republic based on his employment, and Republic is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Because Briggman does not dispute the existence of the settlement agreement or its authenticity or assert that he cannot properly oppose Republic's motion without the opportunity to gather evidence, the court concludes that it is unnecessary to provide the parties with a discovery period before ruling on the motion for summary judgment. See Sager, 855 F.Supp.2d at 542; Messick, 2014 WL 7357554, at *4 n.2.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the court recommends that Republic's motion be converted to one seeking summary judgment and that summary judgment be granted to Republic. (ECF No. 23.)
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).