This limitation on RLUIPA was recognized by the First Circuit, which stated, “[w]hereas RFRA had ap plied to all actions by ‘Government,’ RLUIPA is substantially na rrower in scope, and [it] ... applies only to ‘a program or a ctivity [in an institution] that receives Federal financial assist ance.’” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(1); Spratt v. Rhode Island Dep t. Of Corrections , 482 F.3d 33, 37 (1st Cir. 2007) (alteration added ) (alteration in original). RLUIPA applies to public entities that receive fede ral funds, not individuals who do not receive such bene fits.

8. RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a); Trial Ex. 2, p. 5.

Second, RLUIPA requires that where a policy or practice substantially burdens a religious practice of an incarcerated person, the policy must be the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2). However, Congress, in enacting RLUIPA, anticipated that Courts would give “due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline, Case 1:05-cv-09680-RPP-LMS Document 55 Filed 10/09/07 Page 6 of 19 7 consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources.”

Similarly, in McKnight v. MTC, 2015 WL 7730995 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2015), a prisoner filed a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1, et seq.,2 alleging that his religious freedom rights had been violated by the placement of a homosexual cellmate in his cell. In the absence of any claim that the plaintiff’s religious exercise had been changed, the court held that the claim was without merit: Here, Plaintiff has pled no facts tending to show that Defendants' refusal to accommodate his housing request “put a substantial pressure on him to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.”

Rather, we reject Plaintiffs’ argument and conclude that Real Alternatives’ objection to 15 RLUIPA provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution” unless the burden “is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and “is the least restrictive means” of furthering that interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). 41 Case 1:15-cv-00105-JEJ Document 37 Filed 12/10/15 Page 41 of 76 contraceptive care does not similarly situate it to religious employers with religious objections to the Contraceptive Mandate.

II. Response to the Motion to Dismiss Claims Against Gregg County and the Official Capacity Claims Under 42 U.S.C. §2000cc-1 Opposing Counsel cites Sossamon v. Texas to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the Gregg County Officials, where the Supreme Court held that states cannot be sued for monetary damages under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) for sovereign immunity reasons. 2 Granted Sossamon applies to monetary claims against states; here, the Plaintiff has alleged RLUIPA violations against a municipality, Gregg County, and its officials, Gregg County Officials.

Once Defendants point to a compelling state interest, the final part of the RLUIPA analysis is whether the challenged regulation is the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling government interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(2). “The phrase ‘least restrictive means’ has its plain meaning.”

ARGUMENTS Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment and injunctive relief because there is no genuine issue of material fact that TDCJ failed to use the least restrictive means to impose a substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ exercise of their religion under RLUIPA and TRFRA, the disruption of Plaintiffs’ religious service failed to further a legitimate governmental interest without unduly burdening the Plaintiffs’ free exercise rights under the First Amendment, and the disruption of Plaintiffs’ religious service treated Muslim prisoners differently from prisoners of other religious faiths under the Fourteenth Amendment. A. RLUIPA RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a), provides that: “No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution. . . even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person — (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interests; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” Whether Plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief under RLUIPA depends on whether they satisfy RLUIPA’s strictures.

RLUIPA provides in relevant part that No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person ‒ (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a). Despite this heightened protection, RLUIPA does not "elevate accommodation of religious observances over an institution's need to maintain order and safety."

Moreover, the Greig decision supports defendants’ claim that plaintiff cannot commence a RLUIPA action against the individual defendants after he ceased to be “confined” in HCC. RLUIPA provides that, “[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 2 of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (42 U.S.C. 1997)…” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (underscore added). RLUIPA directly incorporates the definition of “person” at issue in the Greig case.