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Acosta v. 202 S. 2ND St. LLC

Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County
Jan 9, 2019
62 Misc. 3d 1209 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2019)

Opinion

HP 2667/2018

01-09-2019

Maria ACOSTA, Denise Aguilar, Ramon Batista, Jean Claude Cambell, Ramon Malave Jr., and Carmen Martinez, Petitioner-Tenants, v. 202 SOUTH 2ND STREET LLC, Wayfinder PM, Adam Jernow, and Jeremy Kilts, Respondent-Landlords, New York City Housing Preservation and Development, Co-Respondents.

Brooklyn Legal Services Corporation A, Rachel Nager, Esq. of Counsel, for Petitioners Smyth Law PC, By Christina Smyth, Esq. for Respondents


Brooklyn Legal Services Corporation A, Rachel Nager, Esq. of Counsel, for Petitioners

Smyth Law PC, By Christina Smyth, Esq. for Respondents

Jeannine Baer Kuzniewski, J.

Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219(A), of the papers considered in the review of this Notice of Motion:

PAPERS NUMBERED

NOTICE OF MOTION AND AFFIRMATION ANNEXED 1

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND AFFIRMATION ANNEXED

ANSWER AFFIRMATION 2

REPLYING AFFIRMATION 3

EXHIBITS

STIPULATIONS

OTHER Petition and Affidavits 4

Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision/Order in this Motion to dismiss the harassment allegations pursuant to CPLR § 3013 and 3211(a)(7) is as follows:

The Petitioners commenced this HP proceeding seeking an Order to Correct the violations of record, a finding of harassment, and enjoining the landlords from engaging in illegal patterns of behavior. The Respondents filed an Answer and the parties entered into a consent Order to Correct on September 18, 2018; the matter was set down for trial on the allegations of harassment. On the eve of trial, the Respondents-Landlord made this motion to dismiss that part of the proceeding seeking a finding of harassment.

The movant argues that "[t]he Verified Petition does not allege what actions the Petitioners believe constituted harassment or when they allegedly occurred. As a result, the Landlord is deprived of any ability to prepare a defense in the proceeding." The motion cites CPLR § 3013 :

See Attorney Affirmation in support paragraph 7.

"Statements in a pleading shall be sufficiently particular to give the court and parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved and the material elements of each cause of action or defense."

The Respondents argue that "the harassment claim raised in Paragraphs 9, 10, and 11 of the Petition do not contain any factual allegations whatsoever; rather they merely recite the statutory definition of harassment. The Landlord denies any claim of tenant harassment, but it is unable to defend itself against these serious allegations because there are no specific factual claims of wrongdoing, rather mere legal conclusions. " Lastly, the Respondent argues that the pleadings should offer a time period for the alleged harassment as the recent amendments to the harassment statute were phased in with various effective dates, therefore, the time element is important to allow them to prepare a defense.

Supra. at paragraph 12 and 13.

The Petitioners oppose the Motion arguing that the timing of the motion was done to delay the trial and that the pleadings are sufficient. In opposition, the Affirmation In Opposition looks to CPLR § 3026 and § 3013 :

"leadings shall be liberally construed. Defects shall be ignored if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced."

"tatements in a pleading shall be sufficiently particular to give the court and parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved and the material elements of each cause of action or defense."

The Court disagrees with the Petitioners' argument. While the Court does not condone the timing of the Respondent's motion, the Petitioner does not cite to statutory authority that precludes it. The Court recognizes that pleadings must be liberally construed and must be afforded every favorable inference, however, that does not negate the requirement that there be facts, specific to these Petitioners and the conduct of the Respondents, "to give the court and parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved and the material elements of each cause of action or defense." Paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the Verified Petition and Affidavits are a simplified regurgitation of the statute. There is nothing fact specific plead. There are six petitioners in this proceeding and these affidavits do not distinguish any claims or events specific to any particular petitioner. It is also troublesome that these are proffered as affidavits in support and yet these allegations of harassment are plead as being "upon information and belief." The Court recognizes that it is their belief that the facts fall within the statute, however, as affidavits being submitted by the Petitioners themselves, the alleged facts are within their personal knowledge. There are no facts submitted based upon their personal knowledge as there is nothing detailed regarding the actual conduct that these six petitioners allegedly experienced.

See Petition paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12.

The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's determination that:

Mid-Hudson Valley Fed. Credit Union v. Quartararo & Lois, PLLC , 31 NY3d 1090, 1091, 103 N.E.3d 774 (2018)

"When assessing a pre-answer motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, we accept the allegations in the complaint as true and accord the plaintiff every favorable inference (see Goshen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of NY , 98 NY2d 314, 326, 746 N.Y.S.2d 858, 774 N.E.2d 1190 [2002] ; Maki v. Travelers Cos., Inc ., 145 AD3d 1228, 1230, 44 N.Y.S.3d 220 [2016], appeal dismissed 29 NY3d 943, 51 N.Y.S.3d 490, 73 N.E.3d 847 [2017] ; T. Lemme Mech., Inc. v. Schalmont Cent. School Dist. , 52 AD3d 1006, 1008, 860 N.Y.S.2d 241 [2008] ). Such favorable treatment, however, ‘is not limitless’ ( Tenney v. Hodgson Russ, LLP, 97 AD3d 1089, 1090, 949 N.Y.S.2d 535 [2012] ). Notwithstanding the broad pleading standard, bare legal conclusions with no factual specificity do not suffice to withstand a motion to dismiss (see Godfrey v. Spano , 13 NY3d 358, 373, 892 N.Y.S.2d 272, 920 N.E.2d 328 [2009] ; New York State Workers' Compensation Bd. v. Program Risk Mgt., Inc. , 150 AD3d 1589, 1592, 55 N.Y.S.3d 790 [2017] ; Rodriguez v. Jacoby & Meyers, LLP , 126 AD3d 1183, 1185, 3 N.Y.S.3d 793 [2015], lv. denied 25 NY3d 912, 2015 WL 3952245 [2015] ). ‘Dismissal of the complaint is warranted if the plaintiff fails to assert facts in support of an element of the claim, or if the factual allegations and inferences to be drawn from them do not allow for an enforceable right of recovery’ ( Connaughton v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. , 29 NY3d 137, 142, 53 N.Y.S.3d 598, 75 N.E.3d 1159 [2017] [citations omitted] )."

Mid-Hudson Valley Fed. Credit Union v. Quartararo & Lois, PLLC , 155 AD3d 1218, 1219, 64 N.Y.S.3d 389, 390 (NY App. Div. 2017), aff'd, 31 NY3d 1090, 103 N.E.3d 774 (2018)

The opposition cites Kain v. Larkin , 141 NY 144, however, the circumstances are distinguishable as that court stated' "[i]f facts claimed to be essential can be proved as evidence of a fact alleged, then the complaint must be sufficient. (Cole v. Jessup , 10 NY 104.) A fact which need not be proven, in every case of fraudulent conveyances, is not necessary to the sufficiency of the complaint." That is not the case before the Court; there are facts to be proven. The Court further disagrees with the argument "that harassment, by definition, is a rebuttable presumption." The New York Administrative Code § 27-2004(48) provides "the term ‘harassment’ shall mean any act or omission by or on behalf of an owner that (i) causes or is intended to cause any person lawfully entitled to occupancy of a dwelling unit to vacate such dwelling unit or to surrender or waive any rights in relation to such occupancy, and (ii) includes one or more of the following acts or omissions, provided that there shall be a rebuttable presumption that such acts or omissions were intended to cause such person to vacate such dwelling unit or to surrender or waive any rights in relation to such occupancy , ...." The statute does not state that there is a rebuttal presumption that the acts or omissions falling within the definition of harassment have occurred, rather, that those acts or omissions were intended to cause such person to vacate the apartment or to surrender or waive their rights.

See Verified Petition paragraph 12.

The Affirmation In Opposition further argues that harassment does not have to be plead with specificity, however, the three cases that the opponent cites are not cases that were ruling on the issue of harassment. The ruling in Guggenheimer v. Ginsburgh , 43 NY2d 268, found that "[e]ach of the complaint's causes of action embraces a forbidden type of deception set forth with sufficient factual specificity and fullness, so as to identify the transaction and indicate the theory of redress to enable the court to control the matter and the adversary to prepare, ...." In Leon v. Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, the court delved into the sufficiency of the pleadings and addressed the specific facts that were plead. In Foley v. D'Agostino , 21 AD2d 60, the court ruled that "it is clear that, under the Civil Practice Law and Rules, the statements in pleadings are still required to be factual, that is, the essential facts required to give ‘notice’ must be stated. (See Wachtel, New York Practice, p. 102.) Nevertheless, a party may supplement or round out his pleading by conclusory allegations or by ‘stating legal theories explicitly’ if the facts upon which the pleader relies are also stated ." (Emphasis added.) The pleadings before the Court are conclusory allegations but the facts upon which the pleader relies are not also stated.

See Affirmation In Opposition paragraph 17.

The harassment statute, and its recent amendments, are a powerful and necessary shield to protect tenants, however, that does not negate the procedural due process requirements that the CPLR intended. Accordingly, pursuant to the foregoing, the Motion is granted and that part of the Petition seeking a finding of harassment is dismissed, without prejudice. The Petitioners argue that they would suffer severe prejudice, however, the parties have signed a consent Order to Correct the violations of record and this dismissal of the harassment pleading is without prejudice.


Summaries of

Acosta v. 202 S. 2ND St. LLC

Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County
Jan 9, 2019
62 Misc. 3d 1209 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2019)
Case details for

Acosta v. 202 S. 2ND St. LLC

Case Details

Full title:Maria Acosta, Denise Aguilar, Ramon Batista, Jean Claude Cambell, Ramon…

Court:Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County

Date published: Jan 9, 2019

Citations

62 Misc. 3d 1209 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2019)
2019 N.Y. Slip Op. 50040
112 N.Y.S.3d 875

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