. The Second Amended Complaint is a civil rights action which alleges twenty causes of action claiming violation of Constitutional rights pursuant to Title VII, the ADA, the New York State Human Rights Law, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. §§1983, 1985 and 1986, alleging gender discrimination, hostile work environment sexual harassment, disability discrimination, retaliation, and conspiracy claims. (Dkt. 37). Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint alleges four causes of action against the Defendant New York State Police which are not the subject of this motion.

4 (2001) ............................................................................................ 30 Tabb v. District of Columbia, 477 F. Supp. 2d 185 (D.D.C. 2007) ............................................... 37 Thomas v. New World Communications, 681 F. Supp. 55 (D.D.C. 1988) .................................... 40 Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ............................................ 29 Wham v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C. 1948) ............................................................... 36 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) ..................................................................................... 30, 31 Federal Statutes  42 U.S.C. § 1983 ....................................................................................................................... 5, 44 42 U.S.C. § 1985 .................................................................................................................... passim 42 U.S.C. § 1986 .................................................................................................................... passim District Statutes  Case 1:02-cv-02010-EGS Document 1010 Filed 01/05/15 Page 86 of 159 v D.C. Official Code § 1-102 (June 2014 Supp.) ............................................................................. 36 D.C. Official Code § 5-101.01 (June 2014 Cum.

B. The Conspiracy Claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 The law is well-settled that a complaint that fails to state a valid conspiracy claim under § 1985 also fails under § 1986, the second conspiracy claim in the Chang plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint. Bush v. Butler, 521 F. Supp. 2d 63, 70 (D.D.C. 2007) (plaintiff cannot state claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 unless he can state valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985); Richards v. Duke University, 480 F. Supp. 2d 222, 240-41 (D.D.C. 2007) (same). As discussed above, the § 1985 conspiracy claim fails because the Chang plaintiffs, suing as students journalists, are not within a protected class to obtain relief under a § 1985 claim.

This court agrees that, in large part, the claims are time-barred. HN9 42 U.S.C. § 1986 expressly provides a one-year statute of limitations. plaintiff having commenced this suit on March 2, 1988, he can only be heard to complain of failures by defendants to prevent alleged civil rights deprivations occurring after March 2, 1987.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Moreover, it is hornbook law that when bringing a defamation claim, public officials, such as a candidate for office, must plead that any alleged defamatory statements were false.

The State Defendants also argue that certain immunity principles apply to this case and warrant the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims against several of the State Defendants. In addition, the State Defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to state claims under § 1983, § 1985, and § 1986, and under both the United States Constitution and the Tennessee Constitution. Finally, the State Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ supplemental state law claims should be dismissed and that plaintiffs are not entitled to injunctive relief.2 Plaintiffs have responded that none of their claims should be dismissed and that Younger abstention is inapplicable to this case.

vii. 42 U.S.C. § 1986: Neglect to Prevent Conspiracy Next, Plaintiff alleges that all of the Defendants violated § 1986 , in that “they all had5 42 U.S.C. § 1986 provides in pertinent part that:5 Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in the preceding section [42 U.S.C. § 1985], are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented . . . 34 knowledge that the wrongs conspired to be done were about to be committed, had the power to prevent or to aid in preventing the commission of the same and neglected to do so, even though the wrongs which were committed could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable diligence.” (Am. Compl.

In an earlier writing/ pleading/ or answer, Plaintiff’s counsel so advised that same was a typographical error -22- Case 3:17-cv-00040 Document 78 Filed in TXSD on 07/26/18 Page 27 of 29 and that no claim was made in connection therewith. The complaint should have read 42 U.S.C. § 1986, as same was a claim for attorney’s fees. CONCLUSION Defendant terminated Plaintiff for allegedly failing a breath alcohol test.

3. On November 15, 2015, Floyd filed this lawsuit alleging claims of common-law negligence, common-law breach of contract, Title VII sexual harassment, Title VII retaliatory discharge, age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violations of Floyd’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, 42 U.S.C. §1985, 42 U.S.C. §1986, Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for declaratory relief, and respondeat superior/vicarious liability. (DE 1).

See, e.g., Jachetta v. United States, 653 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of FTCA claims arising under federal law); Delta Sav. Bank v. United States, 265 F.3d 1017, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the FTCA does not waive the government's sovereign immunity for claims alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1986); Love v. United States, 60 F.3d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The breach of a duty created by federal law is not, by itself, actionable under the FTCA.”); Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 727 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“[T]he FTCA was not intended to redress breaches of federal statutory duties.”)