Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-40127-TSH
05-25-2021
Jonathan A. AYALA, Plaintiff, v. Matthew DUNNE, Ryan N. Sceviour, and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Defendants.
Hector E. Pineiro, Robert A. Scott, Law Office of Hector E. Pineiro, PC, Worcester, MA, for Plaintiff. Joseph P. Kittredge, Lorena Galvez, Alana B. Clements, Rafanelli & Kittredge, P.C., Acton, MA, for Defendant Matthew Dunne. Daniel J. Moynihan, Jr., Mark A. Russell, Law Office of Daniel J. Moynihan, P.C., Stoneham, MA, for Defendant Ryan N. Sceviour. Mark P. Sutliff, Attorney General's Office, Boston, MA, for Defendant Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
Hector E. Pineiro, Robert A. Scott, Law Office of Hector E. Pineiro, PC, Worcester, MA, for Plaintiff.
Joseph P. Kittredge, Lorena Galvez, Alana B. Clements, Rafanelli & Kittredge, P.C., Acton, MA, for Defendant Matthew Dunne.
Daniel J. Moynihan, Jr., Mark A. Russell, Law Office of Daniel J. Moynihan, P.C., Stoneham, MA, for Defendant Ryan N. Sceviour.
Mark P. Sutliff, Attorney General's Office, Boston, MA, for Defendant Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
ORDER ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
HILLMAN, D.J.,
Background
Jonathan A. Ayala ("Plaintiff" or "Ayala") has filed this action against Matthew Dunne ("Dunne") and Ryan N. Sceviour ("Sceviour"), Troopers with the Massachusetts State Police, and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (the "Commonwealth") asserting claims under Section 1983 against Dunne and Sceviour for violation of his constitutional right to be free from an unreasonable search/seizure and use of excessive force against him (Count I); violation of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, Mass.Gen.L. ch. 258 ("Section 258") against the Commonwealth (Count II); common law claims for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Dunne, individually (Counts III and IV); a common law conspiracy claim against Dunne and Sceviour, individually (Docket No. V); and a claim for malicious prosecution against Dunne (Count VI).
Ayala originally filed the action in Massachusetts Superior Court on or about August 28, 2020. On October 8, 2020, Dunne filed a timely Notice of Removal (Docket No. 1) to this Court with the consent of Sceviour. The Notice of Removal was filed without the consent of the Commonwealth on the grounds that by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment, it is not subject to suit in this Court, and therefore, its consent is not required.
The Commonwealth has filed a motion to sever Count II of the complaint (the Section 258 claim) and remand it to state court, or in the alternative to dismiss Count II. See Docket No. 7. Dunne and Sceviour assented to the motion. Plaintiff filed an opposition in which he argues that the motion to dismiss should be denied, the federal count against Dunne and Sceviour remain with this Court and all state law claims remanded other than Count V (the common law conspiracy claim) .
At the hearing, after discussion with Magistrate Judge Hennessy, Plaintiff apparently agreed that the only claim which should be remanded is Count II. Plaintiff also argues that the federal case should not be stayed, rather the state and federal cases should proceed simultaneously.
Discussion
Judge Mastroianni of this Court recently addressed identical issues to those presented in the instant case. See Rojas v. Demos, Civ.Act. No. 19-10459, 2020 WL 5100229 (D. Mass. Aug. 21, 2020). As in the instant case, the plaintiff in Rojas asserted a Section 1983 claim against the individual Massachusetts state trooper, a Section 258 claim against the Commonwealth, and multiple state law claims against the trooper. The Commonwealth sought to remand or dismiss the Section 258 claim. Judge Mastroianni determined that all state law claims should be remanded to the state court, the federal claim against the individual trooper should remain in this Court and the federal claim should be stayed pending resolution of the state law action.
I agree with the decision reached by Judge Mastroianni and adopt his well-reasoned rationale. Accordingly, I accept and adopt the Report and Recommendation (Docket No. 23) to the extent it denies the motion to dismiss and remands Count II of the complaint to state court. Additionally, it is ordered that Counts III (assault and battery), Count IV (intentional infliction of emotional distress), Count V (common law conspiracy) and Count VI (malicious prosecution) against Dunne and/or Sceviour are remanded back to state court. Count I (Section 1983) against Dunne and Sceviour remains in this Court and shall be stayed pending resolution of the state case.
SO ORDERED.
Report and Recommendation
David H. Hennessy United States Magistrate Judge
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts ("the Commonwealth") moves to sever and remand or, in the alternative, dismiss Count II of this complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). [Dkt. No. 7]. Co-Defendants Matthew Dunne and Ryan Sceviour assented to this motion. [Id. at 2]. Plaintiff Jonathan Ayala has filed his opposition to the motion to dismiss only. [Dkt. No. 8]. The motion to remand Count II is uncontested. For the reasons that follow, I recommend Count II be remanded to the Suffolk Superior Court ("Superior Court") and the motion to dismiss be DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 28, 2017,1 Dunne and Sceviour, both troopers with the Massachusetts State Police, were on patrol duties in Worcester and Holden, Massachusetts respectively. [Dkt. No. 1-3 ("Compl.") ¶¶ 5, 6, 10, 12, 13, 14]. Dunne noticed Ayala driving on Route 290 and pulled him over because his car did not have an inspection sticker. [Id. ¶¶ 16, 17]. Dunne then approached Ayala and requested his license and registration. [Id. ¶ 25]. Ayala complied, providing his Florida driver's license and the car's registration. [Id. ¶ 26]. He also explained to Dunne that he did not own the car. [Id. ]. Dunne also asked Ayala's passenger, Gonzalez, for his license, allegedly because he was not wearing a seatbelt. [Id. ¶¶ 29, 30]. Dunne then discovered Ayala had a previously-dismissed firearm related charge and radioed for backup. [Id. ¶ 31]. Dunne also allegedly believed that Ayala's license was suspended. [Id. ¶ 33]. Sceviour arrived, responding to Dunne's request for backup. [Id. ¶ 37]. Dunne approached the car to hand Ayala a traffic citation. [Id. ¶ 35]. At that time, Sceviour approached the passenger side of the vehicle, allegedly with his hand on his service weapon. [Id. ¶¶ 37, 38]. Sceviour then observed a pellet gun under the front passenger seat and yelled "gun, gun," drawing his weapon. [Id. ¶¶ 39, 54]. Dunne then pulled his service weapon and pointed it at Ayala, yelling "where the fuck is the gun?" and telling him to put his hands up. [Id. ¶¶ 40, 41]. Ayala complied and attempted to explain he did not have a gun. [Id. ¶ 42]. Dunne then attempted to "drag" Ayala out of the drivers’ window, but then opened the car door and "yanked" Ayala into the right lane of traffic. [Id. ¶ 43–45]. Dunne then slammed Ayala's face against the pavement, dug his knees into Ayala's back, and punched the back of Ayala's head and neck. [Id. ¶ 44, 45]. He then handcuffed Ayala and asked him to get up. [Id. ¶¶ 47, 49]. Ayala could not do so due to a knee injury. [Id. ¶ 49]. Dunne then forcefully "scooped his arms underneath Ayala's right arm" and dragged him to the front of the vehicle, injuring Ayala's "right shoulder, right hip, right low-back area," and "right wrist." [Id. ¶¶ 50, 51]. Ayala further alleges the handcuffs were too tight, causing his wrists to bleed, swell and eventually lose all feeling. [Id. ¶¶ 52, 63]. Sceviour had handcuffed Gonzalez and placed him in the back of his cruiser. [Id. ¶ 53]. Both troopers then searched the car and Ayala's phone. [Id. ¶¶ 54, 55]. The search of the car revealed the pellet gun and several CO2 cartridges. [Id. ¶ 60]. During the entire incident, Ayala protested because (1) he did not have a gun; (2) he was willing to comply without the use of force; (3) he was afraid, when forced into a lane of the highway, due to oncoming traffic; and (4) the handcuffs were too tight on his hands. [Id. ¶¶ 42, 46, 48, 63]. At separate points, Dunne responded, "you're a fucking idiot" and "shut the fuck up." [Id. ¶¶ 57, 64]. Ayala also heard Dunne radio his superior after the search and say "Sergeant, I got this kid roughed up in front of over 500 people on the highway." [Id. ¶ 66]. He also heard him ask "What should I do with him?" [Id. ¶ 68].
The complaint does not provide Mr. Gonzalez's first name.
The troopers arrested Ayala and transported him to the Holden barracks. [Id. ¶ 69]. Ayala asked why he was being arrested, and Dunne said he would "let [him] know all [his] charges during booking." [Id. ¶¶ 70, 71]. Dunne charged Ayala with unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle because his license was allegedly suspended. [Id. ¶ 33, 88]. He was also charged with failure to inspect a motor vehicle, which Ayala asserts was not an arrestable offense. [Id. ¶ 89]. Ayala alleges that his license was never suspended. [Id. ¶ 34]. The Court contacted Massachusetts Dept. of Motor Vehicles, and Ayala's charge of unlicensed operation was dismissed prior to arraignment. [Id. ¶ 91]. Subsequently, the Worcester district court found that Ayala was not responsible for the failure to inspect the vehicle. [Id. ¶ 92].
As a result of the September 28 incident, Plaintiff suffered—among other injuries—a "SLAP lesion" to his rotator cuff, "parathesia" of his right wrist, and damage to his ulner nerve in his right elbow. [Id. ¶ 103, 105, 109]. He required a surgery, and his total medical bills are currently $58,000, with a possible second surgery forthcoming. [Id. ¶¶ 108, 113, 114]. He also has sustained emotional damage. [Id. ¶ 101].
On August 27, 2020, Ayala filed this suit in the Superior Court against Dunne, Sceviour, and the Commonwealth. [Compl.]. He alleged: excessive force and unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against both troopers [Id., Count I]; assault and battery against Dunne [Id., Count III]; intentional infliction of emotional distress against Dunne [Id., Count IV]; conspiracy against both troopers [Id., Count V]; and malicious prosecution against Dunne [Id., Count VI]. Against the Commonwealth, he alleged one claim under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258 ("MTCA"). [Id., Count II]. On October 8, Dunne removed the action to federal court, alleging jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. [Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 7]. The Commonwealth now moves to sever and remand the negligence claim to the Superior Court based on sovereign immunity. [Dkt. No. 7 at 1]. In the alternative, the Commonwealth moves to dismiss the claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). [Id. ].
Count V alleged a federal conspiracy. [Dkt. No. 7 at 2 n.2].
II. LEGAL STANDARD
"[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The original jurisdiction of a district court extends to "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Here, the parties do not dispute that the federal court has jurisdiction to hear Ayala's § 1983 claims and conspiracy claim. [Compl., Counts I, V].
Nor is there a dispute that the court has jurisdiction over Ayala's state-law claims against the troopers. [Id., Counts III–VI]. If a civil action includes both claims arising under the district court's original jurisdiction and state-law claims, then a district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Such a case, containing both federal-law and state-law claims, may be removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) ; see also McDermet v. Heath, No. 17-CV-12327, 2018 WL 283889, at *1 (D. Mass. Jan. 3, 2018) ; Ramos v. Silva, No. 16-CV-10083, 2016 WL 1452349 at *2 (D. Mass. Apr. 13, 2016). Here, the only claim outside of the jurisdiction of the court is the MTCA claim against the Commonwealth. [Compl., Count II]. If a federal court cannot exercise either original or supplemental jurisdiction over certain claims within an otherwise removable action, "the district court shall sever from the action all [nonremovable] claims ... and shall remand the severed claims to the State court from which the action was removed." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)(2) ; Schaefer v. Yongjie Fu, 322 F. Supp. 3d 207, 210 (D. Mass. 2018).
III. DISCUSSION
In addressing the present motion to sever and remand or dismiss, there are three issues: (1) whether the Commonwealth has sovereign immunity against suit in federal court; (2) whether the court should remand or dismiss MTCA claim; and (3) whether the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. I address each in turn.
A. Sovereign Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment states that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. Under the Eleventh Amendment, "a federal court could not entertain a suit brought by a citizen against his own State." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984). "[T]he entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a State without consent given." Id. (quoting Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) ) (original alterations omitted).
Here, there is no dispute that the federal court lacks jurisdiction over the Commonwealth. [Dkt. No. 7 at 5; Dkt. No. 8 at 2]. It is settled that the MTCA grants exclusive jurisdiction over "claims brought under the statute to the Commonwealth's Superior Courts." Wolski v. Gardner Police Dep't, 411 F. Supp. 3d 187, 193 (D. Mass. 2019) (MTCA does not waive the Commonwealth's immunity from suit in federal court); Irwin v. Comm'r of Dep't of Youth Servs., 388 Mass. 810, 818 (1983) (same). Accordingly, the Commonwealth has not waived its sovereign immunity and the federal court lacks jurisdiction over Count II of Ayala's complaint.
B. Whether to Remand or Dismiss Count II
In light of the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Commonwealth requests that Count II be severed and remanded to the Superior Court or, in the alternative, dismissed. [Dkt. No. 7 at 1]. Here, the appropriate order is to remand. "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (emphasis added). A federal court should remand a case when appropriate unless it can "say with absolute certainty that remand would prove futile." Hudson Sav. Bank v. Austin, 479 F.3d 102, 109 n.5 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Me. Ass'n of Interdep. Neighborhoods v. Comm'r, Me. Dep't of Human Servs., 876 F.2d 1051, 1054 (1st Cir.1989) ). Section 1447(c) "does not afford district courts leeway to dismiss rather than remand." Id. at 108–09. At oral argument, the Commonwealth agreed that remand, rather than dismissal, is appropriate in this case. I therefore recommend that Count II be severed and remanded to the Superior Court.
C. Remanding the State Law Claims
Initially, in his opposition brief, Ayala requested that this Court also remand all of his state law claims: assault and battery (Count III); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count IV); and malicious prosecution (Count VI). [Dkt. No. 8 at 2]. At oral argument, Ayala withdrew the request for remand of the state law claims. On the basis of this withdrawal, and consistent with the principles underlying 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), I recommend this court maintain supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. IV. CONCLUSION
Notably Ayala does not request a stay on the federal claims. [Dkt. No. 8 at 3]. Compare Shepard v. Egan, 767 F. Supp. 1158, 1164 (D. Mass. 1990) (staying a claim in federal court to avoid an inconsistent verdict).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a federal court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if "(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). None of these factors are applicable here. Santiago v. Keyes, 839 F. Supp. 2d 421, 426 (D. Mass. 2012). In addition, while "it makes little sense to divide this case between federal and state courts," McConnell v. Fernandes, 03-10829-RWZ, 2003 WL 23019183, at *1 (D. Mass. Dec. 29, 2003), all the parties agree that considerations of efficiency and economy favor adjudicating the intentional tort claims against Dunne with the § 1983 claims against both troopers, rather than with the one negligence-based claim against the Commonwealth.
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend Count II of the complaint alleging liability under the MTCA be severed and remanded to the Superior Court. I recommend the court exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all other state-law claims.
The parties are notified that any party who objects to these proposed findings and recommendations must file a written objection thereto within fourteen days of service of this Report and Recommendation. The written objections must identify with specificity the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations, or report to which objection is made, and the basis for such objections. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The United States Court of Appeals for this Circuit has repeatedly indicated that failure to comply with Rule 72(b) will preclude further appellate review of the District Court's order based on this Report and Recommendation. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz-Rosado, 857 F.3d 89, 94 (1st Cir. 2017) ; United States v. Lugo Guerrero, 524 F.3d 5, 14 (1st Cir. 2008) ; Keating v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 848 F.2d 271, 275 (1st Cir. 1988) ; United States v. Valencia-Copete, 792 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1986) ; Scott v. Schweiker, 702 F.2d 13, 14 (1st Cir. 1983) ; Park Motor Mart, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1980) ; see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).