Opinion
No. 37398.
June 12, 1950.
1. Insanity — evidence — lay witnesses.
On the issue whether the grantor in a deed of conveyance was insane at the time of its execution, lay witnesses may testify.
2. Insanity — evidence — lay witnesses — experts.
The issue whether the grantor in a deed of conveyance was insane at the time of its execution is not so far beyond the range of experience or observation of laymen as to require the acceptance of the testimony of a reputable expert to the exclusion of the lay testimony.
Headnotes as approved by Lee, J.
APPEAL from the chancery court of Bolivar County; R.E. JACKSON, Chancellor.
A.D. Somerville and Robert E. Nason, for appellant.
The Supreme Court is empowered to set aside the findings of a lower court, where said findings are manifestly wrong in the light of the court's view of the facts and promptings of its conscience. Miss. Const. 1890, Sec. 146; Puryear v. Austin, 205 Miss. 590, 39 So.2d 257; Gillis v. Smith, 114 Miss. 665, 75 So. 451; Allore v. Jewell, 94 U.S. 506, 508-512.
Insanity — mental incapacity — lack of judgment. Jackson v. Banks, 144 Miss. 392, 109 So. 905; Conn v. Boutwell, 101 Miss. 353, 58 So. 105; Brantley v. Wolf, 60 Miss. 420; Woolbert v. Lee Lumber Co., 151 Miss. 56, 117 So. 354; Nubby v. Scott, 186 Miss. 309, 190 So. 911; Allore v. Jewell, 94 U.S. 506, 508-512; Harding v. Wheaton, 2 Mason 378; 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 461; Stobert v. Smith, 184 Pa. 34; Brokaw v. Duffy, 165 N.Y. 391; Francis v. St. Germain, 6 Grant Ch. (U.C.) 636; Tiffany on Real Property, Abridged Ed. p. 901; Puryear v. Austin, et al., 39 So.2d 257.
Presumption and burden of proof. Hamilton Bros. Co. v. Narciese, 172 Miss. 24, 158 So. 467; King v. Rowan, 82 Miss. 1, 34 So. 325; Washam v. Beaty, 210 Ala. 635, 99 So. 163; Lambert v. Powell, 199 Miss. 397, 24 So.2d 773; Gillis v. Smith, 114 Miss. 664, 75 So. 451; Ricketts v. Jolliff, 62 Miss. 440; Parkinson v. Mills, 172 Miss. 784, 159 So. 651.
Drunkenness — mental incapacity. 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 666; 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1066; Miller v. Sterrigner, 66 S.E. 228 (W. Va.), 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 597; Swan v. Talbot, 152 Cal. 142, 94 P. 238, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1066; Tiffany on Real Property, Abridged Ed. 901; 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 596; Benton v. Sikyta, 84 Neb. 808; Ryan v. Schutt, 135 Ill. App. 554; Spoonheim v. Spoonheim, 14 N.D. 380; Waldron v. Angleman, 71 N.J.L. 166; Drefahl v. Security Sav. Bank, 132 Iowa 563; Fagan v. Wiley, 49 Or. 480; Hardy v. Dyas, 203 Ill. 211; Moore v. Finger, 128 Cal. 313; Jones v. Calkin, 16 N.B. 356.
Fiduciary relation. Brooks v. Brooks, 111 So. 376; Webb v. Webb, 99 Miss. 234; Caulk v. Burt, 114 Miss. 487, 488-489; Bourn v. Bourn, 163 Miss. 71, 140 So. 518; Ham v. Ham, 146 Miss. 161, 110 So. 583; 2 Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence (4th Ed.) Secs. 956-957; Leach v. Hirschman, 90 Miss. 723-727.
Defendants — appellees are not innocent purchasers for value without notice. Wailes v. Cooper, 24 Miss. 208; Rowan Harris v. Adams, et al., 1 S. M. Ch. 45; Parker v. Foy, 43 Miss. 260, 266; Baldwin v. Anderson, 103 Miss. 462, 468, 60 So. 578; Johnson et al. v. Carter et al., 193 Miss. 781, 11 So.2d 196, 198; Brown v. Womack, 181 Miss. 66, 178 So. 785; Beauchamp, et al. v. McLaughlin, et ux., 200 Miss. 83, 25 So.2d 771, 775; Woolbert v. Lee Lumber Co., 151 Miss. 56, 117 So. 354.
Laches. Secs. 2285-87 Code 1930; Secs. 709-711 Code 1942; Hill v. Nash, 73 Miss. 849, 19 So. 707; Johnson v. Carter, 11 So.2d 196; Lake v. Perry, 95 Miss. 550, 49 So. 569; Cox v. American Freehold Land Mortgage Co., 88 Miss. 88, 40 So. 739; Houston v. National Mutual Building Loan Ass'n., 80 Miss. 31, 31 So. 540.
Dugas Shands, for appellees.
A reading of the cases cited by appellant completely differentiate them from the case at bar, and the facts of the case are the things out of which the law grows.
The Puryear case, 205 Miss. 590, 39 So.2d 257, is manifestly distinguishable from the case involved in that there was an old emaciated and enfeebled man who patently did not know or understand the nature of his act in executing the deed, and the evidence was not conflicting on the point.
The case of Gillis v. Smith, 114 Miss. 665, is readily distinguishable from the case involved in that there was the feature of undue influence in securing the execution of the deed and no witnesses in the record ever heard of anybody exercising undue influence upon appellant. The claimant was afflicted with paralysis and the Court speaking through Judge Stevens announces the rule that the decree of the lower court shall not be reversed on a conflict of fact unless the proper inquiry is pursued as to whether he was capable of understanding and appreciating the effect of the one particular act or transaction which is challenged.
We have no crow to pick with these cases other than that the facts simply do not bring them within the testimony of this case.
The facts in the case of Puryear v. Austin, 205 Miss. 590, 39 So.2d 257, announce the proper rule that in order to reverse a decree of the lower court on a sharp conflict in the evidence, the learned chancellor below must be manifestly wrong in his acceptance of the facts out of which the decree rose. This same principle is adhered to in the case of Cole v. Standard Life Insurance Company, 170 Miss. 330, 154 So. 353, which involved the question of suicide or accidental death, and the Court at page 353 speaking through Judge Griffith states that the Supreme Court must accept the findings of a lower court unless finding is manifestly wrong.
In the case of Logan v. Rice, 166 Miss. 454, decided April 24, 1933, the Court held in reference to the accounting of various partnership funds and in which the Court gave a decree for the appellees, and speaking through Ethridge, Presiding Justice, states, "As we view it, the question presented upon the facts in the record and the finding of the fact by the chancellor, if supported by the evidence, cannot be disturbed here."
Early v. U.S.F. . G., 181 Miss. 162, 176 So. 720. In this case the decree was based upon conclusions from the evidence and the Court in affirming the lower court and speaking through Judge Griffith stated the rule to read as follows: "It is only when it is clearly manifest that the chancellor should have accepted the opposite view that this Court should interfere." This was a case in which circumstantial evidence was predominant.
The case of Stroud, et al. v. Loper, 190 Miss. 168, 198 So. 46, involves the foreclosure of a deed of trust for the payment of a debt with certain security and out of which the facts prove a very sharp conflict in the proof. Testimony was conflicting and Judge Ethridge speaking for the court at page 47, stated, "And the rule is well settled that decision of chancellor on conflicting evidence is binding on the courts. Also where there are two or more theories to be deduced from the testimony that the chancellor is entitled to draw the conclusion and his judgment thereon is binding unless manifestly wrong."
There are numerous other decisions which might be submitted to the Court but as these are leading cases which are unimpinged by any decision in the state, and where the testimony of the appellant and appellees is so conflicting, the chancellor has then the right to draw such conclusions as he thinks the conflicting evidence justifies, and unless such is manifestly wrong, they shall be affirmed by the Supreme Court.
I.T. Black brought suit in June, 1948, against C.F. Black and wife, E.F. Robb and wife, C.J. Craggs, trustee, and the Cleveland State Bank. The prayer of the bill sought: (1) cancellation of a deed, which had previously been executed to C.F. Black, and subsequent conveyances to the other defendants, resting thereon; and (2) an accounting for rents. The answer denied all the material allegations. On the hearing, the court declined to grant any relief, but instead, dismissed the bill. From the decree entered, I.T. Black appeals.
The case grew out of this situation: I.T. Black and C.F. Black were father and son respectively. In 1934, the father owned certain real estate in the city of Cleveland. A house was erected thereon, both contributing labor and money for this purpose. Upon completion it was valued at from $1200.00 to $1400.00. The son moved into the house and lived there continuously. At the trial, they disagreed concerning their respective rights.
On August 11, 1941, the father's sister died. A fuss occurred between the father's daughter and Mrs. C.F. Black. The next day, the father indicated to the son that the latter would have to move, and the son informed the father that their business relations would cease. Negotiations were opened by the son to purchase his father's interest in the property involved. The father's first offer was $1000.00, but later he reduced his asking price to $800.00. The son procured a loan for that amount, the deed was executed and delivered, and the consideration paid. This occurred September 5, 1941.
Thereafter on September 14, 1941, the father, who lived on the adjacent lot, desired to connect to his son's sewage line. A dispute arose, the father became irate, made threats, and exhibited a deadly weapon. He was taken into custody by the officers, and, on the following day, was adjudged insane and sent to the mental institution at Whitfield. After several weeks, he was permitted to return to his home. Later in the year, he went back to the institution for several days. Finally on April 18, 1942, an order was entered by the chancery court adjudging him to be not insane but normal in every way.
The sole question in this case was one of fact. The father's contention was that he was insane at the time of the execution of the deed, whereas the defense was that the father was sane and normal.
The father's evidence was to the effect that he was so upset by the above-mentioned fuss, and the notice from his son that their business relations would cease, that he was completely deranged; that he knew nothing about what transpired from that time until he was finally discharged from the institution; and that his whole experience over this period was like a dream. He introduced a doctor from the staff of the institution, who testified that Mr. Black had a psychosis with cerebral arteriosclerosis — a form of insanity caused by the hardening of the tiny arteries in the brain; that some of this existed on September 5, 1941; and that, in his opinion, Black did not know and was not accountable for what he did at that time. However, a copy of all the records in the case was introduced in evidence, and it was susceptible of the conclusion that there was not complete unanimity among the staff.
On the contrary, a large number of witnesses, for the defendant, composed of a son, daughter, former wife, son-in-law, relatives, and others of longstanding acquaintance, testified to this effect: They had never suspected insanity — Mr. Black was not crazy — but, instead, he was perfectly normal and sane. He was a drinking man on week-ends, but he was not drinking before, at the time of, or for a day or two after the execution of the deed. A daughter testified that he visited her the next day, talked to her about the sale, and seemed highly pleased. The evidence was also to the effect that everything went along smoothly until September 14, 1941, when Mr. Black, who was said to be high-tempered and tyrannical toward his family, became enraged at his son's refusal of permission for the sewage connection. The reason for sending him to Whitfield was to treat him for his liquor habit. The daughter testified that on the third day after his admission to the hospital, he told her that he lost his temper and was sorry for what he did. There was evidence that he said he was going to play crazy and get his property back. Besides, the banker testified that Mr. Black indorsed the check of $800.00 and drew the money in cash; that he deposited $405.00 on September 15th, and subsequently, over a period of about two months, he drew this money out of the bank by divers and sundry checks.
In other words, there was a sharp dispute on all of the material facts of the case.
The appellant argues that, even though the defendants introduced a large number of witnesses, yet the decree is contrary to the great weight of the evidence, for the reason that the worth of the evidence of the expert from Whitfield far outweighed that of lay witnesses. (Hn 1) That lay witnesses may testify on an issue such as was presented in this case is so elemental that the citation of authority is not necessary. Moreover, (Hn 2) this was not such an issue beyond the range of experience or observation of laymen as to require the acceptance of evidence by a reputable expert to the exclusion of lay testimony. Kramer Service, Inc., v. Wilkins, 184 Miss. 483, 186 So. 625.
Affirmed.