0612/33255.
Decided by Board July 13, 1954.
Voluntary departure, section 244 (e) of Immigration and Nationality Act — Good moral character, section 101 (f) (6) of Immigration and Nationality Act.
An alien, who falsely alleges in his application for an extension of temporary stay filed subsequent to December 24, 1952, that he is not gainfully employed, is not precluded from establishing good moral character within the meaning of section 101 (f) (6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Such an allegation is not false testimony within the meaning of the section because applications for extension of temporary stay submitted subsequent to December 24, 1952, are not required to be under oath. Therefore, such an individual may be found eligible for voluntary departure under section 244 (e) of the act. (Note Matter of Z----, E-085577, 5 IN Dec. 514, re similar allegation made prior to December 24, 1952.)
CHARGE:
Warrant: Immigration and Nationality Act — Failed to maintain status — Visitor for pleasure.
BEFORE THE BOARD
Discussion: This case comes forward on appeal from an order entered by the special inquiry officer on April 8, 1954, directing that the respondent be deported from the United States pursuant to law on the charge stated in the warrant of arrest. The respondent, a 26-year-old single female, native and citizen of Guatemala, has resided continuously in the United States since her admission at Laredo, Tex., on August 28, 1953, as a temporary visitor for pleasure to February 28, 1954. She was granted an extension of temporary stay to August 28, 1954.
The record reflects the respondent accepted gainful employment at a department store in New Orleans, La., during November 1953. She has continued to be employed by the aforementioned store as a clerk since November 1953. The respondent's testimony reveals that she executed an application for an extension of temporary stay at the New Orleans, La., office of the Service and that she stated therein she was not employed. The aforementioned application for an extension of stay was executed and submitted on February 27, 1954. The record clearly shows that the respondent is subject to deportation on the charge stated in the warrant of arrest.
The special inquiry officer has concluded that the respondent has not established good moral character for at least 5 years immediately preceding her application for voluntary departure. Respondent's testimony shows that she knew that she would not have been granted the extension of temporary stay if she had told that she was employed. The respondent on appeal requested that she be permitted to depart voluntarily from the United States, at her own expense.
The special inquiry officer relies upon the provisions of section 101 (f) (6) to sustain his conclusion that the respondent has not established good moral character for the period required by statute. Section 101 (f) (6) provides that no person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of good moral character, who, during the period for which good moral character is required to be established, is, or was one who has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Since December 24, 1952, it has not been necessary to subscribe and swear to applications for extension of temporary stay. Testimony is the evidence given by a competent witness, under oath or affirmation, as distinguished from evidence derived from writings, and other sources ( Edelstein v. United States, 149 Fed. 636). In view of the foregoing, it cannot be found that the respondent has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under this act. At most, she has merely made a false statement with respect to her activities from November 1953 up until the time she made application for extension of temporary stay. For the reasons stated we conclude that the provision of the statute cited does not preclude a finding of good moral character in the instant case. This Board held in the Matter of B----, 56130/885, 1, I. N. Dec. 611, that the term good moral character is elusive and difficult of definition; that good moral character is not moral excellence and it is not destroyed by a single lapse. Rather, it is a concept of a person's natural worth derived from the sum total of all his actions in the community.
Accordingly, we find the respondent is a person of good moral character. We will, therefore, direct that the case be remanded to the Service for further consideration of the respondent's application requesting that she be permitted to depart voluntarily from the United States. Accordingly, the following order will be entered.
Order: It is ordered that the case be remanded to the special inquiry officer for the purposes stated in the foregoing opinion.