In fact, now that this case has been narrowed down to a mere contract dispute, the testimony of Mexican liability witnesses is unlikely to even be necessary. The contract claim is subject to the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706, which essentially applies a strict liability standard for trucking losses. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co.

Any Claims By Plaintiff for Attorney’s Fees are Preempted The plain language of the Carmack Amendment limits recovery for loss or damage to "actual loss or injury to the property" and excludes any provision for private punitive damages. 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1). Lakeshore, et al. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1892); Cleveland v. Beltman North American Co., 30 F.3d 373 (2nd Cir. 1994); Chandler v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 374 F.2d 129, 137 (4th Cir. 1967); W.A. Stackpole Motor Transport, Inc. v. Malden Spinning and Dying Co., 263 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1968); Missouri Pacific R.R. Company v. H. Rouw Company, 258 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1958); Rockholt v. United Van Lines, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 383, 389 (D.Ida.

This argument, which attempts to conflate the Carrier Agreement’s arbitration clause with its statute of limitations provision, misses the mark. Section C(ii) of the Carrier Agreement (“LOSS & DAMAGE CLAIMS”) provides that “CARRIER’s liability for any cargo damage, loss, or theft from any cause shall be determined under the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706.” Section E (“DISPUTES”) provides that “[i]n the event of a dispute arising out of this Agreement, including but not limited to Federal or State statutory claims, [Cornerstone] shall [have the] sole right to determine Arbitration or Litigation.”

OSL represents and warrants to Customer that all motor carriers selected and engaged by OSL to provide the actual transportation of Customer's property pursuant to this Agreement shall be subject to a separate written agreement between OSL and each motor carrier. OSL further represents and warrants that all agreements with such motor carriers shall contain terms and conditions relating to (a) an obligation to transport commodities in a timely manner as specified on the bill of lading; (b) an express waiver of any and all rights and remedies of the motor carrier against Customer pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §14JOl(b); (c) rates and charges applicable to the transportation and related services to be perfonned appended as a schedule to OSL's contract and not dependent upon any motor carrier tariff; (d) automobile liability, commercial general liability, workers' compensation and cargo liability insurance (at actual value per Section 8); (e) cargo liability based on 49 U.S.C. § 14706; and (f) waiver of any statutory or common law lien, security interest or other encumbrance against the property. 10.

This motion is also supported by ABF Logistics’ memorandum brief filed contemporaneously with the motion. WHEREFORE, ABF Logistics moves the Court to enter summary judgment as follows: (a) that ABF Logistics acted as a broker in the transaction at issue in the Second Amended and Substituted Complaint within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. § 13102(2) and, therefore, the Carmack Amendment is not applicable to ABF Logistics; (b) Alternatively, assuming for purposes of argument that the Court were to find that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether ABF Logistics was acting as a broker with respect to Dresser-Rand’s shipment, that there is no genuine issue of material fact that ABF Logistics has effectively limited its liability to $100,000 pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 14706(c)(1)(A); and (c) Alternatively, assuming for purposes of argument that the Court were to find that the Carmack Amendment applies to ABF Logistics, that the Carmack Amendment preempts the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim as a matter of law. 1 The issue of the limitation of liability as applied to the plaintiffs’ state law breach-of-contract claim is not addressed here because it is not a threshold issue involving the Carmack Amendment.

Point Two: Abouzeidi is strictly liable under the Carmack Amendment Motor carriers engaged in interstate shipping are regulated by the Interstate Commerce Act of 1935. With some limited exceptions which are not relevant to this case, the Carmack Amendment to that Act, (49 USC 14706), states that carriers providing transportation services are strictly liable for the actual loss or injury to the property of the shipper: 49 USC sec. 14706 (a) General Liability.— (1)Motor carriers and freight forwarders.

To the extent any portion of Plaintiff’s claim is not barred as noted above, Plaintiff is not entitled to recover any more than $0.60 per pound of any adequately identified household good that was damaged or lost because Plaintiff and Allied agreed to such a limitation of liability pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §14706(f). Case 5:15-cv-00615-BR Document 37 Filed 03/09/17 Page 1 of 3 In support of this Motion, and pursuant to Local Rule 56.

Skylark is a Canadian motor carrier, which transports cargo on an interstate and international basis, under authority granted by the U.S. Department of Transportation. Skylark was the carrier that transported the devices owned by Plaintiff’s insured from Canada to the U.S. Skylark's liability to the Plaintiff, if any, is governed exclusively by 49 U.S.C. §14706, which comprises part of federal statute commonly known as the Carmack Amendment (hereinafter "Carmack Amendment"). Therefore, Plaintiff’s second and third causes of action against Skylark, based exclusively on state law claims for breach of bailment obligations and negligence/gross negligence, are barred pursuant to the preemptive effect of the Carmack Amendment and should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the F.R.Civ.P.

That carrier … [is] liable to the person entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of lading. The liability imposed under this paragraph is for the actual loss or injury to the property… 49 U.S.C. § 14706 (emphasis added). Within a few years of the Carmack Amendment's passage, the United States Supreme Court addressed its dual goals of uniformity and preemptive scope.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) COMES NOW Guy M. Turner, Inc. (“Turner”), pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and moves the Court for an order dismissing the Crossclaim of Relay Associates, Inc. (“RPS”) against Turner, which is styled as Count VIII of RPS’s Counterclaim, Crossclaim and Third Party Complaint. [DE 17] Case 5:17-cv-00095-BO Document 24 Filed 06/12/17 Page 1 of 3 RPS’s crossclaim against Turner is subject to dismissal on the pleadings because the facts alleged in RPS’s operative pleading, when taken as true, demonstrate that this crossclaim is preempted by the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Commission Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14706. For this reason, as more specifically addressed in the supporting memorandum that is being filed contemporaneously herewith, Turner respectfully requests that Count VIII of RPS’s Counterclaim, Crossclaim and Third Party Complaint be dismissed.