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addressing actual injury or damages in a purported class action that dating service contracts of internet dating site failed to comply with section 1694
Summary of this case from Howell v. Grindr, LLCOpinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEALS from a judgment and order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC306167, Emilie H. Elias, Judge.
Schreiber & Schreiber, Edwin C. Schreiber, Eric A. Schreiber; The Brannan Law Offices and G. Bryan Brannan for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Levy, Small & Lallas, Tom Lallas and Janine F. Cohen for Defendant and Appellant.
CROSKEY, J.
Spark Networks Limited (Spark) operates Internet sites on which subscribers can view personal profiles of other individuals for dating purposes. Jason Adelman subscribed to one of Spark’s services known as Jdate. Adelman sued Spark on behalf of himself and others, alleging that its membership contract was void and unenforceable because it failed to comply with Civil Code section 1694 et seq., governing dating service contracts. He alleges counts for violation of Civil Code section 1694.4, unfair competition (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.), breach of contract, money had and received, restitution, and declaratory relief. The court tried separately, before the other issues, the issue of actual injury and damages resulting from Spark’s conduct, found that Adelman suffered no actual injury or damages, and entered a judgment dismissing him as a plaintiff. Adelman appeals the judgment. Both parties appeal a postjudgment order awarding attorney fees to Spark under Civil Code section 1694.4, subdivision (c).
Spark was formerly known as Matchnet PLC and Spark Networks PLC.
Adelman contends the court’s finding that he suffered no actual injury or damages was error as to each count alleged in the complaint, the court erred by awarding attorney fees based in part on confidential information from the parties’ mediation, and Civil Code section 1694.4, subdivision (c) does not authorize a fee award in these circumstances. He also challenges the fee award on other grounds. Spark disputes Adelman’s contentions and contends the court erred by awarding less than the full amount of fees requested.
We conclude that the evidence supports the finding that Adelman suffered no actual injury or damages, and that Adelman has shown no prejudicial error in the judgment against him. We also conclude that neither party has shown error in the attorney fee award.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Spark operates Internet sites designed to assist individuals to find and communicate with other individuals whom they might be interested in dating. Adelman subscribed to Spark’s service known as Jdate beginning in approximately May 2003 and agreed to Spark’s membership contract. He was a paid subscriber for several, but not all, months from May 2003 through January 2005.
Adelman filed a class action complaint against Spark in November 2003. He alleges that the membership contracts for Jdate and other Internet sites operated by Spark are “dating service contracts” as defined in Civil Code section 1694, and that the contracts do not include provisions required by section 1694 et seq., and therefore are void and unenforceable. He alleges seven counts, each of which is based on the allegation that the contracts are void and unenforceable for failure to comply with section 1694 et seq.: (1) violation of Civil Code section 1694 et seq., seeking treble damages, as a class action; (2) unfair competition (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.), seeking restitution, disgorgement, and an injunction, as a class action; (3) unfair competition, seeking the same remedies, as a representative action; (4) breach of contract, seeking damages, as a class action; (5) restitution to avoid unjust enrichment, as a class action; (6) declaratory relief, seeking a declaration that the contracts are void and unenforceable, as a class action; and (7) money had and received, as a class action.
Spark demurred to the complaint in February 2004, arguing, among other things, that its membership contracts are not “dating service contracts” within the meaning of Civil Code section 1694. Before any hearing on the demurrer, the parties agreed that the application of section 1694 et seq. was a threshold issue to be decided by the court. Accordingly, the court in an order filed on September 10, 2004, ordered limited discovery and further briefing on that issue alone. The court ordered the parties to file a joint stipulation to the facts not in dispute together with exhibits. In a minute order filed on April 19, 2005, the court again ordered counsel to prepare a joint stipulation of undisputed facts and exhibits “relevant to the first phase of this action.”
We take judicial notice of the minute order filed in this action on April 19, 2005. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
Counsel for both parties filed a joint stipulation of undisputed facts in connection with the question of the applicability of Civil Code section 1694 et seq. in July 2005. They stipulated, among other things, that Spark’s membership contracts do not expressly provide a three-day right of rescission, a right to a full or partial refund upon a member’s death or disability, or a right to a full or partial refund upon a member’s relocation to a place more than 50 miles from his or her home. They also stipulated that Adelman never attempted to cancel his subscription, died, became disabled, or relocated during his subscription period.
Civil Code section 1694.1, subdivision (a) states that the buyer has a right to cancel a dating service contract, and receive a full refund, until midnight on the third business day after signing the contract. Section 1694.3 states that every dating service contract must expressly provide for a refund of payments for services not yet received in the event of the buyer’s death, disability, or relocation of his or her primary residence in certain circumstances.
Spark filed an ex parte application on August 8, 2006, asking the court to bifurcate and try first the issue of actual injury and damages, if any, resulting from its conduct. Spark argued that Adelman must prove actual injury and damages to establish standing under the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) and to prevail on each count alleged in his complaint, that Adelman had admitted in his deposition that he suffered no injury, and that no further discovery was required on the issue. The court denied the application, but scheduled an evidentiary hearing to take place on August 17, 2006, “regarding the issue o[f] standing.”
We take judicial notice of the minute order filed in this action on August 8, 2006. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
The parties filed a joint stipulation on August 16, 2006, stating that the court had scheduled a “bifurcated trial on the issue of Adelman’s actual injury and damages” to commence on August 17, 2006. The parties stipulated to admit as evidence excerpts from Adelman’s deposition in lieu of live testimony, and certain other documents, subject to the court’s ruling on stated objections.
The parties both filed briefs before August 17, 2006, on the issue of actual injury and damages. Adelman argued in his brief that the membership contracts were void and unenforceable and that he therefore was entitled to either a full refund or a refund of the price paid minus the reasonable value of the services received. He characterized the issue as one of standing, and argued that because the contracts were void he suffered an actual injury and damages for purposes of each count alleged in the complaint, and therefore had standing to pursue each count. He argued in a footnote that the court at that time could not decide the reasonable value of the services provided because: “1. Plaintiff has been completely denied the right to take damages discovery; 2. Such issue is the subject for the trier of fact and expert testimony; 3. Legally, there must be some amount of damages as the law and social policy of this State could not and would not permit the reasonable value of an illegal contract to be the same as the reasonable value of a legal contract, else such laws would be worthless, and businesses would be free to violate the law with impunity and without penalty. Simply put, an illegal contract cannot be of the same value as a legal contract.” Spark argued in its responsive brief that Adelman received what he paid for and suffered no cognizable injury or damages, and that there was no evidence that the price paid by Adelman exceeded the reasonable value of the services he provided.
At the hearing on August 17, 2006, the court initially stated that the reasonable value of the services provided was a question of fact, and stated: “[T]he question here is not deciding the issue. The question is whether we should bifurcate whether he had damages and hear that first. That’s really the issue. It’s not for me to decide whether he did have damages or not have damages; that’s not my issue today. It is a question of fact.” Counsel for both parties then stated that they understood that the court already had decided to bifurcate the trial and that the purpose of the hearing was to try the issue of actual injury and damages. Counsel proceeded to argue the merits of whether Adelman had suffered actual injury and damages. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court stated, “I don’t know how you can possibly not have in this case, not have the reasonable value of services rendered be the price the person paid when they voluntarily keep paying it.” The court stated further: “Let’s talk about services that somebody monthly is buying and each month they make a decision that the price that they’re paying is worth the services that they’re getting. They have the ability to check other services. They have the ability to--they’ve decided that this is worth it to them. The reasonable value is the price that they are paying for this [sic] services.” The court stated that even if Adelman had suffered damages, he could not be an adequate class representative because the class could not consist of people who keep renewing their membership.
Adelman’s counsel stated: “Well, the bifurcation, as I understood it, was going to happen today. You said when I was here last week, ‘We’ll have a three hour trial to expedite matters.’ Mr. Lallas and I agreed certain portions of the deposition could be read by the court as if it was live testimony. It’s simple.” Spark’s counsel agreed.
Adelman’s counsel stated, “If we’re going on reasonable value, of course we would want to take discovery on records because we were precluded from taking any discovery on reasonable value of the services provided.” The court responded, “That’s not the reasonable value of the services.”
The hearing concluded with a discussion of how to proceed in light of the court’s ruling. The court decided to enter a judgment dismissing Adelman as a plaintiff and stay the action as to the rest of the plaintiff class. The court entered a judgment on September 20, 2006, stating that the court had bifurcated the issue of the actual injury and damages suffered by Adelman as a result of Spark’s conduct and had conducted a trial on that issue. The judgment states that the complaint by Adelman is dismissed with prejudice, that Spark is entitled to recover its attorney fees as the prevailing party, and that the rest of the action is stayed. Adelman timely appealed the judgment.
Spark moved for an award of attorney fees under Civil Code section 1694.4, subdivision (c) as the prevailing party in an action under section 1694 et seq. Spark sought $390,135.99 in attorney fees. The motion referred to statements made by Adelman’s counsel in his mediation brief concerning the potential amount of a recovery and attached a copy of the mediation brief. Adelman objected that the mediation brief was confidential under Evidence Code section 1119, and moved to strike Spark’s motion or for other relief. Spark filed a redacted motion omitting explicit references to the mediation brief and not attaching the brief as an exhibit. At the hearing on the motion for fees, the court stated that it had not read the original, unredacted motion and ordered the original motion sealed.
The court took the attorney fee motion under submission, and entered an order on January 30, 2007, awarding Spark $50,000 in attorney fees under Civil Code section 1694.4, subdivision (c). The order stated, among other things, that an award of less than the amount requested was appropriate because “only a small portion of the requested fees regard the standing issue.” The order stated that most of the fees were incurred in connection with the question whether the membership contracts were dating service contracts under Civil Code section 1694 et seq., and that the court had not yet decided that question but might decide the question if a new class representative were named. The order stated that the court was exercising its discretion not to award fees incurred in connection with a theory on which the prevailing party was not successful. It stated further: “The Court is persuaded that the unique form of this case—it is an alleged class action—militates in favor of limiting the fees amount at this time. Only a small portion of the requested fees amount regards the standing issue. The majority of the work involved class issues and preparation for the legal issue mini-trial. This is work that will be useful in the future; it is not worthless simply because Adelman lacks standing.” Both parties timely appealed the order.
The court and the parties sometimes referred to the issue of actual injury and damages as the “standing” issue in connection not only with unfair competition but also in connection with other counts alleged in the complaint.
CONTENTIONS
Adelman contends (1) assuming his membership contract is a dating service contract and is void and unenforceable under Civil Code section 1694 et seq., he suffered actual injury and damages because he paid full price for a void contract; (2) because the contract is void, he is entitled to either a full refund or a refund of the amount by which the price paid exceeds the reasonable value of the services provided; (3) the reasonable value of the services provided is a question of fact and is based on an objective value, rather than a subjective value to a particular plaintiff; (4) he suffered “actual injury” and “lost money or property” under Business and Professions Code section 17204 because he paid money to Spark under a void contract and is entitled to a full or partial refund; (5) an actual controversy exists for purposes of declaratory relief regardless of whether he is a paid subscriber at the present time; (6) rather than first decide whether Adelman suffered actual injury and damages, the court should have first decided whether the membership contract violated Civil Code section 1694 et seq.; (7) the court erred by awarding attorney fees based in part on confidential information from the parties’ mediation; and (8) Civil Code section 1694.4, subdivision (c) does not authorize a fee award in these circumstances.
Spark disputes Adelman’s contentions and contends the amount of attorney fees awarded by the court is insufficient and it is entitled to the entire amount requested.
DISCUSSION
1. Adelman Has Shown No Prejudicial Error in the Bifurcation of the Issue of Actual Injury and Damages
The hearing on August 17, 2006, on the issue of actual injury and damages was the first phase of a bifurcated trial. The parties in their joint stipulation filed on August 16, 2006, stated that the court had scheduled a “bifurcated trial on the issue of Adelman’s actual injury and damages.” They stipulated to admit Adelman’s deposition testimony in lieu of live testimony and to admit certain evidence, subject to stated objections to be ruled on by the court. There is no indication in the appellate record, and Adelman does not argue, that he objected at any time before August 17, 2006, to the court conducting a nonjury trial on the issue of actual injury and damages before the trial of other issues.
Adelman’s counsel stated at the beginning of the hearing on August 17, 2006, that he understood that the bifurcated trial would commence on that date, and counsel for Spark agreed. Adelman’s counsel stated that the reasonable value of the services provided should be based on expert opinion. When the court asked what kind of expert he had in mind, Adelman’s counsel stated, “Internet and e-commerce expert. We have one we’ve consulted with which we haven’t designated because we haven’t had to.” Adelman’s counsel did not offer any expert testimony at the hearing or explicitly request a continuance for the purpose of presenting expert testimony. He stated, however, “If we’re going on reasonable value of course we would want to take discovery on records because we were precluded from taking any discovery on reasonable value of the services provided.” The court responded, “That’s not the reasonable value of the services.”
Adelman’s counsel stated: “Getting to reasonable, that’s a question of expert opinion. What is the reasonable value of the service?” The court later stated, “But I hear Mr. Schreiber [Adelman’s counsel] saying he thinks he needs an expert for that.” Adelman’s counsel responded, “If we get to the reasonable value. Obviously, in five days, I could not produce--we have a consultant we’ve talked to. But if the question comes down to reasonable value, his motion falls flat on its face.”
Adelman’s principal argument on appeal is that, assuming that his membership contract is a dating service contract and is void and unenforceable under Civil Code section 1694 et seq., he suffered actual injury and damages as a matter of law because the value of a void contract is less than the value of a valid contract. He also mentions in passing in his opening brief that the court denied his requests for “[d]iscovery on Spark’s actual costs and financial records” and “[t]o present expert testimony on the reasonable value of the services Spark provided, or the value of Spark’s contract to a consumer with its missing mandatory legal protections.” He argues that if the court had granted his requests, “he would have been able to demonstrate that the reasonable value of the services provided [was] less than the contract price he paid.” Yet he does not explain why the purported denial of his requests was error. His perfunctory argument on appeal does not explain why his brief references at the hearing on August 17, 2006, to the need for expert testimony and discovery on the reasonable value of services provided were timely and sufficient to inform the trial court that he was requesting a continuance. Moreover, separate and apart from the question whether he preserved the issue for appeal by objecting in the trial court (see Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184-185, fn. 1), we conclude that by failing to offer this court reasoned argument and a discussion of legal authority in support of his apparent contention that he was entitled to a continuance, Adelman has failed to sustain his burden as appellant to demonstrate error. (Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115-1116; Kim v. Sumitomo Bank (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 974, 979.)
We also reject Adelman’s argument that the court should have decided whether his membership contract violated Civil Code section 1694 et seq. before conducting a trial on the issue of actual injury or damages. There is no indication in the appellate record, and Adelman does not argue, that he objected in the trial court at any time to the bifurcation procedure. We therefore conclude that he failed to preserve the issue for appeal. (Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist., supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 184-185, fn. 1.) Moreover, Adelman has not shown that the trial on the issue of actual injury or damages before the trial on whether the contract violated section 1694 et seq. prejudicially affected his ability to show actual injury and damages resulting from the alleged violations.
We conclude that Adelman has shown no prejudicial error in the bifurcation of the issue of actual injury and damages and the conducting of a nonjury trial on that issue before the trial of other issues, and has not shown that he was entitled to a continuance of the first phase of trial.
2. Standard of Review of the Court’s Finding on the Bifurcated Issue
The trial court as the trier of fact found in the first phase of trial that Adelman suffered no actual injury or damages as a result of Spark’s conduct. We review findings by the trier of fact under the substantial evidence standard. Substantial evidence is evidence that a rational trier of fact could find to be reasonable, credible, and of solid value. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and accept as true all evidence tending to support the judgment, including all facts that reasonably can be deduced from the evidence. We must affirm the judgment if an examination of the entire record viewed in this light discloses substantial evidence to support the judgment. (Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429; Kuhn v. Department of General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627, 1633.)
Adelman argues that there were no disputed facts and no weighing of evidence or factual findings by the trial court because all of the evidence was stipulated. We disagree. Although the parties stipulated to the admission of evidence, they did not stipulate to the ultimate facts to be decided based on that evidence. The single most important fact to be determined in the first phase of trial was whether Adelman suffered actual injury or damages as a result of Spark’s conduct. The court’s finding that Adelman suffered no actual injury or damages because the price paid for his subscription did not exceed the reasonable value of the services provided was a finding of fact.
3. The Evidence Supports the Finding that Adelman Suffered No Actual Injury or Damages
The court concluded that the price paid for Adelman’s subscription did not exceed the reasonable value of the services provided. The court therefore found that Adelman suffered no actual injury or damages as a result of the alleged violations of Civil Code section 1694 et seq. for purposes of either the statutory count or the other counts based on the alleged statutory violation. The evidence in support of that finding includes Adelman’s deposition testimony that he was satisfied with the services provided and renewed his subscription several times, that he received all of the services that he paid for, and that he did not believe that he was injured in any way by Spark’s conduct. In our view, that evidence supports the reasonable conclusion that Adelman suffered no actual injury and was not damaged as a result of Spark’s conduct in any manner and by any measure.
We reject Adelman’s argument that services provided under a void contract necessarily have a lesser value to the subscriber than services provided under a valid contract. Adelman does not explain why the services he received were any less valuable because of the omission from the contract of certain allegedly required provisions that he never sought to invoke and that were of no value to him.
Adelman does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that he must establish actual injury or damages in order to prevail on each count alleged in his complaint. We conclude that he has shown no error in the finding that he suffered no actual injury or damages and therefore has shown no error in the judgment against him.
4. The Attorney Fee Award Was Proper
a. Civil Code Section 1694.4 Subdivision (c) Authorizes a Fee Award
Civil Code section 1694 defines a “dating service contract.” Section 1694.1 states that a buyer has a right to cancel a dating service contract within three business days after signing the contract. Sections 1694.2 and 1694.3 establish requirements for dating service contracts, including provisions required to be included in the written contract. Section 1694.4 states that any dating service contract that does not comply with these requirements or that was “entered into under willful and fraudulent or misleading information or advertisements of the seller” is void and unenforceable. (Id., subds. (a), (b).)
Civil Code section 1694.4, subdivision (c) states: “Any buyer injured by a violation of this chapter may bring an action for the recovery of damages in a court of competent jurisdiction. Judgment may be entered for three times the amount at which the actual damages are assessed. Reasonable attorney fees may be awarded to the prevailing party.” Adelman contends section 1694.4, subdivision (c) authorizes an award of attorney fees only if the court finds that the contract at issue is a dating service contract governed by section 1694 et seq. This presents a question of statutory construction.
Statutory construction is a question of law that we review de novo. (Barner v. Leeds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 676, 683.) Our task in construing a statute is to ascertain the legislative intent so as to effectuate the purpose of law. (Hassan v. Mercy American River Hospital (2003) 31 Cal.4th 709, 715.) The statutory language ordinarily is the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. (Ibid.) We give the words of the statute their ordinary and usual meaning and construe them in the context of the statute as a whole and the entire scheme of law of which it is a part. (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Garamendi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1029, 1043.) If the language is clear and a literal construction would not result in absurd consequences that Legislature did not intend, the plain meaning governs. (Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737.) If the language is ambiguous, we may consider a variety of extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the statute, legislative history, and public policy. (Ibid.)
Civil Code section 1694.4, subdivision (c) does not expressly state that attorney fees may be awarded only in an action in which the court finds that the contract at issue is a dating service contract. Rather, the statute states, “[r]easonable attorney fees may be awarded to the prevailing party.” In light of the apparent purpose of such a fee-shifting statute, to encourage meritorious litigation and discourage meritless litigation under the law of which it is a part (see Flannery v. Prentice (2001) 26 Cal.4th 572, 583), we would not construe the provision for a fee recovery to be limited to actions in which the court finds that the contract at issue is a dating service contract absent some indication that the Legislature so intended. In our view, the purpose of the fee-shifting statute is best served by construing it to apply in any action in which the plaintiff alleges a violation of Civil Code section 1694 et seq.
We reject Adelman’s argument that a prevailing defendant must show that a plaintiff’s complaint was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless to recover a discretionary attorney fee award under Civil Code section 1694.4, subdivision (c). Courts apply that heightened standard in employment discrimination cases under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) so as not to discourage plaintiffs from commencing potentially meritorious actions to enforce the important public policies underlying employment discrimination laws. (E.g., Rosenman v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 859, 865.) The court in People v. Roger Hedgecock for Mayor Com. (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 810, 816-818, applied the same heightened standard in an action under the Political Reform Act of 1974 (Gov. Code, § 81000 et seq.), noting the compelling public policies protected by the act. Civil Code section 1694 et seq. provide consumer protections concerning dating service contracts, but do not involve public policies as vitally important as the laws prohibiting employment discrimination or protecting the political process. We therefore conclude that there is no compelling reason to restrict the court’s discretion in the manner suggested.
We also reject Adelman’s argument that if the contract is a dating service contract and is void and unenforceable for failure to comply with Civil Code section 1694 et seq., the court as a matter of public policy was compelled to deny any relief to Adelman, including attorney fees otherwise available under section 1694.4, subdivision (c). Adelman failed to establish a right to relief under section 1694 et seq., is not the prevailing party, and cannot claim the higher ground in this dispute. In our view, the applicable public policy is expressed in section 1694.4 subdivision (c), which authorizes an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party in any action under section 1694 et seq.
Accordingly, we conclude that section 1694.4, subdivision (c) authorizes an attorney fee award against Adelman and in favor of Spark as the prevailing party in this action.
b. The Court Did Not Consider Confidential Statements Made in Connection with the Mediation in Awarding Fees
Evidence Code section 1119 states that no evidence of a statement made for the purpose of, or in the course of, a mediation is admissible in a civil action, that no writing prepared for a mediation is admissible in a civil action, and that all communications between participants in the course of a mediation shall remain confidential. (Id., subds. (a)-(c).) Section 1128 states that any reference to a mediation during a subsequent trial or other civil proceeding is an irregularity in the proceedings for purposes of a new trial motion and “is grounds for vacating or modifying the decision in that proceeding, in whole or in part, and granting a new or further hearing on all or part of the issues, if the reference materially affected the substantial rights of the party requesting relief.”
Adelman contends Spark’s redacted motion for attorney fees retained several references to statements made by Adelman’s counsel his mediation brief, so the court was required to deny the motion pursuant to Evidence Code section 1128. We need not decide whether Spark’s redacted motion contained references to statements made in Adelman’s mediation brief without expressly citing the brief. Adelman has not established a substantial likelihood that the trial court considered any such references in awarding fees and therefore has not shown that the references “materially affected [his] substantial rights” (ibid.). The court explained the basis for the $50,000 fee award, and neither that explanation nor the amount awarded suggests that the court improperly considered confidential statements made in connection with the mediation.
c. Spark Has Shown No Error in the Amount of Fees Awarded
Spark contends all of the $390,135.99 in attorney fees requested were reasonably and necessarily incurred, so Spark is entitled to a fee award in the full amount requested. Spark acknowledges that an attorney fee award under Civil Code section 1694.4, subdivision (c) is discretionary, rather than mandatory, but argues that if the court exercises its discretion to award fees, the court must award all amounts reasonably incurred.
A trial court has broad discretion to determine the reasonable amount of an attorney fee award. The determination ordinarily should be based on the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, and the court’s consideration of the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount in controversy, the skill and effort employed, the degree of success or failure, and other factors. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095-1096.) “ ‘The “experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong[”] ’ – meaning that it abused its discretion. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1095.) We conclude that the court acted within its discretion in awarding less than the full amount requested.
DISPOSITION
The judgment and the order awarding attorney fees are affirmed.
We Concur: KLEIN, P. J., ALDRICH, J.