Wis. Stat. § 893.93

Current through Acts 2023-2024, ch. 122
Section 893.93 - Miscellaneous actions
(1) The following actions shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred:
(c) An action upon a claim, whether arising on contract or otherwise, against a decedent or against a decedent's estate, unless probate of the estate in this state is commenced within 6 years after the decedent's death.
(cm) An action under s. 218.0125(7) or 218.0126 .
(d) An action under s. 968.31 .
(e) An action under s. 895.444 .
(1m) The following actions shall be commenced within 3 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred:
(a) An action upon a liability created by statute when a different limitation is not prescribed by law.
(b) An action for relief on the ground of fraud. The cause of action in such case is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud.
(2) The following actions shall be commenced within 2 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred:
(a) An action by a private party upon a statute penalty, or forfeiture when the action is given to the party prosecuting therefor and the state, except when the statute imposing it provides a different limitation.
(b) An action to recover a forfeiture or penalty imposed by any bylaw, ordinance or regulation of any town, county, city or village or of any corporation or limited liability company organized under the laws of this state, when no other limitation is prescribed by law.
(3) The following actions shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues or be barred:
(a) An action against a sheriff or other officer for the escape of a prisoner arrested or imprisoned on civil process.
(b) An action under ch. 135.
(4) An action by a drainage board for damages under s. 88.92(2) shall be commenced within 3 years after the drainage board discovers the fact, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the fact of the damage, whichever comes first, or be barred.

Wis. Stat. § 893.93

Amended by Acts 2018 ch, 235,s 32, eff. 4/5/2018.
Amended by Acts 2018 ch, 235,s 31, eff. 4/5/2018.
Amended by Acts 2018 ch, 235,s 30, eff. 4/5/2018.
Amended by Acts 2018 ch, 235,s 29, eff. 4/5/2018.
1979 c. 323; 1993 a. 98, 112, 456; 2005 a. 155.

If the complaint does not allege the requisite elements for a cause of action based on fraud, s. 893.19(7) [now sub. (1m) (b)] does not apply. Demos v. Carey, 50 Wis. 2d 262, 184 N.W.2d 117 (1971). A complaint alleging employment discrimination on the basis of sex and seeking back-pay damages is an action upon a liability created by statute, and in the absence of any other applicable limitation, the six-year limitation of s. 893.19(4) [now sub. (1m) (a)] applies. Yanta v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 66 Wis. 2d 53, 224 N.W.2d 389 (1974). When unreasonable delay in bringing suit prejudices the defendant because of the death of a key witness, laches will bar suit even if the s. 893.19(7) [now sub. (1m) (b)] statute of limitations does not. Schafer v. Wegner, 78 Wis. 2d 127, 254 N.W.2d 193 (1977). Complaints under the open meetings law are not brought in the individual capacity of the plaintiff but on behalf of the state, subject to the two-year statute of limitations under sub. (2). Leung v. City of Lake Geneva, 2003 WI App 129, 265 Wis. 2d 674, 666 N.W.2d 104, 02-2747. Sub. (1) (a) [now sub. (1m) (a)] does not apply to a professional disciplinary proceeding, the focus of which is to monitor and supervise the performance of a person who has been granted the privilege of a license in this state. Krahenbuhl v. Wisconsin Dentistry Examining Board, 2004 WI App 147, 275 Wis. 2d 626, 685 N.W.2d 591, 03-2864. Claims for injury caused by an Archdiocese's alleged fraudulent misrepresentation that the Archdiocese did not know that priests it assigned had histories of sexually abusing children and did not know the priests were dangerous to children were independent claims based on the Archdiocese's alleged knowledge of the priests' prior sexual molestation of children and the Archdiocese's intent to deceive children and their families and not derivative of the underlying sexual molestations by the priests. The date of the accrual of the fraud claims was when the plaintiffs discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered that the Archdiocese's alleged fraud was a cause of their injuries. John Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2007 WI 95, 303 Wis. 2d 34, 734 N.W.2d 827, 05-1945. It is not necessary that a defrauded party have knowledge of the ultimate fact of fraud. What is required is that it be in possession of such essential facts as will, if diligently investigated, disclose the fraud. The burden of diligent inquiry is upon the defrauded party as soon as he or she has such information as indicates where the facts constituting the fraud can be discovered. John Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2007 WI 95, 303 Wis. 2d 34, 734 N.W.2d 827, 05-1945. The six-year limitations period found in sub. (1) (a) [now sub. (1m) (a)] applies to actions under the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, s. 112.01. Willowglen Academy-Wisconsin, Inc. v. Connelly Interiors, Inc., 2008 WI App 35, 307 Wis. 2d 776, 746 N.W.2d 570, 07-1178. The limitation period under sub. (1) (b) [now sub. (1m) (b)] was tolled when the victim had "sufficient knowledge to make a reasonable person aware of the need for diligent investigation." Stockman v. La Croix, 790 F.2d 584 (1986). A cause of action under sub. (1) (b) [now sub. (1m) (b)] accrues on the discovery of the fraud. Discovery occurs when the party has knowledge that would cause a reasonable person to make sufficient inquiry to discover the fraud. Owen v. Wangerin, 985 F.2d 312 (1993). Discovery occurs when the plaintiff has information that would constitute the basis for an objective belief as to his or her injury and its cause. The degree of certainty that constitutes sufficient knowledge is variable, depending on the particular facts and circumstances of the plaintiff. With corporate players, a different quantum of expertise and knowledge is in play. Wisconsin courts have recognized that ignorance is a less compelling excuse for corporate enterprises in the context of the discovery rule. KDC Foods, Inc. v. Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett, P.A., 763 F.3d 743 (2014). Section 551.59(5) applies to actions arising out of sales of securities under SEC rules, rather than s. 893.19(7) [now sub. (1m) (b)]. Kramer v. Loewi & Co., 357 F. Supp. 83 (1973). Section 893.21(1) [now sub. (2) (a)] did not control an action by the EEOC charging discrimination in employment when the statute limited only acts brought by a "private party" and the EEOC is a federal agency enforcing public policy. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm. v. Laacke & Joys Co., 375 F. Supp. 852 (1974). Section 893.19(4) [now sub. (1m) (a)] governs civil rights actions. Minor v. Lakeview Hospital, 421 F. Supp. 485 (1976). Section 893.19(4) [now sub. (1m) (a)] governed an action under federal law against an oil refiner for compensatory damages for alleged overcharges. Section 893.21(1) [now sub. (2) (a)] governed an action for treble damages. U.S. Oil Co. v. Koch Refining Co., 497 F. Supp. 1125 (1980). The defendant in a civil rights action was estopped from pleading the statute of limitations when its own fraudulent conduct prevented the plaintiff from timely filing suit. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 498 F. Supp. 1339 (1980). At a minimum, actions for contractual rescission based on negligent or strict responsibility misrepresentation sound in contract, not tort, at least under Wisconsin law, and are not actions "on the ground of fraud" under sub. (1) (b) [now sub. (1m) (b)]. If all misrepresentationsintentional, negligent, and strict responsibilitywere "fraudulent," there would be no need for the second category of "material" misrepresentations. CMFG Life Insurance Co. v. UBS Securities, 30 F. Supp. 3d 822 (2014).