Wis. Stat. § 801.11
A court of this state having jurisdiction of the subject matter and grounds for personal jurisdiction as provided in s. 801.05 may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant by service of a summons as follows:
Wis. Stat. § 801.11
There is no requirement in cases of substituted service that the affidavit recite that the process server used "reasonable diligence" in attempting to make personal service, but substituted service after 2 calls when the defendant was not found, with no effort to learn where the defendant was, was not sufficient to support jurisdiction. Heaston v. Austin, 47 Wis. 2d 67, 176 N.W.2d 309 (1970). When a village was a defendant, service was void when it was made upon the clerk's spouse in the clerk's absence. Town of Washington v. Village of Cecil, 53 Wis. 2d 710, 193 N.W.2d 674 (1972). "Apparently in charge of the office" in sub. (5) (a) refers to what is apparent to the process server. When a receptionist referred the process server to her superior, who did not send the server to the proper office, the server could serve the superior, particularly since the superior had accepted service of process in other actions without objection by the company. Keske v. Square D Co. 58 Wis. 2d 307, 206 N.W.2d 189 (1973). When personal jurisdiction is challenged under the "long arm" statutes, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove prima facie the facts supporting jurisdiction. A plaintiff who relies on sub. (5) is required to establish as a predicate that the defendant entered into some consensual agreement with the plaintiff that contemplated a substantial contact in Wisconsin. Afram v. Balfour, Maclaine, Inc. 63 Wis. 2d 702, 218 N.W.2d 288 (1974). No presumption of due service was raised when an affidavit of service under sub. (5) (a) did not identify the person served as the one specified in sub. (5) (a). Danielson v. Brody Seating Co. 71 Wis. 2d 424, 238 N.W.2d 531 (1976). The prerequisite "due diligence" for service by publication was not established, despite the sheriff's affidavit, when a husband could have ascertained his wife's address by contacting any one of several relatives or in-laws. West v. West, 82 Wis. 2d 158, 262 N.W.2d 87 (1978). A county civil service commission is a "body politic" under sub. (4) (a) 7. Watkins v. Milwaukee County Civil Service Comm. 88 Wis. 2d 411, 276 N.W.2d 775 (1979). The exact identity and job title of the person upon whom service was made was not critical to whether the person was "apparently in charge of office" under sub. (5) (a). Horrigan v. State Farm Ins. Co. 106 Wis. 2d 675, 317 N.W.2d 474 (1982). Discussing "reasonable diligence" under sub. (1). Welty v. Heggy, 124 Wis. 2d 318, 369 N.W.2d 763 (Ct. App. 1985). Indian tribal sovereignty is not infringed by service of process in a state action made on tribal lands. Landerman v. Martin, 191 Wis. 2d 788, 530 N.W.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1995). Service of process on some of the partners in a general partnership is sufficient to properly commence a civil action against the partnership that will be binding on the partnership assets and the partners served. CH2M Hill, Inc. v. Black & Veatch, 206 Wis. 2d 370, 557 N.W.2d 829 (Ct. App. 1996), 95-2619. The existence of a parent-subsidiary corporate relationship does not automatically establish the subsidiary as an agent of the parent for purposes of receiving process. Prom v. Sumitomo Rubber Industries, Ltd. 224 Wis. 2d 743, 592 N.W.2d 657 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-0938. A corporation whose offices were located on the 23rd floor of an office building was not properly served under sub. (5) (a) when the papers were left with a security guard in the building lobby who stated that he was authorized to accept service. Bar Code Resources v. Ameritech, Inc. 229 Wis. 2d 287, 599 N.W.2d 872 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-1314. Service on a limited partnership is governed by sub. (6), not ch. 179. Sub. (6) requires service upon all the general partners known to the plaintiff. When the only person served was a maintenance man, service was insufficient. Carmain v. Affiliated Capital Corporation, 2002 WI App 271, 258 Wis. 2d 378, 654 N.W.2d 265, 01-3077. Neither s. 801.02(1) nor s. 801.11 allows a defendant who is being sued in a dual capacity, personally and officially, to be served in only one of those capacities. When an officer of a company received service on behalf of the company, receiving one copy of a summons and complaint, but was not served as an individual, although named individually, there was no jurisdiction over the officer as an individual. Useni v. Boudron, 2003 WI App 98, 264 Wis. 2d 783, 662 N.W.2d 672, 02-1475. Personal jurisdiction over a body politic may be obtained by service of the summons and complaint on an officer, director, or managing agent, or substitute service on a "person who is apparently in charge of the office." Service on a nonparty, even when it occurs erroneously in reliance on the mistaken direction of a person in the office of the defendant, does not constitute service on the defendant. Hagen v. City of Milwaukee Employee's Retirement System Annuity and Pension Board, 2003 WI 56, 262 Wis. 2d 113, 663 N.W.2d 268, 01-3198. Sub. (1) (d) permits substituted service on a natural person's agent who has actual express authority to accept service of summons for the principal. Apparent authority does not satisfy the requirement that the agent be "authorized by appointment" to accept service of summons. Mared Industries, Inc. v. Mansfield, 2005 WI 5, 277 Wis. 2d 350, 690 N.W.2d 835, 03-0097. "Managing agent" as it appears in sub. (5) relates to an agent having general supervision of the affairs of the corporation. "Superintendent" and "managing agent" have corresponding meanings in the statute. Both terms relate to a person possessing and exercising the right of general control, authority, judgment, and discretion over the business or affairs of the corporation, either everywhere or in a particular branch or district. Richards v. First Union Securities, Inc. 2006 WI 55, 290 Wis. 2d 620, 714 N.W.2d 913, 04-1877. The guiding principle in reasonable diligence cases is that, when pursuing any leads or information reasonably calculated to make personal service possible, the plaintiff must not stop short of pursuing a viable lead or, in other words, stop short of the place where if the diligence were continued it might reasonably be expected to uncover an address of the person on whom service is sought. Loppnow v. Bielik, 2010 WI App 66, 324 Wis. 2d 803, 783 N.W.2d 450, 09-0747. Chapter 801 explicitly applies to a certiorari action initiated by the filing of a summons and complaint. Special circumstances cannot establish personal jurisdiction in a certiorari action when the defendant has not been served in accordance with this section. Bergstrom v. Polk County, 2011 WI App 20, 331 Wis. 2d 678, 795 N.W.2d 482, 09-2572. Publication of the summons and complaint in this case failed to meet the requirements of sub. (1) (c), requiring vacation of a default judgment. While the plaintiff asserted that the newspaper used was the predominant newspaper to publish legal notices in the Milwaukee Metropolitan area, it failed to provide any evidence to that effect. The undisputed record as it stood at the time of the default judgment failed to establish that publication in a newspaper "printed and published daily in the City of Milwaukee, in said county" would have been likely to provide notice to a resident of Menomonee Falls in Waukesha county. PHH Mortgage Corporation v. Scott P. Mattfeld, 2011 WI App 62, 333 Wis. 2d 129, 799 N.W.2d 455, 10-0612. Service by publication and mailing under sub. (1) (c) requires both publication and mailing to the defendant's "known" address. An error in the address used during the "mailing" component of service by publication and mailing was a "fundamental" defect depriving the court of jurisdiction. Strict compliance with the procedures for alternative forms of service is no less important than strict compliance with the requirements for personal service. O'Donnell v. Kaye, 2015 WI App 7, 359 Wis. 2d 511, 859 N.W.2d 441, 13-2615. Admission of service by an assistant attorney general or a clerk specifically designated for that purpose by the attorney general will constitute service of process within the meaning of sub. (3). 63 Atty. Gen. 467. To satisfy the "reasonable diligence" standard under sub. (1), Wisconsin requires a plaintiff who knows or readily can learn that a defendant has multiple addresses to attempt to serve the defendant at each address. Cunningham v. Montes, 883 F.3d 688 (2018). Service on a nonresident defendant's father at the father's residence was insufficient for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident, despite claimed actual notice, when no attempt was made to comply with s. 345.09. Chilcote v. Shertzer, (1974).