immigration petitioners challenging orders of removal exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court is not jurisdictional and, further, does not require those petitioners to exhaust discretionary forms of review.Estrella Santos-Zacaria is a transgender woman who fled to the United States after facing persecution in her native Guatemala. When she was apprehended by immigration authorities, she sought protection from removal because she again faced likely persecution in Guatemala if she had to return there. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed an immigration judge’s reinstatement of the removal order. When Santos-Zacaria filed a petition for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, she argued that the BIA had impermissibly engaged in factfinding that only the immigration judge could perform. The Fifth Circuit sua sponte dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that she had failed to exhaust administrative remedies under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) because she had not sought reconsideration of the BIA’s ruling.Section 1252(d)(1) provides that a “court may review a final order of removal only if … the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.” The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and resolved a circuit split on two issues: (1) whether section 1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional; and (2) whether section 1252(d)(1) requires petitioners to seek discretionary forms of review, such as reconsideration before the Board of Immigration Appeals.First, the Supreme Court held that section 1252(d)(1) is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement, because Congress had not “clearly state[d]” that exhaustion was a jurisdictional rule, and there was no other “unmistakable evidence” that Congress intended it to be so. In particular, the Court noted that nothing in the text of section 1252(d)(1) indicates that Congress intended for it to impose a ju

Respondent then filed a federal habeas petition asserting that he feared persecution based on his political views and Tamil ancestry, that these fears establish a credible fear of persecution which would allow him to make an asylum claim, that immigration officials deprived him of an opportunity to establish his credible-fear claim, and that immigration officials failed to apply the correct standard when assessing his claims. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed his petition, holding that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2) & (e)(2) barred review and that they did not violate the Suspension Clause. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that section 1252(e)(2) violated the Suspension Clause and that Respondent was entitled to procedural due process protections.

hat nothing in a federal law known as the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), designed to deal with a Puerto Rican fiscal crisis brought about by excessive public debt, abrogates the Petitioner Board’s sovereign immunity from legal claims. The Court assumed without deciding that Puerto Rico, a U.S. Territory, enjoys sovereign immunity and the Board partakes of it. Notwithstanding some equivocal language in the statute concerning the fact that suits are to be brought in federal district court, the Supreme Court holds that nothing in PROMESA shows any unmistakably clear congressional intent to abrogate the Board’s sovereign immunity.No,Santos-Zacaria v. Garlandhasn’t anything to do with the affairs of an embattled member of Congress. Instead, it is an immigration case in which a non-citizen sought protection from removal from the United States. The petitioner, having lost her administrative case, filed a petition for review in the Fifth Circuit under 8 U. S. C. §1252, alleging that the Board of Immigration Appeals had impermissibly engaged in factfinding that only an Immigration Judge could perform. The Fifth Circuit dismissed her petition in part, finding that she had not satisfied §1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement. Section 1252(d)(1) provides that “[a] court may review a final order of removal only if . . . the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.” The Fifth Circuit raised the exhaustion issuesua spontebased on its characterization of §1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement as jurisdictional. And the Fifth Circuit concluded that Santos-Zacaria failed to exhaust because she failed to raise her impermissible-factfinding claim to the Board in a motion for reconsideration before filing her petition for judicial review. Justice Jackson, writing for a court unanimously joining or concurring in the judgment, held that Section 1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional essentially because Con

to show that M “would suffer hardship that is substantially different from or beyond that which would ordinarily be expected to result from [his] removal.”In such cases, Immigration Judges have discretionary authority to cancel removals if they first decide that the subject is eligible under the statutory criteria and, if so, whether to exercise that discretion. Here, although hardship relating to a family member is one of the eligibility criteria, the Immigration Judge held that M’s condition did not rise to the level of an exceptional hardship beyond that which ordinarily would be the result of removal.Following affirmance by the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Third Circuit held that it didn’t have jurisdiction to review an Immigration Judge’s discretionary hardship determination. The Supreme Court’s grant posed the alternatives before it:Is the Immigration Judge’s “‘exceptional and extremely unusual’ hardship determination . . . a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under [8 U.S.C.] §1252(a)(2)(D), or [is it] discretionary and therefore unreviewable under §1252(a)(2)(B)(i).”While §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) makes unreviewable any “judgment[s] regarding the granting of [discretionary] relief,”section 1252(a)(2)(D) restores jurisdiction to review “questions of law.” Applying two earlier precedents, Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221 (2020), and Patel v. Garland, 596 U. S. 328(2022), the Court reversed and remanded Wilkinson’s case, holding that the question of his removal presented a mixed question of fact and law that required analysis of whether the application of the statutory removal standard was consistent with the specific set of facts presented.The dissenters contended that the majority had read its precedents too broadly and that the facts in the case at bar so overwhelmed the legal component that the Immigration Judge’s conclusion should have been unreviewable.This jurisdictional difference of opinion resulted in yet another stereotype-defying lineup (as to Trump nominees),

Second, because courts were no longer prohibited from proceeding with review once an alien departed, see Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U. S. 1, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 19–20), Congress repealed the presumption of an automatic stay, and replaced it with the following: “Service of the petition on the officer or employee does not stay the removal of an alien pending the court’s decision on the peti-tion, unless the court orders otherwise.” 8 U. S. C. §1252(b)(3) (2006 ed.).See Nken, slip op. at 4.

A determination that there is not a credible fear of persecution is reviewed by a supervisor, and can also be appealed to an immigration judge. Habeas review of such a determination, however, is unavailable under the statute, 8 U.S.C. §1252(e)(2), which narrowly circumscribes the circumstances in which habeas review is available. Here, Respondent Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam, a Sri Lankan national, was stopped within 25 yards of the U.S. border after crossing without inspection or an entry document.

A determination that there is not a credible fear of persecution is reviewed by a supervisor, and can also be appealed to an immigration judge. Habeas review of such a determination, however, is unavailable under the statute, 8 U.S.C. §1252(e)(2), which narrowly circumscribes the circumstances in which habeas review is available. Here, Respondent Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam, a Sri Lankan national, was stopped within 25 yards of the U.S. border after crossing without inspection or an entry document.

Instead of ruling on the merits, the Seventh Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. According to the Seventh Circuit’s decision, the jurisdiction stripping provision of IIRIRA—codified at 8 USC § 1252(a)(2)(b)(ii)–prohibits federal courts from reviewing the BIA’s decision because, according to regulation, motions to reopen are discretionary. Kucana v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 534 (7th Cir. 2008).

of firearms by persons subject to domestic violence restraining orders, violates the Second Amendment on its face.Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, No. 22-193: This civil rights and employment law case addresses the scope of Title VII protections against an employer's allegeddiscriminatory conduct. The question presented is: Whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination as to all “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” or whether its reach is limited to discriminatory employer conduct that courts determine causes materially significant disadvantages for employees.Wilkinson v. Garland, No. 22-666: This immigration law case concerns the scope of judicial review when non-citizens challenge a deportation order. The question presented is: Whether an agency determination that a given set of established facts does not rise to the statutory standard of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), or whether this determination is a discretionary judgment call unreviewable under Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).Campos-Chaves v. Garland; Garland v. Singh, Nos. 22-674, 22-884: These consolidated immigration law cases address the statutory notice requirements that must be provided to non-citizens prior to an order of removal in abstentia for failure to attend removal proceedings. The question presented is: Whether the government provides notice “required under” and “in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of” 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) when it serves an initial notice document that does not include the “time and place” of proceedings followed by an additional document containing that information, such that an immigration court must enter a removal order in absentia and deny a noncitizen’s request to rescind that order.McElrath v. Georgia,No. 22-721: This criminal procedure case concerns the scope of the U.S. Constitution’s double jeopardy clause. In this case, a jury convicted a defendant on one

s with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), which, among other things, preserves the rights of children with disabilities to bring claims under the Constitution and other federal non-discrimination statutes. If a child brings such a claim and the relief they seek is also available under IDEA, they must exhaust IDEA’s administrative remedies. See 28 U.S.C. Section 1415(l). The questions presented are: (1) Whether courts should excuse exhaustion of the IDEA’s administrative proceedings under Section 1415(l) when such proceedings would be futile, and (2) whether Section 1415(l) requires exhaustion of a non-IDEA claim seeking money damages that are not available under the IDEA.Santos-Sacaria v. Garland, No. 21-1436: In this case, the petitioner, a non-citizen, appealed an adverse decision from the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “Board”), arguing the Board engaged in impermissible factfinding. The Court of Appeals affirmed, determining that she had not exhausted her claim as required by 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(d)(1) because she failed to bring a motion to reconsider to the Board. The question presented is: Whether the court of appeals correctly determined that 8 U.S.C. 1252(d)(1) prevented the court from reviewing petitioner’s claim that the Board engaged in impermissible factfinding because petitioner had not exhausted that claim through a motion to reconsider.