For those cases that a litigant can pursue in a federal court, under Section 3, a litigant can apply for a stay of an action “upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration.” See 9 U.S.C. §3. It is typically in ruling on this stay that a court has an opportunity to carry out its duty to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms. A litigant can appeal a decision denying a stay immediately.

the ability to consolidate different arbitrations. Under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(e), unless otherwise provided in the arbitration agreement, a party to an arbitration agreement may petition the court to consolidate separate arbitration proceedings if:(1) Separate arbitration agreements or proceedings exist between the same parties, or one party is a party to a separate arbitration agreement or proceeding with a third party;(2) The disputes arise from the same transactions or series of related transactions; and(3) There is a common issue or issues of law or fact creating the possibility of conflicting rulings by more than one arbitrator or panel of arbitrators.Under the FAA, courts may not order consolidation unless the contracts involved provide for it. SeeGeorgia Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Excalibur Reinsurance Corp., 4 F.Supp.3d 1362, 1367-68 (N.D. Ga. 2014).What Happens If There are Both Arbitrable and Non-Arbitrable Claims?The Georgia Supreme Court has applied the FAA’s mandatory stay provision, 9 U.S.C. § 3, to actions brought in a Georgia court. DiMambro–Northend Associates v. Blanck–Alvarez, Inc., 251 Ga. 704, 707, 309 S.E.2d 364, 367 (1983). 9 U.S.C. § 3 provides in applicable part, that:. . . the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement. . . .When faced with an action containing both arbitrable and non-arbitrable issues, both Georgia Courts and federal courts have generally allowed both to continue in bifurcated proceedings. The FAA “requires district courts to compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel, even where the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums.” Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.

On an application to stay an action allegedly referable to arbitration, the court decides only if “the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under [a written arbitration] agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 3. On a petition to compel arbitration, the court decides only whether “[1] the making of the agreement for arbitration or [2] the failure to comply therewith” are in issue.

a case — rather than dismiss it — when presented with an enforceable arbitration agreement. The Court’s review will likely resolve a split among the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal on this issue.In Spizzirri, a group of delivery driver plaintiffs sued their employer in an Arizona state court, alleging numerous violations of state and federal employment laws. After the defendant removed the case to federal court, it sought to compel arbitration and dismiss the lawsuit altogether. The parties ultimately agreed that all claims under the lawsuit were subject to arbitration. Plaintiffs, however, strongly opposed dismissal of their suit and argued that the matter must be stayed according to the plain language of Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Section 3 provides that, if an issue is subject to arbitration, the court “shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement . . . ” 9 U.S.C.A. § 3 (emphasis added). Despite this language, the District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the Plaintiffs’ lawsuit.On appeal, a panel for the Ninth Circuit considered “whether the [FAA] requires a district court to stay a lawsuit pending arbitration, or whether a district court has discretion to dismiss when all claims are subject to arbitration” and affirmed the dismissal. The Ninth Circuit evaluated the split in authority within the Circuit Courts of Appeal. The First, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits follow the minority view and have ruled that the FAA affords district courts the discretion to dismiss, rather than stay, lawsuits pending arbitration. The majority approach, followed by the Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, requires district courts to stay a case when presented with a valid arbitration agreement. The Ninth Circuit ultimately sided with the minority view.The Supreme Court’s decision will impact strategic choices and procedures surrounding ar

The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to decide an issue concerning cases that are subject to arbitration that has divided the federal appeals courts: when the claims at issue in a federal court suit are subject to arbitration, does the court have authority to dismiss the action, or can it only stay the action pending resolution of the arbitration? That is the question presented in Smith v. Spizzirri, an appeal from a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that the Supreme Court agreed to hear by granting the plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of certiorari this month.Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. 3, provides:If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.Six federal circuits—the Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits—have ruled that, under this language, a federal district court may only stay, and not dismiss, an action in which the claims are subject to arbitration. Four circuits, however—the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits—have ruled that district courts have the discretion to dismiss, rather than stay, an action where al

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7503(a). 9 U.S.C. Section 3; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7503(b).

Carolina corporation providing warehousing and logistics services, agreed to provide storage, handling, and management for automotive wheels manufactured and produced by China-based Wanfeng.In the event of a dispute, the Agreement’s voluntary arbitration provision allowed either party to submit disputes to the “America International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission,” which unfortunately was a non-existent entity.When a dispute arose, Wanfeng made a formal demand for arbitration, asserting the parties actually intended to name the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) in the Agreement, rather than the fictitious arbitral institution. Sunland promptly rejected Wanfeng’s demand and litigation commenced, invoking the application of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307, which affirms that a party may enforce an arbitration agreement by obtaining either a stay of litigation in any case that raises a dispute referable to arbitration (9 U.S.C. § 3), or an affirmative order to engage in arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 4.To compel arbitration under § 4 of the FAA, a party must demonstrate (1) a dispute between the parties; (2) an arbitration provision in a written agreement reputedly applicable to the dispute; (3) a relationship between the transaction, as demonstrated by the agreement, with interstate or foreign commerce; and (4) the failure or refusal of the non-moving party to arbitrate.

While the federal circuit courts are split on the question, the better rule seems to be that after granting a defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, FAA §4 (9 U.S.C. §4), the court should stay the judicial proceeding pending the arbitration. The pertinent provision is FAA §3 (9 U.S.C. §3), which provides that: “[u]pon being satisfied that the [claim] involved in [the pending] suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under . . . an agreement [in writing for such arbitration], [the court] shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.” On that basis, the Second Circuit decided in Katz v. Cellco Partnership, dba Verizon Wireless, 2015 WL 4528658 (2d Cir. July 28, 2015), that such a stay was mandatory.

Op. at 5-6 (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4). This directive, as the Court has held previously, requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements containing class action waivers.

[29] See 68 P.L. 40 (The FAA was specifically enacted “[t]o make valid and enforceable written provisions or agreements for arbitration of disputes arising out of contracts […].”); see also, 9 U.S.C §§ 3, 4; Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985) (“By its terms, the [Federal Arbitration] Act leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.”).