In the Matter of C

Board of Immigration AppealsNov 25, 1947
3 I&N Dec. 96 (B.I.A. 1947)

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How cited

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A-6915806, (VP-351411)

Decided by Board November 25, 1947

Visa petition — On behalf of alien husband — Preference-quota status — Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1924.

The statutory requirements of section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1924 are deemed met where the beneficiary (husband) of a visa petition is the one upon whom the petitioner (wife) must depend for support and there is no likelihood he will become a public charge, apparently has been of good health and is able and willing to go to work, since the provision was intended to guard against the likelihood of prospective immigrants becoming public charges.

BEFORE THE BOARD


Discussion: This case is before us on an appeal from the order of the Acting Commissioner revoking approval of a petition filed by an American citizen to establish preference-quota status for her alien husband.

The petitioner was born in New York City in October 1906. She lived in Italy from December 1921 until March 1939 and from May 1940 until February 1947. The United States Government paid for her and her two citizen children's transportation to the United States. The petitioner signed a $500 promissory note to reimburse the Government.

On April 18, 1947, the petition, filed to establish preference-quota status for the petitioner's husband, was approved. Thereafter, the American Consulate General in Naples, Italy, reported that only $100 had been paid upon the promissory note executed by petitioner. For that reason he recommended to the Department of Justice that the approval be revoked on the ground that the petitioner could not meet the requirements of section 9 (b) (6) of the Immigration Act of 1924.

On October 20, 1947, the Acting Commissioner revoked the approval, because "the petitioner's failure to fulfill her obligation with respect to reimbursing the United States Government for the expense of her return to the United States not only indicates her inability to meet a lawful obligation, but demonstrates that she is unable to support the beneficiary as required by section 9 (b) (6) of the Immigration Act of 1924."

Section 9 (b) (6) of the Immigration Act of 1924 requires the petitioner to state that she "is able to and will support the immigrant, if necessary, to prevent such immigrant from becoming a public charge." Section 9 (d) of the same act requires that the petition be accompanied by statements of two or more responsible American citizens that the petitioner is a responsible individual able to support the prospective immigrant. In approving the petition on April 18, 1947, the Immigration and Naturalization Service must have found that the statutory requirements of section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1924 had been met.

So far as we can see, there has been no material change in the factual situation since the Service's action of April 18, 1947. The petitioner now is just as able and willing to support her husband as she was in April 1947. The fact that her promissory note had not yet been fully paid does not alter the situation. Until and unless the petitioner's husband enters the United States and obtains gainful employment the note will probably not be fully paid. Nor do we think that the Government, when it provided transportation for the petitioner and her two children, expected the note to be paid until the husband came to this country. In this connection we note that the Italian Welfare League has made an additional payment of $50 and expects to make other monthly payments.

Finally, while the literal language of section 9 (b) (6) appears to support the Acting Commissioner's decision, we do not think that his construction of this provision is realistic. The provision was intended to guard against the likelihood of prospective immigrants becoming public charges. In a situation where the beneficiary is the one upon whom the petitioner must depend for support, we think section 9 (b) (6) is satisfied when it is established that the beneficiary is not likely to become a public charge.

In this case there is no likelihood that the beneficiary will become a public charge. So far as we know, he is in good health and is able and willing to go to work. The Acting Commissioner's approval of April 18, 1947, was a correct and realistic application of section 9. His present order will be reversed.

Order: The Acting Commissioner's order of October 20, 1947, is reversed, and

It is further ordered, that the approval of April 18, 1947, remain in full force and effect.