The Law Offices of Grinberg & Segal, PLLC focuses vast segment of its practice on immigration law. This steadfast dedication has resulted in thousands of immigrants throughout the United States.Reference:Eligibility for Cancelation-B:8 INA ยง 240A(b)(1)(B), 8 USC ยง 1229b(b)(1)(B).9 INA ยง 240A(b)(1)(C), 8 USC ยง 1229b(b)(1)(C).10 INA ยง 240A(b)(1)(D), 8 USC ยง 1229b(b)(1)(D).Suspension Eligibility under former law.INA ยง 244(a)(1), 8 USC ยง 1254(a)(1) and INA ยง 240A(b)(1)(D), 8 USC ยง 1229b(b)(1)(D).
Holder v. Carlos Martinez Gutierrez, USSC No. 10-1542, 5/21/12, reversing 411 Fed. Appx. 121 and 399 Fed. Appx. 313The Attorney General has discretion under 8 U.S.C. ยง1229b(a) to allow otherwise-removable aliens to remain in the U.S., if the alien satisfies three criteria: minimum of five years as a lawful permanent resident; continuous residence in the U.S. for at least seven years after lawful admission, as an LPR or otherwise; no conviction for an aggravated felony. The question here is whether the years of a parentโs continuous residence, or LPR status, may be imputed to a child who would otherwise not meet the criteria.
Decided: April 14, 2015The Fourth Circuit held that 8 U.S.C. ยง 1229b(b)(1)(C) applies to both legal aliens and illegal aliens, and renders both ineligible for cancellation of removal from the United States when they have committed a crime of moral turpitude which falls under 8 U.S.C. ยงยง 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or ยง 1227 (a)(3), even if the crime committed would otherwise fall under a petit-offense exception within those statutes. The Fourth Circuit thus upheld the Board of Immigration Appealsโs (โBIAโ) denial of Marina Hernandezโs application for cancellation of removal from the United States.
True, but Guerreroโs claim was not that the marijuana possession conviction makes him deportable; rather, his claim is that it makes him ineligible for cancellation of removal. In a footnote, the court makes light of this point and belies its poor understanding of immigration law enforcement and removal proceedings. Footnote 55 states, in its entirety: Appellee argues that, because of the 1998 marijuana case, he is now not even eligible to be considered for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. ยง 1229b. But, what matters is the state of the law and the state of appelleeโs knowledge at the time he entered his plea, not events that have occurred since then.
On April 29, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Niz-Chavez v. Garland, holding that, to constitute a notice to appear sufficient to stop a nonpermanent resident alienโs continuous presence in the country under 8 U.S.C. ยง 1229b, the notice must be a single document containing all information about an individualโs removal hearing specified in 8 U.S.C. ยง 1229(a)(1).Under U.S. immigration law, nonpermanent resident aliens who are ordered removed from the U.S. may be eligible for discretionary relief from removal if (among other requirements) they can establish their continuous presence in the U.S. for at least 10 years. But under the so called โstop-time ruleโ in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (โIIRIRAโ), an alienโs continuous presence in the country is deemed to end โwhen the alien is served with a notice to appearโ in a removal proceeding. 8 U.S.C. ยง 1229b(d)(1).
The Court's decision is available here.Pereira v. Sessions, No. 17-459: Under federal law, the Attorney General has discretion to โcancel removalโ of certain non-permanent residents, including for noncitizens who have โbeen physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of [an] applicationโ for cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C. ยง1229b(b)(1)(A). The โstop-time ruleโ ends the period of continuous presence โwhen the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a) of this title.โ
Santos-Reyes v. United States, 660 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2011). Under 8 U.S.C. ยง1229b(a), an alien who could otherwise be deported from the United States can have the deportation cancelled if the alien โhas resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status.โ That provision, however, is qualified by the โstop-time rule,โ which states that โany period of continuous residence or continuous physical presence in the United States shall be deemed to end when the alien has committed an offense [listed elsewhere in the statute].โ
Carachuri-Rosendo, No. 09-60, slip op. at 10.DHS initiated removal proceedings in 2006 based on his Xanax conviction. Carachuri-Rosendo conceded removability and applied for Cancellation of Removal for LPRs under INA ยง 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. ยง 1229b(a). Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, No. 09-60, slip op. at 6.
Fikre from the No Fly List, nor the governmentโs declaration that Fikre would not be placed back on the list โbased on the currently available informationโ was sufficient to demonstrate mootness. Today, in a 9-0 opinion authored by Justice Gorsuch, the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit and held that the governmentโs actions and declaration fall short of the โformidable burdenโ to demonstrate it โcannot reasonably be expected to do again in the future what it is alleged to have done in the past.โ Justice Alito (joined by Justice Kavanaugh) issued a short concurrence clarifying that the disclosure of classified information is not required to show mootness.View the Court's decision.Wilkinson v. Garland, No. 22-666: This case concerns the reviewability of an Immigration Judgeโs (โIJโ) determination for whether a non-permanent residentโs removal โwould result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardshipโ to an immediate family member who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident under 8 U.S.C. ยง 1229b(b)(1)(D). Situ Kamu Wilkinson applied for cancellation of his removal, arguing it would result in โexceptional and extremely unusual hardshipโ to his son, a U.S. citizen who suffers from a serious medical condition and relies on him for emotional and financial support. An IJ held that Wilkinson did not satisfy the โexceptional and extremely unusual hardshipโ standard, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Third Circuit dismissed Wilkinsonโs petition for review, holding that because an IJโs hardship determination is โdiscretionary,โ it lacks jurisdiction to review it. Recognizing that the Courts of Appeal are split on this issue, the Court, in a decision authored by Justice Sotomayor, held that the application of the โexceptional and extremely unusual hardshipโ standard to a given set of facts is reviewable as a question of law under 8 U.S.C. ยง 1252(a)(2)(D). The Court reversed the Third Circuitโs decision on jurisdiction, vacated the judgment, and remanded for further proceedings
Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996โs (โIIRIRAโ) โstop-timeโ rule, time towards this 10 year requirement stops accruing โwhen the alien is served a notice to appear.โ 8 U.S.C. ยง1229b(d)(1). The IIRIRA further defines a notice to appear as โwritten notice . . . specifyingโ several things, including the nature of the proceedings against the alien, charges against the alien, the time and place at which the proceedings will be held, and other requirements.