Plaintiff, while deemed as raising a § 1983 conspiracy claim against Commonwealth Defendants, merely alleges a vague conspiracy absent any specific agreement between Defendants to violate his constitutional rights. We find that Plaintiff‘s bare conclusory allegations of a § 1983 conspiracy against Commonwealth Defendants are inadequate to state a cognizable conspiracy claim.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim against Lieutenant Montano in his individual capacity should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 2. Allegations against Officers Arroyo and Montijo.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are preempted by the Copyright Act. Consequently, this Honorable MUST DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ claim under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 because they have failed to state a cognizable claim. D. Pendant Jurisdiction Codefendants move the court to defer any surviving supplemental jurisdiction to the state courts that are better suited to apply local state law to the facts of this case.

Fantasy, Inc., 984 F.2d at 1527–28. 1. By Merely Mentioning 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Only Once And Failing to Allege Facts to Support the Claim, the Reference to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is Immaterial to the Action and Should be Stricken Plaintiff’s failure to plead any facts to support a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim and merely mentioning this code section once on the caption page causes the reference to this code section to be immaterial to the FAC.

That authority, instead, rests with the City, which employed Plaintiff. Based upon the face of the Complaint, Plaintiff has not shown that his constitutional rights were violated because of either Hayward, Olson, or Sisson’s actions, much less that their actions–outlined above–violated a clearly established right. WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Ashton Hayward, Eric Olson, and Edward Sisson in their official and individual capacities be dismissed with prejudice. Case 3:16-cv-00421-RV-EMT Document 13

Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207; Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (explaining that “ [b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”).

14th Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 - Dkt. 37, FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION, ¶¶142-51; (2) alleged sexual harassment hostile work environment under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 – id., SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION, ¶¶152-61; (3) alleged retaliation under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 – id., SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION, ¶¶162-171; (4) alleged conspiracy to commit sex discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 – Case 1:15-cv-00444-BKS-DJS Document 57-2 Filed 07/25/16 Page 9 of 30 3 id., EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION, ¶¶172-81; (5) alleged conspiracy to commit sexual harassment hostile work environment under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 – id., NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION, ¶¶182-91; (6) alleged conspiracy to retaliate under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 – id., TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION, ¶¶192-201; (7) alleged conspiracy to commit sex discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1985(3) – id., EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION, ¶¶202-11; (8) alleged conspiracy to commit sexual harassment hostile work environment under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1985(3) – id., TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION, ¶¶212-

Rehabilitation and treatment-oriented programs and services, both in prison and the community, are key stepping stones towards achieving this goal.”).31 Second, Plaintiffs Eason and Gambrell have not challenged the Defendants’ discretionary determinations; rather, these plaintiffs have challenged the Defendants’ ability to make such discretionary determinations using criteria (offense accountability) that is contrary to the parole policies and practices in effect when these plaintiffs committed their crime and that specifically has the effect of increasing their punishment, and as discussed above, see supra Parts III, IV, they properly brought this challenge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Even Defendants’ regulations recognize that the D.C. Parole Board’s policy and practice was to treat D.C. Code offenders’ minimum sentence as the measure of punishment for the offenders’ offenses.

. Here, as the St. Louis County Circuit Court‘s presiding judge had the right to oversee and review the Ferguson Municipal Court, the Ferguson Municipal Judge‘s actions regarding advising Plaintiffs of their Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and potentially appointing counsel are not actions or omissions attributable to Defendant for purposes of municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

2. From Plaintiff’s Second Claim for Relief - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Due Process a. All Claims against All Defendants for failing to state a claim for a Constitutional Due Process violation; alternatively, b. Claims against the University of Oregon because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a cause of action against a state; c. Claims against all Defendants alleged to be acting in their official capacity because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a cause of action against a state. Page 16 – DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 3.