Defendants request the Court deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment because Time Warner Cable – a cable operator under the statute – specifically authorized the receipt and broadcast of the cable programming at issue so there was no violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553. The undisputed evidence also shows there was no interception of cable programming delivered by satellite or radio, thus 47 U.S.C. § 605 does not apply and there was no violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605. The evidence conclusively shows J&J Sports lacks standing to pursue piracy claims because it owns no legal interest in cable programming delivered by Time Warner Cable to Greenville Avenue Pizza.

Brown stated that it was “not necessary to consider” whether call records are “protected information within the meaning of the statute.” 670 F.2d at 1365. Instead, the court held that a disclosure made in response to a request by the police, unaccompanied by a warrant or court order, was authorized by the provision of § 605 permitting disclosures “on demand of other lawful authority.” Id. at 1365-66.

(J. Lonstein Dec. at ¶ 29.) After the determination is made, DirecTV then instructs LLO to enforce its rights under 47 U.S.C. §605 et seq., by serving attorney demand letters, negotiating settlements, or initiating litigation. (Id.) It is patent that there is no nexus between Plaintiff’s conduct and the Lonstein Defendants’ subsequent activity.

at 913 (emphasis added). In the more relevant context of a civil trial against telephone companies for invasion of privacy based on unauthorized interception of call records, multiple federal circuit courts have found 47 U.S.C. § 605 applicable. See Brown v. Continental Telephone Company of Virginia, 670 F.2d 1364, 1365-66 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying Section 605 to privacy suit for disclosure of telephone records, and finding Section 605 authorized release of records pursuant to subpoena issued by court).

In each of those statutes, as explained above, Congress has carefully crafted the scope and limits of liability and has also created good faith defenses to liability. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2520(d), 2707(e); 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(iii); 50 U.S.C. § 1809(b). There is no basis in these statutes for a court to imply qualified immunity on top of the carefully nuanced statutory scheme of liability and good faith defenses that Congress has created, and to do so would violate congressional intent.

Moreover, the Lonstein letters enclosed surveillance photos of the Plaintiff and her customers clearly intended to shock and frighten the recipient, disclosing that she had been secretly stalked, photographed, and videotaped by a stranger. The letters accused her of violating the anti-piracy provision of the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. sec. 605, which carries criminal penalties for knowing violations. One of the letters accuses the Plaintiff, without explanation or supporting facts, that “[i]n order for you to have received the programming on your television, it had to have been affirmative actions intended to purposely defraud DIRECTV, LLC. Said action could only have been accomplished by overt acts done to avoid paying the legal subscription rate for a business viewing account within a commercial establishment.”

”); I.S. Joseph Co. v. J. Lauritzen A/S, 751 F.2d 265, 267 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that groundless threats of litigation cannot constitute extortion under the Hobbs Act); Winsome Shoppe, Inc. v. Cynwyd Inv., No. 91-7013, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16715, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 1992) (same); Peterson v. Phila. Stock Exch., 717 F. Supp. 332, 336 (E.D. Pa. 1989)(“The ordinary resort to legal process does not rise to the level of a “wrongful use” of force or fear.”). Case 3:15-cv-08194-MAS-DEA Document 108 Filed 08/21/18 Page 27 of 35 PageID: 2003 22 Further, the letters cannot be construed as furthering an extortion scheme as they did nothing more than demand $10,000, which is the amount of the damages DirecTV is entitled to under this strict liability statute. 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II); Alvarez, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159133, at *5 n.5. As the Third Circuit instructs, it is not the case that every business dispute can be turned into a RICO case simply by invoking the mail fraud statute. Brokerage Concepts v. U.S. Healthcare, 140 F.3d 494, 529 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[D]efendant’s heavy- handed business tactics . . . cannot be made to fit within the statutory and doctrinal constraints of the mail and wire fraud statutes.”). Plaintiff’s inability to identify any actual fraudulent conduct confirms that NJ RICO has no application to the fact pattern that underlies this case.

V. THE REMAINING CLAIMS MUST BE DISMISSED A. Claim 4, Under 47 U.S.C. § 605, Must Be Dismissed The Fourth Claim, under 47 U.S.C. § 605, must be dismissed to the extent it relates to alleged content interception. As discussed above, § 605 does not apply to the President’ s interception of calls for foreign intelligence purposes.

There is no language in 17 U.S.C. § 1203(c)(3)(B) which limits multiple violations to a single award. To the contrary, 17 U.S.C. § 1203(c)(3)(B) specifically calls for multiple awards for "each violation", just the same as the anti-piracy of satellite transmission statute, 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II). c.

Plaintiff also does not explain why any conducted alleged in that case would be subject to NJ RICO. Case 3:15-cv-08194-MAS-DEA Document 110 Filed 08/21/18 Page 32 of 45 PageID: 2648 28 company in connection with alleged violations of 47 USC § 605 for displaying DIRECTV in their restaurants. (Spina, Dkt. No. 7.)