Opinion
No. 32891.
November 15, 1937.
APPEAL AND ERROR.
Where either of two conclusions from reasonable inferences is justified by evidence, conclusion reached by chancellor must be accepted as correct, and Supreme Court will interfere only when it is clearly manifest that chancellor should have accepted the opposite view.
APPEAL from chancery court of Alcorn county. HON. JAMES A. FINLEY, Chancellor.
Chester L. Sumners, of Corinth, and Fred B. Smith, of Ripley, for appellant.
The opinion of the court was in the following language: "The court is of the opinion that the evidence fails to show any fraudulent or dishonest act or breach of trust on the part of Mr. Hazard; therefore the bill will be dismissed at the cost of the complainant."
This is not a case, as shown by the opinion of the court, where the court was passing on the credibility of the witnesses, or deciding a controverted issue of fact about which there was a conflict in the testimony. In fact, taking the admissions of the appellee in the record and the undisputed facts, there is very little conflict in the testimony. The real issue is whether the facts and admissions established constitute a breach of the bond, and whether the conclusions of the Chancellor were the correct legal conclusions under the facts established by the record.
All of the facts pertinent to the issues involved were fully produced in the trial of this cause, clearly showing that the Bank, the appellant, suffered losses far in excess of $10,000, which is the limited amount of recovery. The admissions of appellee on each item as set out in the record are sufficient to entitle the appellant to a judgment on the bond.
Therefore, the appellant respectfully submits that this court should reverse this case and the decision of the trial court, and render a decree and judgment here in favor of the appellant and against the appellee for the maximum amount of recovery under said bond and in the sum of $10,000 with interest as allowed by law from September 27, 1932, the date of the proof of claim.
Ely B. Mitchell and W.C. Sweat, both of Corinth, for appellee.
The findings of fact by the Chancellor will not be disturbed on appeal unless the same is against the overwhelming weight of the testimony.
Herd v. Cotrell, 100 Miss. 42, 56 So. 277; Lott v. Hull, 104 Miss. 308, 61 So. 421; Grace v. Pierce, 127 Miss. 83, 90 So. 590; Scott v. Perry, 140 Miss. 452, 106 So. 12; Seller Motor Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 150 Miss. 473, 116 So. 833; Babcock v. Holloway, 140 Miss. 120, 104 So. 105; Austin v. Page, 169 So. 671.
Argued orally by C.L. Sumners and Fred B. Smith, for appellant, and by W.C. Sweat and Ely B. Mitchell, for appellee.
The record in this case consists of three volumes, and embraces such a wide range of facts and figures as to make a written review of it impossible within a reasonable length of recital. The picture presented is that of the optimism everywhere entertained by businessmen, when values were high and when nearly all of those engaged in any profitable enterprise were regarded as good for any obligations undertaken by them and would continue so to be, and then the dismal realizations to the contrary which followed the financial crash of six or seven years ago.
The facts disclosed by this record, are such, looking backward, that one who prefers to reach the conclusion that a conscious unfaithfulness, amounting to dishonesty or fraud, on the part of the bank president, has been established, may find sufficient support for such a conclusion; while, on the other hand, another, viewing the facts as of the time when the events transpired and preferring to reach the opposite view, will find little difficulty in arriving at the conclusion so preferred by him.
The case, therefore, is one which turns upon the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the admitted facts, or those established by all the proof; and it was the province of the chancellor, entertaining no preferences or prejudgment, to draw from all the facts upon the completed record such inferences as to him appeared the more reasonable and just; and, when either of two conclusions from such reasonable inferences is justified by the evidence, that reached by the chancellor must be accepted as correct. It is only when it is clearly manifest that the chancellor should have accepted the opposite view that this court may interfere. Huckaby v. Jenkins, 153 Miss. 359, 361, 121 So. 130. We think, as already indicated, that there is no such manifest case here as would authorize our intervention.
Affirmed.