3. The Complaint States An FHA Claim Based on Intentional Targeting Or Disparate Treatment That intentional discrimination claims may be brought under the FHA by any “aggrieved person,” such as Plaintiff here is indisputable. 42 U.S.C. §3613; Whitley v. Taylor Bean & Whitacker Mortgage Corp., 607 F. Supp. 2d 885, 901 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (Castillo, R.); Martinez v. Freedom Mortgage Team, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 827, 834-35 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (Shadur, J). “Disparate treatment involves a showing of intentional discrimination, provable via either direct or circumstantial evidence.”

The FHA indisputably permits “aggrieved persons” to bring private civil actions on the basis of intentional discrimination in residential real estate related transactions in violation of 42 U.S.C. §3605. 42 U.S.C. §3613; see e.g., Whitley v. Taylor Bean & Whitacker Mortgage Corp., 607 F. Supp. 2d 885, 901 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (Castillo, R.); Martinez v. Freedom Mortgage Team, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 827, 834-35 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (Shadur, J.). 2.

An “aggrieved person,” like Cook County, indisputably may bring an intentional discrimination claim under the FHA. 42 U.S.C. §3613; Whitley v. Taylor Bean & Whitacker Mortgage Corp., 607 F. Supp. 2d 885, 901 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Martinez v. Freedom Mortgage Team, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 827, 834-35 (N.D. Ill. 2007). “Disparate treatment involves a 36 See Adkins v. Morgan Stanley, No. 12 CV 7667 (HB), 2013 WL 3835198 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2013) (“[A] plaintiff need not allege that the defendant’s actions were the very last step in the chain of causation to demonstrate that the defendant’s actions caused the claimed injury”; a lapse of time between the outset of a continuing FHA violation and a plaintiff’s injuries does not mean those injuries are too remote to support standing).

The same is true here. Like the plaintiff in Marinoff, MacKenzie claims that HUD’s investigation was improper and he requests court relief that would essentially require HUD to re-do its investigation of the City of Dallas’s alleged discrimination. But MacKenzie can simply sue the city directly if he believes it engaged in unlawful discrimination.4 See 42 U.S.C. § 3613. Therefore, no claim lies against HUD under the APA.

Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 381 (1992). A court may order injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) of the FHA. Enjoining Knickerbocker from failing or refusing to allow A.G. Spanos to bring the alleged violations into compliance with the FHA is improper.

This alleged irreparable harm is theoretical at best as changes and retrofits to buildings can always take place at any time even if a building is sold. The ERC mistakenly relies on 42 U.S.C. § 3613(d) for support. Section 3613(d) provides: "Relief granted under this section shall not affect any contract, sale, encumbrance, or lease consummated before the granting of such relief and involving a bona fide purchaser, encumbrancer, or tenant, without actual notice of the filing of a complaint with the Secretary or civil action under this subchapter."

12. The ERC is an "aggrieved person" within the definition of 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i) and Va. Code Ann. § 36-96.1:1, and as used in 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(l)(A) and Va. Code Ann. § 36- 96.18.

Consequently, it is undisputed that the City has not been “aggrieved” by anything that happened within the statutory limitations period— and it therefore cannot recover under the FHA. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A). IV.

As clarified in a pair of recent Supreme Court decisions, a plaintiff may not sue under a federal statute unless the interests that it is seeking to protect are within the “zone of interest” that Congress meant to protect in enacting the statute.23 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1388-89 (2014). The FHA allows claims by “aggrieved persons,” (42 U.S.C. § 3613), and in considering that phrase this court should conclude that a county seeking to recover lost tax revenue and out-of-pocket expenses for governmental functions is not within the FHA’s “zone of interest.” In Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 869-70 (2011), the Supreme Court interpreted Tile VII, which also gives the right to sue only to aggrieved persons.

The statutory language is clear that an “aggrieved person” may state a clim under the FHA: An aggrieved person may commence a civil action … not later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice … to obtain appropriate relief with respect to such discriminatory housing practice …. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). An “aggrieved person” includes “any person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice.”