Respondents asked to be released on bond. The United States had argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1231 governs. Under Section 1231, noncitizens already ordered removed must be held for 90 days to carry out deportation.

A noncitizen who has been paroled is not considered to be in the country “illegally or unlawfully.”If a noncitizen is determined to be inadmissible and a removal order is entered, the government must detain the individual during the “removal period,” the ninety-day period that, in this case, would begin the date the order of removal became final. If, at the end of that period, the person still has not been removed, he or she may be released subject to supervision. 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(3) and (6). Contrary to a noncitizen who has been paroled, an individual who has been ordered removed but who has been granted supervised release is not lawfully present in the United States – whether detained or at liberty pending the execution of the removal order, the person’s immigration status is unchanged and is considered unlawful.

The Government instead maintained that the respondents were not entitled to bond hearings. Whether the respondents are entitled to a bond hearing depends upon whether 8 U.S.C. §1226 or 8 U.S.C. §1231 applies. Section 1226 applies “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States,” and allows for a bond hearing before an immigration judge.

He sought relief from removal proceedings on the ground that his life or freedom would be threatened in Mexico. The IJ held that he was ineligible for relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), excluding from relief noncitizens who have “been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime.” The IJ weighed Alcaraz-Enriquez’s own testimony against conflicting evidence in a probation report to find that a California conviction for domestic violence was a “particularly serious crime.”

However, US immigration law provides no maximum. The closest the law has come is the setting of a presumptively reasonable period of six months in relation to detainees who had received a final removal order and were detained on the basis of 8 U.S.C. § 1231, INA § 241. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).

(unpub'd) - A plea-agreement waiver of the right to collaterally attack the judgment includes a waiver of a claim that counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to file a motion to suppress before deciding to advise accepting the plea agreement. KC v. Holder, 2011 WL 4925859 (10/18/11) (unpub'd) - The BIA abused its discretion when it found the Maoists in Nepal extorted her for financial gain, rather than for political reasons, despite the Immigration Judge crediting her explanation that the Maoists extorted her because she belonged to the Congress Party. Cordova-Soto v. Holder, 2011 WL 4908351 (10/17/11) (unpub'd) - The alien's prior order of removal may be reinstated under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), which allows such a procedure where an alien has "reeentered the U.S. illegally" after being removed, even though the alien reentered in a procedurally regular way. The alien was stopped at the border and was asked for her ID. She pretended to look for it and the inspector dealt with the other car passengers and then waved the car through.

The government contends that Rule 60(b)(1) applies any time a party alleges that a judge has made an “obvious” legal error, such as the “failure to apply unambiguous law to record facts.” The Court notes that it was correct to apply Rule 60(b)(1), but rejected Kemp’s claim that it applies only to factual errors made by someone other than the judge, a view that would have allowed him to avoid the timeliness barrier under Rule 60(b)(6), and thus the one-year limit.Garland v. Gonzalezis the consolidated matter in which the respondents who are Mexican and Salvadoran natives detained under 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) argued that they are entitled to bond hearings after six months’ detention. They had been instructed by the Court to answer the jurisdictional question of whether the district courts have jurisdiction to entertain respondents’ requests for class-wide injunctive relief under the INA. Answering the question in the negative, the Court, per Justice Alito, has held that Section 1252(f)(1) of the INA deprived the district courts of jurisdiction to entertain respondents’ requests for class-wide injunctive relief.

Today, in a per curiam opinion, the Court vacated and remanded, holding that Andrus’s defense counsel failed to perform any investigation into mitigating evidence and remanding for the trial court to analyze whether this failure caused prejudice. Justice Alito filed a dissent joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch.The Court's decision is available here.Today, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in two cases:Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc., No. 19-963: Whether a provision in an arbitration agreement that exempts certain claims from arbitration negates an otherwise clear and unmistakable delegation of questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator.Albence v. Chavez, No. 19-897: Whether the detention of an alien who is subject to a reinstated removal order and who is pursuing withholding or deferral of removal is governed by 8 U.S.C. §1231, or instead by 8 U.S.C. §1226.

This article is intended to serve as a guideline of potential remedies for undocumented who reentered the United States with a prior removal. It is always best to have your Plan B or Plan C considered in case “disaster” strikes and the federal government initiates an order to reinstate removal.Summary of Reinstatement of Removal Reinstatement of Removal is a removal procedure (INA§ 241(a)(5); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), 8 C.F.R. § 241.8.)

Rather than join Justices Rehnquist and Thomas in dissent, Scalia wrote a straightforward opinion holding that the due process holding of Zadvydas must be extended to detained Mariel Cuban men who could not be deported. As Scalia explained, there was no principled way to parse the post-removal order statute, INA § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1231, to protect against indefinite detention for noncitizens found deportable, like the Zadvydas petitioners, but not those who had been found inadmissible and paroled into the country, as had the Clark petitioners.If it seems strange that Scalia’s votes were largely far more helpful to immigrants convicted of crimes than those whose are undocumented but lack criminal records – it is only strange to an observer trying to fit an entirely political frame on a justice who had many motivating principles, with his political inclinations being only one. More broadly, Scalia’s voting record is a reminder that good lawyers can win cases presenting criminal immigration issues even when our clients are not the most politically popular – such cases can and have been won in front of “conservative” justices by presenting the best possible arguments about proper statutory construction and the most efficient and rigorous way for appellate courts to consider the immigration agencies’ actions. Whoever rep