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distinguishing between the recovery allowed for "combined" and "integrated" accommodations
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Docket No. 142842. Calendar No. 2.
2013-05-23
ADMIRE v. AUTO–OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY.
Sinas, Dramis, Brake, Boughton & McIntyre, P.C., Lansing (by George T. Sinas and Stephen H. Sinas), for Kenneth Admire. Willingham & Coté, P.C., East Lansing (by John A. Yeager and Kimberlee A. Hillock), for Auto–Owners Insurance Company.
Sinas, Dramis, Brake, Boughton & McIntyre, P.C., Lansing (by George T. Sinas and Stephen H. Sinas), for Kenneth Admire. Willingham & Coté, P.C., East Lansing (by John A. Yeager and Kimberlee A. Hillock), for Auto–Owners Insurance Company.
Kerr Russell and Weber PLC, Detroit (by Daniel J. Schulte and Joanne Geha Swanson) for amicus curiae the Coalition Protecting Auto No–Fault.
Dykema Gossett PLLC, Lansing (by Lori McAllister) for amicus curiae the Michigan Insurance Coalition and the Insurance Institute of Michigan.
Dykema Gossett PLLC, Ann Arbor (by Jill M. Wheaton and Joseph Erhardt) for amicus curiae the Michigan Catastrophic Claims Association.
ZAHRA, J.
At issue in this case is whether Michigan's no-fault insurance act requires defendant, Auto–Owners Insurance Company, to pay the entire cost of a van modified to accommodate the plaintiff's wheelchair, including both the base price of the van and the separately introduced modifications. We conclude that defendant is only required to pay for the modifications because only the modifications are allowable expenses “for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation” under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Because the base price of the van is an ordinary transportation expense—an expense that is as necessary for the uninjured as the injured—and is easily separated from the modifications, defendant is not required to pay for it under the no-fault insurance act. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals' decision to the extent it held otherwise. Furthermore, at the trial court, plaintiff, Kenneth Admire, never argued that defendant had contractually agreed to reimburse him for the base price of the van, thereby waiving that issue. Thus, we need not determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the parties' agreement was ambiguous, and we vacate that portion of the Court of Appeals' judgment. Plaintiff's application for leave to appeal as cross-appellant is denied, and the case is remanded to the trial court for entry of summary disposition in defendant's favor.
.MCL 500.3101 et seq.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In 1987, plaintiff suffered catastrophic injuries when the motorcycle he was riding collided with a car being operated by an insured of defendant. Plaintiff's injuries left him unable to speak or walk and rendered his entire right side virtually useless. A family member tends to all of plaintiff's personal and financial affairs.
Plaintiff requires wheelchair-accessible transportation to go to work five days a week, visit his family, attend medical appointments, and get around the community. On three prior occasions, defendant agreed to pay the full cost of purchasing a van large enough for plaintiff to get in and out while remaining in his wheelchair. Defendant also agreed to pay the cost of modifying the vehicle to make it wheelchair-accessible. In 1988, 1994, and 2000, plaintiff and defendant entered into contracts under which defendant purchased a van and paid for the necessary modifications with the expectation that the van would last for seven years. At the end of the van's life, plaintiff would give defendant notice of his intent to purchase a new van, and the parties would enter a new agreement. The most recent “Transportation Purchase Agreement” was executed on April 26, 2000. It specified that plaintiff was to notify defendant 60 days before purchasing a new van and that the old van's value would be applied to the purchase price of the new van.
In December 2006, plaintiff, through his guardian, notified defendant that it was time to purchase a new van. In January 2007, defendant informed plaintiff by letter that it had determined that it was not obligated to pay the base purchase price of a new van under the transportation purchase agreement or the no-fault insurance act. Defendant acknowledged that, pursuant to the transportation purchase agreement, the “current van should be traded in toward the price of a new van” should plaintiff choose to purchase a new van himself. Defendant further stated that it would “pay for the necessary medical modifications needed on any vehicle purchased ... as well as ... any medical mileage incurred in relation to Mr. Admire's motor vehicle accident....” Plaintiff's guardian purchased the van for him, and after the modifications were reimbursed and the trade-in value was applied, plaintiff was left with out-of-pocket expenses of $18,388.50.
Plaintiff sued defendant for reimbursement of the $18,388.50, claiming that it was an allowable expense under Michigan's no-fault insurance act. Defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that this Court's decision in Griffith v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. required it to pay for medically necessary modifications, but not the base price of the van. Plaintiff argued that conflicting precedent interpreted the no-fault insurance act to require reimbursement for the entire modified van. The Ingham Circuit Court denied defendant's motion for summary disposition and instead granted summary disposition in favor of plaintiff.
Griffith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 472 Mich. 521, 697 N.W.2d 895 (2005).
Defendant appealed by right in the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in an unpublished decision. In dicta, the Court of Appeals panel concluded that the transportation purchase agreement was ambiguous regarding who had the responsibility to pay the base price of a new van:
Admire v. Auto–Owners Ins. Co., unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued February 15, 2011 (Docket No. 289080), 2011 WL 520541.
On its face, the contract does not provide that defendant is required to buy a new van. It says that the van shall be traded in on a replacement van but it does not say that defendant will pay for the replacement. However, the contract also does not say that plaintiff is responsible for buying the new van.
Accordingly, the panel held that “the trial court erred in evidently concluding that the transportation purchase agreement mandated that it grant summary disposition to plaintiff.”
Id. at 3.
Id. The Court of Appeals erred by considering the implications of the transportation purchase agreement because plaintiff never raised that issue in his complaint or argued it at the trial court. Therefore, the issue was waived. See Walters v. Nadell, 481 Mich. 377, 387, 751 N.W.2d 431 (2008) (“Michigan generally follows the ‘raise or waive’ rule of appellate review. Under our jurisprudence, a litigant must preserve an issue for appellate review by raising it in the trial court.”) (citation omitted).
The Court of Appeals panel then proceeded to address whether Michigan's no-fault insurance act required reimbursement for both the purchase price of a van and the modifications to accommodate the insured's disability. Defendant again relied primarily on this Court's decision in Griffith, which held that the no-fault insurance act did not require the insurer to reimburse the insured for food costs absent evidence that the food was somehow different than what was required before the plaintiff's accident. So, reasoned defendant, the base price of the van was not compensable because plaintiff required transportation before and after the accident; the modifications were, however, compensable because they were not required before the accident.
Griffith, 472 Mich. at 535–536, 697 N.W.2d 895.
The panel disagreed with defendant's characterization of Griffith, instead relying on its own decision in Begin v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. As in this case, Begin involved an insurer that had refused to compensatea claimant for a modified van. The panel in this case agreed with the reasoning in Begin that a van and its modifications are “so blended ... that the whole cost is an allowable expense if it satisfies the statutory criteria for being sufficiently related to injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident....” Thus, like the Begin Court, the panel reasoned that a modified van was more like food provided at a care facility (which Griffith acknowledged was covered by the no-fault insurance act) than ordinary food eaten at home by an injured person (which Griffith determined was not covered). The panel concluded that because plaintiff could not drive an unmodified vehicle, unlike the Griffith plaintiff who could still eat ordinary food, the modified vehicle must be covered in its entirety.
Begin v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 284 Mich.App. 581, 773 N.W.2d 271 (2009).
Id. at 596–597, 773 N.W.2d 271.
Admire, unpub. op. at 5.
Defendant sought leave to appeal. After hearing oral arguments on the application, we granted leave to appeal to determine whether the no-fault insurance act requires reimbursement for the entire cost of the modified vehicle.
Admire v. Auto–Owners Ins. Co., 490 Mich. 871, 803 N.W.2d 319 (2011).
Admire v. Auto–Owners Ins. Co., 491 Mich. 874, 809 N.W.2d 571 (2012).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether MCL 500.3107(1)(a) requires an insurer to reimburse an insured claimant for the full cost of a vehicle and modifications necessary to accommodate the insured claimant's disability is a question of statutory interpretation that this Court reviews de novo.
Griffith, 472 Mich. at 525–526, 697 N.W.2d 895.
III. ANALYSIS
A. LEGAL BACKGROUND
MCL 500.3107(1)(a) permits an injured person to recover personal injury protection (PIP) benefits from an insurer for “[a]llowable expenses consisting of all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” This Court has often been called on to determine the reach of this provision. This case particularlyimplicates our 2005 decision in Griffith, in which we interpreted the clause “for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” The plaintiff's husband in Griffith, Douglas Griffith, suffered from severe brain damage stemming from a motor vehicle accident. For the duration of Griffith's hospitalization and his stay at a 24–hour nursing facility, his insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, covered ordinary expenses, including Griffith's food. On his return home he still required assistance with basic tasks like eating and bathing. State Farm refused to reimburse the plaintiff for Griffith's food because it determined that the food costs were not an “allowable expense” under MCL 500.3107(1)(a).
See, e.g., Johnson v. Recca, 492 Mich. 169, 178–180, 821 N.W.2d 520 (2012) (holding that replacement services did not qualify as allowable expenses); Douglas v. Allstate Ins. Co., 492 Mich. 241, 277–278, 821 N.W.2d 472 (2012) (explaining the dichotomy between allowable expenses and replacement services as it related to spousal care); Krohn v. Home–Owners Ins. Co., 490 Mich. 145, 163–167, 802 N.W.2d 281 (2011) (holding that an experimental procedure was not an allowable expense); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Mich. Catastrophic Claims Ass'n (On Rehearing), 484 Mich. 1, 6, 795 N.W.2d 101 (2009) (holding that the reasonableness requirement of MCL 500.3107 did not apply to MCL 500.3104(2)).
Griffith, 472 Mich. at 534–540, 697 N.W.2d 895.
Id. at 524, 697 N.W.2d 895.
Id. at 524–525, 697 N.W.2d 895.
Id. at 525, 697 N.W.2d 895.
In determining whether the particular expense was for “ ‘reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation,’ ” this Court defined the terms “care,” “recovery,” and “rehabilitation.” This Court gave “recovery” and “rehabilitation” their dictionary definitions, defining “recovery” as “ ‘restoration or return to any former and better condition, [especially] to health from sickness, injury, addiction, etc.,’ ” and “rehabilitate” as “ ‘to restore or bring to a condition of good health, ability to work, or productive activity.’ ” Defining “care” required this Court to consider the term's meaning in light of the statutory terms “recovery” and “rehabilitation”:
Id., at 532–536, 697 N.W.2d 895, quoting MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Because there was no dispute that Griffith was an injured person, the key issue was whether the ordinary food he was eating was reasonably necessary for his care, recovery, or rehabilitation.
Griffith, 472 Mich. at 534, 697 N.W.2d 895, citing Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2001).
Generally, “care” means “protection; charge,” and “to make provision.” Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2001). Thus, taken in isolation, the word “care” can be broadly construed to encompass anything that is reasonably necessary to the provision of a person's protection or charge. But we have consistently held that “[c]ourts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 466 Mich. 142, 146, 644 N.W.2d 715 (2002). Therefore, we must neither read “care” so broadly as to render nugatory “recovery and rehabilitation” nor construe “care” so narrowly that the term is mere surplusage. “Care” must have a meaning that is related to, but distinct from, “recovery and rehabilitation.”
As an initial matter, it is important to note that the statute does not require compensation for any item that is reasonably necessary to a person's care in general. Instead, the statute specifically limits compensation to charges for products or services that are reasonably necessary “for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” (Emphasis added.) This context suggests that “care” must be related to the insured's injuries.
* * *
“Care” must have a meaning that is broader than “recovery” and “rehabilitation”but is not so broad as to render those terms nugatory. As noted above, both “recovery” and “rehabilitation” refer to an underlying injury; likewise, the statute as a whole applies only to an “injured person.” It follows that the Legislature intended to limit the scope of the term “care” to expenses for those products, services, or accommodations whose provision is necessitated by the injury sustained in the motor vehicle accident. “Care” is broader than “recovery” and “rehabilitation” because it may encompass expenses for products, services, and accommodations that are necessary because of the accident but that may not restore a person to his preinjury state.
Griffith, 472 Mich. at 533–535, 697 N.W.2d 895. Justice Cavanagh would employ the analysis from Justice Marilyn Kelly's dissent in Griffith, defining “care” as “the provision of what is necessary for the welfare and protection of someone,” to conclude that defendant should reimburse plaintiff for the cost of a van because transportation is necessary for plaintiff's welfare. Id. at 547, 697 N.W.2d 895 (Kelly, J. dissenting) (citation and quotation marks omitted). While Justice Cavanagh's position is unsurprising—he, after all, supported the dissent in Griffith—it was rejected by the collective wisdom of this Court as inconsistent with MCL 500.3107(1)(a) in Griffith, and we reject it again here. We reiterate that the Griffith dissent defined “care” so broadly that “recovery and rehabilitation” were impermissibly stripped of meaning. See id. at 534 n. 10, 697 N.W.2d 895.
Having determined at the outset that Griffith's food could not be for recovery or rehabilitation because it lacked curative properties, this Court proceeded to explain that ordinary food also could not be for Griffith'scare. This Court determined that Griffith's food costs failed to satisfy the requirements of MCL 500.3107(1)(a) because the food was Griffith's “ordinary means of sustenance” and “if Griffith had never sustained, or were to fully recover from, his injuries, his dietary needs would be no different than they are now.” Therefore, this Court concluded, the food costs were not an allowable expense under the statute.
Id. at 536, 697 N.W.2d 895.
Id.
This Court drew an important distinction between ordinary food eaten by an injured person at home and ordinary food provided by a hospital during the injured person's stay, stating that
it is “reasonably necessary” for an insured to consume hospital food during in-patient treatment given the limited dining options available. Although an injured person would need to consume food regardless of his injuries, he would not need to eat that particular food or bear the cost associated with it. Thus, hospital food is analogous to a type of special diet or select diet necessary for an injured person's recovery. Because an insured in an institutional setting is required to eat “hospital food,” such food costs are necessary for an insured's “care, recovery, or rehabilitation” while in such a setting. Once an injured person leaves the institutional setting, however, he may resume eating a normal diet just as he would have had he not suffered any injury and is no longer required to bear the costs of hospital food, which are part of the unqualified unit cost of hospital treatment.
This Court specifically noted that MCL 500.3107(1)(a) requires insurers to cover hospital food as an allowable expense for the care of an injured person because the person is required to eat hospital food precisely because of his or her need for care in the hospital. Finally, this Court concluded that requiring an insurer to reimburse the insured for ordinary, everyday expenses merely because of a remote relationship to the insured's care undermines the no-fault insurance act's goal of cost containment.
Id. at 537–538, 697 N.W.2d 895.
Id. at 538 n. 14, 697 N.W.2d 895.
Id. at 539, 697 N.W.2d 895.
Several Court of Appeals decisions have attempted to interpret MCL 500.3107(1)(a) in light of Griffith, yet they have taken inconsistent approaches in Griffith's application. For instance, the Court of Appeals applied Griffith to housing expenses in Ward v. Titan Insurance Co. The majority adopted an incremental approach to allowable expenses and stated the following:
Ward v. Titan Ins. Co., 287 Mich.App. 552, 791 N.W.2d 488 (2010).
Under the Griffith analysis, plaintiff's housing costs are only compensable to the extent that those costs became greater as a result of the accident. Plaintiff must show that his housing expenses are different from those of an uninjured person, for example, by showing that the rental cost for handicapped accessible housing is higher than the rental cost of ordinary housing. In the absence of that kind of factual record, the trial court erred by concluding that plaintiff was entitled to housing costs compensation merely on the basis of the amount plaintiff was currently paying in rent, for a residence that the record does not even demonstrate was handicapped accessible.[[
As a result, the court reversed the trial court's award of the entire amount of the insured's postinjury housing, instead holding that an insurer is only liable for the increase in housing costs attributable to the injury.
Id. at 557–558, 791 N.W.2d 488 (citation omitted).
Similarly, in Hoover v. Michigan Mutual Insurance Co., the Court of Appeals applied Griffith to other household expenses, including real estate tax bills, utility bills, homeowner's insurance, home maintenance, telephone bills, and security system costs. The Hoover Court understood Griffith as requiring “but for” causation between the claimed expense and the injury:
Hoover v. Mich. Mut. Ins. Co., 281 Mich.App. 617, 761 N.W.2d 801 (2008).
At its core, the holding in Griffith requires a court to determine whether expenses would not have been incurred but for the accident and resulting injuries. Stated otherwise, the question is whether the expenses would have been incurred in the course of an ordinary life unmarred by an accident. And if they would have been incurred, like the ordinary food costs at issue in Griffith, a causal connection between the expenses and the accidental bodily injury would be lacking and it could not be said that the act of providing products, services, and accommodations was necessitated by the accidental bodily injury.
The Hoover Court understood Griffith as requiring a comparison of the injured person's preinjury expenses to the injured person's postinjury expenses, with the insurer covering the difference.
Id. at 628, 761 N.W.2d 801.
Id. at 629–631, 761 N.W.2d 801.
But the Court of Appeals adopted a different approach in Begin, which presented a similar factual situation to the instant case: a dispute over whether an insurer was responsible for the base price of a van for the insured plaintiff. The Begin Court disavowed any interpretation of Griffith that required a comparison to the injured person's preinjury expenses:
Begin, 284 Mich.App. at 583–584, 773 N.W.2d 271.
[T]he Griffith Court, when discussing the cost of food provided to an injured person in an institutional setting, did not suggest that only the marginal increase in the cost of such food served in an institutional setting would be an allowable expense. Nor did the Court suggest that only the marginal cost of modifying regular shoes would be a recoverable “allowable expense” under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Rather, in each example, the product, service, or accommodation used by the injured person before the accident is so blended with another product, service, or accommodation that the whole cost is an allowable expense if it satisfies the statutory criteria of being sufficiently related to injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident and if it is a reasonable charge and reasonably necessary for the injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation under MCL 500.3107(1)(a).[
Thus, Begin held, if a particular product, service, or accommodation satisfies the requirements of MCL 500.3107(1)(a), then the insurer must also cover as “allowable expenses” all associated expenses that are “blended” with the qualifying expense. This view directly conflicts with the “setoff” analysis promulgated in Ward and Hoover. Because the statutory language plainly cannot support these divergent interpretations, we now seek to clarify the reach of MCL 500.3107(1)(a).
Id. at 596–597, 773 N.W.2d 271.
Id.
B. INTERPRETATION
As stated, MCL 500.3107(1)(a) permits an injured person to recover PIP benefits from an insurer for, “[a]llowable expenses consisting of all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” Under Griffith, this provision requires that “an ‘allowable expense’ must be ‘for’ one of the following: (1) an injured person's care, (2) his recovery, or (3) his rehabilitation.”
Griffith, 472 Mich. at 532 n. 8, 697 N.W.2d 895.
This case requires us to clarify when a particular product, service, or accommodation is actually “for” the injured person's “care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” In this context, the word “for” as a preposition “implies a causal connection” and is defined as “ ‘with the object or purpose of....’ ” Accordingly, a claimant can recover as an allowable expense the charge for a product, service, or accommodation that has the object or purpose of effectuating the injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation. The causal connection is further implied in the statutory language making compensable only those products, services, or accommodations that are “for an injured person's care, recovery, and rehabilitation.” This language suggests that any product, service, or accommodation consumed by an uninjured person over the course of his or her everyday life cannot qualify because it lacks the requisitecausal connection with effectuating the injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation. An ordinary, everyday expense simply cannot have the object or purpose of effectuating an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation because it is incurred by everyone whether injured or not. For instance, Griffith explained that “the food that Griffith consumes is simply an ordinary means of sustenance rather than a treatment for his ‘care, recovery, or rehabilitation,’ ” because “if Griffith had never sustained, or were to fully recover from, his injuries, his dietary needs would be no different than they are now.” In sum, an ordinary, everyday product, service, or accommodation is not compensable under MCL 500.3107(1)(a) because that expense cannot be for the claimant's care, recovery, or rehabilitation.
Id. at 531, 697 N.W.2d 895.
Id. at 531 n. 6, 697 N.W.2d 895, quoting Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997). The same definition is found in Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2005).
.MCL 500.3107(1)(a) (emphasis added).
Griffith, 472 Mich. at 536, 697 N.W.2d 895.
The noncompensability of the ordinary food the insured in Griffith consumed at home exemplifies this principle.
Further, nothing in the statutory language of MCL 500.3107(1)(a) supports the notion that postinjury allowable expenses should be reduced by the margin of the injured person's preinjury expenses of the same character. Complying with MCL 500.3107(1)(a) and determining what products, services, and accommodations are actually for the injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation requires a careful examination of the injured person's postaccident expenses. A mere change in the injured person's postaccident expenses is insufficient to satisfy MCL 500.3107(1)(a); the new expense must be of a wholly different essential character than expenses borne by the person before the accident to show that it is for the injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation. But if an expense is new in its essential character, and thus actually for the injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation, MCL 500.3107(1)(a) requires that it be covered in full regardless of whether the expense represents an increase or decrease in the injured person's preaccident costs. Indeed, the provision states that allowable expenses consist of “ all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations....” Thus, if a product, service, or accommodation satisfies the statutory criteria, it is fully compensable.
For example, if before an accident the claimant wore budget shoes costing $10 but as a result of the accident required custom medical shoes costing $100, the claimant would be entitled to the full $100, not merely the $90 difference between the pre- and postaccident shoe expenses. But if before the accident the claimant wore designer shoes costing $300, the claimant would still be entitled to the full $100 cost of the custom shoes because the custom shoes represent a change in character from the claimant's preinjury needs and are thus for the claimant's care, recovery or rehabilitation. Of course, MCL 500.3107(1)(a) also requires allowable expenses to be “reasonable charges” and they must be “reasonably necessary” for the claimant's care, recovery, or rehabilitation.
.MCL 500.3107(1)(a) (emphasis added).
Special accommodations or modifications to an ordinary item present a particular challenge. A “combined” product or accommodation results from an ordinary expense, unchanged as a result of the injury, being joined with an accommodation or product that is actually for the injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation. An “integrated” product or accommodation involves the blending of an ordinary expense with one that is for the injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation in a way that the resulting product or accommodation cannot be separated easily into unit costs. Unlike an integrated product or accommodation, a combined product or accommodation can be separated easily, both conceptually and physically, so that the fact-finder can identify which costs are of a new character and are thus for the injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation and which costs are ordinary, everyday expenses that are unchanged after the accident. As this Court suggested in Griffith, MCL 500.3107(1)(a) requires the insurer to cover a truly integrated product or accommodation in full because the entire expense, including the portions that might otherwise be considered ordinary, is necessary for the injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation. But because a combined product or accommodation can be easily separated into components related to the injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation and components unrelated to that care, recovery, or rehabilitation, only the related expenses are actually compensable. MCL 500.3107(1)(a) mandates this result because, when the product or accommodation can be easily separated into an ordinary expense and an expense for care, recovery, or rehabilitation, requiring the insurer to pay for the ordinary expenses would destroy the cost-containment aspect of the no-fault insurance act, something of which this Court has long been mindful.
See Griffith, 472 Mich. at 537–538, 697 N.W.2d 895.
For an example of a combined product or accommodation, consider a medical insole that an injured person might have to put in his or her shoe following an accident. Certainly the insole is compensable as a product or accommodation for the injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation. But the easy physical and conceptual separability of the insole and the actual shoe means that the shoe itself—an ordinary expense—will not be compensable because it is not for the injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation.
See, e.g., Griffith, 472 Mich. at 539, 697 N.W.2d 895 (“We have always been cognizant of this potential problem [obliterating cost containment] when interpreting the no-fault act....”); Celina Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lake States Ins. Co., 452 Mich. 84, 89, 549 N.W.2d 834 (1996) (stating that “the no-fault insurance system ... is designed to provide victims with assured, adequate, and prompt reparations at the lowest cost to both the individuals and the no-fault system”); O'Donnell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 404 Mich. 524, 547, 273 N.W.2d 829 (1979) (“Because the first-party insurance proposed by the act was to be compulsory, it was important that the premiums to be charged by the insurance companies be maintained as low as possible. Otherwise, the poor and the disadvantaged people of the state might not be able to obtain the necessary insurance.”).
This analysis is consistent with this Court's application of MCL 500.3107(1)(a) in Griffith. In its discussion of insurance coverage for hospital food during the insured's hospital stay, the Griffith Court stated that compensation was required because the insured was required to eat “ that particular food.” This is an example of an integrated accommodation. The food, clothing, shelter, and any other ordinary products that are provided by the hospital as part and parcel of the hospital stay are not easily separated from the products, services, and accommodations provided by the hospital for the injured person's care. Thus, the statute requires the insurer to pay the entire cost. The same could be said for the custom medical shoes briefly discussed in Griffith. When a medical products company produces a custom shoe, the shoe is an integrated product because the medical nature of the shoe, which is for the injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation, cannot be separated from the ordinary need for shoes by an uninjured person. Thus, the entire cost of the shoe is an allowable expense.
Griffith, 472 Mich. at 537, 697 N.W.2d 895.
Id. at 535 n. 12, 697 N.W.2d 895.
In sum, MCL 500.3107(1)(a) only requires an insurer to pay for products, services, and accommodations that are reasonably necessary to the object or purpose of “an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” Postaccident expenses of a wholly new essential character satisfy the statutorily required causal connection that expenses be for the injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation. Ordinary expenses that are the same for an injured and an uninjured person are not recoverable at all because the claimant cannot show that the expense is for his or her care, recovery, or rehabilitation. However, if an expense satisfies the statute, then it is recoverable in full; there is no setoff based on the injured person's preinjury expenses of the same character. Some products, services, or accommodations might otherwise be ordinary but are so integrated with a product, service, or accommodation that is actually for the injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation that the entire product, service, or accommodation must be included as an allowable expense under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). But if the ordinary expense is merely combined with a product, service, or accommodation for the injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation in a way that is physically and conceptually separable, the ordinary expense fails to satisfy the statute and is not compensable.
Justice Cavanagh suggests that our interpretation injects language into the statute. Quite the opposite. As this Court has often done, we merely highlight guideposts inherent in the statutory language to assist Michigan's citizens—inside and outside the litigation context—in faithfully administering the statute's plain language in the myriad situations in which it applies. See, e.g., Krohn v. Home–Owners Ins. Co., 490 Mich. 145, 163–164, 802 N.W.2d 281 (2011) (concluding that a surgical procedure cannot be “reasonably necessary” under MCL 500.3107(1)(a) unless a plaintiff provides objective and verifiable evidence of the procedure's efficacy); Frazier v. Allstate Ins. Co., 490 Mich. 381, 385–386, 808 N.W.2d 450 (2011) (expounding on the beginning and end of the process of “alighting” as that term is used in MCL 500.3106(1)(c)); Thornton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 425 Mich. 643, 659, 391 N.W.2d 320 (1986) (explaining that an injury arises out of the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle under MCL 500.3105(1) when the “causal connection between the injury and the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle is more than incidental, fortuitous, or ‘but for’ ”).
C. APPLICATION
Applying this standard here, we conclude that the base price of the van is not an allowable expense under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). The statute only entitles plaintiff to reimbursement for products, services, and accommodations that are actually for his care, recovery, or rehabilitation, and only the van's modifications rise to that standard. The base price of the van is an ordinary transportation expense of the same essential character as plaintiff would have incurred regardless of whether he was injured in an accident. While plaintiff's choice of transportation before his injury might not have been a van, the essential character of plaintiff's preinjury need for transportation has not changed. Like Griffith's need for sustenance, had plaintiff never sustained his injury, or were he to fully recover, his need for ordinary transportation would be unchanged. Accordingly, the statute does not require that defendant reimburse plaintiff for the base price of the van.
Certain transportation expenses may be recoverable under MCL 500.3107(1)(a) because they are part of plaintiff's care, recovery, or rehabilitation. For instance, plaintiff requires some form of transportation to and from his medical appointments. Medically necessary transportation needs represent a change in character from plaintiff's preinjury requirements because the trips would not have been necessary in a life unmarred by injury. But by paying for the van's modifications and so-called medical mileage, defendant has met its statutory obligations. Indeed, defendant has made it possible—through mileage and modifications—for plaintiff to use his otherwise ordinary transportation to reach medical appointments. But plaintiff cannot show that the van itself, an ordinary form of transportation, is actually for his care, recovery, or rehabilitation. Thus, MCL 500.3107(1)(a) does not require defendant to compensate plaintiff for the base price of the van.
This Court's decision in Griffith leads inexorably to this result. The van itself is akin to the food that Griffith was eating at home. The character of plaintiff's general need for transportation—like Griffith's food requirements—did not change as a result of the accident. And unlike the hospital food in Griffith, the van does not constitute an integrated product because the modified van, as a whole, was not actually for plaintiff's care, recovery, or rehabilitation. Hospital food is compensable because the injured person is required to eat that particular food during the hospital stay for his or her care and recovery. The Court likened hospital food to a special diet. But plaintiff only requires some form of transportation for his care, not any particular form, so his transportation needs are not akin to a special diet. Indeed, if defendant provided plaintiff with a taxi service that accounted for his disability, defendant would only be required to provide that service for those trips that had the object or purpose of plaintiff's care, recovery, or rehabilitation.
Id. at 537, 391 N.W.2d 320.
Id.
The parties agreed that plaintiff should have a vehicle with modifications as the means for transporting plaintiff on his medically necessary trips. But because the van and the modifications are easily separable, we must determine which expenses are actually for plaintiff's care, recovery, and rehabilitation and which are not. The modifications indisputably have the object or purpose of effectuating plaintiff's care, recovery, or rehabilitation because without the modifications plaintiff could not make use of his ordinary transportation for medically necessary trips. Thus, defendant was required to and did compensate plaintiff for the cost of the modifications pursuant to MCL 500.3107(1)(a). But the van is just a van; and while a van may not have been plaintiff's transportation preference, it remains an ordinary means of transportation used by the injured and uninjured alike.
Justice Cavanagh argues that defendant must pay for the van because the van cannot be separated from plaintiff's general need for transportation and the van itself is for plaintiff's care. But we never suggest that the van can be separated from the general need for transportation. Indeed, driving a van is consistent with plaintiff's general need for transportation. Our focus is on the medically necessary modifications and medical mileage, which are separable from plaintiff's general need for transportation. Thus, because only the modifications and medical mileage are for plaintiff's care, recovery, or rehabilitation, they are the only items for which defendant must reimburse plaintiff.
Justice Cavanagh says that the van must be compensable because plaintiff did not require a van before the accident, similar to how the van's medical modifications were unnecessary before the accident. But this argument misconstrues why the modifications are compensable. What makes the modifications compensable is that they represent a change in character from plaintiff's preinjury transportation needs, without which plaintiff could not use ordinary transportation, so they must be for plaintiff's care, recovery, or rehabilitation. But the van itself is an ordinary means of transportation, just like the motorcycle plaintiff used for transportation before his accident.
Because the character of plaintiff's ordinary transportation needs remains unchanged, he is free to meet those needs in the way that best suits him. If plaintiff had already owned a van, defendant could have modified that van. If plaintiff wanted a Mercedes van, he could pay for the added luxury, and defendant could modify the van as required by statute. However, only the modifications and medical mileage—separable elements that actually represent a change in character from plaintiff's general preinjury transportation requirements—must be compensated pursuant to MCL 500.3107(1)(a).
IV. CONCLUSION
Our decision in Griffith was sound, and we reaffirm that decision here. To the extent that the Court of Appeals' opinions in Ward, Hoover, or Begin are inconsistent with this opinion, they are overruled. In concluding that the base price of the van was compensable, the Court of Appeals in this case misapplied our holding in Griffith. We therefore reverse that portion of the Court of Appeals' judgment.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals erred by unnecessarily concluding that the parties' transportation purchase agreement was ambiguous regarding whether defendant was contractually obligated to reimburse plaintiff for the base price of the van regardless of the no-fault insurance act's requirements. In fact, plaintiff waived the contractual argument by failing to raise it in his complaint or argue it to the trial court at any point. Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the Court of Appeals' judgment regarding the parties' contract. Plaintiff's application for leave to appeal as cross-appellant is denied, and the case is remanded to the trial court for entry of summary disposition in favor of defendant. YOUNG, C.J., and MARKMAN and KELLY, JJ., concurred with ZAHRA, J.
MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).
See Walters, 481 Mich. at 387, 751 N.W.2d 431 (“Michigan generally follows the ‘raise or waive’ rule of appellate review. Under our jurisprudence, a litigant must preserve an issue for appellate review by raising it in the trial court.”) (citation omitted); Napier v. Jacobs, 429 Mich. 222, 227, 414 N.W.2d 862 (1987) (“A general rule of trial practice is that failure to timely raise an issue waives review of that issue on appeal.”).
For nearly a decade now, a majority of this Court has employed what I believe to be an erroneous and confusing statutory interpretation of MCL 500.3107(1)(a). I have often dissented from this approach to Michigan's no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. See, e.g., Griffith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 472 Mich. 521, 542–554, 697 N.W.2d 895 (2005) (Marilyn Kelly, J., dissenting), Krohn v. Home–Owners Ins. Co., 490 Mich. 145, 179–197, 802 N.W.2d 281 (2011) (Hathaway, J., dissenting), Johnson v. Recca, 492 Mich. 169, 207, 821 N.W.2d 520 (2012) (Cavanagh, J., concurring in the result proposed by Hathaway, J., dissenting), and Douglas v. Allstate Ins. Co., 492 Mich. 241, 279–295, 821 N.W.2d 472 (2012) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). Instead, I have argued in favor of Michigan's previously well-established interpretation of MCL 500.3107(1)(a). See, e.g., Griffith, 472 Mich. at 549, 697 N.W.2d 895 (Marilyn Kelly, J., dissenting) (citing Manley v. Detroit Auto. Inter–Ins Exch., 425 Mich. 140, 168, 388 N.W.2d 216 (1986) (Boyle, J., concurring in part), and Reed v. Citizens Ins. Co. of America, 198 Mich.App. 443, 499 N.W.2d 22 (1993), overruled by Griffith, 472 Mich. 521, 697 N.W.2d 895). Because the majority's opinion today is an extension of the Griffith majority's erroneous interpretation, I respectfully dissent.
I. APPLYING THE GRIFFITH DISSENT
The key provisions of the no-fault act applicable to this case are MCL 500.3105(1) and MCL 500.3107(1)(a). I continue to believe that Justice Marilyn Kelly provided the proper interpretation of these statutes in her Griffith dissent. See Griffith, 472 Mich. at 542–554, 697 N.W.2d 895 (Marilyn Kelly, J., dissenting). Specifically, MCL 500.3105(1) establishes that an insured is eligible for certain benefits as long as the insured is injured in a motor vehicle accident. Thus, the only limitations placed on the benefits are the limitations stated in MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Id. at 543–546, 697 N.W.2d 895. This is true because “the Legislature did not expressly limit the expenses recoverable in no-fault cases to those that the injured person did not require before the injury.” Id. at 548, 697 N.W.2d 895. Thus, it was the Griffith majority, not the Legislature, that created the additional restriction that personal injury protection (PIP) benefits are not recoverable for expenses that were necessary before the injury. Id.
.MCL 500.3105(1) states:
Under personal protection insurance an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, subject to the provisions of this chapter.
.MCL 500.3107(1) states in relevant part:
[P]ersonal protection insurance benefits are payable for the following:
(a) Allowable expenses consisting of all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation.
Applying the Griffith dissent's interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions to this case, plaintiff clearly satisfied MCL 500.3105(1) given the catastrophic injuries plaintiff suffered in the motor vehicle accident. Next, it is necessary to determine whether the cost of the van is “reasonably necessary” for plaintiff's “care.” As Justice Marilyn Kelly explained, in order to ensure that the word “care” in MCL 500.3107(1)(a) has a meaning independent of the words “rehabilitation” and “recovery,” the word “care” should be defined as “the provision of what is necessary for the welfare and protection of someone.” Griffith, 472 Mich. at 547, 697 N.W.2d 895 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Although a van is not as obviously necessary for a person's “welfare and protection” as the food at issue in Griffith, I think that the facts presented in this case adequately indicate that the van is reasonably necessary for plaintiff's care because a van is the only mode of personal transportation available that will accommodate plaintiff's severe injuries resulting from the motor vehicle accident.
The majority repeats the Griffith majority's unfounded claim that this definition of “care” engulfs “rehabilitation” and “recovery.” Griffith, 472 Mich. at 534 n. 10, 697 N.W.2d 895. However, as Justice Marilyn Kelly explained, under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, “ ‘care’ fits with ‘recovery’ and ‘rehabilitation’ when ‘care’ is interpreted broadly to mean ‘the provision of what is necessary for the welfare and protection of someone’ ” because “[t]he Legislature intended that an injured person's needs be furnished (‘care’) until ‘recovery’ has been accomplished through ‘rehabilitation.’ ” Id. at 547, 697 N.W.2d 895 (Marilyn Kelly, J., dissenting). The majority's overly narrow definition of “care,” however, “turns ‘care’ into a mere redundancy.” Id.
The simplicity of applying the Griffith dissent's interpretation of the plain languageof MCL 500.3105 and MCL 500.3107(1)(a) is consistent with the long-held principle that the Legislature intended that the no-fault act be construed liberally “in favor of the persons intended to benefit from it.” Turner v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 448 Mich. 22, 28, 528 N.W.2d 681 (1995). Likewise, the Griffith dissent's approach addresses this Court's oft-repeated concern regarding cost containment, because the dissent's approach would eliminate much of the costly litigation spawned by the Griffith majority's erroneous analysis, which will only be perpetuated by the majority opinion's modifications to the Griffith majority's analysis in this case. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals because plaintiff is entitled to PIP benefits under MCL 500.3107(1)(a).
One need only examine this Court's recent docket to see that Griffith continues to engender confusion and, thus, litigation regarding allowable expenses. See, e.g., Krohn, 490 Mich. 145, 802 N.W.2d 281,Johnson, 492 Mich. 169, 821 N.W.2d 520,Douglas, 492 Mich. 241, 821 N.W.2d 472, and Wilcox v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 488 Mich. 930, 930–932, 790 N.W.2d 139 (2010) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
II. THE MAJORITY'S ERRONEOUS ANALYSIS
The straightforward application of the statutes' plain language under the Griffith dissent stands in stark contrast to the majority's effort to apply the Griffith majority's confusing analysis to this case because, in attempting to clarify Griffith, the majority takes an approach that is divorced from the statutory language. Specifically, I agree with the majority that “nothing in the statutory language of MCL 500.3107(1)(a) supports the notion that postinjury allowable expenses should be reduced by the margin of the injured person's preinjury expenses of the same character.” Ante at 857. However, the majority is forced to inject a variety of terms and phrases not found in the statutory language in an effort to “clarify” Griffith in its purported attempt to avoid an incremental approach to allowable expenses. The result is an overly narrow construction of the statute that is inconsistent with the Legislature's intent regarding MCL 500.3107(1)(a).
For example, the majority states that an “ordinary, everyday expense” cannot qualify as an allowable expense under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). However, the phrase “ordinary, everyday expense” is amorphous and, more importantly, absent from the statutory language. Rather, the statute simply provides that allowable expenses are “ all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” MCL 500.3107(1)(a) (emphasis added). In my view, “all reasonable charges” could encompass a so-called “ordinary, everyday expense” and thus satisfy MCL 500.3107(1)(a) if that expense is reasonable and reasonably necessary for the injured person's welfare and protection.
The majority also proclaims that “the new expense must be of a wholly different essential character than expenses borne by the person before the accident....” Ante at 857 (emphasis added). Again, this undefined statement of what an insured must now show to be eligible for benefits finds no support in the statutes or caselaw. Moreover, the majority's explanation of expenses that satisfy MCL 500.3107(1)(a) will not add clarity to this area of the law because the majority's examples are not truly “of a wholly different essential character.” For instance, the majority states that a “custom shoe” would qualify as an allowable expense. However, no matter how much a shoe is customized or modified,it retains its “essential character” as a shoe, i.e., it protects a person's foot while walking. I question how the bench and bar are to apply the majority's opinion consistently and fairly when the majority itself struggles to do so.
Next, the majority attempts to draw a distinction between a “combined” product, which it deems insufficient to satisfy MCL 500.3107(1)(a), and an “integrated” product, which, according to the majority, does satisfy MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Again, that distinction does not appear in the statutory language, and the majority is unable to cite any support for its judicially created distinction. Moreover, the majority's explanation of the difference between a “combined” product and an “integrated” product evidences that the majority's approach is entirely standardless.
The majority also states that a product must be “truly integrated” to satisfy its interpretation of MCL 500.3107(1)(a), but the majority does not explain, and it is unclear to me, whether there is a difference between “combined,” “integrated,” and “truly integrated” products.
Specifically, the majority defines a “combined” product as one that “can be separated easily, both conceptually and physically, so that the fact-finder can identify which costs are of a new character and are thus for the injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation and which costs are ordinary, everyday expenses that are unchanged after the accident.” Ante at 858. Given the unique nature of modified products, however, this explanation provides little assistance to the bench and bar. Indeed, the majority concludes that “[w]hen a medical products company produces a custom shoe, the shoe is an integrated product because the medical nature of the shoe ... cannot be separated from the ordinary need for shoes by an uninjured person.” Ante at 858–59. Presumably, the majority considers a “custom shoe” integrated because it cannot be separated “conceptually or physically.” Yet, the majority reaches a different conclusion in this case despite the fact that, as explained later in this opinion, the same is true of plaintiff's modified, or “custom,” van. In short, althoughthe majority claims to reject the “incremental” approach used in Ward v. Titan Ins. Co., 287 Mich.App. 552, 791 N.W.2d 488 (2010), and Hoover v. Mich. Mut. Ins. Co., 281 Mich.App. 617, 761 N.W.2d 801 (2008), the majority implicitly adopts that very rule by defining the preinjury need too broadly while simultaneously defining an “integrated product” too narrowly. The majority's further deviation from the clear statutory language will only perpetuate the confusion that began with the Griffith majority's erroneous analysis.
The majority claims to merely “highlight guideposts” so that Michigan's citizens may faithfully administer the statute's plain language. See ante at 859 n. 47. However laudable that goal might be, I disagree with establishing “guideposts” that bear no connection to the “plain language” of the statute. The majority opinion represents the latest example of the majority's deviating from the actual language of MCL 500.3107. See, e.g., Douglas, 492 Mich. at 279–287, 821 N.W.2d 472 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (explaining that the majority erroneously injected language not found in, and inconsistent with, the statutory language of MCL 500.3107(1)(a)); and Krohn, 490 Mich. at 186–187, 802 N.W.2d 281 (2011) (Hathaway, J., dissenting) (same).
III. APPLYING THE MAJORITY'S NEW RULE
Although I would apply the Griffith dissent, I believe that plaintiff is entitled to benefits even under the majority's faulty statutory interpretation. As the majority acknowledges, what might otherwise be considered an “ordinary, everyday expense” could constitute, under certain circumstances,an “integrated” product. Specifically, under the Griffith majority, food provided in an institutional setting is an “integrated” product, despite the fact that the exact same food is merely an “ordinary, everyday expense” when provided in a noninstitutional setting. Likewise, although plaintiff's van is at its core “transportation,” it is nevertheless an “integrated” product because plaintiff is required to use “ that particular ” form of transportation, given that plaintiff is ventilator dependent and wheelchair bound as a result of the motor vehicle accident. Griffith, 472 Mich. at 537, 697 N.W.2d 895.
The majority apparently believes that plaintiff is not limited to a particular form of transportation, but that is simply not true, as even defendant conceded. Thus, plaintiff's need for transportation cannot be easily separated from a van on conceptual grounds because no other type of vehicle can accommodate plaintiff's wheelchair. Stated differently, contrary to the majority's unsupported conclusion that “the character of plaintiff's ordinary transportation needs remains unchanged,” ante at 861, because of his injuries the only personal vehicle that plaintiff can travel in is a van. Thus, plaintiff's postaccident transportation needs are significantly different from his preaccident transportation needs. In fact, it bears repeating that the van itself is for plaintiff's care because a van is the only type of vehicle that can accommodate plaintiff's postaccident condition. Before the accident, plaintiff did not require the modifications that the majority concedes are covered by MCL 500.3107(1)(a) because the modifications are for plaintiff's care. Likewise, before the accident, plaintiff did not require a van. After the accident, however, plaintiff cannot operate a personal vehicle unless it is modified and it is a van. Thus, there is no meaningful difference between the modifications and the van itself for purposes of the majority's analysis. Plaintiff required neither before the accident, but, because of his motor-vehicle-related injuries, plaintiff now requires both for his care.
See defendant's answer to plaintiff's request for admissions, dated September 24, 2008 (admitting that plaintiff “has required and currently requires a modified van that accommodates his wheelchair if [plaintiff] is to drive a motor vehicle with his currently [sic] disabilities”) (emphasis added).
The majority concludes that plaintiff's postaccident transportation needs are no different from his preaccident transportation needs, just as the Griffith majority concluded that the plaintiff's postaccident food needs were no different from his preaccident food needs. Perhaps the majority is correct that the Griffith plaintiff could, after recovering in the hospital, return to his home, open the refrigerator, and eat the exact same food that he had before his injury. However, could plaintiff in this case return home after recovering in the hospital and use the exact same mode of transportation he had before his injury? Clearly, the answer is no, because the character of plaintiff's transportation needs changed as a result of the accident, contrary to the majority's claim that a van is no different than the motorcycle plaintiff used for transportation before his accident. In fact, plaintiff could no longer ride a motorcycle or even operate a passenger car because plaintiff requires a van that is suitable for modification. Yet, by erroneously focusing on a person's general transportation needs before an accident and defining that need too broadly, the majority's interpretation will regrettably leave some injured parties without postaccident transportation, given the likely increased expense of purchasing a modifiable van, which many accident victims will not be able to afford.
The majority implicitly acknowledges that plaintiff's condition limits him to transportation in a van when it states that “[i]f plaintiff had already owned a van, defendant could have modified that van. If plaintiff wanted a Mercedes van, he could pay for the added luxury....” Ante at 861 (emphasis added). Fear that an insurer could be automatically required to pay for the full cost of any van an insured selects is misplaced because, as the plain language of MCL 500.3107(1) establishes, the cost of the van must be “reasonable,” and “the question whether expenses are reasonable ... is generally one of fact for the jury....” Nasser v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 435 Mich. 33, 55, 457 N.W.2d 637 (1990). Thus, if an insured selects “a Mercedes van,” the insurer would be free to argue to the jury that the insured's choice is not reasonable under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Likewise, an insurer would be free to argue that any type of personal van is not reasonable because wheelchair-accessible public transportation is reasonable under the specific circumstances. See Wilcox, 488 Mich. at 932, 790 N.W.2d 139 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). However,as the majority admits, the parties in this case agreed that plaintiff should have a personal vehicle for transportation. Thus, because a van is the only mode of personal transportation available to plaintiff given the injuries he sustained in the motor vehicle accident, plaintiff's need for transportation cannot be easily separated from a van on conceptual grounds. Thus, the van itself is for plaintiff's care, and plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement for the full cost of the van even under the majority opinion because the modified van is an “integrated” product.
IV. PLAINTIFF DID NOT WAIVE THE CONTRACT ISSUE
Finally, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that plaintiff waived the argument that defendant had contractually agreed to reimburse plaintiff for the base price of the van. As the Court of Appeals noted, the basis for the trial court's decision to deny defendant's motion for summary disposition and instead grant plaintiff summary disposition was not a model of clarity. However, in my view, the transcript of the hearing on the motion for summary disposition reveals that the trial court based its decision on its conclusion that the “Transportation Purchase Agreement” (TPA) required defendant to pay for the reasonable purchase price of a van. Moreover, the Court of Appeals opinion clearly considered the issue and ultimately determined that the TPA is ambiguous. See Admire v. Auto–Owners Ins. Co., unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued February 15, 2011 (Docket No. 289080), pp. 2–3, 2011 WL 520541. Accordingly, both the trial court and Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether the TPA contractually requires defendant to pay for the purchase price of the van. Thus, although I do not think that it is necessary to reach the issue because, in my view, plaintiff is entitled to the purchase price of the van under the no-fault act, even accepting the majority's contrary conclusion on the no-fault issue, I would remand to the trial court for further consideration of the contractual issue.
The parties executed the first TPA in 1988, shortly after plaintiff's 1987 motor vehicle accident. After hearing arguments, the trial court granted summary disposition in plaintiff's favor, explaining that defendant became “involved in this in '87 and it's gone on for some time, what, 22 years, and I'm afraid [defendant is] going to have to remain involved.” Thus, the trial court seemingly relied on the parties' contractual history dating back to 1988 regarding the cost of the van rather than no-fault principles in granting summary disposition in favor of plaintiff.
V. CONCLUSION
I dissent from the majority's decision to expand the erroneous majority opinion in Griffith. Moreover, even under the majority's faulty statutory interpretation, I believeplaintiff is entitled to benefits because the van in this case is no different from the “integrated” products that the majority offers as examples of allowable expenses under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Finally, because both lower courts considered the argument that defendant contractually agreed to reimburse plaintiff for the base price of the van, I would not hold that the issue was waived. Accordingly, I dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, or, at a minimum, remand to the trial court for further consideration of the contractual issue.