He didn’t file a formal complaint against Ross using the inmate grievance process, but he did alert Ross’s superiors, triggering an extensive internal affairs investigation. Ross moved to dismiss the suit alleging Blake’s failure to file a grievance means he didn’t exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the federal Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit held Blake “reasonably believed that he had sufficiently exhausted his [administrative] remedies” because of the internal affairs investigation, but a dissenting judge concluded that the statute provides no exceptions to the exhaustion requirement; so, no matter how reasonable Blake’s belief, he still had to file a grievance, which serves a different purpose (providing a remedy to the inmate, whatever that might be) than an internal investigation (employee discipline).

Today, the Court reversed, holding that a guilty plea by itself does not bar a federal criminal defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the statute of conviction on direct appeal. The Court's decision is available here.Murphy v. Smith,No. 16-1067: When a prisoner wins a civil rights suit, 42 U.S.C. §1997e(d)(2) requires that “a portion of the [prisoner’s] judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded against the defendant.” Here, petitioner Charles Murphy was awarded a judgment of $307,733.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) mandates that an inmate exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available” before bringing suit to challenge prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The court below adopted an unwritten “special circumstances” exception to that provision, permitting some prisoners to pursue litigation even when they have failed to exhaust available administrative remedies.

See Medina, 71 F.3d at 368-69. (some internal citations omitted)Prisoner's Rights and Prosecutorial MisconductDavis v. KellySecond Circuit holds that allegations of retaliatory transfer and subsequent dismissal in the district court, without adequate opportunity to identify officials responsible for the challenged transfer orders, was premature.Swan v. BanksNinth Circuit holds 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(e) of the PLRA applies only prospectivelyRecent Cert Grants of Note97-2048 O'SULLIVAN, WILLIAM V. BOERCKEL, DARRENQuestion: May an individual who is in custody pursuant to a state criminal conviction pursue claims in a federal habeas petition if those claims were not raised on direct appeal in a petition for discretionary review to the state's highest court?98-223 FLORIDA V. WHITE, TYVESSEL TYVORUSQuestion: Do police generally need a court warrant before they can search vehicles under state forfeiture laws that allow seizure of property linked to drug crimes?

On February 21, 2018, the United States Supreme Court decided Murphy v. Smith, No. 16-1067, holding that when a prisoner receives a judgment under certain civil rights statutes, the district court must apply as much of the prisoner’s judgment as necessary, up to 25 percent, to satisfy any award of attorney’s fees. When a prisoner wins a civil rights suit and the district court awards fees to the prisoner’s attorney pursuant to 42 U. S. C. §1997e(d)(2), “a portion of the [prisoner’s] judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded against the defendant. If the award of attorney’s fees is not greater than 150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant.”

Garrett v. Wexford Health, ___ F.3d ___ (3d Cir. 2019). This appeal was brought by a prisoner who claimed, as Chief Judge Smith summarized it, that “were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and that they retaliated against him.” The District Court dismissed his case, holding that he had not exhausted administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (“PLRA”), and that his operative Complaint, after several prior iterations, violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. That rule requires pleadings to contain a “short and plain statement” of the plaintiff’s claims. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed. Chief Judge Smith offered a lengthy analysis of the PLRA issue and concluded that a supplemental pleading cured an original pleading defect that led to the District Court’s decision regarding failure to exhaust. The opinion discussed in detail the interplay of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, regarding amended and supplemental pleadings, and the doctrine of relation back of such pleadings,Chief Judge Smith then turned to the issue of whether plaintiff had satisfied the Rule 8 requirement of a “short and plain statement” of his claims. The abuse of discretion standard governed the panel’s review of that issue.Rule 8, Chief Judge Smith said, imposes “minimal burdens on the plaintiff at the pleading stage.” A complaint need o

The Court, 5-4, resolved a circuit split and affirmed. The majority held that under 42 USC 1997e(d)(2), district courts are required to act with the purpose of satisfying the awarded attorney fees for the judgment obtain by the prisoner up to the 25% cap, “portion” in 1997e(d)(2) does not allow the use of discretion and the history of 1997e(d)(2) shows it was meant to alter the normal civil rights attorney fee ward regime to require prisoner to bear the attorney fee award up to the 25% of the award cutoff and this approach is consistent with the precedent in normal civil rights attorney fee regime area. Sotomayor, joined by Ginsberg, Breyer and Kagan, dissented arguing that “to satisfy” in 1997e(d)(2) does not require full payment, prisoner civil rights cases almost always have attorney fee awards greater than the value of the judgment obtained, Congress rejected language that would do what the majority holds 1997e(d)(2) does, “portion” dos not have a set value and thus introduces discretion into the shame and red a whole the civil rights litigation statutes cabins the discretion but d

Ross v BlakeRoss sued Blake under 42 USC 1983 alleging excessive force. The district court dismissed pursuant to 42 USC 1997e(a) ruling Ross failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The 4th Circuit reversed holding special circumstances applied here excusing the failure.

In addition, the Prison Litigation Reform Act bars a prisoner in custody from bringing an action for damages "for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custodywithout a prior showing of physical injury." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 417 (2d Cir. 2002). See alsoSearles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 876 (10th Cir. 2001); Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1998).30.

Section 1988(b) of the U.S. Code provides that in a civil rights action, the court may award attorney fees to the prevailing party in its discretion. Cervantes, however, argued that Woods’ award of attorney fees was subject to the provisions in Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d), which arguably could limit the recovery of attorney fees under these circumstances. The PLRA imposes a cap on the amount of attorney fees that a prisoner can recover from defendant prison officials.