Opinion
C. A. 3:23-1783-SAL-PJG
08-15-2023
Desmond Denzel Allen, Plaintiff, v. City of Columbia; Columbia Police Dep't; Nicholas Q. Sexton, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff Desmond Denzel Allen filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Columbia and one its police officers, Nicholas Q. Sexton, for injuries arising out of Sexton's arrest of Allen on March 28, 2021. Allen filed this action in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas. The City of Columbia removed the action to this court.
Allen concedes that the Columbia Police Department is not a separate legal entity from the City of Columbia, and therefore, the court refers to both of these defendants as “the City of Columbia.”
This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on the City of Columbia's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8), and Sexton's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 15). Allen filed responses in opposition to the motions (ECF Nos. 11 & 24), and Sexton filed a reply (ECF No. 25). Having reviewed the record presented and the applicable law, the court finds the motions should be granted as to the federal claims, and that the state law claims should be remanded.
Allen filed a motion to remand his state law claims to the Richland County Court of Common Pleas. (ECF No. 15.) As explained in Sexton's response in opposition to Allen's motion, (ECF No. 19 at 4), Allen's motion actually seeks to sever those claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21. Regardless, Allen's motion is moot in light of the court's recommendation.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are either undisputed or are taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, to the extent they find support in the record. In the late morning of March 28, 2021, City of Columbia Police Officer Nicholas Sexton responded to a dispatch about a civil disturbance in a city park involving a gun. Sexton and the other officers who responded to the call were advised by dispatch that the caller claimed that an unknown male had pulled a gun on him. Upon arrival in the park, Sexton and another officer made contact with the caller, Bernard Grooms, who was visibly upset and yelling at Plaintiff Desmond Allen and Shannon Pringle. The officers separated Grooms, Allen, and Pringle and frisked them for weapons.
Allen told the officers that he got into a verbal altercation with Grooms, who pulled a knife on Allen. Allen denied that he had a gun or that he displayed one in the altercation. Grooms told the officer that he got into a verbal altercation with Allen, but Grooms told the officers that Allen pulled a black pistol from Allen's waistband and pointed it at Grooms, which is when Grooms called police. Grooms also told the officer that while on the phone with 911, he saw Allen give the pistol to Pringle and Pringle hide the gun. Grooms described the size and color of the gun, and the general area where he believed Pringle had hidden the gun.
Sexton searched the area where Grooms said the gun was hidden and Sexton found a black bag between some bushes close to where Allen and Pringle were located. Sexton opened the bag and found a black pistol with a brown wood grip. The officers handcuffed Allen and Pringle and gave them a Miranda warning. Pringle admitted that the bag was his, but he gave the officers multiple stories about from where he obtained the gun. He ultimately admitted the gun belonged to Allen, but denied that Allen ever pointed it at Grooms.
Meanwhile, the officers ran a warrant check on Allen, and dispatch twice confirmed that Allen had an active outstanding warrant for his arrest from the South Carolina Department of Probation, Pardon, and Parole Services for a probation violation. Sexton also looked into Allen's criminal history and discovered that Allen had a 2019 first-degree assault and battery conviction which he believed made Allen's possession of a firearm illegal. Sexton arrested Allen for pointing and presenting a firearm, possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a violent crime, unlawful carrying of a pistol, and prohibited acts in parks (a city ordinance prohibiting the open carry of concealable weapons). Sexton also obtained arrest warrants for the state charges from a municipal judge that day.
The unlawful carrying of a pistol charge was dismissed at a preliminary hearing before a magistrate on July 27, 2021. However, the magistrate found probable cause to hold Allen on the other state charges pending trial. Allen was held in jail for over fifteen months until the solicitor dropped the remaining state charges and Sexton dropped the ordinance violation charge.
Allen then filed this lawsuit claiming that the defendants' actions violated his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and personal liberty. (Compl. ¶¶ 62-64, ECF No. 1-1 at 11-12.) Allen also raises state law claims of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, defamation, civil conspiracy, false imprisonment, and negligent training and supervision against the defendants.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Standards
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) examines the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible when the factual content allows the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The court “may also consider documents attached to the complaint, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c), as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 526 n.1 (4th Cir. 2006)).
Summary judgment, on the other hand, is appropriate only if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party may support or refute that a material fact is not disputed by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). Rule 56 mandates entry of summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
In deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the evidence of the nonmoving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248.
The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
B. Sexton's Motion for Summary Judgment
Sexton argues that Allen cannot put forth any evidence to support his § 1983 claims. The court agrees.
Allen argues that a motion for summary judgment is premature at this stage of the litigation because the parties have not yet engaged in discovery. But Allen did not file an affidavit or declaration to show that the lack of discovery prevents him from presenting facts essential to justify his opposition to the motion for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d); Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that the failure to file an affidavit detailing the need for additional discovery “is itself sufficient grounds to reject a claim that the opportunity for discovery was inadequate”). Regardless, Allen argues that he needs to depose Sexton to inquire into Sexton's knowledge, motivations, and decision-making to determine whether Sexton had probable cause to arrest and charge Allen. (Pl.'s Resp. Sexton's Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 24 at 4.) As explained in detail herein, Allen's subjective motivations for the arrest are irrelevant to the court's probable cause analysis and objectively, probable cause existed. Therefore, Allen fails to show that discovery is needed to produce facts essential to oppose Sexton's motion.
A legal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Initially, Sexton argues that Allen's § 1983 claims arise under the Fourth Amendment, not the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. The court agrees. As Allen's claims against Sexton arise in the context of a custodial arrest, the Fourth Amendment provides the proper standard. See, e.g., Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998) (“[W]here a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.”); see also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274 (1994) (stating that the Fourth Amendment is concerned with matters of “pretrial deprivations of liberty”). And, though the Complaint does not expressly state what specific cause of action Allen raises against Sexton, the parties appear to agree that he raises claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution.
Allen appears to concede this point by not addressing the argument in his response to Sexton's motion. See Eady v. Veolia Transp. Servs., Inc., 609 F.Supp.2d 540, 560-61 (D.S.C. 2009) (“The failure of a party to address an issue raised in summary judgment may be considered a waiver or abandonment of the relevant cause of action.”); Sawyers v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., C/A No. 1:18CV1037, 2019 WL 4305771, at *3 (M.D. N.C. Sept. 11, 2019) (collecting cases showing that “[t]his district and others within the Fourth Circuit agree that failing to respond to an argument constitutes an abandonment of a claim”).
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government and requires warrants be issued only upon a finding of probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV. To establish a § 1983 claim for false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff must show the seizure of his person was unreasonable, i.e., he must show he was arrested without probable cause. See Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that claims for false arrest and false imprisonment “are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment”); see also Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff must show he was arrested without probable cause). But, “a public official cannot be charged with false arrest when he arrests a defendant pursuant to a facially valid warrant.” Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 568 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1996)); see also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144-45 (1979) (finding the plaintiff's false imprisonment claim failed because he was arrested pursuant to a facially valid warrant, which satisfied probable cause).
On the other hand, “[a]llegations that an arrest made pursuant to a warrant was not supported by probable cause, or claims seeking damages for the period after legal process issued- e.g., post-indictment or arraignment-are considered a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim.” Humbert v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City, 866 F.3d 546, 555 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Brooks, 85 F.3d at 182) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Thompson v. Clark, 142 S.Ct. 1332, 1337 (2022). “A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 is properly understood as a Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable seizure which incorporates certain elements of the common law tort.” Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 261 (4th Cir.2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Generally, an officer may give deference to a judge's determination of probable cause. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984); Smith v. Munday, 848 F.3d 248, 255 (4th Cir. 2017). Therefore, to establish a malicious prosecution claim after a warrant is issued, the plaintiff must show that the officer deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth made material false statements in the warrant application, Humbert, 866 F.3d at 556 (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978)), or that the officer intentionally or with reckless disregard made the application misleading by omitting material facts, Id. (quoting United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 1990)). A reckless disregard can be shown by evidence that an officer acted with a high degree of awareness of a statement's probable falsity such that when viewing all the evidence, the officer must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported. Miller v. Prince George's Cty., Md., 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007). However, an officer's mere negligence or innocent mistake in making a false statement in a warrant affidavit will not provide a basis for a constitutional violation. Id. at 627-28 (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 171). A fact is material if it necessary to the magistrate's finding of probable cause. Humbert, 866 F.3d at 556; Miller, 475 F.3d at 628.
For a variety of reasons, Sexton had probable cause to arrest Allen and Allen cannot produce evidence to the contrary. Most importantly, regardless of Allen's actions in the park, Allen had an outstanding arrest warrant for a probation violation. The outstanding arrest warrant, standing alone, provided probable cause to arrest Allen. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143 (1979) (holding that an arrest pursuant to a facially valid warrant does not give rise to a cause of action under the Constitution); Carter v. Baltimore Cnty., Maryland, 95 Fed.Appx. 471, 478 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating officers are under no duty to second-guess a facially valid arrest warrant); Porterfield, 156 F.3d at 568 (“[A] public official cannot be charged with false arrest when he arrests a defendant pursuant to a facially valid warrant.”) (citing Brooks, 85 F.3d at 183). Even assuming for the sake of argument that Sexton lacked reasonable suspicion to initially detain Allen or probable cause to arrest him on the gun-related charges, Sexton had a lawful duty to arrest Allen once he discovered the outstanding arrest warrant, rendering Allen's detention lawful from that point forward. See Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 240 (2016) (stating an arrest pursuant to a pre- existing warrant is a ministerial act compelled by the warrant regardless of the lawfulness of the initial stop or detention). Allen appears to concede this point (Pl.'s Resp., ECF No. 24 at 9), and regardless, Allen offers no argument that the warrant for his probation violation was facially defective. See Porterfield, 156 F.3d at 568. Therefore, on that basis alone, Allen's false arrest claim fails as a matter of law.
Nor did Sexton have access to the warrant at the time of the arrest, since that information was relayed to Sexton from dispatch. (Sexton Aff. ¶ 10, Sexton's Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 21-2 at 2.)
Additionally, as explained in greater detail by Sexton (Sexton's Mem. Supp. Summ. J., ECF No. 21-1 at 12), Sexton had probable cause to arrest Allen at the scene for the gun-related charges. A law enforcement officer has probable cause to effect a warrantless arrest where the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest would cause a reasonable officer to believe that a criminal offense has been committed. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152-53 (2004); Smith v. Munday, 848 F.3d 248, 253 (4th Cir. 2017). Probable cause inquiries turn on two factors: the suspect's conduct as known to the officer, and the contours of the offense thought to be committed by that conduct. Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 1992). Probable cause requires more than bare suspicion, but it requires less than evidence necessary to convict. Munday, 848 F.3d at 253. Probable cause to support an arrest for any offense defeats a § 1983 false arrest claim. See Wilkerson v. Hester, 114 F.Supp.2d 446, 457 (W.D. N.C. 2000) (“If there was probable cause for any of the charges made . . . then the arrest was supported by probable cause, and the claim for false arrest fails.”) (quoting Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1995)).
Grooms accused Allen of pointing a gun at him, Grooms and Pringle both claimed Sexton openly displayed a gun in a city park, the officers found a gun matching the one Grooms described in Pringle's bag, Pringle claimed the gun belonged to Allen, Allen did not deny that the gun was his, and the officers discovered that Allen had been convicted of assault and battery. A reasonable officer on the scene could conclude based on those facts that Allen pointed a gun at Grooms during their dispute in violation of South Carolina law. See S.C. Code § 16-23-20 (unlawful carrying of a pistol); S.C. Code § 16-23-410 (pointing and presenting a firearm); S.C. Code § 16-23-500 (possession of a firearm by a person convicted of violent crime). While Allen argues that there is a genuine dispute of material fact about who really owned the gun, arguing it could have been owned by Pringle (Pl.'s Resp., ECF No. 24 at 8), the mere possibility that the plaintiff is innocent of the charges does not vitiate probable cause. See United States v. Gray, 137 F.3d 765, 769 (4th Cir. 1998) (“While probable cause requires more than ‘bare suspicion,' it requires less than that evidence necessary to convict.”); see also Wadkins v. Arnold, 214 F.3d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Reasonable law enforcement officers are not required to ‘exhaust every potentially exculpatory lead or resolve every doubt about a suspect's guilt before probable cause is established.' ”) (quoting Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 264 (4th Cir. 1991)).
Allen also argues that Sexton lacked probable cause to arrest him for possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a violent crime because Sexton relied on Allen's first-degree assault and battery conviction, which is not a conviction that barred him from possessing a firearm. Sexton is correct that S.C. Code § 16-23-500 does not include assault and battery as a conviction that bars persons from possessing a firearm, see S.C. Code § 16-1-60 (defining “violent crimes”), but Allen did have a carjacking conviction listed on the same report relied on by Sexton, which is listed as a violent crime under the statute. Thus, even if Sexton mistakenly assumed assault and battery was listed in the statute, an objective officer in Sexton's position could still reasonably find that Allen was prohibited from carrying a firearm because of his carjacking conviction. See D.C. v. Wesby, 138 S.Ct. 577, 585 (2018) (“Because probable cause is an objective standard, an arrest is lawful if the officer had probable cause to arrest for any offense, not just the offense cited at the time of arrest or booking.”); see also Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153 (“[A]n arresting officer's state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause[;] . . . his subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause”). Consequently, Allen cannot put forth evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Sexton lacked probable cause to arrest Allen on state and municipal gun-related charges.
Sexton also argues that Allen cannot put forth evidence that Sexton's pursuit of the gun charges supports a malicious prosecution claim. The court again agrees. Sexton sought arrest warrants for the charges on the same day that he arrested Allen, and those warrants were issued by a municipal judge. Allen fails to offer any argument that Sexton deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth made material false statements in the warrant application, or that Sexton intentionally or with reckless disregard made the application misleading by omitting material facts. See Humbert, 866 F.3d at 556. Allen argues again that the warrant application includes a reference to his conviction for assault and battery, rather than carjacking, to support his charge for possession of a firearm by a person convicted of violent crime. But that mistake by Sexton is not material to the existence of probable cause because, as explained earlier, the charge is supported by Allen's prior carjacking conviction. See Humbert, 866 F.3d at 556 (stating that a fact in a warrant application is material only if it necessary to the magistrate's finding of probable cause).
Allen cannot put forth evidence that his arrest or prosecution lacked probable cause. Consequently, Allen's § 1983 claims against Sexton fail as a matter of law.
C. The City of Columbia's Motion to Dismiss
The City of Columbia argues that Allen fails to state a § 1983 claim against it upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons provided in the City's motion (ECF No. 8 at 9-13), the court agrees. A plaintiff who seeks to assert a § 1983 claim against a municipality for acts done by a municipal official or employee must show that a municipal policy or custom caused the plaintiff's injury. See Semple v. City of Moundsville, 195 F.3d 708, 712 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir. 1994)); see also Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691, n.54 (1978). As explained by the City of Columbia, Allen's Complaint makes only conclusory allegations about deliberate indifference, without identifying a municipal policy or custom that could plausibly state a claim for municipal liability. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (stating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it requires more than a plain accusation that the defendant unlawfully harmed the plaintiff, devoid of factual support). Therefore, Allen's § 1983 claims against the City of Columbia are subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
However, as the court has already concluded that Allen cannot put forth evidence showing that he was arrested or prosecuted without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the City of Columbia is also entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”); Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 1985); see also 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1366 (3d ed. Apr. 2022). Allen's inability to put forth evidence of an underlying constitutional violation is fatal to his municipal liability claims against the City of Columbia. See, e.g., City of L.A. v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (providing that Monell will not authorize a claim for damages against a municipality where a jury has found that a city officer has inflicted no constitutional harm); S.P. v. City of Takoma Park, Md., 134 F.3d 260, 272 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding a municipality cannot be held liable even if its training of officers was unconstitutional where no underlying constitutional violation occurred as to the plaintiff). Therefore, the City of Columbia is also entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Generally, the court must give the parties notice that it is converting a motion to one for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment and a reasonable opportunity for discovery. Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 721 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2013) (en banc); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 450 (4th Cir. 2011)). But Allen was already aware that Sexton had moved for summary judgment. And, as previously explained, Allen fails to articulate a need for discovery to resolve his § 1983 claims. Therefore, the court need not provide time for discovery. See Sager v. Hous. Comm'n of Anne Arundel Cnty., 855 F.Supp.2d 524, 542 (D. Md. 2012); Messick v. Bd. of Educ. of Wicomico Cnty., Civil Action No. GLR-14-2690, 2014 WL 7357554, at *4 n.2 (D. Md. Dec. 19, 2014) (quoting Nguyen v. CNA Corp., 44 F.3d 234, 242 (4th Cir. 1995)).
D. Supplemental Jurisdiction
In light of the recommendation that Allen's § 1983 claims fail as a matter of law, the court should exercise its discretion to remand the state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (authorizing a district court to decline to exercise jurisdiction over a supplemental claim); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1988) (discussing the factors in deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after removal). Here, Allen raises numerous state law claims that, in the interest of comity, are more appropriate for consideration in South Carolina's courts because they include complex issues of state law, including the immunities afforded under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (listing bases for declining supplemental jurisdiction, including the presence of novel or complex issues of state law and the dismissal of federal claims); Hinson v. Nw. Fin. S.C, Inc., 239 F.3d 611, 617 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding the district court did not abuse its discretion to remand the case to state court where the federal claims were no longer at issue, the state claims predominated, and the state claims involved interpretations of complex state statutes on which there was no state precedent). Also, this litigation is in its early stages, and, if this recommendation is adopted, only state law claims will remain. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 484 U.S. at 350 (“When the balance of these factors indicates that a case properly belongs in state court, as when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice.”).
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the court recommends that summary judgment be granted to the defendants on Allen's § 1983 claims and that Allen's state law claims be dismissed without prejudice and remanded to the Richland County Court of Common Pleas.
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).