See Barnes v. Sea Hawaii Rafting, LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 171804, *23 (D. Haw., December 22, 2015) (“The Jones Act provides a cause of action for ‘[a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment.’ 46 U.S.C. § 30104. Likewise, under general maritime law, a seaman injured by a shipowner's failure to provide a seaworthy vessel may sue the shipowner for his harm.”)

See Barnes v. Sea Hawaii Rafting, LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 171804, *23 (D. Haw., December 22, 2015) (“The Jones Act provides a cause of action for ‘[a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment.’ 46 U.S.C. § 30104. Likewise, under general maritime law, a seaman injured by a shipowner's failure to provide a seaworthy vessel may sue the shipowner for his harm.”)

The Jones Act does not itself describe how an employee may recover from his employer; rather, it incorporates provisions of the Federal Employer Liability Act (“FELA”) in prescribing a right to recovery. See 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (“Laws of the United States regulating recovery for personal injury to, or death of, a railway employee apply to an action under this section”). FELA, in turn, provides injured employees with a cause of action for negligence.

The Jones Act does not itself describe how an employee may recover from his employer; rather, it incorporates provisions of the Federal Employer Liability Act (“FELA”) in prescribing a right to recovery. See 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (“Laws of the United States regulating recovery for personal injury to, or death of, a railway employee apply to an action under this section”). FELA, in turn, provides injured employees with a cause of action for negligence.

PageID #: 148 5 D. The Factual Basis for Plaintiff’s Jones Act Negligence and Unseaworthiness Causes of Action Against KOMH. The only facts identified by Plaintiff upon which she bases her contentions that KOMH was negligent under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. §30104, or that the vessel NOHO-LOA was unseaworthy in connection with her alleged September 7, 2013 accident are that “the hose I tried to carry and stow away got caught on a hanging chain which should not have been there hanging down.” See SCSMF, Paragraph 30. III.

Requirement of an “Injury” under the Jones Act, Maritime Law, and FELA Under the Jones Act, a “seaman injured in the course of employment . . . may elect to bring a civil action . . . against the employer.” 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006). Further, laws “regulating recovery for personal injury to . . . a railway employee apply to an action under this section.”

Plaintiff’s Jones Act Negligence Claims against Coastal Must Be Dismissed The Jones Act allows “[a] seaman injured in the course of employment” to sue his employer for personal injuries suffered as a result of the employer's negligence. 46 U.S.C. § 30104; see Park v. Stockstill Boat Rentals, Inc., 492 F.3d 600, 602–03 (5th Cir.2007). To state a cause of action for negligence under the General Maritime Law, a “plaintiff must demonstrate that there was a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, breach of that duty, injury sustained by plaintiff, and a causal connection between defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury.”

She is only attempting to establish status, i.e., whether, at all times relevant, her late husband was in the course and scope of his employment aboard D/S Titanium Explorer. 39 See 46 U.S.C. § 30104. 40 See 45 U.S.C. § 51.

OPENING BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF EMPLOYER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: Plaintiff, Matthew Weaver, filed a claim against Mover, Signal Mountain Cement Co. (“Signal”), his employer, under the Jones Act (46 USC 30104, formerly 46 USC 688) seeking recovery of money damages due to injuries he obtained when he fell on the deck of an empty hopper barge as he was handling lines to move the barge into position under a loading spout. The barge he was aboard was moored at a marine terminal on the Tennessee River in Marion County, Tennessee.

III. APPLICABLE LAW The issues in this case are governed by the general maritime law (the “GML”). The parties do not dispute that Michealin Sylve qualifies as a “seaman” for purposes of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, or that his alleged injury occurred aboard a vessel, the STINGRAY, in the course of his employment for Subsea 7. Sylve’s claims against BP are governed by the GML.18 IV.