r a more intrusive one.The 2020 Rule changed this analysis by adding new pleading and proof requirements, as well as new defenses, all fashioned upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Inclusive Communities. However, in Mass. Fair Housing Ctr. v. HUD, 496 F. Supp. 3d 600 (D. Mass. 2020), the court stayed the 2020 Rule prior to implementation on the basis that development of the rule did not meet the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. As such, the 2013 Rule remained in effect, and following the 2020 election (which ushered in a new presidential administration), the 2020 Rule was never implemented.Regarding the discriminatory effects doctrine and disparate impact, under the 2013 Rule, a legally sufficient justification:[E]xists where the challenged practice: (i) Is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent, with respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 3612, or defendant, with respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 3613 or 3614; and (ii) Those interests could not be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.(24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(1) (2014))Moreover,[a] legally sufficient justification must be supported by evidence and may not be hypothetical or speculative. The burdens of proof for establishing each of the two elements of a legally sufficient justification are set forth in paragraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3) of this section.(24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(2) (2014))As for which party shoulders the burden of proof in discriminatory effects cases, the 2013 Rule provides:(1) The charging party, with respect to a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 3612, or the plaintiff, with respect to a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 3613 or 3614, has the burden of proving that a challenged practice caused or predictably will cause a discriminatory effect.(2) Once the charging party or plaintiff satisfies the burden of proof set forth in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, the respondent or defendant has the burd

Key Precedent42 U.S.C. §3604(b) (It is unlawful to discriminate against any person in the sale or rental of a dwelling because of familial status.)42 U.S.C. 3613(c) (In a housing discrimination case, the plaintiff is limited to (1) actual and punitive damages if the court finds that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred; (2) injunctive relief enjoining the defendant from continuing to engage in discriminatory practices; and (3) attorney fees to the prevailing party.)Allstate Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 2010-Ohio-6312 (The doctrine of inferred intent applies only in cases in which the insured’s intentional act and the harm caused are intrinsically tied so that the act has necessarily resulted in the harm)Preferred Risk Ins. Co. v. Gill, 30 Ohio St.3d 108 (1987) (An insurer is under no duty to defend or indemnify the insured for a claim that is “inextricably entwined in time and purpose” with an intentional act, even when such a claim is purportedly within the coverage of the insured.)

The Fair Housing Act authorizes suit by an “aggrieved person[,]” which is defined to include “any person who . . . claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 3613(a)(1)(A), 3613(c)(1), 3602(i). The Supreme Court held that even if the Fair Housing Act did not provide standing “as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution[,]” Miami was entitled to standing because the financial impacts of discrimination on city budgets was within the “zone of interests” protected by the Fair Housing Act.The other matter on appeal was whether there was a “sufficiently close connection” between the defendants’ alleged misconduct and the reduced tax revenue and increased expenses claimed by Miami (or, put another way, whether the misconduct was the proximate cause of the injuries).

The Fair Housing Act authorizes suit by an “aggrieved person[,]” which is defined to include “any person who . . . claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 3613(a)(1)(A), 3613(c)(1), 3602(i). The Supreme Court held that even if the Fair Housing Act did not provide standing “as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution[,]” Miami was entitled to standing because the financial impacts of discrimination on city budgets was within the “zone of interests” protected by the Fair Housing Act.

Key Precedent42 U.S.C. §3604(b) (It is unlawful to discriminate against any person in the sale or rental of a dwelling because of familial status.)42 U.S.C. §3613(c) (In a housing discrimination case, the plaintiff is limited to (1) actual and punitive damages if the court finds that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred; (2) injunctive relief enjoining the defendant from continuing to engage in discriminatory practices; and (3) attorney fees to the prevailing party.)Allstate Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 2010-Ohio-6312 (The doctrine of inferred intent applies only in cases in which the insured’s intentional act and the harm caused are intrinsically tied so that the act has necessarily resulted in the harm.

The remedies provided for successfully bringing suit pursuant to the FHA include actual and punitive damages, injunctive relief, and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 3613. There is a two-year statute of limitations on bringing such claims.